UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`AMERICAN VEHICULAR SCIENCES LLC
`Patent Owner
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`Patent Number: 8,036,788
`Title: VEHICLE DIAGNOSTIC OR PROGNOSTIC MESSAGE
`TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS AND METHODS
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`Case IPR2013-00417
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`_________________________________________________________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.120
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`AMERICAN VEHICULAR SCIENCES LLC
`Patent Owner
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`
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`Patent Number: 8,036,788
`Title: VEHICLE DIAGNOSTIC OR PROGNOSTIC MESSAGE
`TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS AND METHODS
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`
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`Case IPR2013-00417
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`_________________________________________________________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.120
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`Patent Owner’s Response
`IPR2013-00417
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... i
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
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`I.
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`II.
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`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
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`SUMMARY OF THE 788 PATENT ............................................................. 2
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`III. GROUNDS FOR WHICH REVIEW HAS BEEN INSTITUTED ................ 4
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`IV. ORIGINAL CLAIM 9 IS PATENTABLE OVER FRY ................................ 6
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`A. Legal Standards ..................................................................................... 6
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`B. Toyota Failed To Prove That Fry Is Prior Art ....................................... 8
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 14
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`i
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
`Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
`No. 95-218, 1998 WL 151411 (D. Del. Mar. 13, 1998) ...................................... 12
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`Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co.,
`804 F.2d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ......................................................................... 7, 12
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`DH Tech., Inc. v. Synergystex Int’l, Inc.,
`No. 92-3307, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5301 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1994) ............... 10
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`Hilgraeve, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`271 F. Supp. 2d 964 (E.D Mich. 2003) .................................................................. 9
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`In re Cronyn,
`890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .............................................................................. 6
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`In re Omeprazole Patent Litig.,
`490 F. Supp. 2d 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) .................................................................... 8
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`Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,
`363 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ....................................................................... 8, 14
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`Santec Indus. v. Micro-Waste Corp.,
`No. 04-3066, 2006 WL 3455000 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2006) ................... 8, 10, 12
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`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc.,
`511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..........................................................................6, 7
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`Statutes
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.120 ..................................................................................................... 1
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`Other Authorities
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`MPEP § 2128 .................................................................................................... 10, 11
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`MPEP § 2128.02 ........................................................................................... 7, 10, 13
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`Rules
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`Fed. R. Evid. 1002 ..................................................................................................... 9
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`Fed. R. Evid. 402 ....................................................................................................... 9
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`Fed. R. Evid. 403 ....................................................................................................... 9
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`Fed. R. Evid. 602 ....................................................................................................... 9
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`Fed. R. Evid. 801 ....................................................................................................... 9
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`Fed. R. Evid. 802 ....................................................................................................... 9
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`Fed. R. Evid. 901 ....................................................................................................... 9
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`iii
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`Patent Owner’s Response
`IPR2013-00417
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
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`Patent Owner American Vehicular Sciences LLC (“AVS”) submits the
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`following response under 37 C.F.R. § 42.120 to the Petition filed by Toyota Motor
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`Corporation (“Toyota”) requesting inter partes review of certain claims of U.S.
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`Patent No. 8,036,788 (“the 788 patent”). This filing is timely pursuant to the
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`Board’s Scheduling Order and the parties’ stipulation to extend the deadline for
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`AVS to file its response to March 24, 2104. (See Paper 15, Scheduling Order;
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`Paper 26, Joint Notice of Stipulation to Adjust Schedule.)
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`In this inter partes review, the Board instituted review of claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7,
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`8, 9, 11, 15, 16, and 18 of the 788 patent. (Paper 14, Board Decision at 34.)
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`Review of claim 9 was instituted on only one ground—anticipation based on an
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`article entitled “Diesel Locomotive Reliability Improvement By System
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`Monitoring,” by Fry (“Fry”). (Id.) Despite multiple opportunities to prove that
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`Fry is prior art to the claims of the 788 patent, namely, it was publicly accessible
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`prior to the June 7, 1995 priority date, Toyota failed to do so.
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`Because Toyota has failed to show that Fry is prior art to the claims of the
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`788 patent, AVS respectfully submits that the Board should confirm the
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`patentability of claim 9.1
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`1 Concurrently with its Patent Owner’s Response, AVS is filing a Motion to
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`Amend. In its Motion to Amend, AVS is requesting cancellation of claims 1, 3, 4,
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`1
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`II.
`SUMMARY OF THE 788 PATENT
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`The application that issued as the 788 patent was filed on August 9, 2007.
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`(Ex. 1001 at 1.) The application, however, is part of a chain that claims priority
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`back to an application filed on June 7, 1995. (Id.) Toyota agrees that the claims of
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`the 788 patent are entitled to a June 7, 1995 priority date. (Toyota Pet. at 4; Ex.
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`1008 at, e.g., ¶ 77.)
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`Both the 1995 priority application and the 788 patent generally disclose a
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`system on-board a vehicle for providing status data relating to vehicle
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`maintenance. (See Ex. 1001 at claim 1.) In particular, the claims of the 788 patent
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`relate generally to diagnostic and prognostic analysis of components or subsystems
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`of a vehicle. (See Ex. 1001 at claims.) This diagnostic or prognostic analysis
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`occurs on-board the vehicle and is much more comprehensive than any on-board
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`analysis that occurred in the prior art. (Id. at 11:25-45.) For example, the on-board
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`analysis disclosed by the 788 patent is able to predict that a component or
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`subsystem of the vehicle is going to fail. (Id.; see also claim 9.) The results of this
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`analysis are then wirelessly transmitted to a remote site, such as a dealership. (Id.
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`at claims.)
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`The invention claimed by the 788 patent was a significant advancement over
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`6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 18 of the 788 patent. In place of those claims, AVS has
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`proposed substitute amended claims.
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`the prior art. Prior art systems typically did not conduct diagnostic or prognostic
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`analysis on the vehicle, but rather sent raw data from the vehicle to a remote
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`location for processing. (Ex. 1001 at 11:25-28 (“An important function that can be
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`performed by the diagnostic system herein is to substantially diagnose the vehicle’s
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`own problems rather then [sic] forwarding raw data to a central site for
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`diagnosis.”).) In contrast, in the invention of the 788 patent, the raw data is
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`processed on the vehicle for diagnostic or prognostic purposes. (Id. at claims.)
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`The results of this analysis are then sent to a remote site, such as a dealership. (Id.)
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`The 788 specification explains some of the advantages of this system/method:
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`An advantage of the ability to transmit diagnostic and prognostic
`information from a vehicle to a remote site is that performance data
`from the components or subsystems being monitored can be collected.
`Since each sensor obtains a value of a measurable characteristic of the
`component or subsystem and these values are analyzed, e.g., by the
`diagnostic module 33, to determine that the component or subsystem
`has a fault condition, a diagnostic or prognostic message relating to
`the determination of the fault condition of the component or system is
`thus generated by the diagnostic module 33 and transmitted to the
`remote site via the communications unit 32. At the remote site, it now
`becomes possible to receive messages from multiple vehicles and thus
`compile statistics on a failure rate of the components or subsystems,
`most likely by the manufacturer as noted above. Additionally or
`alternatively, it is possible to notify a driver, vehicle owner,
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`manufacturer or dealer of the fault condition of the component or
`subsystem . . . .
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`(Ex. 1001 at 73:1-18; see also id. at 71:31-72:17.) The specification of the 788
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`patent also specifically emphasized the advantages of having a system on-board the
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`vehicle that could predict component failure:
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`An important function that can be performed by the diagnostic system
`herein is to substantially diagnose the vehicle’s own problems rather
`then [sic] forwarding raw data to a central site for diagnosis.
`Eventually, a prediction as to the failure point of all significant
`components can be made and the owner can have a prediction that the
`fan belt will last another 20,000 miles, or that the tires should be
`rotated in 2,000 miles or replaced in 20,000 miles. . . . This can permit
`the vehicle manufacturer to guarantee that the owner will never
`experience a vehicle breakdown provided he or she permits the dealer
`to service the vehicle at appropriate times based on the output of the
`prognostic system.
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`(Id. at 11:25-45.)
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`III. GROUNDS FOR WHICH REVIEW HAS BEEN INSTITUTED
`Toyota’s Petition included four proposed grounds for invalidity, based on
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`three prior art references. (See Toyota Pet. at 3-4.) Of those four proposed
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`grounds, the Board granted review on the following grounds:
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`4
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` Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 18 for alleged anticipation by U.S.
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`Patent No. 5,400,018 to Scholl;
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` Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 16 and 18 for alleged anticipation by Unexamined
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`Patent Application Publication JP H01-197145 to Ishihara; and
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` Claims 9 and 15 for alleged anticipation by Fry.
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`(Paper 14, Board Decision at 34.)
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`Importantly, review of claim 9 was only instituted based on alleged
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`anticipation by Fry. Claim 9 is dependent on claim 7 which is dependent on claim
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`4. Claim 9 particularly relates to predicting component failure and recites:
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`The method of claim 7, wherein the at least one sensor is part of
`9.
`a diagnostic module on the vehicle, further comprising configuring the
`diagnostic module to analyze data obtained by the at least one sensor
`in order to predict failure of the at least one component of subsystem
`and generate the triggering event based on prognostic criteria.
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`(Ex. 1001 at claim 9.)
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`The Board did not institute review of claim 9 based on Scholl and Ishihara
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`because the Board found that both Scholl and Ishihara did not disclose predicting
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`component failure as recited by claim 9. (See, e.g., Paper 14, Board Decision at 20
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`(explaining that Scholl’s disclosure was insufficient because “[p]roducing a fault
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`code related to prognostics, as disclosed in Scholl, is not predicting failure, as
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`recited in claim 9”) 29-30 (explaining Ishihara’s insufficient disclosure).) While
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`the Board did initiate review of claim 9 based on Fry, the Board acknowledged
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`AVS’s objection to Fry as prior art and indicated that the rules provided Toyota
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`with an opportunity to cure any deficiency. (Id. at 33.) As explained below,
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`however, Toyota did not cure the deficiency with its evidence.
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`IV. ORIGINAL CLAIM 9 IS PATENTABLE OVER FRY
`Fry is a technical article that indicates on its face that it was copyrighted
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`1995, with no more specific date given. (See Ex. 1005 at 2-12.) Because Toyota
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`has not proven that Fry was accessible to the public before the June 7, 1995
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`priority date, AVS respectfully requests that the Board confirm the patentability of
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`claim 9.
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`A. Legal Standards
`“The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to mean that
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`before the critical date the reference must have been sufficiently accessible to the
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`public interested in the art . . . .” In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
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`1989). “Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to
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`the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in
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`determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar . . . .” SRI
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`Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also
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`Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1160 (“[D]issemination and public accessibility are the keys
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`to the legal determination whether a prior art reference was ‘published.’”). “A
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`given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such
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`document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that
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`persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising
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`reasonable diligence, can locate it.” SRI, 511 F.3d at 1194. Importantly, “[a]
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`publication disseminated by mail is not prior art until it is received by at least one
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`member of the public. Thus, a magazine or technical journal is effective as of its
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`date of publication (date when first person receives it) not the date it was mailed or
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`sent to the publisher.” MPEP § 2128.02 (emphasis added). The proponent of the
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`publication bears the burden of producing sufficient proof of dissemination or
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`sufficient proof that the publication was otherwise available and accessible. See
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`SRI, 511 F.3d at 1194; see also Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804
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`F.2d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[O]ne who wishes to characterize the information,
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`in whatever form it may be, as a ‘printed publication’ should produce sufficient
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`proof of its dissemination or that it has otherwise been available and accessible to
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`persons concerned with the art to which the document relates . . . .”).
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`Applying this well-established precedent, courts routinely hold that a
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`reference does not constitute prior art where the proponent of the evidence fails to
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`come forward with evidence regarding the public accessibility of the reference.
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`See, e.g., Carella, 804 F.2d at 139 (no anticipation by an advertisement where
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`“[n]o evidence was presented as to the date of receipt of the mailer by any of the
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`addressees”); Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`(no anticipation because evidence of an organization’s “general practice” was
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`insufficient to establish “actual availability” of the reference at issue); In re
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`Omeprazole Patent Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d 381, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (references
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`with publication dates of 1979 were not printed publications because “no party has
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`presented any evidence that [the references] were accessible to the public prior to
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`the critical date”); Santec Indus. v. Micro-Waste Corp., No. 04-3066, 2006 WL
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`3455000, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2006) (“The Spring 1989 CE-E Journal Article
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`is not dated, and the evidence is not clear and convincing that the Spring 1989 CE-
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`Journal was disseminated and/or was publicly accessible before the April 16, 1989,
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`critical date.”).
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`Toyota Failed To Prove That Fry Is Prior Art
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`B.
`On its face, Fry indicates that it was copyrighted in 1995 and appeared in the
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`Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit in 1995. (Ex. 1005 at 2-12.) Fry itself
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`(including the cover page from the journal) provides no further information
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`regarding when Fry may have been published. (Id.) Although Toyota has offered
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`various pieces of evidence in an attempt to establish the date on which Fry was
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`publicly accessible, Toyota’s proffered evidence (assuming it is admissible) does
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`not address the only relevant inquiry under the law—the date when Fry was
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`disseminated to or otherwise made available to the public.2
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`As a threshold matter, Fry itself does not provide sufficient information
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`regarding when it was publicly accessible. As stated above, Fry does not provide a
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`specific date on its face. (Ex. 1005 at 2-12.) Rather, Fry only indicates it was
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`copyrighted in 1995 and the journal it appeared in was purportedly published in
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`1995. (Id.) Even if a copyright date and the date on the cover of a journal were
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`sufficient evidence of public accessibility, a date of “1995” does not establish
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`public accessibility before the 788 patent’s June 7, 1995 priority date, as a matter
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`of law. Hilgraeve, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 271 F. Supp. 2d 964, 974-77 (E.D.
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`Mich. 2003) (finding that copyright dates were insufficient evidence); DH Tech.,
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`2 For purposes of this response, AVS will assume that Toyota’s evidence (e.g., Exs.
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`1005 and 1011-1014) is admissible. AVS has objected to Toyota’s evidence as
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`inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403, 602, 801, 802, 901 and 1002. (See
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`Paper 21, Patent Owner’s Amended Objections To Evidence Submitted By Toyota
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`Motor Corporation; Paper 25, Patent Owner’s Objections To February 18, 2014
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`Supplemental Evidence Submitted By Toyota Motor Corporation.) AVS plans to
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`file a motion to exclude this evidence at the appropriate time, in accordance with
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`the Board’s Scheduling Order.
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`Inc. v. Synergystex Int’l, Inc., No. 92-3307, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5301, at *4
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`(N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1994), vacated in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 1333 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1998) (“[T]he June 1989 notation on the manual’s cover does not identify the
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`date in June 1989 on which the manual was published, or if the manual was
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`actually published in June 1989”); MPEP § 2128.02 (“[A] magazine or technical
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`journal is effective as of its date of publication (date when first person receives it)
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`not the date it was mailed or sent to the publisher.”); Santec, 2006 WL 3455000, at
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`*9 (“The Spring 1989 CE-E Journal Article is not dated, and the evidence is not
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`clear and convincing that the Spring 1989 CE-Journal was disseminated and/or was
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`publicly accessible before the April 16, 1989, critical date.”).
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`Toyota’s other evidence regarding the public accessibility of Fry is likewise
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`deficient. For example, Toyota appears to argue that Fry was published on January
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`1, 1995 because years later, in 2013, an internet web-site (Sage Publications)
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`recorded the publication date as being January 1, 1995. (See Ex. 1005 at 1, 13; see
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`also Ex. 1012.) Sage Publications was not the original publisher of Fry in 1995,
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`i.e., Sage Publications did not publish Fry on the Internet in 1995. (See Ex. 1014 at
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`¶ 3.) Because Sage Publications did not publicly post Fry on the Internet on
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`January 1, 1995, the January 1, 1995 date now appearing on the Sage Publications
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`web-site is not evidence of public accessibility. See MPEP § 2128 (“Prior art
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`disclosures on the Internet or on an online database are considered to be publicly
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`available as of the date the item was publicly posted. Absent evidence of the date
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`that the disclosure was publicly posted, if the publication itself does not include a
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`publication date (or retrieval date), it cannot be relied upon as prior art under 35
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`U.S.C. 102(a) or (b).”).
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`Moreover, it is highly unlikely that Fry was published on January 1, 1995
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`because Toyota’s proffered evidence appears to show that Fry was not accepted for
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`publication until December 22, 1994. (Ex. 1005 at 13.) Thus, it is highly unlikely
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`that the reference was published and publicly available by January 1, 1995—less
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`than ten days later (as asserted by Toyota). Nor have Toyota’s witnesses
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`corroborated the January 1, 1995 date, assigned years later by Sage Publications.
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`(See Ex. 1013 at ¶¶ 3-5; Ex. 1014 at ¶ 6.) Rather, it is likely that the January 1,
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`1995 date was merely a recording convention of Sage Publications used in
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`connection with its 2013 database (e.g., assigning a date for articles that do not
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`identify a specific date of publication, but identify only a year). Toyota’s Internet
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`print outs (e.g., Ex. 1005 and Ex. 1012), therefore, do not establish the date on
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`which Fry was publicly accessible in 1995. See, e.g., MPEP § 2128.
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`The declaration from Kevin Fry submitted by Toyota (Ex. 1013) is likewise
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`insufficient to prove when Fry was actually publicly accessible. Mr. Fry states that
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`because he received an award in 1995 related to his article and because Sage
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`Publications now records the publication date of his article as in January 1995, he
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`has “refreshed [his] recollection that the Fry paper was published in January
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`1995.”3 (Ex. 1013 at ¶ 5.) Again, Mr. Fry’s declaration offers no relevant
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`information, namely when Fry was publicly accessible (e.g., received by a member
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`of the public, accessible in a library, etc.). It is, therefore, insufficient as a matter
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`of law. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 95-218, 1998 WL
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`151411, at *38 (D. Del. Mar. 13, 1998) (finding testimony by the author of a thesis
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`insufficient to establish public accessibility because he “had no actual first-hand
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`knowledge of the procedures employed by the university libraries, being a doctoral
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`candidate not a member of the library personnel”); Carella, 804 F.2d at 139 (no
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`anticipation by an advertisement where “[n]o evidence was presented as to the date
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`of receipt of the mailer by any of the addressees”); Santec, 2006 WL 3455000, at
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`*9 (journal dated “Spring 1989” was not proven “disseminated and/or . . . publicly
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`3 Mr. Fry implies that he received the award related to his article in January 1995.
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`(See Ex. 1013 at ¶ 3.) The award, like the article itself, merely indicates that Fry
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`was published in “1995.” (Ex. 1011.) There is no reference to “January 1995” on
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`the face of the award. (Id.) Mr. Fry provides no further evidence to corroborate
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`his claim that he received this award in January 1995. And, in any event, the date
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`on an award is not evidence of the date on which someone in the public actually
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`received Fry.
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`accessible before the April 16, 1989, critical date.”); MPEP § 2128.02 (“[A]
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`magazine or technical journal is effective as of its date of publication (date when
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`first person receives it) not the date it was mailed or sent to the publisher.”).
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`Nor is Toyota’s final piece of evidence, the affidavit of Sarah Broadhurst,
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`adequate to show when Fry was publicly accessible. Ms. Broadhurst currently
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`works for the organization that arranges for the publication of Fry—she does not
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`work for the organization that actually published Fry in 1995 or the organization
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`that currently publishes Fry. (See Ex. 1014 at ¶¶ 1, 3.) Not surprisingly, therefore,
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`Ms. Broadhurst’s vague and conclusory statement that Fry “was made available to
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`the public as of January 1995” appears to be supported only by her review of the
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`information currently on Sage Publications’ website. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6 (indicating that
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`“the Institution of Mechanical Engineers’ records” she reviewed were “on Sage
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`Publications’ website”).) As explained above, what Sage Publications currently
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`records as the publication date is not evidence of when Fry was actually published
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`in 1995. And, in any event, Ms. Broadhurst’s statement does not address the
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`relevant inquiry—e.g., when Fry was received by a member of the public or made
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`available at a library. (See generally id.) Indeed, because Ms. Broadhurst’s
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`employer was not even the publisher of Fry in 1995, she logically would not have
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`information regarding the date on which Fry was actually accessible to the public.
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`Ms. Broadhurst’s statement regarding general publication practices for the
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`journal in which Fry appeared is likewise misplaced. (See id. at ¶ 7.) Again, since
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`Ms. Broadhurst’s employer is not the actual publisher of the journal in which Fry
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`appeared, Ms. Broadhurst does not possess foundational or indeed any information
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`about when volumes of that journal were actually accessible to the public. Finally,
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`in any event, unsupported statements regarding an organization’s general practice
`
`are not sufficient to prove public accessibility of a specific reference. See, e.g.,
`
`Norian, 363 F.3d at 1330 (finding that testimony regarding “general practice” was
`
`not sufficient evidence of “actual availability” of the prior art).
`
`* * *
`
`Toyota had multiple opportunities to submit evidence regarding when Fry
`
`was publicly accessible. Toyota failed to do so. Because Toyota has not provided
`
`sufficient evidence that establishes that Fry was publicly accessible prior to the
`
`June 7, 1995 priority date, Fry cannot be considered prior art to 788 patent. Fry
`
`therefore cannot be used as grounds to cancel claim 9 of the 788 patent.
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`Toyota argued that three separate prior art references invalidated claim 9.
`
`The Board found that the two references did not disclose predicting component
`
`failure as recited in claim 9. For the reasons set forth above, Toyota has failed to
`
`show that its third reference, Fry, is in fact prior art to the 788 patent. AVS
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`
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`14
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`
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`Patent Owner’s Response
`IPR2013-00417
`
`therefore respectfully submits that the Board should confirm the patentability of
`
`claim 9 of the 788 patent.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`/Thomas J. Wimbiscus/
`Thomas J. Wimbiscus
`Reg. No. 36,059
`Attorney for Patent Owner,
`American Vehicular Sciences LLC
`
`
`
`Dated: March 24, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By:
`
`
`
`McANDREWS, HELD & MALLOY, LTD.
`500 West Madison St., 34th Floor
`Chicago, IL 60661
`Telephone: (312) 775-8000
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Response
`IPR2013-00417
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that Patent Owner’s Response Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §
`
`
`
`42.120 and Exhibits 2011 through 2013 in connection with Inter Partes Review
`
`Case IPR2013-00417 was served on this 24th day of March by electronic mail to
`
`the following:
`
`
`A. Antony Pfeffer
`apfeffer@kenyon.com
`Thomas R. Makin
`tmakin@kenyon.com
`Matt Berkowitz
`mberkowitz@kenyon.com
`ptab@kenyon.com
`Kenyon & Kenyon LLP
`One Broadway
`New York, NY 10004
`Tel: 212-425-7200
`
`
`MCANDREWS HELD & MALLOY, LTD.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Telephone: 312-775-8000
`
`
`
`Facsimile: 312-775-8100
`
`
`
`
`/Thomas J. Wimbiscus/
`Thomas J. Wimbiscus
`Registration No. 36,059
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CUSTOMER NUMBER: 23446
`
`Date: March 24, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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