throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`AMERICAN VEHICULAR SCIENCES LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`Patent Number: 8,036,788
`Title: VEHICLE DIAGNOSTIC OR PROGNOSTIC MESSAGE
`TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS AND METHODS
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00417
`_________________________________________________________________
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
` ITS MOTION TO AMEND PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.121
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`McAndrews, Held, & Malloy, Ltd.
`500 West Madison St, 34th Floor
`Chicago, IL 60661
`(312) 775-8000
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Patent Owner’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion To Amend
`IPR2013-00417
`I. THE PROPOSED CLAIMS ARE DEFINITE AND ENABLED
`
`
`
`
`
`With respect to indefiniteness, Toyota incorrectly argues that the claims are
`
`indefinite because it can concoct an alternative claim construction. Contrary to
`
`Toyota’s argument, the claims are clear. The claims state that the diagnostic
`
`module generates a diagnostic/prognostic message that identifies a component and
`
`identifies whether the component “should be either repaired or replaced,” i.e.,
`
`indicate that a determination has been made as to whether the component should be
`
`repaired on the one hand as opposed to be replaced on the other hand. This reading
`
`is consistent with the claim language (gives effect to the word “either”), the
`
`specification (Ex. 1001 at e.g., 11:25-32, 13:30-40) and the understanding of a
`
`skilled artisan (Ex. 1025 at 486-87). In any event, as its own lexicographer, AVS
`
`declares that the subject claim language means “an identification representative of
`
`a determination of whether the identified component or subsystem should be
`
`repaired on the one hand as opposed to replaced on the other hand.” See, e.g.,
`
`Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 89 Fed. Appx. 218 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`The claims are also enabled. The specification provides detailed disclosure,
`
`including citation to books, articles, etc., regarding the use of algorithms to
`
`determine whether a component, such as a tire, needs to be either repaired or
`
`replaced. (Ex. 1001 at e.g. 13:28-23:52.) Indeed, the 788 patent’s disclosure is far
`
`greater than the disclosure in any of the cited prior art—which Toyota impliedly
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Patent Owner’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion To Amend
`IPR2013-00417
`
`asserts is enabled. Moreover, AVS’s expert testimony from a different IPR is
`
`inapposite. Mr. Loudon never opined that a specification like the one here was
`
`insufficient. (IPR2013-00416, Ex. 2020 at ¶¶ 6-20.)
`
`II. AVS SATISFIED ITS BURDEN OF PROOF
`Toyota’s arguments that AVS fails to satisfy its burden should be rejected.
`
`Toyota objects to AVS’s evidence of written description support and
`
`priority. But Toyota should have raised its objection to evidence within 5 business
`
`days, to give AVS an opportunity to supplement its evidence. 37 CFR §42.64. In
`
`any event, AVS did comply with the IPR rules’ express language. The rules only
`
`required AVS to set forth “(1) [t]he support in the original disclosure of the patent .
`
`. .” and “(2) [t]he support in an earlier filed disclosure for each claim for which
`
`benefit of the filing date of the earlier filed disclosure is sought.” 37 CFR
`
`§42.121(b)(2). An application has one effective filing date, and the rules do not
`
`refer to any intervening applications. Accordingly, AVS’s motion was in strict
`
`compliance with the rules, identifying support in the 788 patent’s application-as-
`
`filed and the application to which AVS claims an earlier effective filing
`
`date. Toyota now makes a technical argument that AVS was required to identify
`
`support in all applications in the chain. Toyota did not cite any IPR rule support,
`
`identify any gaps, or attack the substance of the support. And Toyota would not
`
`have been prejudiced by AVS simply confirming that support is found in each
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Patent Owner’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion To Amend
`IPR2013-00417
`priority application—nothing substantive would have changed in AVS’s motion.
`
`
`
`To the extent necessary, AVS therefore asks the Board to take official notice
`
`that the five intervening applications in a continuous chain of priority (identified
`
`by the Board in Paper 41) contain the identical or substantially identical support,
`
`something
`
`that
`
`is
`
`readily apparent
`
`from a cursory
`
`reading of
`
`those
`
`applications. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (allowing a request for judicial notice “at
`
`any stage of the proceeding”); 37 CFR § 42.62 (“Judicial notice means official
`
`notice.”). Those applications are publicly available at the USPTO. To the extent it
`
`would be helpful or necessary for official notice, upon the Board’s request, AVS
`
`can file a supplemental official notice submission with citations in the intervening
`
`applications. Toyota’s attempt to elevate technicalities over substance should not
`
`be condoned.
`
`
`
`Second, as Mr. Kennedy explains, Toyota mischaracterizes the prior art:
`
` Baumann: An off-board system plugs into a vehicle at, e.g., a service shop.
`
`(Ex. 2027 at ¶¶ 23-28.) To the extent the system, and not a human, makes a
`
`diagnosis, it is not: (1) on a vehicle; and (2) determining whether a component
`
`needs to be either repaired or replaced. (Id.) Another patent, Peters, confirms
`
`that Baumann is off-board and relies on human analysis. (Ex. 1021 at 1:43-63.)
`
` Peters: A technician enters data into an off-board system. Based on this human
`
`input, the off-board system tries to diagnose faults. (Ex. 2027 at ¶¶ 32-33.)
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Patent Owner’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion To Amend
`IPR2013-00417
`
`
` Riviera: Riviera merely provides a display that states that e.g. a “service check”
`
`is “required”/“recommended.” (Id. at ¶¶ 36-41.) No determination is made
`
`regarding whether a component is in need of either repair or replacement. (Id.)
`
` Ortega: Ortega is largely duplicative of Riviera. (Id. at ¶ 43; Ex. 2028 at 88.)
`
`To the extent it states “Check Bulbs And Replace If Necessary,” a human
`
`determines if replacement is needed. (Ex. 2027 at ¶ 44; Ex. 2028 at 193-97.)
`
` Bryant: Even assuming, the cursory paragraph cited by Toyota is enabling, it
`
`discloses predicting certain “service requirements.” (Ex. 1023 at 100-01.)
`
`There is no disclosure about how this prediction is done. (Id.; Ex. 2027 at ¶
`
`46.) Prediction of “service requirements,” such as tire replacement/rotation, can
`
`be based on predetermined distance traveled, not diagnostics. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47.)
`
` Crane: While Crane may identify a faulty component, as explained below, it
`
`does not distinguish between repair or replacement. (Id. at ¶¶ 61-67.)
`
`III. THE PROPOSED CLAIMS ARE PATENTABLE
`In arguing that the claims are unpatentable, Toyota misreads the prior art.
`
`Crane is not anticipatory for two reasons. First, Crane does not distinguish
`
`between component repair and replacement. (Id.) Rather, Crane uses “repair” and
`
`“replace” interchangeably. (See Ex. 1022 at 12:15-30 (“The display 124 can also
`
`provide the indication to “Replace Belt.” If the belt is properly repaired, the
`
`processor 122...will display …that the repairs are correct....”); 11:8-14.) Moreover,
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Patent Owner’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion To Amend
`IPR2013-00417
`
`Crane’s display of a “Replace Belt” or “Repair Starter Motor” message only
`
`indicates that a certain component may be in need of service. (Ex. 2027 at ¶ 65.)
`
`And, even if Crane indicates that a belt needs replacement or the starter motor
`
`needs repair, there is no disclosure that distinguishes between repair or replace for
`
`each component. (See Ex. 1022 at 5:41-44 (mention only repairs); 11:64-66
`
`(same); 12:7-9 (same); 5:45-47 (mention only replace battery); 14:32-35 (same);
`
`18:22-28 (same); Ex. 2027 at ¶¶ 63-65.) Second, Crane does not disclose all the
`
`original claim limitations (nor did Toyota argue so in its Petition). Crane discloses
`
`a transmitter, but does not disclose what is transmitted. (Ex. 1022 at 8:29-48.)
`
`Because the transmission could be of raw data (not diagnostic messages), this
`
`limitation is also not inherent. (Ex. 2027 at ¶¶ 57-58.)
`
`Toyota’s obviousness arguments are also flawed. Combining Baumann with
`
`Scholl/Ishihara fails because Baumann is an off-board system. (Ex. 2027 at ¶¶ 23-
`
`28.) It is not an on-board system that determines whether a component needs to be
`
`either repaired or replaced. And, neither Scholl nor Ishihara disclose this
`
`limitation. (Opp’n at 11-15; Ex. 1026 at ¶ 96; Ex. 2002 at ¶¶ 72, 74.) Combining
`
`Scholl/Ishihara with the Crane, Baumann, Bryant, Riviera or Ortega also fails.
`
`Scholl/Ishihara admittedly does not disclose the recited on-board system (id.),
`
`which as explained above, is also lacking in the remaining references.
`
`Dated: June 26, 2014 By: /Thomas J. Wimbiscus/ Reg. No. 36,059
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Patent Owner’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion To Amend
`IPR2013-00417
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that Patent Owner’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion to
`
`
`
`Amend Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 in connection with Inter Partes Review
`
`Case IPR2013-00417 and Exhibits 2027 through 2028 was served on this 26th day
`
`of June by electronic mail to the following:
`
`
`A. Antony Pfeffer
`apfeffer@kenyon.com
`Thomas R. Makin
`tmakin@kenyon.com
`Matt Berkowitz
`mberkowitz@kenyon.com
`ptab@kenyon.com
`Kenyon & Kenyon LLP
`One Broadway
`New York, NY 10004
`Tel: 212-425-7200
`
`
`MCANDREWS HELD & MALLOY, LTD.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone: 312-775-8000
`
`
`
`Facsimile: 312-775-8100
`
`
`
`
`/Thomas J. Wimbiscus/
`Thomas J. Wimbiscus
`Registration No. 36,059
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CUSTOMER NUMBER: 23446
`
`Date: June 26, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket