`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_______________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_______________________________
`
`AVAYA INC., DELL INC., SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
`and HEWLETT-PACKARD CO.
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`NETWORK-1 SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC.
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`
`CASE IPR2013-00071
`U.S. Patent No. 6,218,930
`____________________
`
`Before the Honorable Joni Y. Chang, Justin T. Arbes, and Glenn J. Perry
`____________________
`
`
`OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO AMEND
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.121
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`Requirement 1: Amendments Fail To Distinguish Prior Art Of Record ........ 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The “Ethernet Amendments” Fail To Distinguish Ground 2 ................ 2
`
`The “Determining Step” Fails To Distinguish Ground 1 ...................... 3
`
`III. Requirement 2: The Amendments Fail To Distinguish Other Known Prior
`Art—Both Of Record And Not Of Record ...................................................... 8
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Failure to Consider Woodmas ............................................................... 9
`
`Failure to Consider Known Ethernet-Related Prior Art......................11
`
`Failure to Consider Other Highly Relevant Known Prior Art ............12
`
`IV. Claims 10 and 11 Would Be Unpatentable Over Ground 2 (Matsuno And De
`Nicolo) In View Of Either Woodmas Or Chang ...........................................12
`
`V.
`
`Impermissable Broadening/ Lack of Written Description Support ...............13
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Requirement 3 – An Intentional Broadening Violation ......................13
`
`Lack of an Adequate Written Description ..........................................14
`
`VI. Requirement 4: Failure To Address Basic Knowledge and Skill Set ...........15
`
`VII. Conclusion .....................................................................................................15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`The Board should deny a motion to amend unless it:
`
`(1) shows that the added feature(s) distinguish the prior art of record;
`
`(2) shows that the added feature(s) distinguish other known prior art;
`
`(3) ensures that no claim is broadened in any way; and
`
`(4) addresses the basic skill level in the art.
`
`Regarding the first and second requirements, the patent owner bears the
`
`burden of: “com[ing] forward with technical facts and reasoning about those
`
`[added] feature(s), including construction of new claim terms, sufficient to
`
`persuade the Board that the proposed substitute claim is patentable over the prior
`
`art of record, and over the prior art not of record but known to the patent
`
`owner.” Idle Free Systems, Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00026, Paper 26 at p.
`
`7 (emphasis added).
`
`Network-1’s claim 10 proposes the following two amendments:
`
`• to specify that the data network and data node used in the method are
`
`“Ethernet” components ( “Ethernet amendments”); and
`
`• to add a step of “determining whether the access device is capable of
`
`accepting remote power based on the sensed voltage” (“determining step”).
`
`For the “Ethernet amendments,” Network-1 offers no argument to
`
`distinguish Ground 2 (De Nicolo in view of Matsuno). And, Network-1 fails to
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`address how or why the “Ethernet amendments” are not obvious over Ground 1
`
`(Matsuno).
`
`For the “determining step,” Network-1’s argument: (1) hinges on an
`
`improper construction of the phrase “capable of accepting,” which lacks support in
`
`the ’930 patent; and (2) attempts to shift the focus away from the added step, and
`
`onto other limitations of claim 6—admitting that the added step was known.
`
`Regarding the third requirement, the “determining step” broadly recites
`
`“voltage” instead of the “sensed” narrower feature of “voltage level.” This scope
`
`change, which Dr. Knox, agrees was not a mistake, impermissibly broadens the
`
`claim. Moreover, there is not an adequate written description to conclude that the
`
`inventors had possession of the broader invention.
`
`Finally, regarding the fourth requirement, Network-1 fails to even
`
`acknowledge the basic skill level despite warnings from the Board that motions
`
`which fail to specifically consider skill level are unlikely to be successful.
`
`Because Network-1’s Motion fails to satisfy each or even any of the
`
`requirements, along with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, it must be denied.
`
`II. Requirement 1: Amendments Fail To Distinguish Prior Art Of Record
`The “Ethernet Amendments” Fail To Distinguish Ground 2
`A.
`
`
`
`Network-1’s Motion wrongly contends that “each proposed amendment
`
`directly responds to the two grounds of unpatentability.” Motion at 8. Its Motion,
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`however, makes no showing how the “Ethernet amendments” distinguish Ground
`
`2. In fact, Dr. Knox agrees the “Ethernet amendments” do nothing to overcome it:
`
`
`
`Depo. Transcript of Knox (AV-1028)(“Knox Dep.”) at 143:10-20; see also Second
`
`Declaration of Dr. Zimmerman (AV-1041) (“2nd Zim. Decl.”) at ¶¶ 68-70
`
`(concurring that De Nicolo is Ethernet-based).
`
`
`
`Thus, Network-1’s Motion should be denied in toto for failing to distinguish
`
`Ground 2. Alternatively, the “Ethernet amendments” must be stricken.
`
`B.
`
`The “Determining Step” Fails To Distinguish Ground 1
`
`Matsuno does exactly what Network-1 proposes to add —namely, it
`
`determines whether the access device will be able to accept applied remote power
`
`based on sensing a particular voltage condition on the data signaling pair.
`
`1. Proper Construction of “capable of accepting”
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`
`Under the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) standard, the phrase
`
`“capable of accepting” means the access device is able to accept remote power at
`
`that time. While Network-1 merely pays lip service to the BRI standard (see
`
`Motion at n. 4), when asked, Dr. Knox applied a narrower definition in an attempt
`
`to distinguish Matsuno:
`
`
`
`Knox Dep., at 118:4-16.
`If Network-1 intended “capable of accepting” to mean capable of being
`
`operated without harm, it should have proposed that particular language. But it did
`
`not do so, and has failed to support how the ordinary and customary meaning of
`
`“capable of accepting” can mean operating the device without harm.
`
`Implicit, however, in the Motion is an alternative construction based on how
`
`an access device may be designed. Namely, Network-1 attempts to limit—through
`
`argument—the construction of “capable of accepting” to mean an access device
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`originally designed to accept remote power, whether or not the device has the
`
`ability to actually receive remote power at any given time. See Motion at 13; see
`
`also Declaration of Dr. James Knox (N1-2015) (“Knox Decl.”) at ¶¶ 187 & 213.
`
`That construction, which is much narrower than the broadest reasonable one, is
`
`inconsistent with the teachings of the ’930 patent, as described below. Again, if
`
`Network-1 intended “capable of accepting” to mean designed to accept, it should
`
`have proposed that language.
`
`The proper broadest reasonable ordinary and customary meaning of the
`
`phrase “capable of accepting” is that the access device is able to accept the remote
`
`power at that time. See 2nd Zim. Decl. at ¶¶ 76-82. That is, the determination that
`
`a device is “capable of accepting” must be that the access device, including the
`
`connection to that device, are in such a state that the remote power would be
`
`received if applied. See id. This is because, as Dr. Zimmerman previously
`
`testified, the “only thing the power-sourcing equipment can see is the combination
`
`of the line and the remote device.” Deposition Transcript of Dr. Zimmerman (N1-
`
`2016) (“Zim. Dep.”) at 22:6-22:16 (emphasis added). This construction is
`
`consistent with the teachings of the ’930 patent, which, significantly, does not
`
`teach any way in which to detect if a device was designed to accept power or if the
`
`device would be harmed by such power, irrespective of whether it can actually
`
`currently receive that power at the time. See 2nd Zim. Decl. at ¶¶ 76-82.
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`
`In the ’930 patent, if a particular voltage condition (sawtooth varying
`
`voltage) is seen, it is assumed that the access device is capable of accepting remote
`
`power. That voltage condition would simply not be produced, however, if the
`
`access device were in a state where it was unable to receive power (e.g., device or
`
`line failure)—irrespective of how it was designed. See 2nd Zim. Decl. at ¶ 80; see
`
`also Knox Dep. at 120:3-122:6; 125:2-126:5. Dr. Knox agrees that the proposed
`
`“determining step” inherently includes considering the ability of the device to
`
`accept remote power at the time the determination is made, which is precisely
`
`what Matsuno does. See Knox Dep. at 120:3-122:6; 125:2-126:5.
`
`2. Matsuno Operates In The Same Way
`
`Contrary to Network-1’s characterization, Matsuno does not automatically
`
`apply operating power via the high voltage source V1 once an access device is
`
`connected. In that sense, Matsuno is not limited to “captive” devices, as Network-
`
`1 uses that term, since power is selectively applied to only those devices that need
`
`it and can receive it. Rather, Matsuno looks for a particular voltage condition on
`
`the line that is indicative of the fact that the NT1/DTE needs power and is capable
`
`of actually accepting power at that particular point in time. See 2nd Zim. Decl. at
`
`¶¶ 83-90; see also Zim. Dep. at 44:5-8. Dr. Knox confirmed: (i) that Matsuno’s
`
`DTE is unable to receive the remote power when the breakers 8 are open (voltage
`
`condition not satisfied), but is able to receive remote power when the breakers are
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`closed and a DC loop is formed (voltage condition satisfied), (ii) that Matsuno
`
`applies the high voltage power V1 in response to detecting the particular voltage
`
`condition on the line, and (iii) that the particular voltage condition occurs only
`
`when local power is lost and the breakers 8 are closed. Knox Dep. at 127:6-128:7;
`
`129:6-129:13; 130:5-130:8; 131:6-132:8.
`
`Thus, by looking for and responding to a particular voltage condition on the
`
`data signaling pair, Matsuno determines that the access device is capable of
`
`accepting remote power based on the sense voltage. And while Matsuno may not
`
`independently detect whether or not the NT1/DTE was originally designed to
`
`accept remote power, neither does the ’930 patent.
`
`Put simply, the ’930 patent only describes a method that looks to “see” if
`
`one of three voltage conditions occurs: Condition A of a varying voltage level, in
`
`which case it assumes operational power can be supplied; and Condition B of a
`
`fixed voltage level drop, or Condition C of no voltage level drop, in which cases it
`
`assumes no operational power is to be supplied. In the same way, Matsuno looks
`
`to “see” if one of three voltage conditions occurs: Condition A of exceeding a set
`
`voltage, in which case it assumes operational power is to be supplied; and
`
`Condition B of an open circuit voltage, or Condition C of exceeding a second,
`
`higher set voltage, in which cases it assumes no operational power is to be supplied
`
`See 2nd Zim. Decl. at ¶¶ 85-89. Matsuno therefore “determines whether the access
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`device is capable of accepting remote power based on the sensed voltage” no
`
`differently than in the ’930 patent.
`
`In sum, Network-1’s arguments concerning patentability of the “determining
`
`step” are not commensurate with its claim scope. The arguments implicitly add
`
`limitations having no basis in the actual claim language. See In re Morris, 127 F.
`
`3d 1048, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`III. Requirement 2: The Amendments Fail To Distinguish Other Known
`Prior Art—Both Of Record And Not Of Record
`
`Aside from Matsuno and DeNicolo, only one reference —the Chang
`
`reference included in Avaya’s original Petition— is mentioned in the Motion.
`
`Thus, not a single prior art reference not already of record in this Proceeding is
`
`discussed, despite Network-1’s undeniable knowledge of other highly-relevant
`
`prior art brought to its attention during previous litigations, a granted ex parte
`
`reexamination, and IPR2013-00092 and -00386. As such, Network-1 has failed to
`
`carry its burden of showing that the proposed “determining step” would be
`
`patentably distinguishable over other known prior art not of record.
`
` Even with respect to Chang, Network-1’s Motion confirms—rather than
`
`contests—that the proposed amendments are unpatentable. First, Network-1
`
`concedes that Chang “…teaches the concept of determining whether an access
`
`device is capable of accepting remote power.” Motion at 15. It therefore relies on
`
`an alleged “teaching away” argument, which, however, is based on the original
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`“sensing step,” not the proposed “determining step.” Motion at 15 (“Chang
`
`teaches away . . ., where the sensed voltage, as required by the second step of
`
`Claim 6, is on the data signaling pair.”) (emphasis added). And while Chang may
`
`have had a misplaced concern about intrusiveness on the data signal, the later-in-
`
`time De Nicolo reference would have dispelled that concern as it teaches supplying
`
`power in a non-intrusive manner over the same data signaling pair used for the
`
`data. One skilled in the art understands that if operational power can be supplied
`
`over the same data signaling pair, then Chang’s detection signal could also be used
`
`on the same data signaling pair. At a minimum, one would be motivated to save
`
`the “spare pair” from use—knowing full well that both low and operational voltage
`
`can non-intrusively be provided over the data signaling pair per De Nicolo. Thus,
`
`Network-1’s teaching away argument fails and, as admitted, Chang discloses the
`
`proposed “determining step.”
`
`While Petitioner is not required to prove unpatentability of proposed
`
`amendments, aside from Chang, a sampling of other highly-relevant, known prior
`
`art that should have been addressed by Network-1, does just that.
`
`A.
`
`Failure to Consider Woodmas
`
`Woodmas is known prior art directly relevant to the proposed “determining
`
`step,” and apparently was never even reviewed by Dr. Knox in connection with
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`this Proceeding. See Knox Dep. at 162:24 – 163:18; see also Request for
`
`Rehearing in IPR2013-00092, Paper 22 (“the ’092 Request for Rehearing”).
`
`While Network-1 previously argued in IPR2013-00092 that Woodmas does
`
`not disclose the “data node adapted for data switching,” that element is wholly
`
`unrelated to the “determining step” proposed by Network-1 here. The requirement
`
`of showing patentable distinction is with respect to the particular feature(s)
`
`proposed to be added, not with respect to one or more other claim elements
`
`believed to be missing from the prior art.
`
`Woodmas states that:
`
`“When low level power is imposed on cable 30 and power
`reception unit 76 is present and operational, oscillator 88 (FIG.
`3) senses the low level voltage delivered to reception unit 76,
`produces the power status signal representative of the low level
`voltage and returns the signal by way of cable 30 back to
`delivery unit 34. In this way both the presence and functionality
`of power delivery unit 76 are checked before full power is
`imposed on cable 30.”
`Woodmas (AV-1040) at 7:39–52.
`
`This passage confirms that Woodmas expressly discloses “determining
`
`whether the access device is capable of accepting remote power based on the
`
`sensed voltage.” See 2nd Zim. Decl. at ¶¶ 92-97.
`
`While Network-1 may attempt to argue that Woodmas uses a “power status
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`signal” rather than sensed voltage to carry out the “determining step,” this is
`
`incorrect for two reasons. First, in prior litigation, Knox read the claim language
`
`on accused devices which converted an analog voltage level into digital
`
`information, which digital information was used to make decisions about
`
`controlling the power. See Knox Expert Report, March 14, 2010 (AV-1031),pp.
`
`73-74. Such an analog-to-digital conversion of the sensed voltage level is exactly
`
`how Woodmas’ “power status signal” is derived and used. See 2nd Zim. Decl. at ¶
`
`94-95. Network-1 cannot adopt one position to prove infringement, and a contrary
`
`position to find patentability.
`
`B.
`
`Failure to Consider Known Ethernet-Related Prior Art
`
`The Motion fails to explain why it would not have been obvious to adapt
`
`Matsuno to operate in an Ethernet environment, such as that of U.S. Provisional
`
`Patent App. No. 60/115628 from IPR 2013-00386, or why one could not have
`
`adapted such an Ethernet-related reference to implement Matsuno’s power control.
`
`See Knox Dep. at 167:14-168:1. In fact, commercial products were available that
`
`combined Ethernet and ISDN network communications, such as an ISDN router
`
`with an integrated Ethernet hub. And an IEEE standard existed for combined
`
`ISDN and Ethernet functionality. See 2nd Zim. Decl. at ¶ 71-74. Thus, the level
`
`of convergence between ISDN and Ethernet was already very high by the time the
`
`’930 patent had been filed. See id.; see also Knox Dep. at 65:16 – 66:19.
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`
`C.
`
`Failure to Consider Other Highly Relevant Known Prior Art
`
`Network-1’s Motion also fails to consider any of the prior art relied-upon in
`
`the granted, but now-stayed, ex parte reexamination filed against the ’930 patent
`
`over a year ago. Dr. Knox did not appear to be aware of that ex parte proceeding,
`
`nor of the fact that the U.S.P.T.O had already issued an Office Action finding the
`
`claims anticipated or obvious over several prior art references. See Knox Dep. at
`
`168:16-169:3; 171:1-171:15. Therefore, Network-1 has failed to show the
`
`proposed ‘determining step’ distinguishes other known prior art not of record.
`
`IV. Claims 10 and 11 Would Be Unpatentable Over Ground 2 (Matsuno
`And De Nicolo) In View Of Either Woodmas Or Chang
`
`
`
`Even under Network-1’s limiting interpretation of “capable of receiving,”
`
`the proposed substitute claims would still not be patentable over Matsuno and De
`
`Nicolo, in further combination with Woodmas or Chang. While the applicability
`
`of Matsuno and De Nicolo are fully set forth in Avaya’s Petition and Reply to the
`
`Patent Owner’s Response, Woodmas provides the proposed additional
`
`“determining step,” as detailed above in Section III.A.2. Therefore, when
`
`Woodmas is combined with Matsuno and De Nicolo, each and every one of the
`
`elements of proposed substitute claims 10 and 11 are present, arranged as claimed.
`
`Further, a skilled artisan would be motivated to consider Woodmas’
`
`teachings to provide additional information about the capabilities of the attached
`
`Ethernet devices of De Nicolo, which would enable more informed power
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`controlling decisions to be made using Matsuno’s power controlling techniques.
`
`Regarding obviousness over Chang, it is discussed above in Section III.
`
`V.
`
`
`Impermissable Broadening/ Lack of Written Description Support
`
`Every occurrence of the word “voltage” in the originally-issued claims is
`
`followed by the word “level.” The only embodiment that decides when to apply
`
`power is based on the sensed voltage “level.” Despite the uniformly consistent
`
`description of “voltage level” throughout the ’930 patent, the proposed amendment
`
`broadens the phrase by dropping the word “level” in the “determining step.” “In
`
`the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these
`
`different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.” See CAE Screenplates
`
`Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`A. Requirement 3 – An Intentional Broadening Violation
`
`While choosing to omit the word “level” may appear curious, Dr. Knox
`
`explained exactly why it was done. The phrase “sensing voltage” is “much more
`
`clear” than “voltage level” in how the claim covers the preferred embodiment of
`
`sensing a varying voltage level over time. See Knox Dep. at 133:19-134:19. An
`
`amended claim is enlarged if it includes within its scope subject matter not
`
`previously covered. See Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1580 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1995)(changing “at least” to “at least approximately” being a broadening).
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`
`Network-1 purposefully selected the broader term to improve its litigation
`
`infringement posture. Specifically, Dr. Knox explained that “[i]n the past there has
`
`been some confusion when we used that phrase, ‘voltage level,’ and it's confusion
`
`that relates to some of your questions this morning about whether it's over a period
`
`of time.” Id. at 133:24-134:2. Dr. Knox believes the phrase “sensed voltage” is
`
`less susceptible to being narrowly interpreted as being a single voltage
`
`measurement. See id. at 137:25-138:8 (emphasis added).
`
`By re-wording the claim in a manner which would render one of its key
`
`terms less susceptible to a narrower interpretation, Network-1 is engaging in a de
`
`facto broadening. A “patent owner may not seek to broaden a challenged claim in
`
`any respect, in the name of responding to an alleged ground of unpatentability.”
`
`Idle Free at 5 (emphasis added).
`
`Lack of an Adequate Written Description
`B.
`The ’930 patent consistently refers to sensing a voltage level. The only
`
`alleged inventive method described for remote powering senses the voltage level,
`
`and determines whether a device is capable of receiving power based on the
`
`voltage level. Making a determination based on voltage level is not merely a
`
`preferred embodiment, it is the only embodiment. Network-1’s attempt to now
`
`cover any characteristic of voltage, rather than its level, runs afoul of the written
`
`description requirement. See Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1340
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding it insufficient to rely on “knowledge in the art” to satisfy
`
`what inventor might have envisioned but failed to disclose).
`
`VI. Requirement 4: Failure To Address Basic Knowledge and Skill Set
`“[A]ny motion to amend claims specifically must address the basic
`
`knowledge and skill set possessed by one with ordinary skill in the art even
`
`without reliance on any particular item of prior art,” and a “motion to amend which
`
`fails in that regard is unlikely to be successful.” IPR2013-100, Paper 16 at page 2.
`
`Network-1’s Motion never mentions, or attempts to satisfy, this requirement.
`
`Rather, Network-1 does exactly what the Board admonished the patent
`
`owner in IPR2013-100 from doing. Namely, Network-1 relies on the conclusion
`
`(albeit flawed) that Matsuno and De Nicolo both assume that the access device is
`
`capable of accepting remote power and therefore have no need to carry out the
`
`proposed ‘determining step.’ See Motion at 13. The Motion provides no indication
`
`as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been able to readily adapt
`
`Matsuno or De Nicolo using the known basic and general techniques—as discussed
`
`above based on either Woodmas or Chang.
`
`VII. Conclusion
`
`For the reasons above, Network-1’s Motion to Amend should be denied.
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend
`
`IPR2013-0071
`
`
`
`
`
`
`October 22, 2013
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`/Jeffrey D. Sanok/
`
`Jeffrey D. Sanok, Reg. No. 32,169
`Jonathan M. Lindsay, Reg. No. 45,810
`CROWELL & MORING LLP
`Intellectual Property Group
`1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20004-2595
`Telephone No.: (202) 624-2500
`Facsimile No.: (202) 628-8844
`ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER AVAYA
`
`16
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e)
`
`I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of October 2013, a true and correct copy
`of the foregoing “OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO AMEND
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.121” was served, by electronic mail, upon the following:
`
`Robert G. Mukai
`Charles F. Wieland III
`BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL & ROONEY
`P.C.
`1737 King St., Suite 500
`Alexandria, VA 22314
`Robert.Mukai@BIPC.com
`Charles.Wieland@BIPC.com
`Counsel for Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc.
`
`Lionel M. Lavenue, Esq.
`Erika Arner, Esq.
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
`GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`Two Freedom Square
`11955 Freedom Drive
`Reston, VA 20190-5675
`(571) 203-2700
`lionel.lavenue@finnegan.com
`erika.arner@finnegan.com
`Counsel for Sony Corp. of America
`
`Michael J. Scheer
`Thomas M. Dunham
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`200 Park Ave.
`New York, NY 10166
`(212) 294-4700
`mscheer@winston.com
`tdunham@winston.com
`Counsel for Dell Inc.
`
`Robert J. Walters, Esq.
`Charles J. Hawkins, Esq.
`MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
`500 North Capitol Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20001
`(202) 756-8019
`rwalters@mwe.com
`chawkins@mwe.com
`Counsel for Hewlett-Packard Co.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`October 22, 2013
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /Jonathan Lindsay/
`Jonathan M. Lindsay, Reg. No. 45,810
`CROWELL & MORING LLP
`Intellectual Property Group
`1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20004-2595
`
`
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
