`
`By: Richard T. Black
`Foster Pepper PLLC
`1111 Third Avenue, Suite 3400
`Seattle, Washington 98101-3299
`Tel:
`(206) 447-6251
`Fax: (206) 749-2062
`Email:
`blacr@foster.com
`Registration No.: 40514
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________________
`
`ABB, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
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`ROY-G-BIV CORPORATION
`Patent Owner
`_____________________
`
`Trial No.: IPR2013-00062
`(pursuant to Joinder with IPR2013-00282)
`U.S. Patent No. 6,516,236B1
`____________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S SURREPLY
`ON ANTEDATE ISSUE
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`
`
`
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`In its Reply, Petitioner ABB, Inc. (“ABB”) fails to meet its burden of proving
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`that both Gertz and Morrow are prior art, which alone resolves the IPR.
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`As to corroboration, ABB applies the “impossible standard of ‘independence’
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`on corroborative evidence” that was rejected in Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S.,
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`LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The law does “not require that
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`every point ... be corroborated by evidence having a source totally independent of
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`the witness.” Whether testimony is sufficiently corroborated is evaluated under the
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`“rule of reason.” Id. Reliable evidence of corroboration “comes in the form of
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`records made contemporaneously with the inventive process. Circumstantial
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`evidence of an independent nature may also corroborate.” Linear Tech. Corp. v.
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`Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal citation
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`omitted). Every corroboration case “must be decided on its own facts with a view
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`to deciding whether the evidence as a whole is persuasive.” Id.
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`The Brown Declaration and its contemporaneous exhibits clearly demonstrate
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`conception of all claims1 no later than July 24, 1994, well before publication of
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`both Gertz and Morrow. (Brown Decl., Ex. 2010, ¶¶6, 8, 10, 12.) Two key
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` 1
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` Contrary to ABB’s Reply, RGB addressed claims 5-7 of the ‘236 Patent.
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`Dependent claims 5-7 are necessarily addressed in the antedating testimony and
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`evidence provided regarding the independent claims.
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`1
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`corroborating documents indisputably existed and were filed in the PTO years
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`Trial No.: IPR2013-00062
`U.S. Patent No. 6,516,236B1
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`prior to ABB’s claim of Gertz and Morrow as alleged prior art:
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`1. Priority Application Appendix A, filed May 30, 1995, containing an excerpt
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`from the third draft of the XMC Motion Control Reference. The third draft
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`references an April 15, 1994 first draft and a July 1, 1994 second draft.2
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`2. Mr. Brown’s XMC Motion Control Component 93-94 History, filed
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`November 6, 2008, which references an NDA between Compumotor and RGB
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`dated May 19, 1994.”3
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`These documents in turn reveal three other corroborating documents:
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`1. The NDA between ROY-G-BIV and Compumotor, dated May 19, 1994.4
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`2. First Draft of the XMC Motion Control Reference, dated April 15, 1994.5
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`3. Second draft of the XMC Motion Control Reference (divided into two
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` 2
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` ABB Ex. 1024.
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`3 ABB Ex. 1025
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`4 Referenced by: (1) p. 1 of Mr. Brown’s XMC Motion Control Component 93-94
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`History, attached by ABB as Ex. 1025; (2) p.1 of Ex. 2010-1; (3) p.1 of Ex. 2010-
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`2.
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`5 Referenced by: (1) p. 1 of Appendix A of Priority Application No. 08/454,736,
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`May 30, 1995, filed by ABB as Ex. 1024; (2) Ex. 2010-1; (3) Ex. 2010-2.
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`2
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`Trial No.: IPR2013-00062
`U.S. Patent No. 6,516,236B1
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`separate specifications in the second draft), dated July 1 and July 15, 1994.6 The
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`second drafts reference the April 15, 1994 first draft. Both state “[t]his document
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`is provided for discussion purposes only in strict confidence and subject to the
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`non-disclosure agreement executed between ROY-G-BIV Corporation and
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`Compumotor, a division of Parker Hannifan, dated May 19, 1994.”
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`These numerous corroborating documents satisfy the rule of reason. ABB’s
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`suggestion that Mr. Brown foresaw both this litigation and the need to antedate
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`Gertz and Morrow, and fabricated multiple documents which cross-referenced
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`other fabricated documents bearing the same dates is unreasonable conjecture.
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`As to diligence, the basic inquiry is “whether, on all of the evidence, there was
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`reasonable continuing activity to reduce the invention to practice. There is no rule
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`requiring a specific kind of activity in determining whether the applicant was
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`reasonably diligent in proceeding toward ... reduction to practice.” Brown v.
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`Barbacid, 436 F.3d 1376, 1382
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`(Fed. Cir. 2006). Evidence made
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`contemporaneously “provides the most reliable proof that the inventor’s testimony
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`has been corroborated.” Id. at 1350-51. “Circumstantial evidence about the
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`inventive process, alone, may also corroborate.” Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal
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`& Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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` 6
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` Exs. 2010-1 & 2010-2 & referenced in Appdx. A, p.1, Ex. 1024
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`3
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`The Brown Declaration includes detailed time logs and a summary of the
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`Trial No.: IPR2013-00062
`U.S. Patent No. 6,516,236B1
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`work performed towards actually reducing to practice and constructively reducing
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`to practice the claimed invention during each work week from November 20, 1994
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`through May 30, 1995. (Brown Decl., Ex. 2010, ¶¶6, 7, 8, 20, 21). During these six
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`months, Mr. Brown worked approximately 1,453 hours, 1,049 of which were spent
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`on work related to the XMC project. (Id. ¶20). This equates to over 40 hours per
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`week dedicated to work on the invention. The weekly summary of major activities
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`on the XMC Project and the time logs show substantial and continuous activity
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`towards reduction to practice (without any significant gaps). Moreover, the 1995
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`XMC Project Log, which Mr. Brown had forgotten about when preparing his
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`declaration, supports this analysis. Although prepared for a different purpose, it
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`shows over 800 hours of work on developing the XMC invention over a shorter
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`time period. (See ABB Ex. 1128.) Mr. Brown testified that this document was
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`very consistent with the analysis in his declarations. (See Ex. 1129, p. 199:10-18).
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`The exhibits to Mr. Brown’s Declaration and to ABB’s 2nd Petition for IPR
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`corroborate Mr. Brown’s diligence. Third party documentation (such as the
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`Compumotor NDA here) and PTO filings have been held to constitute
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`corroboration of diligence. See, e.g., Brown v. Barbacid, 436 F.3d at 1376; In re
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`Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`ABB merely nit-picks in arguing that Mr. Brown’s intensive work somehow
`4
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`does not constitute diligence. ABB criticizes Mr. Brown for including time for
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`Trial No.: IPR2013-00062
`U.S. Patent No. 6,516,236B1
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`travel and for reading a book related to his invention over the holidays—“he
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`claimed to be diligent by reading a book on Neural Networks and Fuzzy Logic
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`between 12/23/94 and 1/3/95.” (Reply, p.6.) ABB cites Preston v. White, 97 F.2d
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`160, 165 (CCPA 1938), for the proposition that “XMC Legal” work on “trademark
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`issues, NDA, and licensing issues” do not constitute diligence. (Reply at 7.) But
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`the Federal Circuit recently distinguished Preston in Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d
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`1243, 1248–49 (Fed. Cir. 2002), which makes clear that these activities constitute
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`valid evidence of attorney diligence. But even if excluded, they only constitute a
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`tiny fraction of hundreds and hundreds of hours ABB does not dispute was spent
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`reducing the invention to practice. (See Brown Decl., Ex. 2010, Sections 15-16;
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`Ex.1129, pp. 197-200.) Courts have found that inventors exercised due diligence
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`even where—unlike Mr. Brown here—the inventor delayed substantially (up to
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`three weeks) in reducing the invention to practice. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru,
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`816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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`Dated: January 14, 2014. Respectfully:
`
`/Richard T. Black/
`RICHARD T. BLACK, Reg.40514
`Foster Pepper PLLC
`1111 Third Avenue Suite 3400
`Tel:
`(206) 447-6251
`Email: blacr@foster.com
`
`
`
`
`5
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`/Richard S. Meyer/
`RICHARD S. MEYER, Reg.32541
`5301 Wisconsin Avenue NW
`Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP
`Tel:
`(202) 237-2727
`Email: rmeyer@BSFLLP.com
`
`