UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`INNOLUX CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
`
`V.
`
`SEMICONDUCTOR ENERGY LABORATORY CO., LTD.
`Patent Owner
`
`Case IPR2013-00066 (SCM)
`Patent 7,876,413 B2
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQ QUEST FOR REHEARING OF DECISION TO
`INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`INNOLUX CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
`
`V.
`
`SEMICONDUCTOR ENERGY LABORATORY CO., LTD.
`Patent Owner
`
`Case IPR2013-00066 (SCM)
`Patent 7,876,413 B2
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQ QUEST FOR REHEARING OF DECISION TO
`INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING OF DECISION TO
`INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 .... ..l
`
`I.
`
`THE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF “CONTACT THROUGH AN
`
`OPENING” IS UNREASONABLE .............................................. ..l
`
`A.
`
`The Board Followed Incorrect Claim Construction Procedure ....... . .2
`
`B.
`
`The Board Definition is Broad Beyond Reasonable Bounds .......... ..5
`
`1.
`
`The Claims Use “Through” in Different Contexts .............. ..6
`
`The Claims Also Distinguish Between “Contact” and “Contact
`2.
`Through an Opening” ............................................................... ..7
`
`None of the Specification Uses of “Through” Support the
`3.
`Board’s Alternate Construction .................................................... ..8
`
`The Board’s Construction of “Through” Is Divorced From the
`4.
`Correct Context ...................................................................... ..9
`
`C.
`
`Conclusion re the Board’s Alternate Construction .................... ..l3
`
`II.
`
`THE CLAIMS DEFINE OVER SUKEGAWA ............................... .. 13
`
`III.
`
`The ALTERNATE CONTENTION RE SUKEGAWA IS WRONG. .
`
`.
`
`. .
`
`14 A
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................ .. l 5
`
`
`
`-1-
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQ QUEST FOR REHEARING OF DECISION TO
`INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`The Decision to Institute inter partes review mailed April 24, 2013 has been
`
`carefully considered. This Request for Rehearing on behalf of the Patent Owner
`
`(“SEL”) is filed within 14 days of the Decision (Paper 10) and is timely under 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.71. SEL respectfully requests rehearing because the Board incorrectly
`
`construed the claim language and improperly interpreted what the asserted prior art
`
`U.S. Patent ,5 ,63 6,329 to Sukegawa disclosed.
`
`I.
`
`THE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF “CONTACT THROUGH AN
`
`OPENING” IS UNREASONABLE
`
`In Paper 10, pp. 10-12, the Board construed the claimed phrase “. .. contact
`
`through an opening.” From an English language dictionary, the Board reproduced
`
`“several ordinary definitions” for the Word “through.”
`
`Id., p. 11. SEL had
`
`proposed a definition that in the context of this phrase and patent specification,
`
`“contact through an opening” means contact made possible by the opening or by
`
`Virtue of the opening. The Board agreed that SEL’s definition is consistent with the
`
`specification of U.S. Patent No. 7,876,413 (“the ‘413 patent”) and three of the
`
`dictionary definitions which the Board cited.
`
`However, the Board then made further comments on the ordinary meaning
`
`of “through” according to these dictionary definitions, “tempered by the meaning
`
`thereof in light of the ‘4l3 patent specification and the claim phrase at issue ...” Id.
`
`
`
`- 2 —
`
`lPR2013—0OO66
`
`It concluded that
`
`these dictionary definitions do not preclude contact
`
`from
`
`occurring “between” the vertical limits of the claimed contact opening or through-
`
`hole defined by the surrounding insulation film, even if the opening does not cause
`
`or permit the contact to be made. The Board referenced Figure 4A of the ‘413
`
`patent which shows that the electrical contact between ITO transparent conductive
`
`layer 114 and second wiring 403 occurs at the bottom boundary of the opening in
`
`the second insulating film 113 such that “between” includes that bottom boundary
`
`of the opening in insulating film 113. 1d,, pp. 11-12. It ruled, “Accordingly,
`
`‘contact through an opening’ means contact which occurs because of, or by virtue
`
`of, the opening, or which occurs between the vertical limits of the opening.” Ia’., p.
`
`12 [emphasis added]. SEL respectfully submits that the ruling wrongly includes the
`
`alternate definition, reproduced here in italics. Everything beginning with “or”
`
`should be stricken.
`
`A.
`
`The Board Followed Incorrect Claim Construction Procedure
`
`The Board consulted The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
`
`Language (1975) and developed a construction of “contact through an opening”
`
`based on some general definitions it found there. The Board followed a procedure
`
`similar to one overruled en banc in Phillips v. AWH Corp, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005). That Court specifically addressed the use of dictionaries at 415 F.3d
`
`1303, 1319-1324. It cited (and abrogated) the panel decision in Texas Digital
`
`
`
`~ 3 -
`
`lPR2013-00066
`
`Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Texas Digital had
`
`ruled that Words often have multiple dictionary meanings so the intrinsic record
`
`must be consulted to determine which of the different possible meanings is most
`
`consistent with the use of the term in question by the inventor. Texas Digital added
`
`that the patent specification and file history must be consulted to determine
`
`Whether the patentee has used the words of the claim in a manner clearly
`
`inconsistent With the ordinary meaning reflected, for example,
`
`in a dictionary
`
`definition. Phillips at 1319 [internal quotation marks omitted]. Under Texas Digital
`
`the presumption in favor of a dictionary definition is overcome Where the patentee
`
`acts as a lexicographer or has made a disavowal or disclaimer of claim scope.
`
`la’.
`
`The reason given by the Texas Digital panel for this modus operandi Was to
`
`avoid importing limitations into the claims. The Federal Circuit agreed in Phillips
`
`that the goal expressed in Texas Digital was Valid but the methodology adopted to
`
`achieve that goal “placed too much reliance on extrinsic sources such as
`
`dictionaries,
`
`treatises, and encyclopedias and too little on intrinsic sources,
`
`in
`
`particular the specification and prosecution history.” Phillips, at 1320. The Federal
`
`Circuit explained, “In effect, the Texas Digital approach limits the role of the
`
`specification in claim construction to serving as a check on the dictionary meaning
`
`of a claim term if the specification requires the court to conclude that fewer than all
`
`the dictionary definitions apply, or if the specification contains a sufficiently
`
`
`
`I
`
`— 4 -
`
`lPR2013-00066
`
`specific alternative definition or disavowal.” Id. The Phillips Court explicitly
`
`rejected that limitation:
`
`The main problem with elevating the dictionary to such
`prominence is that
`it
`focuses the inquiry on the abstract
`meaning of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms
`Within the context of the patent. Properly viewed, the ‘ ‘ordinary
`meaning’ ’ of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan
`after reading the entire patent. Yet heavy reliance on the
`dictionary
`divorced
`from the
`intrinsic
`evidence
`risks
`transforming the meaning of the claim term to the artisan into
`the meaning of the term in the abstract, out of its particular
`context, which is the specification.
`
`Phillips at 1321. Considering Merrill v. Yeomcms, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1876),
`
`Phillips explained, “The use of a dictionary definition can conflict with that
`
`directive because the patent’s applicant did not create the dictionary to describe the
`
`invention. Thus, there may be a disconnect between the patentee’s responsibility to
`
`describe and claim his invention, and the dictionary editors’ objective of
`
`aggregating all possible definitions for particular Words.” Phillips at 1321. Also,
`
`“The risk of systematic overbreadth is greatly reduced if the court instead focuses
`
`at the outset on how the patentee used the claim terms in the claims, specification,
`
`and prosecution history, rather than starting with a broad definition and whittling it
`
`down.” Id. General usage dictionaries cannot overcome art-specific evidence of the
`
`meaning. Id. at 1322. A particularly apropos admonition states:
`
`A claim should not rise or fall based upon the preferences of a
`particular dictionary editor, or the court’s independent decision,
`
`
`
`- 5 —
`
`IPRZO13-00066
`
`uninformed by the specification, to rely on one dictionary rather
`than another. Finally, the authors of dictionaries or treatises
`may simplify ideas to communicate them most effectively to
`the public and may thus choose a meaning that is not pertinent
`to the understanding of particular claim language. See
`generally Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary
`Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 275, 293-314
`(1998). The resulting definitions therefore do not necessarily
`reflect
`the inventor’s goal of distinctly setting forth his
`invention as a person of ordinary skill in that particular art
`would understand it.
`
`Id. [emphasis added].
`
`In the present case,the Board used a general purpose dictionary that is
`
`completely unrelated to semiconductor technology. The Board selected several
`
`different usages of the word “through.” That process took the Word “through”
`
`away from the phrase where it appears in the patent. In support of an expanded
`
`definition, the Board relied on alternate definitions Where the context is (quoting
`
`from the dictionary) “a walk through the flowers,” and “a tour through France ...”
`
`Paper 10, p. 11. These alternate definitions are utterly unrelated to semiconductor
`
`manufacturing technology, and the Board followed the Wrong path in construing a
`
`term of art in the semiconductor industry.
`
`B.
`
`The Board Definition is Broad Beyond Reasonable Bounds
`
`In IPRS, a claim term has “the broadest reasonable construction in light of
`
`the specification of the patent
`
`in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. §42.lO0(b)
`
`[emphasis added]. The task is not to find the broadest abstract meaning of words in
`
`
`
`- 6 -
`
`|PR2013—00066
`
`a phrase. Rather, it is to find the broadest construction that is reasonable in light of
`
`the specification of the patent in which it appears. The Federal Circuit requires that
`
`USPTO claim interpretations be reasonable and in harmony with the specification.
`
`It has reversed the Board for applying unreasonably broad interpretations of claim
`
`language to support rej ections.1
`
`Phillips ’ admonitions apply even when seeking the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation. First, the Rule still specifies “in light of the specification.” Second,
`
`the Federal Circuit crafted no carVe—out for USPTO claim constructions.
`
`1.
`
`The Claims Use “Through” in Different Contexts
`
`The claims use the Word “through” in different contexts. First, claims 1, 7,
`
`15, 17, 22, and 29 use the phrase “through an opening” in the claim feature: “the
`
`second Wiring and the transparent conductive layer are in direct contact through an
`
`opening in the second insulating film.” Second, claims 1, 7, 10, 17, 22, and 24 use
`
`the same phrase in another recital: “the first wiring and the second wiring are in
`
`electrical contact through an opening in the first insulating film.” Thus, claims 1, 7,
`
`17, and 22 call for contact “through an opening” twice. The claims also call for
`
`1In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Rehrig
`Paczfc Co, 461 Fed. Appx 942 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (non-precedential); In re Suitco
`Surface, 603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Vaidyanathan, 381 Fed. Appx. 985,
`96 USPQ2d 1507 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (non-precedential); In re Wheeler, 304 Fed.
`Appx. 867 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (non-precedential); In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364 (Fed.
`Cir. 2007).
`
`
`
`— 7 —
`
`lPR2013-00066
`
`“electrical contract through the transparent conductive layer.” See claims 1, 7, 17,
`
`and 22 (“the second wiring and the flexible printed circuit are in electrical contact
`
`through the transparent conductive layer”). Furthermore,
`
`the claims call
`
`for
`
`“flexible printed circuit is electrically connected to the active matrix display circuit
`
`through the first wiring and the second wiring.” See also claims 17, 22, and 24. In
`
`these contexts, the Word “through” fits with SEL’s definition of “because of’ or
`
`“by Virtue of.” However, the Board’s construction of “between” or “around” is
`
`inapposite and inapplicable.
`
`2.
`
`The Claims Also Distinguish Between “Contact” and
`“Contact Through an Opening”
`
`When the inventors meant to call for contact unrelated to a contact opening,
`
`they used appropriate language for that. Thus,
`
`‘413 claim element 1.9 recites,
`
`“wherein the sealant is in direct contact with the second insulating film.”
`
`The phrase at issue here always denotes that a contact is made Via the
`
`opening. Something has to reach into the opening to establish the contact. The
`
`contact occurs because the opening permits it. For example, if first and second
`
`wirings are separated by an insulating film disposed between them, these wirings
`
`can only be in contact with one another because of an opening in the insulating
`
`film. Without going through the opening, there is no contact.
`
`
`
`- 8 -
`
`lPR2013—OO066
`
`3.
`
`None of the Specification Uses of “Through” Support the
`Board’s Alternate Construction
`
`Nothing in the ‘413 patent supports a claim construction that contact
`
`through an opening can mean contact everywhere, including at the bottom of the
`
`opening, but not because of, or by Virtue of, the opening. In every use of contact
`
`through an opening in the specification, SEL’s construction applies.
`
`The ‘413 patent uses “through” in Various contexts.
`
`In one context,
`
`“through” means that contact occurs Via the opening. Another usage is this:
`
`Referring to FIG. 4A, the external connection lines 403 are
`electrically connected to an FPC (flexible printed circuit) 107
`through contact holes provided in the resin inter-layer film 113
`through an ITO (indium tin oxide) film 114. In the present
`embodiment, the ITO film 114 is fabricated at the same step as
`for an ITO film that forms pixel electrodes connected to the
`TFTs of the active matrix display circuit. The ITO film 114 is
`electrically connected to external circuits through the FPC 107.
`
`Ex 1001, p.15, col. 8, 11. 52-60 [emphasis added]. The specification speaks of
`
`through contact holes, through an ITO film, and through the FPC 107. Here, the
`
`context informs that the word “through” denotes “because of’ or “by Virtue of.”
`
`The ‘413 patent also uses “through” in describing Example 1, where it refers
`
`I to how film 113 is made: “The resin inter-layer film 113 is made of organic resin
`
`such as acrylic or polyimide and is formed through deposition using a spin coating
`
`process or the like.” 1d,, p. 15, col. 7, lines 3-5 [emphasis added].
`
`Another use found in the patent is in the causality sense:
`
`
`
`- 9 —
`
`|PR2013-00066
`
`FIG. 15E shows a rear type projector in which light emitted
`by a light source 2402 provided in a main body 2401 is
`reflected and modulated by a pixel portion in a reflection type
`liquid crystal display device 2403. The reflected light
`is
`projected through a mirror 2404 and 2405 upon a screen 2406
`to be displayed thereon as an image.
`
`Id., p. 18, col. 14, lines 24-29. This usage together with Fig. 15E itself clearly
`
`indicate that the mirrors cause the projecting.
`
`lmportantly, no usage of “through” in the specification supports the View
`
`that “(contact) through an opening” means that contact occurs at the opening but
`
`not because of or via the opening. In all instances Where “through an opening” is
`
`used, it is clear that the opening causes the contact, Without exception.
`
`4.
`
`The Board’s Construction of “Through” Is Divorced From
`the Correct Context
`
`When the Board consulted a general purpose dictionary for definitions of
`
`“through,” it found some definitions beyond the context of the ‘413 patent
`
`specification. The fact that such definitions exist does not make them “reasonable
`
`in light of the speczfication.” The dictionary had to account for instances Where
`
`“through” is used in very different contexts, as in “a walk through the flowers” and
`
`“a tour through France.” These are different from making Contact through an
`
`opening in a semiconductor device. The dictionary definitions relied on by the
`
`Board for its alternate construction use the Word “through” to mean “among or
`
`between; in the midst of’ (definition 2) or “here and there in; around” (definition
`
`
`
`- 10 —
`
`_
`
`IPRZO13-00066
`
`5). Such usages do not appear to occur in the ‘4l3 patent claims or specification.
`
`The phrase, “contact through an opening” adds critical context. The Board’s
`
`first interpretation of “through” is in that context: the phrase means “contact which
`
`occurs because of or by virtue of the opening.” This makes sense in the context of
`
`how “contact through an opening” is used in the specification and drawings. The
`
`Board’s second interpretation of “through” is “between the vertical limits of the
`
`opening.” It is unclear how the dictionary meanings cited by the Board are even
`
`relevant to the phrase, “contact through an opening,” and if they are, how they
`
`lead to the Board’s alternate definition.
`
`SEL respectfully submits that it is unreasonable to apply these meanings of
`
`“through” to “contact through an opening” in a semiconductor technology. The
`
`Board’s alternate definition fundamentally changes the entire concept of “contact
`
`through an opening” from what was explained in the ‘4l3 patent specification and
`
`uses the word out of the context in which it appears.
`
`Figure 4A of the ‘4l3 patent shows that the contact occurs at the bottom of
`
`the opening in resin inter—layer film ll3, as the Board notes. However, that is
`I05 SEALENT
`
`.
`_
`unavailing. Such contact occurs due
`
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`112 FIRST INTER-
`LAYER FILM
`
`to the first definition, not the second.
`
`401 AUXILIARY LINES
`403
`EXTERNAL CONNECTION LINES
`
`I“ EEQERLYING The contact occurs because of or by
`X 101 SUBSTRATE
`
`
`
`— 1'1 -
`
`lPR2013-00066
`
`virtue of the opening in inter-layer film 113 to expose the top surface of connection
`
`lines 403. Hence, it is the E definition that describes the structure here.
`
`The Board’s second definition is merely a byproduct of the first definition.
`
`In Figure 4A, a structure is shown which indicates that an intermediate structure
`
`was formed having external connection lines 403 as an uppermost structure.
`
`Following that, resin inter-layer film 113 was added on top of it. Because film 113
`
`covers the top of lines 403, a subsequent layer (such as ITO) added after the
`
`deposition of film 113 would not touch or contact lines 403. Film 113 prevents it.
`
`To make that contact happen, an opening had to be provided before
`
`depositing the ITO 114. That opening is shown at the right side of Figure 4A --
`
`which the Board itself cites. Having created that opening, a process was used
`
`subsequently to add the ITO 114, part of which would contact the top surface of
`
`lines 403 whose upper surface had been exposed by the opening. Subsequently,
`
`another process installed the flexible printed circuit 107 on top of the ITO 114. It is
`
`only because of the opening in film 113 that contact could be made between ITO
`
`114 and lines 403. Without the opening, ITO 114 could not contact lines 403
`
`buried below film 113. The actual contact occurs at the bottom of the opening
`
`where lines 403 are located.
`
`This relationship is referred to in the last element of claim 1 which states,
`
`“wherein the second wiring and the transparent conductive layer are in direct
`
`
`
`— 12 —
`
`|PR20’I3—O0O66
`
`contact through an opening in the second insulating film.” [Emphasis added.] The
`
`sense in which this phrase is used in the claim, as fully supported by Figure 4A, is
`
`that without the contact opening, the “direct contact through [the] opening in the
`
`film” would not occur. It is only because of and by virtue ofthe opening that the
`
`direct contact occurs. That the contact occurs at the bottom of the opening is only
`
`because the opening permitted the contact to occur.
`
`When searching for the broadest reasonable interpretation, the Board turned
`
`to the second and fifth dictionary definitions relating to Walking through flowers
`
`and touring through France. These are not reasonable to apply here because they
`
`are completely outside the context of semiconductor device manufacturing. The
`
`issue is not merely the isolated Word “through,” but rather it is making electrical
`
`contact or direct contact in a semiconductor device “through an opening.”
`
`The Board’s alternate definition changes the meaning of “through” to “at.”
`
`This is clearly unreasonable and not what is understood when artisans in the
`
`semiconductor device industry use the phrase “contact through an opening.” This
`
`alternative definition is unreasonable because it encompasses situations where the
`
`Contact is made Wholly independently of the opening. Such a situation is not
`
`described in the claim language or the ‘4l3 patent specification.
`
`Also, it is unsound to describe a preexisting contact that happens to be
`
`located under an opening as “contact through an opening” because “through” has
`
`
`
`— 13 -
`
`IPR2013-00066
`
`no sensible meaning in that context. The Board’s claim construction unreasonably
`
`expands the meaning of “through” in this phrase and context.
`
`C.
`
`Conclusion re the Board’s Alternate Construction
`
`The Board adopted a two-part construction of “through,” but its second part
`
`does not reflect the context of the ‘4l3 patent specification, claims, nor the phrase
`
`in which the word is used. That loss of‘ context is the very danger explained en
`
`banc in Phillips. SEL respectfully requests the Board to reconsider and give
`
`“contact through an opening” the construction provided by SEL and adopted
`
`correctly in the first part of the Board’s claim construction. The second part is an
`
`anomaly unrelated to the semiconductor fabrication industry; it should be stricken.
`
`II.
`
`THE CLAIMS DEFINE OVER SUKEGAWA
`
`Under the broadest reasonable claim interpretation, Sukegawa fails to meet
`
`the last element of claim 1 (which appears also in claims 7, 15, 17, 22, and 29). See
`
`SEL’s Prelim. Resp. pp. 37-40, 52-53. In brief, Sukegawa’s transparent conductive
`
`film 8 sits directly upon upper layer metal wiring 7. The opening in protective
`
`insulating film 9 beneath CMI’s red arrow shows that contact between wiring 7
`
`and film 8 extends broadly, including below the remaining parts of film 9. Such
`
`contact preceded the opening which uncovered some of film 8. At the right side of
`
`Sukegawa Fig. 2C, the opening allows anisotropic conductive film 10 to contact
`
`film 8. At the left side, silicone resin 13 covers the remaining, otherwise-exposed,
`
`
`
`- 14 —
`
`lPR20’I3-00066
`
`top surface of film 8. Clearly, this opening in Sukegawa fails to permit the contact
`
`between wiring 7 and film 8, as it preexisted. The contact is clearly not via the
`
`opening; it is beneath the opening and elsewhere.
`
`SEL requests the Board to reconsider its ruling at paper 10, p. 18, especially
`
`note 6. The Board adopts a strained, arbitrary View of the “bottom” of opening 14,
`
`which in fact is defined by the exposed top surface of film 8 in Sukegawa Fig. 3B.
`
`What happens below film 8 is below the opening 14, not in the opening 14. The
`
`contact between wiring 7 and film 8 is below that bottom. For this further reason,
`
`Sukegawa does not teach this “through an opening” feature.
`
`III. THE ALTERNATE CONTENTION RE SUKEGAWA IS WRONG
`
`At paper 10, pp. 19-20, the Board’s alternate analysis of Sukegawa stated :
`
`...sl<illed artisans would have recognized that new terminal
`contact wiring 7 and transparent conductive layer 8 sections
`could have been provided through the pre—existing opening in
`the second insulating film 9 in order to replace the peeled—off
`wiring 7 and film 8.
`Such a new connection would have
`created a reliable re-connection which would have been similar
`to the initial connection. This subsequent through—hole re-
`connection, as suggested by Sukegawa, also satisfies SEL’s
`definition of the recited limitation in claim 1, “direct contact
`through an opening.” (Paper 10, p. 19, l. 24 - p. 20, l. 7)
`
`The Board cites Sukegawa, col. 6, l. 39-col. 7, l. 15. However, that passage
`
`is directed to tape-carrier package 300. As stated in col. 5,
`
`ll. 32-36, a liquid
`
`crystal panel
`
`is completed, and then a tape-carrier 300 is connected to the
`
`
`
`- 15 —
`
`|PR2013-00066
`
`completed LCD panel. Hence, the repairing operation of the tape—carrier package
`
`300 in this section of Sukegawa is conducted on a completed LCD panel.
`
`Therefore, the Sukegawa passage cited by the Board does not indicate that a new
`
`connection is achieved by using a new terminal contact wiring 7 and a new
`
`transparent conductive layer 8 of the LCD panel, but instead that a new connection
`
`of the tape-carrier package is made by a new anisotropic conductive film 10.
`
`It is technically impossible for a completed LCD panel, such as in Sukegawa
`
`Fig. 3D, to be placed again in a deposition or etching apparatus. Accordingly, it is
`
`technically impossible to form a new terminal contact wiring 7 and transparent
`
`conductive layer 8 in the terminal portion. A skilled artisan simply would not do
`
`this, and this passage is not a basis for suggesting “contact through an opening.”
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The Board should withdraw its decision and issue a new decision based on a
`
`correct claim interpretation and interpretation of Sukegawa.
`
`
`
`
`Mark J. Murphy, Reg”f'“’No,,..,§4,225
`Edward Manzo, Reg. No.
`
`Husch Blackwell LLP
`
`120 South Riverside Plaza
`
`Chicago, Illinois 60606
`(312) 526-1533
`Customer No. 24628
`
`
`
`- 1 ~
`
`|PR20’I3-00066
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`the foregoing PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR
`I certify that
`REHEARING OF DECISION TO INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`§ 42.71 was served on the Petitioner by Federal
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R.
`Express Standard Overnight at the following addresses on May 8, 2013.
`
`Scott A. McKeoWn
`
`Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier & Neustadt, L.L.P.
`1940 Duke Street
`
`Alexandria, VA 22314
`
`Gregory S. Cordrey
`Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP
`3 Park Plaza, Suite 1100
`
`Irvine, CA 92614-2592
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