Letting Loose the Light: Igniting Commerce in Electronic Publication
`M. Stefik
`
`UIR-R-1996- 10
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`Letting Loose the Light:
`
`Igniting Commerce in
`
`Electronic Publication
`
`Mark Stefik
`
`Connections
`
`In "The Digital Library Project: The World of Knowbots" in Part 1, Robert
`Kahn and Vinton Cerf ask, "If a thousand books are combined on a single
`CD-ROM and the acquirer of the CD-ROM only intends to read one of
`them, what sort of royalty arrangement is appropriate to compensate the
`copyright owners? How would compensation be extended for cases in
`which electronic copies are provided to users?" Their questions show how,
`in 1988,
`issues about copyright protection and payment for using
`information arose in the context of early CD-ROM distribution.
`By 1994 copyright issues had not only not been settled, they were
`coming to a boil. [aura Fillmore's effort to build a successful publishing
`business on the Internet reveals the limitations of what was practical in
`May of 1994. Although digital works were being sold on the Internet,
`provisions for commerce were primitive. Furthermore, the ease of copying
`digital works had led many people to believe that digital information should
`befree. Fast access to the network had made trading programs or other data
`as easy as mixing songs on audio tape.
`In short,
`it had become much
`simplerfor network users to infringe copyright than to uphold it.
`This is the context for the oft-quoted statement by lohn Perry Barlow
`of the Electronic Freedom Foundation, "Copyright is dead." Advocates of
`free information argue that because you don't lose the original when you
`make a copy of a digital work.
`there should be no charge for copying
`information. The conventional wisdom among publishers in late-1994,
`when this article was written, was that digital containers for software were
`inherently leaky vessels and that no viable solution would ever be found.
`
`From Internet Dreams: Archetypes, Myths, and Metaphors, edited
`by Mark Stefik, to be published by The MIT Press in September
`1996
`
`Swede4&5
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`4
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`Mark Stefik
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`The article suggests,'however, a way to sustain commerce for those who
`want to sell information on the network.
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`—"”"O ""'" “" _'O "
`
`v
`
`Throughout the time I’ve been groping around cyberspace, an immense,
`unsolved conundrum has remained at the root of nearly every legal, ethical,
`governmental, and social vexation to be found in the Virtual World. I refer
`to the problem of digitized property. The enigma is this: If our property can
`be infinitely reproduced and instantaneously distributed all over the planet
`without cost, without our knowledge, without
`its even leaving our
`possession, how can we protect it? How are we going to get paid for the
`work we do with our minds? And, if we can't get paid, what will assure the
`continued creation and distribution of such work?
`
`—]ohn Perry Barlow, ”The Economy of Ideas"
`
`No problemo.
`—T-101 (Arnold Schwarzenegger) in Terminator 2
`
`It all depends on whether you really understand the idea of trusted
`systems.
`If you don’t understand them,
`then this whole approach to
`commerce and digital publishing is utterly unthinkable.
`If you do
`understand them, then it all follows easily.
`—Ralph Merkle
`
`Across many cultures, knowledge and inner knowing are described
`as light. Letting loose the light refers to spreading knowledge in the
`world, typically in written form. Consistent with this metaphor, the
`period in the eighteenth century characterized by a burst of writings
`in philosophy and science is called the Enlightenment. In the present
`century the metaphor of knowledge as light is both poetic and
`physically realized. Books, pictures, movies, musical performances,
`and other works can be conveniently represented digitally. With
`fiber optics, digital works are actually transmitted by the shining
`and pulsing of light.
`and their nearly
`The digital
`representation of works
`consequences
`for
`instantaneous
`transmission
`has
`profound
`commercial publishing. Three of the fundamental economic factors
`affecting the publishing industry—printing costs, inventory costs,
`and transportation costs—can be drastically reduced. Digital works
`can be copied at minuscule costs, stored in almost no space, and
`transported instantly anywhere in the world.
`This portability opens up visions of a greater information age.
`For libraries. universal access to the world’s written knowledge is a
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`o
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`lVlm n ul‘a an
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`centuries-old vision. Today many libraries have electronic catalogs
`accessible to anyone with a computer. Articles can be delivered to
`anyone with a fax machine. In the technophile's idealized vision,
`books and magazines need never be printed on paper at all; any
`digital work could be made available to anyone, anytime, anywhere
`in the world.
`
`However, the dream of universal digital access to highoquality
`works dangles just beyond reach. Such works are not usually
`available, because of publishers' concerns that uncompensated
`copying will
`infringe and erode their ability to make a living.
`History suggests that this problem will not go away. Publishing
`thrives only when it
`is profitable, and profitability depends on
`limiting uncompensated copying.
`The conventional wisdom—based on the way computers are
`for word processing,
`electronic mail,
`and computer
`used
`networking—is that copying digital works is easy and, therefore,
`inevitable. There appears to be a clear, inherent conflict between
`representing works digitally and honoring the commercial and
`intellectual
`property
`interests
`of
`creators
`and
`publishers.
`Fortunately, computers need not be blind instruments of copyright
`infringement. Properly designed digital systems can be more
`powerful and flexible instruments of trade in publications than any
`other medium. The seeming conflict between digital publishing and
`commerce is merely a consequence of the way computer systems
`have been designed to date.
`The technological means for commerce in digital works are
`now at hand. New and unconventional when compared with
`today’s uses of computers, these means will enable us to buy, sell,
`and lend digital works much as we now buy, sell, and lend printed
`books and other publications. They will change the way digital
`works are purchased and delivered and will give consumers access
`to all sorts of works at any time of the day—though not necessarily
`for free. Consumers will be able to sample works, borrow them, rent
`them for nominal fees, and make copies for friends. Creative people
`will be able to circulate their worlds to networks of friends while
`
`earning a reliable living from people who make copies of them. This
`technological system will affect everything from digital books to
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`Letting Loose me ngnl
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`digital television, from digital music to digital video games. It will '
`radically change our concepts of digital libraries, digital bookstores,
`digital music stores, digital newspapers, and digital
`television
`stations. Moreover, any competent technological company will be
`able to implement the required systems.
`Here is a road map to this new land. First, we discuss the
`history of copyright law and the reasons for the widespread, but
`incorrect, belief that works represented digitally will be copied
`without permission. We then describe the technological innovations
`that can enable and support commerce in digital publishing. Finally,
`we introduce the institutional and- business challenges that
`lie
`ahead. What we require to overcome them is the wit, will, and
`means to create institutions that provide the necessary security,
`convenience, vision, and longevity.
`
`The Origin and Rationale of Copyright
`
`It is harder to be honest than to cheat when copying digital works
`on general-purpose computers. The license printed on the package
`of most purchased computer software authorizes a buyer to load the
`software into one computer and use it there. Getting another legal
`copy for a friend involves driving to the computer store and buying
`it. It is much easier, faster, and cheaper to simply load the same
`software into another computer. Such copying is so private and easy
`to do that most people do it without thinking, and without guilt.
`Unauthorized copying on computers is not, of course, limited
`to purchased software. With a few keystrokes, it is often possible to
`copy a paragraph, an article. a book, or a life’s work without
`compensating its creators or publishers. Nor are unauthorized
`copying and use new phenomena. Anyone who ignores the FBI
`waming message on video tapes to make copies for friends infringes
`a copyright, as do people who copy compact discs onto cassettes. As
`a practical matter, it has not been feasible to enforce the copyright
`law in these cases. There are simply too many people with recording
`devices to make rigorous enforcement practical or cost-effective.
`it is widely believed that there is no viable technical solution to
`this problem for digital information. John Perry Barlow, a prominent
`spokesperson in the computer industry, says that the idea of patents
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`8
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`MaJ'K DIEHK
`
`and copyrights needs to be rethought in the digital age. Information,
`he argues, cannot be contained or owned. It wants to be free.
`Cyberspace is the new frontier, and its leaders and pioneers are
`today's radical
`thinkers about
`freedom of information. Barlow
`suggests, in fact, that we abandon all notions of intellectual property
`and market regulation. This solution was tried at least once, and it
`didn't work. Apparently, for high—quality works to spread in the
`world people need to be able to make a living from creating and
`distributing them.
`Barlow's arguments are reminiscent of the intense debates
`about intellectual property that took plate in France during the
`French Revolution. Like Barlow, revolutionaries argued that ideas
`cannot be owned and should not be regulated. “ During the
`revolution, many writers and underground publishers emerged as
`civic heroes of public enlightenment by arguing against tyranny and
`for freedom of the press. The revolution of the mind, they said,
`required the dismantling of the laws and. institutions governing
`authorship, printing, publishing, and bookselling. Absolutely free
`communication was one of the most precious rights of man. All
`citizens should be able to speak, to write, and crucially, to print
`freely. According to this philosophical ideal, people had a will to
`know and should be allowed to read and learn from anything they
`liked. The wide availability of books and the right to publish were
`seen as keys to this spread of knowledge.
`In 1789, the revolutionary govemment wholly deregulated the
`press, believing that
`the works of
`the great writers of
`the
`Enlightenment would thus be made universally and cheaply
`available. The writers and publishers certainly never expected what
`actually happened. instead of works of enlightenment, the presses
`turned out mostly seditious pamphlets and pornography. Printers
`also competed with each other to bring out cheap editions of books
`others had spent money developing. 50 little money could be made
`producing the good books that quality declined; most editions were
`abridged and contained many errors. Publisher after publisher Went
`into bankruptcy and then out of busmess. The disastrous nature of
`an unregulated press,
`largely unanticipated in the heat of the
`revolution, became blatantly obvious as the publishing industry fell
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`Letting Loose the Light
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`9
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`into shambles. The same leaders who had clamored for the freeing
`of the presses came belatedly to understand the folly of their action.
`In the chaos of the unregulated press, some prominent and popular
`writers even stopped publishing; because they could not control the
`printing of their works, they could not make a living by writing.
`In 1793 legislation to restore order to publishing was passed. It
`recognized the rights of authors and grounded the publishing
`industry in the principles of the marketplace, establishing the author
`as creator,
`the book as property, and the reader as an elective
`consumer. This
`law reflected a
`fundamental
`shift
`in the
`Enlightenment perspective, which now saw that the widespread
`creation and publication of creative works was better served when
`the authors could own the products of their minds. According to
`Carla Hesse (Publishing and Cultural Politics in Revolutionary Paris,
`1789-1810), the basic elements of modern copyright law as we know
`them in America derive from this period in France.
`
`Today, most people see the infringement of copyright on digital
`systems as unavoidable. In the remainder of
`this section, we
`describe the assumptions about computer design behind this belief
`and argue that we need to go beyond conventional ways of thinking
`to solve the problem.
`Three main factors currently inhibit the development of digital
`publishing: (1) the absence of high-contrast, low-power, cheap flat-
`panel displays;
`(2)
`lack of an inexpensive and reliable way of
`handling money digitally; and (3) the need for a widely accepted
`means of accounting for the use and copying of digital works.
`improvements in technology will almost certainly solve the display
`problem in the next five to ten years. Most people see such displays
`as crucial
`to making electronic books and newspapers portable.
`They matter less, however,
`in applications for which desktop
`displays are satisfactory or where displays are not necessary—such
`as in transmitting musical works. The second factor—methods of
`handling money digitally, in the form of checks, credit cards, or
`anonymous cash—has recently become the subject of much field
`experimentation. Our focus is on the third problem, techniques for
`commerce in what we call digital property rights or usage rights, a
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`10
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`Mark Stefik
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`generalization of the idea of copyright that delineates several kinds
`of rights besides copying.
`Some publishers see illicit copying as too big a business risk
`and do not publish in digital form at all. Digital newspapers often
`leave out important and high-value content such as the pictures or
`graphics, and consumers of these lower-quality papers are unwilling
`to pay much for them. .The perception of low quality leads to a
`chicken-and-egg problem in which the publishers make little money
`and consumers have few choices. Ironically, publishers of works
`that need periodic upgrading, such as computer software, have
`found that some leakage increases their customer base, even though
`it is often reported that there are more unauthorized copies of a
`program in use than authorized ones. Software publishers have
`decided that the revenue losses of illegal copying are affordable,
`although they lead to unfair billing. Software publishers charge all
`users the same price, regardless of the use to which they put the
`program,
`arguably overbilling people who use
`the work
`infrequently.
`As computers and computer networks have proliferated, the
`need for a better approach to protecting digital works has become
`more widely appreciated. Moreover, as new kinds of works-finch
`as music, video, and multimedia works that mix these forms—are
`
`industries are
`now available digitally, people from different
`searching for solutions. Given this wide acknowledgment of the
`need, why have solutions seemed so elusive? Apparently, we are
`stuck in a rut, assuming that things must be done the way they have
`always been done with electronic mail, word processing, and other
`current applications.
`Conventionally, we use general-purpose computers with
`general-purpose operating systems and general-purpose programs.
`The computer industry, grounded on the premise that computers
`can do anything that can be programmed in software, produces a
`wide range of programs—word processors, spreadsheets, databases,
`calendars, graphics programs, and computer games. Manufacturers
`accept no liability when someone uses a computer to copy a
`copyrighted file. After all, one company builds the computer,
`another writes the software that does the copying, and both
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`hardware and software are intended for general purposes—that is,
`any purpose the user wants to put them to. The manufacturer wants
`no responsibility for someone who uses the computer in a way that
`just happens
`to infringe a copyright, nor does the software
`publisher. The perpetrator is the consumer, who finds it easier to
`make an unauthorized copy than to be strictly honest.
`Stuck within this framework, the community of computer users
`protests against any attempt to regulate the copying of digital
`property. If we continue to accept this framework, with all of its
`assumptions, no party will be motivated or empowered to break the
`cycle and no effective way to protect digital property will be
`developed. At present, without enforceable property rights,
`the
`writers of words,
`interactive games, and songs often are not
`compensated for their work. And without their works the world is a
`darker, poorer place. Honoring their creative work in the digital
`systems of
`tomorrow requires us
`to challenge
`the design
`assumptions of the systems we use today.
`
`A New Design for Digital Publishing
`
`The technical core of the approach we propose is based on two
`ideas: (1) that digital works can be bought and sold among trusted
`systems, and (2) that works have attached usage rights that specify
`what can be done with them and what it costs to exercise those
`
`rights.
`
`Trusted Systems
`
`The term trusted system refers to computers that can be relied on to
`do certain things. For. example. suppose that a creator or publisher
`forbids all copying of a particular digital work. A trusted system in
`this context would reliably and infallibly carry out that stipulation;
`no amount of shouting or coaxing would coerce it to copy the work.
`The trusted system might be very polite, but ultimately it would
`always refuse to make an unauthorized copy. Similarly, suppose
`that a trusted system could copy a work but only if it reliably records
`a set fee to be paid when it has done so. A trusted system would
`always record the fee whenever the work was copied. If the copying
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`mark atemc
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`process is interrupted part way through, the trusted system would
`follow a standard policy; for example, it might delete the partial
`copy, record no fee, and note that a copying attempt was begun but
`not completed. Again, no amount of coaxing would change its
`behavior. It could always be counted on to follow the rules of the
`trust.
`
`A common but false analogy claiming to show why digital
`works cannot be protected in computers is that of genies and bottles.
`In this analogy, a valued digital work corresponds to a genie and the
`bottle is a place to store it When a digital work is sent to a computer,
`for example,
`it may be sent in coded form, so that even it the
`transmission is intercepted it is useless to a wiretapper. Once people
`have a legal copy of a digital work, however, they can make more
`copies of it. Since they have a key, they can just decode the work and
`make copies of it. Alternatively, they can copy the coded version
`and give away copies of the key. Once the content genie is out of the
`bottle, according to this scenario, you can’t put it back in and
`unauthorized digital copies are sure to circulate. This is the problem
`trusted systems can fix.
`Trusted systems speak a communications protocol with other
`trusted systems and will not transmit information to any system not
`recognized as another trusted system. This strategy ensures that
`copies of digital works are either inside trusted systems or they are
`encrypted. When they are inside trusted systems, usage is
`controlled. When they are outside trusted systems, usage is
`practically impossible without breaking the code. The important
`issue, however, is not just protection and containment. The greater
`good is not served by simply limiting the flow of information. It is
`served by supporting and encouraging a lively trade in information.
`Rather than just confining genies to specific bottles, we want to encourage
`them to travel between bottles under rules of commerce.
`A very concrete question about such a system is "Why couldn't
`I just copy a file onto a diskette and give that away?" Unless there is
`permission to do so, a trusted system would never copy a work to a
`diskette or anywhere else. Even if permission to copy a work is
`given, a trusted system would not make a copy on a diskette,
`because a diskette is not a trusted system. Nor are magnetic tapes,
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`Letting Loose the Light
`
`is
`
`compact discs, or, even, the disk drives of trusted systems. Trusted
`systems contain computers, have internal protected storage, and
`communicate by protocol. From a user's point of view, the trusted
`system is the storage device. Trusted systems only make copies of a
`digital work on themselves or on other trusted systems. Putting an
`unencrypted copy on a diskette is letting the genie out of the bottle
`onto an unprotected medium that can be accessed by a general-
`purpose computer that does not honor usage rights.
`There is an important issue about the perception of trusted
`systems. One way of looking at them is to say that trusted systems
`presume that
`the consumer
`is dishonest. This perception is
`unfortunate, and perhaps incorrect, but nonetheless real. Unless
`trusted systems offer consumers real advantages they will probably
`view them as nuisances that complicate our lives. A more favorable
`way to look at trusted systems is to compare them to vending
`machines. .They make it possible to order digital works any time of
`the day and get immediate delivery. Faster than a telephoneorder
`pizza, a digital work can be delivered immediately over the same
`telephone line in was ordered over.
`In summary, the first key to commerce in digital works is to use
`trusted systems. We have spoken of these systems as computers, but
`they are not limited to devices like personal computers and need not
`seem like computers at all. They could be personal entertainment
`devices for playing music, video game devices, laptop reading
`devices, personal computers, devices for playing digital movies at
`home, credit-card-sized devices that fit in your pocket, or whatever.
`In the following discussion we refer to these trusted systems as
`rqmsitories,
`an
`architectural
`plan
`that
`can
`have different
`embodiments. Repositories communicate digitally with other
`repositories and not with anything else. In contrast to such current
`passive media as compact discs, repositories have no externally
`defined limits on storage capacity; so successive. generations of
`repositories could increase in capacity while remaining completely
`compatible with earlier
`systems. Digital works would be
`communicated between repositories using secure coded protocols.
`Repositories would read the rules that apply to a given digital work
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`14
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`Milk DIEILIK
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`and follow them. This brings us to the next
`repositories know what the rules are?
`
`issue: How do
`
`Attached Usage Rights
`
`We start with an analogy. When we go to a store to buy a shirt, there
`are various tags attached to it. One kind of tag is a price tag. If we
`want to buy the shirt, we must pay the amount on the tag. Another
`tag gives cleaning instructions: for example, wash by hand in cold
`water or dry clean only. Still another tag might say something about
`the style of the shirt or the history of the shirt company.
`This is roughly the idea of usage rights on digital works. Digital
`works would come with tags on them. The tags—put there by the
`creators, publishers, and distributors—would describe the usage
`rights for the digital work: what can be done with it and what it
`costs.
`
`There are some important differences from the shirt's tags. The
`first is that the tags are digital and intended to be read and used by
`the repository itself, although consumers can also read the tags
`through the repository's user interface. They are written in a
`machine~readable language and give the repository the rules for
`using the work;
`they are an electronic contract enforced by the
`repository. Another difference is that the tags are not removable.
`Finally, there can be tags attached to different parts of a work. For a
`shirt, it is as if there were tags on the pockets, tags on the buttons,
`tags on the collar, tags on the sleeves. and so on. Each tag would
`grant rights to that part, and different rights could pertain to
`different parts of a work. For example, a digital newspaper might
`have certain rights on local stories, others on photographs or
`wireline stories or advertisements, and so on.
`
`Suppose that the digital work is a piece of music. A statement
`describing a right might say the following:
`
`This digital work can be played on a player of type Musical-138. This right
`is valid from February 14. 1995 to February H, 1996. The repository must
`have a security level of three. No other authorizations are needed. The fee
`for exercising this right is one cent per minute with a minimum of five cents
`in the first hour. Usage fees are paid to account 1991200567131.
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`Lilflng LOOSE me: Lars!”
`
`.
`
`h}
`
`Of course, such an internal statement would not be in English,
`although it should be in a well-defined computer language. Here is
`an example of a machine-readable statement
`in a usage rights
`language:
`
`Right Code:
`Copy Count:
`Time~Spec:
`Access-Spec:
`Fee—Spec:
`
`Account:
`
`Play Player: Musica-IBB
`1
`From 95 /02/ 14 Until: 96/02/14
`Security-Level: 3
`Fee: Metered $0.01 per 0:1:0
`Min: $0.05-per 0/1 /0
`1997-200—567131
`
`Computer languages are more precise than natural languages
`and have formal grammars and semantics that define how to
`interpret each phrase in the language. Computer languages are not
`at all poetic, but they are much less ambiguous, if less expressive
`than natural languages. Because the sentences of a digital property
`language are parts of potential contracts between the creators of
`digital works and consumers, clarity and simplicity are exactly what
`we want. Interpreting a usage rights language is quite simple. In
`level of difficulty, it is more like reading bar codes from packages at
`the supermarket checkout than it is like reading and understanding
`an English sentence in a story.
`-
`A digital property language needs to define several different
`kinds of rights, mainly those concerned with how the work can be
`transported, how it can be rendered, and whether it can be used in
`derivative works. Other, special
`rights relate to making and
`restoring backup copies to protect against hardware failure. The
`easiest way to understand usage rights
`is
`to consider some
`examples.
`
`Trnnsfi'rring Digital Works. When we copy files for friends on a
`general-purpose computer, we increase the number of copies of a
`digital work, fail to compensate the work‘s creator, and infringe the
`copyright. A repository, in contrast, never infringes copyright.
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`16
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`Mark Stetik
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`Our first scenario illustrates how copy and transfer rights
`would work in a repository system. Suppose that Morgan buys a
`copy of a digital book, perhaps at the book kiosk at the supermarket.
`To do so, he exercises a right to copy the book and pays a fee;
`copying the book records a
`transaction between the seller’s
`repository and (say) a card-sized repository that Morgan carries
`with him. Alternatively, he could buy a copy of the digital book
`from home by telephone. In either case, the digital book'is delivered
`electronically by a communications protocol between the vendor's
`repository and Morgan's repository. At the end of the transaction,.
`Morgan has spent some money, has a copy of the digital book in his
`repository, and can now read it on a reader. The book arrives with
`all its usage rights intact.
`Now suppose that, when Morgan finishes reading the book, his
`friend Andy asks to borrow it. They plug their repositories together,
`and Morgan exercises a transfer right to move the digital book to
`Andy’s repository. With paper books, once we have bought a book
`we can give it away or dispose of it in any way we please, and the
`same right could apply to Morgan’s digital book. At the end of the
`transfer transaction, the digital book resides on Andy's repository
`and not on Morgan’s, and no money has been exchanged. Andy can
`now read the book, but Morgan cannot. The crucial point is that the
`transfer transaction preserves the number of copies of the digital
`book.
`
`We now consider a scenario involving a loan right. Again
`Morgan has a digital book that his friend Ryan wants to borrow for
`a week. They plug their repositories together and Morgan exercises
`a loan right. Again, while the digital book is loaned out, Morgan
`cannot use it. Suppose, however, that Ryan goes off on vacation and,
`while he is playing volleyball on a beach thousands of miles away,
`the week's loan period runs out. He has completely forgotten the
`book. Because both repositories have clocks in them, Ryan's
`repository deactivates its copy when the week is up. Meanwhile,
`Morgan's repository also notices that the loan time is up and marks
`its temporarily deactivated copy as usable again. Without any action
`by either person, or even any communication between their
`repositories, the digital book has been returned automatically. If
`
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`Ryan still wants to access it later, he could pay a nominal fee to rent
`the work or to make his own copy. The point of both scenarios is
`that the repositories follow rules, which in this case mimic and
`improve on the rules of loaning for paper books. The ability to
`return loaned materials automatically would probably be widely
`used in digital libraries.
`
`Rendering Digital Works. To read a digital book you have to be able to
`see it; to listen to digital music you have to be able to hear it; to enjoy
`a digital video game, you have to be able to see and hear it. We use
`the term render to mean the processing of a digital work so that it
`can be experienced. Like copying,
`transferring, and loaning,
`rendering is controlled by usage rights.
`We distinguish two forms of rendering: playing and printing.
`When we play a digital work we send it to another person through
`some kind of transducer so that he or she can experience it. The term
`play, usually employed in phrases like playing music or playing a
`movie, is also used to denote displaying part of a book, running a
`computer program, or running an interactive video game. The term
`print in the digital context means to make a copy of the work on
`media outside usage rights control, either on paper or by writing a
`file to an external storage device.
`The concept of usage rights allows great flexibility in marketing
`digital works. Today, when you buy a compact disc at the music
`store, you pay for the copy and play it for free. The same is true for a
`book. You buy the book and read it as often as you want; generally,
`you aren’t supposed to make copies of it, but you can give it away.
`By contrast, keeping digital works in repositories would provide
`more flexibility.
`Suppose for example that Andrea's mother is at the music store
`but does not know exactly what music her teenage daughter wants
`to buy. She transfers a selection of music to her own repository,
`choosing collections by half a dozen bands that she knows Andrea
`likes. At this point she does not need to pay anything for the right to
`make the copies. When she gets home, she transfers the music to
`Andrea's repository for her to checks out at her leisure. Like all
`repositories, Andrea's home repository has a built—in credit server
`
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`18
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`mark arena
`
`can listen to short
`electronically. She
`funds
`transfers
`that
`demonstration samples for free or listen to pieces she selects for
`twenty-five cents an hour; or she can pay for five years of unlimited
`playing for $10. Thus, Andrea exercises a pay-for-play right rather
`than a pay—for-copying right. If pay for play has an infinite term,
`there are no fees for playing the music as often as she likes. The
`terms and alternatives for usage rights and usage fees would be set
`by the music’s creators and distributors. Wh