`Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
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` Paper 23
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` Entered: June 3, 2013
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`INNOLUX CORPORATION
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`SEMICONDUCTOR ENERGY LABORATORY CO., LTD.
`Patent Owner
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2013-00066(SCM)
`Patent 7,876,413 B2
` _______________
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KARL D. EASTHOM, and
`KEVIN F. TURNER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`EASTHOM, Administrative Patent Judge.
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`DECISION
` Request for Rehearing
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00066
`Patent 7,876,413 B2
`
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Patent Owner, Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd. (“SEL”), in its
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`Rehearing Request, seeks reversal of the Board’s Decision (“Decision”) to institute
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`an inter partes review of certain claims in the `413 patent. (See Rehearing Req. 6.)
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`SEL directs arguments toward a claim phrase which appears in claims 1, 2, 4-7, 9,
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`15, 17, 18, 20-22, and 29, “contact through an opening in the second insulating
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`film.” (See Rehearing Req. 6.)1 SEL argues that the Decision unreasonably
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`construes the phrase and that the claims define over Sukegawa. (See Rehearing
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`Req. 1-15.)
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`The applicable standard for a request for rehearing is set forth in 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part:
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`A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing,
`without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a
`decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.
`The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the
`Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter
`was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply.
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`For the reasons that follow, SEL fails to show that the Board
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`misapprehended or overlooked any material matters warranting a reversal of the
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`Decision. Accordingly, the Board denies the requested relief.
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` II. DISCUSSION
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`SEL’s contention that the Board overlooked or misapprehended the meaning
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`of “contact through an opening” is not persuasive. The Board construed the phrase
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`to include SEL’s definition; i.e., the contact occurs “through” or “because of” the
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`1 The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 4-7, 9-11, 13-18, 20- 22, 24, 25, and
`27-29. (Dec. 2.)
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`2
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`Case IPR2013-00066
`Patent 7,876,413 B2
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`opening. The Board also construed the phrase to include another ordinary
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`definition supported by the `413 patent; i.e., the location of the contact occurs
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`“through” or “between the vertical limits of the opening.” (See Dec. 11-12.)
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`SEL urges that the Board’s claim construction misinterprets the meaning of
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`“through” because “the Board used a general purpose dictionary that is completely
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`unrelated to semiconductor technology.” (See Rehearing Req. 5.) SEL also
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`contends that the `413 patent Specification does not support the Board’s claim
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`construction and only supports SEL’s claim construction. (See Rehearing Req. 8-
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`10.)
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`The Decision addresses SEL’s contention that “through” only means
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`“because of” or “by virtue of.” (See Rehearing Req. 10; Dec. 10-12; 17-20.) SEL
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`now contends that “[w]hen the Board consulted a general purpose dictionary for
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`definitions of ‘through,’ it found some definitions beyond the context of the ‘413
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`patent specification.” (Rehearing Req. 9.) SEL includes the following dictionary
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`definitions cited by the Board as “beyond the [proper] context”: defining “through”
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`to mean “[a]mong or between; in the midst of: a walk through the flowers” or
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`“[h]ere and there in; around: a tour through France.” (See Dec. 11 (dictionary
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`citation omitted); Rehearing Req. 5, 9-10.)
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`Contrary to SEL’s argument, the `413 patent employs the word “through” in
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`different contexts. For example, the`413 patent notes that “a spacer . . . penetrates
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`through the resin.” (Ex. 1001, col. 13, ll. 43-44.) In other words, contrary to
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`SEL’s arguments, the word “through” as employed in the `413 patent does not
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`always take on its alternative ordinary meanings of “because of” or “by virtue of.”
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`Rather, the word implies that “through an opening” can mean “between the vertical
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`limits of the opening” as the Decision reasons and as discussed further below. (See
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`Rehearing Req. 11; Dec. 12, 18.)
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`3
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`Case IPR2013-00066
`Patent 7,876,413 B2
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`While SEL contends that it is not clear how the Board’s definition of
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`“through” is “relevant” to the phrase at issue, SEL virtually acknowledges that the
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`Board provides the relevance in SEL’s statement that “Figure 4A of the `413 patent
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`shows that the [electrical] contact occurs at the bottom of the opening in resin
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`inter-layer film 113, as the Board notes.” (Rehearing Req. 10.) While SEL also
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`contends that the depicted contact satisfies its proposed definition that the contact
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`occurs “because of” the opening, the depicted contact location is also consistent
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`with the Board’s definition which also specifies a contact location. In other words,
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`Figure 4A shows contact “between the vertical limits of the opening.” The Figure
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`4A depiction and the Board’s definition coalesce with one of the Board’s cited
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`dictionary definitions of “through” as meaning, for example, “among or between”
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`as discussed supra.
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`Moreover, the `413 patent states that electrical lines are “connected in
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`parallel by forming contact holes in the first inter-layer film.” (Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll.
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`48-49.) That disclosure implies that the claims at issue are broader than any single
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`embodiment described therein. If the disclosed contact occurs “because of” the
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`opening, it does so because a connection occurs “by [first] forming” the opening.
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`In other words, the thrust of SEL’s arguments is that an implied order of making
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`the opening exists in which an electrical contact is formed after forming the
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`opening: “To make that contact happen, an opening had to be provided before
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`depositing the ITO 114.” (Rehearing Req. 11.) However, contrary to SEL’s
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`thrust, the device claims at issue here do not require the specific order of making as
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`argued, even if the `413 patent happens to disclose such an order. Therefore, for
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`this additional reason, SEL does not show that the Decision misapprehends the
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`meaning of the claim phrase, “contact through an opening.”
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`4
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`Case IPR2013-00066
`Patent 7,876,413 B2
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`Moreover, even under SEL’s definition of “contact through an opening,”
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`SEL does not show that the Board misapprehended that Sukegawa renders obvious
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`the disputed phrase in the claims at issue. (See Rehearing Req. 14-15; Dec. 19-20.)
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`As the Decision explains under an alternative which employs SEL’s definition,
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`Sukegawa suggests making a subsequent through-hole reconnection in a repairing
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`operation “to replace the peeled-off wiring 7 and film 8.” (Dec. 20.) In response,
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`SEL contends that it would have been “technically impossible” to place a
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`completed LCD panel into a “deposition or etching apparatus” to replace that
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`wiring and film. (See Rehearing Req. 15.)
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`However, at this preliminary stage, the record does not support SEL’s
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`characterization of a deposition or etching apparatus. Sukegawa reasonably
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`suggests that applying new contact materials in through-holes would have been
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`obvious to replace the missing contact materials, as the Decision explains. (See
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`Dec. 19-20.) SEL also does not contend that forming metal contact layers other
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`than by “deposition or etching” would have been impossible or unobvious.
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`Accordingly, SEL does not show that the Decision misapprehends the claim
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`phrase “contact through an opening,” or overlooks a material point related to the
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`obviousness of providing such contact through an opening as set forth in the claims
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`at issue here.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`Based on the foregoing discussion, SEL’s Rehearing Request is granted to
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`the extent that the Board has reconsidered its Decision, but SEL’s requested relief
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`for a reversal of the Decision is denied because SEL has not shown that the
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`Decision overlooks or misapprehends a material point.
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`5
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`Case IPR2013-00066
`Patent 7,876,413 B2
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`For Petitioner:
`
`Scott A. McKeown
`Gregory S. Cordrey
`OBLON, SPIVAK, McCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
`cpdocketmckeown@oblon.com
`gcordrey@jmbm.com
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`For Patent Owner:
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`Mark Murphy
`Edward Manzo
`Husch Blackwell
`mark.murphy@huschblackwell.com
`
`Stanley A. Schlitter
`Douglas R. Peterson
`Steptoe & Johnson, LLP
`sschlitt@steptoe.com
`dpeterson@steptoe.com
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`6
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