Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 5605
`
`
` IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`
`
`ROY-G-BIV Corporation,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`ABB, Ltd., ABB, Inc., MEADWESTVACO
`TEXAS, LP and MEADWESTVACO
`CORPORATION,
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`ROY-G-BIV Corporation,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`MOTIVA ENTERPRISES, LLC
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Case No. 6:11-cv-00622-LED
`
` JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`ROY-G-BIV Corporation,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SIEMENS CORP., et al.
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF ROY-G-BIV CORPORATION’S
`REPLY MARKMAN BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 5606
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`In order to manufacture nonexistent disclaimers from out-of-context prosecution history
`
`snippets, Defendants blatantly ignore the applicable legal standard: “argument-based disavowals
`
`will be found . . . only if they constitute clear and unmistakable surrenders of subject matter.”
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc. (Cordis II), 511 F.3d 1157, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2008); accord
`
`N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d. 1281, 1293-95 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This is
`
`necessary because a patent’s prosecution history “often lacks the clarity of the specification and
`
`thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Digital-Vending Servs. Int’l, LLC v. Univ. of
`
`Phoenix, Inc., 672 F.3d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Prosecution disclaimer
`
`cannot apply to statements that are amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations. See SanDisk
`
`Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic
`
`AVE, Inc. (Cordis I), 339 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Further, “statements by the
`
`applicants must be read in the context of its overall argument . . . .” Lucent Techs., Inc. v.
`
`Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 1200, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2008). These legal standards demonstrate that
`
`Defendants’ purported “disclaimers” do not exist.
`
`II.
`
`CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS
`
`A.
`
`Motion Control “Operation” and “Device” Terms
`
`1.
`
`“motion control” (term no. 1)
`
`Purporting to rely on a prosecution disclaimer, Defendants ignore the RGB Patents’
`
`teaching that “the principles of the present invention are generally applicable to any mechanical
`
`system that generates movement based on a control signal.” Ex. 2 at 1:34-36 (emphasis added).1
`
`But Defendants’ purported justification is fundamentally flawed: RGB never argued that prior
`
`1 In the main, RGB cites to the previously referenced exhibits in RGB’s opening brief and Defendants’ responsive
`brief. Other exhibits are denominated as “New Exhibits.”
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: 5607
`
`
`art was distinguishable because it taught “controlled movement” and not moving an “object”
`
`along a “desired path.” Defendants cite the Levy Declaration, which explains that “no type of
`
`printing language or implementation of printer drivers I am familiar with can be described as ‘a
`
`method of moving an object.’” Dfs’ Ex. N, ¶ 32. But that paragraph does not even mention
`
`“motion control,” much less disclaim a broad meaning of that term. And even the cases on
`
`which Defendants purport to rely recognize that, “[p]rosecution disclaimer does not apply . . . if
`
`the applicant simply describes features of the prior art and does not distinguish the claimed
`
`invention based on those features.” Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d
`
`1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F. 3d
`
`1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Eolas Techs, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d. 1325, 1337 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005). The sentence that Defendants cite in the Levy Declaration merely compares the prior
`
`art to the embodiment in the patent at column 3, not to the claim term “motion control.”
`
`Defendants also cite four bullet points to justify limiting “motion control” to an “object”
`
`and a “desired path.” Dfs’ Brf. at 5. But the cited passages do not refer to an “object” or a
`
`“desired path.” Further, they actually undercut Defendants’ position. For example, Defendants
`
`cite Mr. Malina’s statement that “Motion Control encompasses the coordinated real-time control
`
`of multiple actuators . . . to achieve control of linear or rotary directions of motion, velocities of
`
`movement, positions, and output torques.” Dfs’ Brf. at 5 (emphases added). The statement
`
`reflects that motion control “encompasses” certain things, not that it is limited to those things.
`
`2.
`
`“motion control operation” (term no. 2)
`
`“A claim construction that excludes the preferred embodiment is rarely, if ever, correct . .
`
`. .” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
`
`(citations omitted). Here, Defendants concede that Appendices A and B reflect RGB’s preferred
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: 5608
`
`
`embodiment. And, despite Defendants’ protestations to the contrary, their proposed construction
`
`would indeed exclude some of the operations in Appendix A.
`
`Defendants argue that their proposed construction “does not require each individual
`
`operation to control motion.” Dfs’ Brf. at 7. This is incorrect. Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction for “motion control operations” (taking account of Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction for “motion control”) is “hardware independent operations [used to perform control
`
`of movement of an object along a desired path] (such as GET POSITION, MOVE RELATIVE,
`
`or CONTOUR MOVE).” Ex. 9. Thus, to qualify as a “motion control operation” under
`
`Defendants’ proposed constructions, the operation must indeed be “used to perform control of
`
`movement of an object along a desired path.” Defendants’ proposed construction therefore
`
`improperly excludes motion control operations that are not used to perform control of movement,
`
`including Get Position, Reset, Initialize, Shut Down, and Get Error Status. Yet these are
`
`exemplary motion control operations in RGB’s preferred embodiment. RGB’s Opening Brief
`
`(“Op. Brf.”) at 4-6. Indeed, Get Position is called out specifically. Ex. 2 at 7:32-39.
`
`Defendants also incorrectly argue that RGB’s reliance “on ‘motion control operations’ to
`
`distinguish prior art during Reexam” is a disavowal of motion control operations that do not
`
`directly cause movement. Dfs’ Brf. at 6-7, citing an RGB PTO Response (Dfs’ Ex. B at 37-39)
`
`and the McConnell Declaration (Dfs’ Ex. O, ¶14). But these documents distinguish “motion
`
`control operations” from “graphics operations” on a computer screen. Mr. McConnell explained
`
`that the GDI operations are “drawing operations which are performed via a Graphical Device
`
`Interface.” Dfs’ Ex. O, ¶14. These graphics operations give only the “illusion of motion created
`
`by changing the colors of individual pixels on a computer display.” Id. An example is a screen
`
`saver that appears to move on the screen. Consistent with the prosecution history, RGB is not
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 5 of 13 PageID #: 5609
`
`
`attempting to cover these “graphics operations.” RGB’s construction for “motion control
`
`operations” is “operations performed on or by a motion control device,” where a “motion control
`
`device” comprises a “controller and a mechanical system.” In short, RGB never disclaimed any
`
`of the motion control operations taught in the RGB Patents or appendices.
`
`Defendant ABB’s recent statement to the PTO confirms RGB’s proposed construction:
`
`The process of controlling an MCD begins by defining several physical actions
`capable of being performed by MCDs in the abstract (“motion control operations”). . .
`
`New Exhibit 27 at 4-5 (emphasis added). ABB agrees that “motion control operations” are
`
`merely “operations performed on or by a motion control device” (which ABB calls “MCDs).
`
`3.
`
`“non-primitive operations” (term no. 3)
`
`Although Defendants now attempt to ignore the RGB Patents’ lexicography, their
`
`summary judgment motion on indefiniteness admits that “[t]he patents describe a non-primitive
`
`operation as any operation that ‘do[es] not meet the definition of a primitive operation[].’” Dkt
`
`No. 164 at 3. Significantly, Defendants acknowledge that a non-primitive operation merely
`
`“includes” (and is not “limited to,” as they argue here) “any operation that can be simulated
`
`using a combination of other (i.e., primitive) operations.” Id.
`
`Contrary to Defendants’ accusation, RGB’s application of “necessary for motion control”
`
`has not varied. For example, RGB’s position regarding “Move Relative” is completely
`
`consistent with its position regarding “Open Shutter” and “Close Shutter.” Because the “Move
`
`Relative” operation is required for some classes of motion control devices, it meets the
`
`“necessary for motion control” requirement. In contrast, the WOSA/XFS standard creates two
`
`classes of cash dispensing machines: ATSs and ATMs. But in contrast to “Move Relative,” the
`
`“Open Shutter” and “Close Shutter” operations are not required in either class of devices. In
`
`ATSs, those operations are “not supported;” in ATMs, those operations are “optional.” Because
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 6 of 13 PageID #: 5610
`
`
`neither of the classes of cash dispensing machines requires those operations, they are not
`
`“necessary for motion control.” This is exactly what RGB told the PTO. RGB will address this
`
`issue further in its opposition brief regarding indefiniteness.
`
`4.
`
` “motion control device” (term no. 4)
`
`Defendant ABB correctly told the PTO that, in RGB’s Patents, “motion control devices”
`
`were “described as hardware controllers combined with mechanical systems.” New Exhibit 27 at
`
`4. The Court should reject Defendants’ attempt to argue a different construction now.
`
`Defendants posit that “[t]he fact that a ‘motion control device’ is a device that ‘performs
`
`motion control’ should not be controversial.” Unfortunately, Defendants’ improperly narrow
`
`definition of “motion control” renders their statement highly controverted. Further, Defendants’
`
`argument that RGB disclaimed all “robots” as “motion control devices” is incorrect.2 Mr.
`
`Malina merely explained that the particular robots in Sorensen were “composed of, among other
`
`things, motion control devices, but are themselves not motion control devices.” Ex. L ¶ 82. He
`
`stated that “the robots contemplated by Sorensen” did “not provide direct access to motion
`
`control operations.” Id. ¶ 68. But he stated that “[s]ome modern day robots (unlike those
`
`contemplated by Sorensen) do expose functions corresponding to motion control operations to
`
`the user.” Id. (emphasis added). It is undeniable that the Malina declaration did not disclaim
`
`robots generally. Moreover, the Examiner expressly found that the Malina statements were not
`
`limiting. See New Exhibit 28 at 13. (“The further descriptions [in Malina Decl.] of what motion
`
`controllers ‘generally’ or ‘typically’ include or require are not limiting definitions . . . .”).
`
`B.
`
`The Top Layer “Application Program” Term (Term No. 5)
`
`Defendants neither challenge the customary and ordinary meaning for “application
`
`2 Defendants’ argument is particularly unpersuasive where they admit that “[r]epresentative applications” for the
`RGB Patents “include robots that paint cars on an assembly line . . . and robotically-controlled lasers that cut tissue
`in microscopic procedures.” Dfs’ Brf. at 2.
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 7 of 13 PageID #: 5611
`
`
`program,” nor dispute that the RGB Patents broadly disclose “any application that uses the
`
`system 22 by programming the motion control component 35.” Ex. 2 at 8:30-33.3 Instead,
`
`Defendants argue disclaimer based on carefully cropped and misquoted statements that they lift
`
`from the prosecution history. Here is what RGB actually stated:
`
`[T]he ‘058 describes an application program comprising a series of motion
`control operations, which the system then transforms into control commands
`which cause a controller to manipulate motors on a machine. In other words, in
`the ‘058 as claimed, the application program can directly control each motor
`using base incremental steps, whereas in Sorensen, the application does not
`control motors at all. . . .
`
`Ex. A at 10 (emphasis added).4 The first sentence dovetails with the claim language itself,
`
`which recites an “application program comprising a set/series of component functions” where a
`
`“component function” is “a hardware independent function that corresponds to a motion control
`
`operation.” The “in other words” that Defendants excised from the second sentence makes clear
`
`that that sentence does not narrow the first sentence, but merely restates it. In context, these
`
`sentences merely suggest that because the application program selects motion control operations
`
`that the system then transforms into control commands that manipulate motors, it can be
`
`designed to directly control the motors within the motion control device.5 The point of
`
`distinction was that the Sorenson application program “does not control motors at all.” Certainly
`
`
`3 Defendants ignore examples that demonstrate the broad scope of “application program.” Indeed, Defendants’ own
`exhibit states that “[t]he application layer (‘application program’) offers various motion control operations through
`hardware independent ‘component functions’ . . . .” Ex. A at 3 (emphasis added). This is why any disclaimer
`analysis must consider the prosecution history as a whole.
`4 Defendants misquoted this passage by excising “In other words.” They also capitalize “In the ‘058,” in an attempt
`to make it seem as though the sentence began that way. The sentence actually refers back to the prior sentence.
`Defendants also improperly quote Exhibits E and F. The PTO has specifically criticized defendant ABB for
`misciting a document. New Exhibit 29 at 7, n.1.
`5 Although the RGB Patent specifications included similar language, Judge Folsom nevertheless found “no basis in
`the specification to narrow the ordinary meaning of the term ‘application program.’” Ex. 5 at 7 (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 8 of 13 PageID #: 5612
`
`
`RGB did not limit application programs to those that must use base incremental steps.6
`
`At best for Defendants, these statements are ambiguous or are subject to multiple,
`
`reasonable interpretations, and therefore cannot disavow claim scope. See SanDisk Corp., 415
`
`F.3d at 1287; Cordis I, 339 F.3d at 1359. For example, Defendants incorrectly assert that RGB
`
`distinguished Sorensen based on the “application program” limitation. But the cited statement is
`
`from the introduction of RGB’s response. Ex. A at 10. The next page demonstrates that RGB
`
`did not distinguish on that basis. Id. at 11-12. Indeed, after reviewing the RGB submission that
`
`Defendants cite (Dfs’ Ex. E), the Examiner adopted RGB’s construction of “application
`
`program.” Ex. 18 at 8. Thus, even if one possible reading of RGB’s statements would result in a
`
`disclaimer, there is a contrary reading that does not. This fact precludes a finding of disclaimer.
`
`But even assuming for the sake of argument that RGB’s prosecution statements constitute
`
`disclaimers, Defendants’ requested disclaimer is overbroad. Any narrowing in claim scope due
`
`to prosecution disclaimer must be “congruent with the scope of the surrender.” Omega Eng’g,
`
`Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Even under Defendants’
`
`interpretation of the cited statements, the application program at most has the “ability” to control
`
`motors (or “can” be so designed). Defendants’ proposed construction improperly requires the
`
`application program to actually control each motor. Further, the statement that “in Sorenson, the
`
`application does not control motors at all” (e.g., Ex. A at 10), does not distinguish on the basis of
`
`“base incremental steps.” Any hypothetical disclaimer based on that statement must be limited
`
`to controlling motors, not to “base increment steps.” So even if this Court were to find a
`
`disclaimer—incorrectly, in our view7 —the Court should limit it to requiring the application
`
`
`6 The fact that “incremental steps” simply refers to the granular “motion control operations” is reflected by RGB’s
`substitution of “motion control operations” for the term “plurality of incremental steps.” Ex. Q at 5.
`7 There is no disclaimer if the specification “expressly define[d] a [claim] term . . . and remarks made to distinguish
`claims from the prior art are broader than necessary to distinguish the prior art, the full breadth of the remark is not a
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 9 of 13 PageID #: 5613
`
`
`program to have the ability to control motors.
`
`C.
`
`The Middle Layer “Component Code” Term
`
`1.
`
`“component code” (term no. 6)
`
` RGB noted in its opening brief that the claims recite component functions “associated”
`
`with driver functions, or that the patent specifications invariably describe the relationship
`
`between component functions and driver functions as an association. Op. Brf. at 15-16.
`
`Defendants simply ignored this evidence and instead rely on a prosecution disclaimer. But,
`
`nothing in the prosecution history suggests that component functions are “converted” into driver
`
`functions. Instead, Defendants cherry-pick language from a reexamination document explaining
`
`that the inventors’ preferred embodiments convert “motion control operations” into “control
`
`commands.” The cited paragraph does not mention “component code” (or even “component
`
`functions” or “driver functions”) and thus cannot possibly support a prosecution disclaimer as to
`
`these claim limitations.8
`
`D.
`
`The Lower Layer “Driver” Terms
`
`1.
`
`“driver functions” (term no. 7)
`
`RGB explicitly said in its opening brief that the component functions and driver functions
`
`are located in different software layers. Op. Brf. at 17-18. But RGB further explained that the
`
`functions are also located in the same layer—namely in the motion control component
`
`containing the component code. Id. Defendants agree, and argue elsewhere in their brief that
`
`“the middleware, which includes the component code, performs the conversion of a component
`
`clear and unambiguous disavowal of claim scope as required to depart from the meaning of the term provided in the
`written description.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In
`the RGB Patents, “[t]he application program 26 is any application that uses the system 22 by programming the
`motion control component 35.” Ex. 2 at 8:30-32.
`8 Defendants’ erroneously argue that RGB “attempts to broaden the scope of the claims by not requiring that the
`component functions . . . even have a corresponding driver function.” Dfs’ Brf. at 17. But the RGB Patents
`specifically explain that “certain component functions are provided for administrative purposes and do not have a
`corresponding driver function.” Ex. 2 at 7:59-63.
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:
` 5614
`
`
`function into a driver function.” Dfs’ Brf. at 15 (emphasis added). Defendants thus agree that
`
`the component functions and driver functions are located in the middleware layer. Although
`
`RGB’s opening brief explained that Defendants’ proposal would confuse the jury, Defendants
`
`offer no response. Because Defendants’ proposed construction is confusing, the jury should not
`
`be instructed that those functions are located in different layers, especially if the jury is not also
`
`instructed that they can be in the same layer.
`
`2.
`
`“core driver functions” and “extended driver functions”
`(term nos. 8a and 8b)
`
`Defendants ignore the overwhelming evidence in the RGB patents that driver functions
`
`are “associated with” motion control operations. Instead, Defendants rely on a prosecution
`
`history document that states in a few places that driver functions “identify” motion control
`
`operations. Dfs’ Ex. A at 3, 8. But, that same document also states that the driver functions are
`
`“associated with” motion control operations. Id. at 8 (“driver functions are hardware
`
`independent abstract functions that are associated with primitive or non-primitive motion control
`
`operations . . . .”). This fact alone precludes the finding of a “clear” or “unambiguous”
`
`disclaimer of scope. Further, RGB never distinguished prior art based on the “associated with”
`
`versus “identifies” distinction.
`
`Defendants also argue that “a” does not always mean “one or more” and “that ‘a’ must be
`
`construed in light of the particular intrinsic record.” Dfs’ Brf. at 21.9 But, in negotiating the
`
`proper construction for the term “software driver,” Defendants admitted that:
`
`[t]he only difference in the parties constructions is “a” instead of “one or more.”
`We do not believe an actual dispute exists. We agree that the term “a” or “an”
`carries the meaning of “one or more” in patent parlance as the Court noted in the
`
`
`9 RGB relied on Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013), which explained
`that “one” can mean “one or more.” Id. at 1326. This case controls. Defendants’ citation to a thirteen year old
`district court decision underscores the weakness of its position. See Dfs’ Brief at 22, citing Tulip Computers,
`Internationali B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 364, 397-99 (D. Del. 2002).
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:
` 5615
`
`
`FANUC claim construction order (at 36).
`
`New Exhibit 30 at 1. Defendants’ primary argument is that “the specification fails to disclose
`
`anything other than a one-to-one correlation between motion control operations and driver
`
`functions.” Dfs’ Brf. at 21. That is not accurate; Defendants note, for example, that some non-
`
`primitive operations can be emulated using a combination of motion control operations. Thus,
`
`the driver function for that non-primitive operation necessarily will be associated with the “other
`
`motion control operations.” In any event, “it is improper to read limitations from a preferred
`
`embodiment described in the specification--even if it is the only embodiment--into the claims
`
`absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so
`
`limited.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Defendants have
`
`not identified the required “clear indication in the intrinsic record” that a driver can be associated
`
`with only a single motion control operation necessary to support their position. Id.
`
`E.
`
`The “Network” Term (term no. 9)
`
`Defendants offer no basis for deviating from Judge Folsom’s well-reasoned construction
`
`for network. Ex. 5 at 41. And Defendants’ other cited references similarly support that
`
`construction. Dfs’ Brf. at 23, n.13 (“physically interconnecting two or more computers”).
`
`F.
`the “means plus function” terms (term nos. 10-14)
`First, Defendants’ argument that RGB seeks to construe the MPF terms as “‘software
`
`code’ for performing the claimed function” (Dfs’ Brf. at 25) is wrong. RGB identified the
`
`algorithm for performing the claimed functions and claimed software code for performing that
`
`algorithm. Second, RGB did not mischaracterize ABB’s statements. ABB told the Patent Office
`
`that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the “means for converting” was “a component
`
`which converts measurements from one coordinate system to another.” Dfs’ Brf. at 27. Third,
`
`Defendants’ proposed MPF constructions will not assist the jury. For example, identifying the
`
`corresponding structure of the “means for determining” as “CDriverMgr” is not helpful.
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:
` 5616
`
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`RGB respectfully requests that this Court adopt RGB’s proposed constructions.
`
`Dated: May 24, 2013
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`/s/Russell A. Chorush
`Russell A. Chorush
`Texas State Bar No. 24031948
`HEIM, PAYNE & CHORUSH, L.L.P.
`JP Morgan Chase Tower
`600 Travis Street, Suite 6710
`Houston, Texas 77002
`(713) 221-2000
`(713) 221-2021 (Fax)
`rchorush@hpcllp.com
`
`William A. Isaacson
`D. Michael Underhill
`Richard S. Meyer
`Patrick M. Lafferty
`BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
`5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20015
`202-237-2727
`202-237-6131 (Fax)
`wisaacson@bsfllp.com
`munderhill@bsfllp.com
`rmeyer@bsfllp.com
`plafferty@bsfllp.com
`
`Gregory P. Love
`Texas Bar No. 24013060
`STEVENS LOVE
`P. O. Box 3427
`Longview, Texas 75606-3427
`903-753-6760
`903-753-6761 (Fax)
`greg@stevenslove.com
`
`Lance Lubel
`Texas Bar No. 12651125
`Adam Q. Voyles
`Texas Bar No. 24003121
`LUBEL VOYLES, LLP
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00622-LED-ZJH Document 167 Filed 05/24/13 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:
` 5617
`
`
`5020 Montrose Blvd., Suite 800
`Houston, Texas 77006
`713-284-5200
`713-284-5250 (Fax)
`lance@lubelvoyles.com
`adam@lubelvoyles.com
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`
`
`I hereby certify that on May 24, 2013, counsel of record for the parties are being served a
`
`copy of the foregoing document and exhibits via the Court’s CM/ECF system.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Gregory P.Love
`Gregory P. Love
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`
`