`
`By: Richard D. Mc Leod (Reg. No. 46,921)
`Rick.mcleod@klarquist.com
`Michael D. Jones (Reg. No. 41,879)
`michael.jones@klarquist.com
`Klarquist Sparkman LLP
`One World Trade Center, Suite 1600
`121 S.W. Salmon Street
`Portland, Oregon 97204
`Telephone: (503) 595-5300
`Facsimile: (503) 595-5301
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`ABB, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`ROY-G-BIV CORPORATION
`Patent Owner
`
`____________
`
`Trial No. IPR2013-00062 (joined with IPR2013-00282)
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`____________
`
`ABB’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT
`OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`
`II.
`
`DISCUSSION .................................................................................................. 1
`
`A.
`
`RGB’s Motion Is Improper ................................................................... 1
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`ABB’s Reply Responded To The Issues Raised By RGB .................... 2
`
`Drs. Papanikolopoulos And Voyles Testimony Is Admissible ............. 7
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Drs. Papanikolopolous And Voyles Offer Facts
`In Addition To Opinions Based On The Cited Art ..................... 8
`
`Expert Testimony
`(Via Declaration) Is Not An “Expert Report” ..........................11
`
`3.
`
`Dr. Papanikolopolous Applied The Law Correctly ..................12
`
`III. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................13
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Avaya, Inc. v. Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00071, Paper 75, Dec. 2, 2013 ................................................................ 1
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .................................................................................................11
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................13
`
`
`
`Other Authorities
`
`MPEP 2143.03 ........................................................................................................... 9
`
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide,
`77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48767 (Aug. 14, 2012) .......................................................... 2
`
`
`
`Rules
`
`Rules of Practice,
`77 Fed. Reg. at 48633 ............................................................................................. 2
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`ABB timely submits this Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`
`Evidence (Paper #59). RGB moved to exclude: “(1) arguments raised for the first
`
`time in ABB’s reply (“Reply”); (2) new alleged grounds of un-patentability outside
`
`of the scope of the initial Petition and Institution Decision (“I.D.”); and (3) the
`
`expert testimony of Dr. Papanikolopoulos (“Dr. P.”) and portions of Dr. Voyles’
`
`declaration…” For at least the reasons set forth below, RGB’s motion should be
`
`denied in its entirety.
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`
`RGB’s motion to exclude makes clear that it either misunderstands the
`
`technology, misunderstood ABB’s reply, or is seeking to obfuscate the issues.
`
`A. RGB’s Motion Is Improper
`
`As they Board has stated, a motion to exclude should be directed at the
`
`admissibility of evidence, not the sufficiency of evidence, credibility of witnesses,
`
`or whether new arguments may have been raised in a reply. Avaya, Inc. v.
`
`Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc., IPR2013-00071, Paper 75, Dec. 2, 2013 (“a
`
`motion to strike or motion to exclude is not the proper mechanism for raising the
`
`issue of whether a reply or reply evidence is beyond the proper scope permitted
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 1
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`under the rules” -- citing Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48633 and Office
`
`Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48767 (Aug. 14, 2012)).
`
`Thus, RGB’s Motion is improper on its face, and should be denied.
`
`B. ABB’s Reply Responded To The Issues Raised By RGB
`
`ABB has not raised new arguments or new grounds of unpatentability; it
`
`responded to the assertions made in RGB’s papers.
`
`RGB did not provide persuasive evidence supporting its interpretation of the
`
`claims in its preliminary, primary, or supplemental responses. Rather, RGB
`
`appears to have been reduced to the two pronged argument that: 1) the claimed
`
`functions and component code include only “executable” functions/code, and 2)
`
`the prior art does not teach executable functions associated with one another by
`
`executable code. Accordingly, ABB’s reply pointed out that, with respect to the
`
`first prong of RGB’s argument:
`
`However, “computer code” encompasses more than executable machine
`
`language, rather it includes any form of control flow, including visual
`
`programming constructs. (Ex. 1130, ¶¶ 21-22, 39; Ex. 1132, ¶ 55-56; 236
`
`Patent, Fig. 1A, “Visual Basic”).
`
`…
`
`However, the term “function” encompasses more than executable machine
`
`language instructions. Rather, “function” broadly encompasses “in-line”
`
`functions, constructs in scripting languages, interpreted languages, and also
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 2
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`visual programming constructs, regardless of how the program is stored or
`
`executed. (Ex. 1130, ¶ 39, 42-46). (Reply, 9-10)
`
`Indeed, neither the Board nor the district court has adopted a construction for
`
`the disputed terms that is limited to “executable code.”
`
`ABB’s reply also pointed out that, with respect to the second prong of
`
`RGB’s argument:
`
`Stewart identifies the executable functions of a PBO. (Id. at 47, 52). Of
`
`these, the “cycle” method is the function that executes the task represented
`
`by the PBO. (Id.; also Gertz at 56, Fig. 6). The others are simply constructor,
`
`destructor and error methods typically associated with OO programming
`
`techniques (Id. at 48, discussing init).
`
`As such, the PBOs taught by Gertz and Stewart provide the “driver
`
`function” limitation of the claims. The “cycle” function for any given PBO
`
`corresponds to executing the task represented by the PBO. By definition, a
`
`PBO for a “primitive operation” that sends commands to a motion control
`
`device has an association to a “core driver function.” (See e.g., Gertz, “joint
`
`move to q” discussed below).
`
`…
`
`While Dr. Stewart ignored the Board’s BRI, ordinary artisans would
`
`recognize that Onika is both a programming and execution environment
`
`(Gertz at §§ 1.1; 1.3; 5.9) and that the configuration files that it creates
`
`comprise software code that binds various components together into a
`
`programming sequence (including Turing equivalents) that have been the
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 3
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`basis of computer programming for over a century. (Ex. 1030, ¶ 37-39, 42-
`
`46). (Reply, 12-13).
`
`That is, in any case, Gertz’s tasks are executed – by the “cycle” function
`
`contained within the port based object – and are associated with one another by
`
`computer code. Thus, the “cycle” function (discussed by Dr. Stewart in his
`
`declaration at exhibit 2011, ¶ 11) illustrates that tasks are executed.
`
`ABB’s Reply does not present new “alleged grounds of un-patentability,”
`
`but merely responded to RGB’s strained arguments supported by the Stewart
`
`declarations. ABB’s Petition explained that Gertz’s control tasks, configurations,
`
`and actions, as well as their connections (i.e. associations) within Onika (Gertz,
`
`Fig. 1), met various claim limitations (e.g., driver functions, component functions,
`
`and component code.) Although the Board and district court have not limited these
`
`terms to “executable” code, RGB presented an analysis premised on Dr. Stewart’s
`
`memory of Onika/Chimera, asserting that Onika was not an execution
`
`environment. ABB’s Reply focused on portions of Gertz that refuted Dr. Stewart’s
`
`analysis -- portions that he admitted not reading reading/reviewing in detail (e.g.,
`
`Gertz, § 5.9 “Execution of Applications”; Ex. 1104, pp. 45-48. This is not a “new
`
`argument.” Indeed, ABB’s Petition noted that Onika is:
`
`…capable of creating, simulating, and executing motion control
`
`application programs which are capable of controlling a variety of
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 4
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`motion control devices. (’236 Petition at 10-11, citing Gertz, § 1.1; §
`
`1.3) (underline added).
`
`ABB’s petition also noted (underline added):
`
`an application can be created by combining subsystems for execution
`
`in parallel. (’236 Petition at 12, citing Gertz, § 3.2.10).
`
`…
`
`Gertz discloses that the applications built in Onika are constructed
`
`from one or more control subsystems, and that “[a] control subsystem
`
`is a collection of actions which are executed one at a time, and can be
`
`assembled by a user.” (’236 Petition at 22).
`
`…
`
`Onika can then execute the application, thereby translating the logic
`
`contained in the application into commands for controlling a specific
`
`motion control device. (’236 Petition at 24).
`
`…
`
`“The control tasks, which execute in parallel, are combined (using
`
`their icons) to form configurations, which perform some real-time
`
`control function (such as ‘move to x’).” (’236 Petition at 52, quoting
`
`Gertz, § 3.3).
`
`…
`
`Applications comprise component functions (“actions”) defining a
`
`desired motion sequence: “An application is one or more subsystems
`
`executing in parallel towards some common goal.” (Gertz, § 3.2.10).
`
`“A control subsystem is a collection of actions which are executed one
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 5
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`at a time, and can be assembled by a user.” (Gertz, § 3.2.9). (’236
`
`Petition at 55).
`
`With specific reference to “component code,” ABB’s Petition noted:
`
`Thus, by describing that the control tasks and configurations (“driver
`
`functions”) are connected to the actions (“component functions”),
`
`Gertz discloses that Onika contains the claimed component code.
`
`(’236 Petition at 23, citing Gertz, § 3.2; § 4).
`
`Strangely, RGB’s response argued that “configuration information” is not
`
`“software code” (Response, 29, citing Stewart Decl. ¶ 44), even though this
`
`is not the BRI of any claim term.
`
`Three other points require clarification. First, the motion to exclude states
`
`that ABB’s reply did not rely on Morrow as teaching primitive operations. RGB’s
`
`response did not dispute that Morrow teaches “trajectory primitives” or
`
`substantively dispute the Board’s finding regarding Morrow, thus it appeared
`
`neither necessary nor appropriate for ABB to address. Second, RGB apparently
`
`confuses a configuration, which is “a set of tasks taken from a from a library
`
`which, when assembled together and activated, will perform a specific job, such as
`
`‘move to x,’” (Gertz, 45) and which ABB asserts is an extended driver function
`
`(’236 Petition at 21) with a type of configuration file, which is one of the various
`
`file formats used by Onika (Gertz, 145; 147-148). Third, the motion to exclude
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 6
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`accuses ABB of “switching horses” and citing to the Stewart reference too often.
`
`In essence, RGB suggests that it is entitled to ignore the teaching of the Stewart
`
`reference, even though Gertz and Stewart describe the Onika/Chimera framework.
`
`The central ground for trial, unpatentability over Gertz, Stewart, and Morrow
`
`(along with other references for some claims) remains.
`
`C. Drs. Papanikolopoulos And Voyles Testimony Is Admissible
`
`The Board’s Trial Practice Guide states:
`
`In the event that cross-examination occurs after a party has filed
`
`its last substantive paper on an issue, such cross-examination may
`
`result in testimony that should be called to the Board’s attention, but
`
`the party does not believe a motion to exclude the testimony is
`
`warranted. The Board may authorize the filing of observations to
`
`identify such testimony and responses to observations, as defined
`
`below. (Emphasis added).
`
`
`
`Apparently, RGB “does not believe a motion to exclude the testimony is
`
`warranted,” as RGB filed a motion for observations in this matter. (NB: RGB did
`
`not serve objections to ABB’s Reply in the related IPR2013-00063, and did not
`
`cross-examine Dr. Papanikolopolous in that proceeding). ABB will nevertheless
`
`respond, briefly, to each of RGB’s assertions in turn.
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 7
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`Drs. Papanikolopolous And Voyles Offer Facts
`In Addition To Opinions Based On The Cited Art
`
`1.
`
`RGB accuses both Drs. Papanikolopoulos and Voyles of relying on their
`
`own knowledge and experience, and on other background materials not cited in
`
`ABB’s original petition. RGB apparently concludes that such knowledge is
`
`“impermissible as a reference.”
`
`Drs. Papanikolopoulos and Voyles testified regarding RGB’s Response,
`
`specifically the testimony of Dr. Stewart. Dr. Stewart’s testimony included factual
`
`assertions based on the alleged operation of Onika/Chimera (see, e.g., ¶¶ 9, 17, 23,
`
`27 and 28), as well as opinions regarding the references and patents (see, e.g., ¶¶
`
`29-32). Drs. Papanikolopoulos and Voyles gave testimony rebutting both
`
`Stewart’s factual assertions (e.g., what a person of skill in computer science and/or
`
`motion control who attended Carnegie Mellon University and worked in the
`
`Advanced Manipulators Lab actually thought of the systems described in the cited
`
`prior art, in the timeframe of the alleged invention by Mr. Brown), and opinions
`
`(e.g., what a person of skill in the art would have thought of the patents and the
`
`cited prior art in the timeframe of the alleged invention), principally with respect to
`
`the issues disputed by Dr. Stewart.
`
`RGB has not presented a proper basis for excluding all factual testimony of
`
`Drs. Papanikolopoulos and Voyles, particularly the fact that Dr. Voyles personally
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 8
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`suggested to Dan Morrow using Onika in his research (Ex. 1130, ¶ 36-40) and the
`
`facts regarding Dr. Stewart’s problems in academia. (ABB’s reply to RGB’s
`
`Motion for Observations at section IV; Exhibit 2014 at 58:3-64:22) (Ironically, it
`
`desires to retain testimony that would paint Stewart in a better light).
`
`Further, RGB has presented no reasonable basis to exclude any of the
`
`opinions of Drs. Papanikolopoulos and Voyles. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) provides:
`
`Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on
`
`which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight…
`
`The Board’s Trial Practice Guide also states:
`
`Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the
`
`underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. See Fed. R.
`
`Evid. 705; and § 42.65. Opinions expressed without disclosing the
`
`underlying facts or data may be given little or no weight.
`
`Thus the regulations and the Board’s guidance not only contemplate that expert
`
`testimony may rely on background material, but in fact require its disclosure.
`
`
`
`Of course, it is black letter law that the cited art is interpreted through the
`
`knowledge of persons having order skill, who are presumed to have knowledge of
`
`all prior art. Further, background material (even that which is not prior art) may be
`
`relied upon to explain how a reference might be understood, the level of ordinary
`
`skill, etc. (See e.g., MPEP 2143.03).
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 9
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`Drs. Papanikolopoulos and Voyles do not map “background material”
`
`against the claims, but, as required, they disclosed background materials they
`
`relied upon in preparing their declarations. See, e.g., Ex. 1132, ¶ 8, disclosing
`
`relevant publications by Dr. Papanikolopoulos illustrating his background
`
`knowledge of the field, ¶ 5, disclosing his familiarity with the Chimera system, and
`
`¶ 34, disclosing relevant publications relied upon by Dr. Papanikolopoulos in his
`
`discussion of the “Background of the State of the Art.” See also, e.g., Ex. 1130, ¶
`
`3, disclosing his familiarity with the Chimera and Onika systems, ¶ 12, disclosing
`
`that Dr. Voyles relied on contemporaneous documents reflecting the state of the art
`
`prior to July 10, 1994, the research being conducted at the AML, and his
`
`experience in the field, ¶¶ 2-3, disclosing the relevance of Dr. Voyles’s own Ph.D.
`
`thesis and that he made extensive use of Chimera and Onika while at the AML,
`
`and ¶¶ 11 and 41, referring to specific materials reviewed. See also, e.g., the C.V.s
`
`of Drs. Papanikolopoulos and Voyles, included in their declarations.
`
`
`
`FRE 702 requires that expert testimony be (1) based on sufficient facts or
`
`data; (2) the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the product of
`
`reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case. In this
`
`case, the testimony undoubtedly meets these requirements. Drs. Papanikolopoulos
`
`and Voyles (1) based their testimony on the claim terms and prior art at issue, as
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 10
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`well as prior findings of the Board in this proceeding and their own background
`
`knowledge of and experience with the technologies (see, e.g., Ex. 1130, ¶¶ 11, 32;
`
`Ex. 1132, ¶¶ 23-25, 43; and above); (2) assessed the scope of the claim terms at
`
`issue and the scope and content of the prior art, as required by Graham v. John
`
`Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (see, e.g., Ex. 1130, ¶¶ 22, 39, and 42-44 and Ex.
`
`1132, ¶¶ 47- 51, 56, 61, and 90-92); and (3) applied the analysis prescribed in
`
`Graham to the underlying facts and information, rendering the various opinions set
`
`forth in their respective declarations.
`
`2.
`
`Expert Testimony
`(Via Declaration) Is Not An “Expert Report”
`
`RGB attempts to treat expert testimony like litigation-based “expert reports,”
`
`asserting that Dr. Papanikolopolous offered “new opinions” on cross. However,
`
`there is no such parallel litigation.
`
`RGB asserts that Stewart’s port-based object is not itself a “function” even
`
`though Dr. Stewart admitted that a PBO includes numerous functions including a
`
`“cycle” function. (Ex. 2011, ¶ 11).
`
`Dr. Papanikolopoulos explained that the cycle function is executable code
`
`that does the “work” associated with the specific by the PBO. (Ex. 2014, 178:21-
`
`179:9). Stewart teaches a variety of specific modules, some of which are
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 11
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`cognizable as being primitive (i.e. “zero”), as well as combining them into variety
`
`of more complex tasks (just as Gertz does).
`
`As such, ABB’s experts fairly responded to Dr. Stewart’s asssertions.
`
`3.
`
`Dr. Papanikolopolous Applied The Law Correctly
`
`RGB accuses Dr. Papanikolopoulos of “refus[ing] to rely upon accepted
`
`dictionary definitions.” Of course, the Board has not adopted a dictionary
`
`definition for any claim term. Rather, Dr. Papanikolopoulos expressly relied upon
`
`the Board’s construction of terms as he was required to do. Ex. 1132, ¶ 25.
`
`Moreover, RGB cannot reasonably assert that 1997 Microsoft dictionary is
`
`the preeminent source of computer terminology (even though the alleged priority
`
`application dates to 1995). (Ex. 2016; Ex. 2014, 140:11-16; 180:12 – 181:20). For
`
`example, RGB’s witness testified that there were multiple definitions for “code”
`
`and “execution.” See Ex. 1104, 38:6 – 39:8, specifically “To the best of my
`
`knowledge, yes, there are different definitions of code.” See also 72-17: 75:12.
`
`Similarly, Dr. Papanikolopolous acknowledged having both IEEE and ACM
`
`dictionaries in his library (Ex. 2014, 180:5-16):
`
`Q. Mr. Chorush asked you if -- well, when he introduced the
`
`Microsoft dictionary, previously, you'd testified I think there were
`
`something like eighty definitions of code if you looked in various
`
`places; is that correct?
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 12
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`A. Of -- of different types of programming.
`
`Q. Different types of programming. Are there other dictionaries in
`
`your office that you use from time to time?
`
`A. There is the ACM. There is the IEEE standard.
`
`Of course, there is no evidence establishing that the Microsoft Computer
`
`Dictionary 3rd ed. contains only the “accepted dictionary definitions” adopted by
`
`the ACM, IEEE or other professional body. Indeed, well-established rules of
`
`claim construction relegate extrinsic evidence such as dictionary definitions behind
`
`other more relevant sources in determining how the ordinary artisan would have
`
`understood the claims. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`At best, RGB’s motion is an attack on credibility, not admissibility, and even
`
`then, Dr. Papanikolopolous (like Dr. Voyles) has faithfully relied upon not just the
`
`teaching of cited references, but also the claim construction adopted by the Board
`
`as applied to those references.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`RGB’s motion to exclude is improper. RGB’s did not serve specific
`
`objection to ABB’s Reply, and the instant motion is directed to issues that the
`
`Board has deemed inappropriate, both in its Trial Practice Guide and in specific
`
`opinions construing those rules.
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 13
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`Where appropriate, ABB’s witnesses gave testimony as to facts, and these
`
`facts refute the testimony of RGB’s witness, Dr. Stewart. Factual testimony is not
`
`subject to a Daubert challenge.
`
`Further, ABB’s witnesses properly relied on various background materials
`
`(i.e. representing and/or confirming the knowledge and understanding of the
`
`ordinary artisan). ABB’s witnesses rendered sound opinions based on the proper
`
`legal standards and the claim construction given by the Board, and refuting Dr.
`
`Stewart’s conclusory testimony (who could give no account for the legal basis he
`
`used, nor explain the glaring inconsistency between the references and his
`
`testimony).
`
`Accordingly, the Board should deny RGB’s motion to exclude in its entirety.
`
`
`
`Dated: January 21, 2014
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Richard D. Mc Leod/
`Richard D. Mc Leod
`Registration No. 46,921
`rick.mcleod@klarquist.com
`Klarquist Sparkman LLP
`One World Trade Center, Suite 1600
`121 S.W. Salmon Street
`Portland, Oregon 97204
`Telephone: (503) 595-5300
`Facsimile: (503) 595-5301
`
`ABB’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`Page 14
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00062
`Case IPR2013-00282
`Patent 6,516,236 B1
`
`
`Certificate of Service in Compliance With 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e)(4)
`
`The undersigned certifies that a complete copy of ABB’s Opposition to
`
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence was served on counsel of record for
`
`RICHARD S. MEYER
`BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
`5301 WISCONSIN AVENUE NW
`SUITE 800
`WASHINGTON, DC 20015
`TEL: (202) 237-2727
`FAX: (202) 237-6131
`RMEYER@BSFLLP.COM
`
`
`the ’236 Patent Owner:
`
`RICHARD T. BLACK
`FOSTER PEPPER PLLC
`1111 THIRD AVENUE, SUITE 3400
`SEATTLE, WA 98101-3299
`TEL: (206) 447-6251
`FAX: (206) 749-2062
`BLACR@FOSTER.COM
`
`
`DOUGLAS R. WILSON
`HEIM, PAYNE & CHORUSH LLP
`600 TRAVIS, SUITE 6710
`HOUSTON, TX 77002
`TEL: (512) 242-3622
`FAX: (713) 345-2924
`DWILSON@HPCLLP.COM
`
`
`via EXPRESS MAIL, on January 21, 2014.
`
`By /Richard D. Mc Leod/
`Richard D. Mc Leod
`Registration No. 46,921
`rick.mcleod@klarquist.com
`Klarquist Sparkman LLP
`One World Trade Center, Suite 1600
`121 S.W. Salmon Street
`Portland, Oregon 97204
`Telephone: (503) 595-5300
`Facsimile: (503) 595-5301
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`