`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`
`CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS US,
`INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No.: 2:11-CV-14525-SJM-MJH
`
`vs.
`
`
`
`District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III
`Magistrate Judge Michael J. Hluchaniuk
`
`SCHRADER ELECTRONICS, INC., a Delaware
`Corporation, and SCHRADER-BRIDGEPORT
`INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`PLAINTIFF CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS US, INC.’S
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`IV.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`CONTINENTAL’S PATENTED TIRE PRESSURE MONITORING
`TECHNOLOGY ................................................................................................................ 1
`A.
`The ‘973 Patent...................................................................................................... 2
`B.
`The ‘019 Patent...................................................................................................... 2
`C.
`The ‘418 Patent...................................................................................................... 3
`THE LAW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION...................................................................... 4
`CONTINENTAL’S PATENT CLAIMS USE WELL UNDERSTOOD TERMS
`AND THEIR PLAIN MEANING CONTROLS ............................................................... 5
`A.
`The ‘973 Patent...................................................................................................... 5
`1.
`“natural time lag” (Claim 1) ...................................................................... 5
`
`“internal time lag” (Claim 2) ..................................................................... 5
`2.
`“precision of an RC-type oscillator” (Claim 2) ......................................... 6
`3.
`“used to prevent collisions” (Claim 1)....................................................... 6
`The ‘019 Patent...................................................................................................... 8
`1.
`“converting measured air pressure into a temperature compensated
`second air pressure, said converting being in accordance with said
`measured temperature” (Claim 1) “converting said air pressure into
`a temperature compensated air pressure corresponding to said
`temperature” (Claim 11) ............................................................................ 8
`“determining temporal fluctuation(s) of said temperature
`compensated second air pressure, said fluctuations being in
`accordance with a difference between said temperature
`compensated second air pressure and a predetermined temperature
`compensated reference air pressure” (Claim 1)....................................... 10
`“determining” (Claim 11) ........................................................................ 11
`“threshold (value)” (Claims 1, 11)........................................................... 11
`“generating an alarm if said fluctuations exceed a predetermined
`threshold” (Claim 1) “generating an alarm signal when said
`temporal fluctuation of said temperature compensated air pressure
`exceeds an air pressure threshold value” (Claim 11)............................... 12
`“updating determined temporal fluctuation of said temperature
`compensated air pressure according to said measured additional
`parameter” (Claim 11) ............................................................................. 13
`
`B.
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`2.
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`3.
`4.
`5.
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`6.
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`i
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
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`Page
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`C.
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`2.
`3.
`4.
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`5.
`
`The ‘418 Patent.................................................................................................... 14
`1.
`“low profile tire pressure assembly adapted to conform to a curved
`surface of a tire” (Claim 1) ...................................................................... 14
`“attached to” (Claim 1) ............................................................................ 15
` “defining/defines” (Claims 1, 6)............................................................. 15
`“the low-profile tire pressure assembly including a battery side
`adapted to house the battery and a printed circuit board side
`adapted to house the printed circuit board” (Claims 1, 4) ....................... 16
`“vertex dividing the printed circuit board side and the battery side”
`(Claim 1) “vertex defines a location where the printed circuit board
`and the battery substantially meet and are free from overlapping”
`(Claim 6) .................................................................................................. 17
` “valve stem” (Claims 1, 2, 5).................................................................. 18
`6.
`“positioning the valve stem through the opening” (Claim 1) .................. 18
`7.
`“generally perpendicular” (Claim 1)........................................................ 19
`8.
`CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 20
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`ii
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`V.
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`
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`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................18
`
`Anchor Wall Sys. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls,
`340 F. 3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003)...............................................................................................19
`
`Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
`195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................11
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................16
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) .....................................4, 7
`
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................13
`
`Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp.,
`514 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................10, 12, 13
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)........................................................................ passim
`
`Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
`No. 2:05-cv-463, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20458 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2007) ..........................11
`
`SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp.,
`336 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................6
`
`Toshiba Corp. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc.,
`No. C-04-4708, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63313 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2006) ..............................4
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..................................................................................................4
`
`Wilson Sporting Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
`442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................13
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,998,973....................................................................................................1, 2, 5, 7
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`iii
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,004,019...................................................................................................... passim
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,284,418...................................................................................................... passim
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`iv
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`The purpose of claim construction is to determine the meaning and scope of the asserted
`
`claims. However, where the term has a plain and ordinary meaning, no construction is
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`necessary. Claim terms need only be defined where doing so would aid the jury’s understanding
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`of the term, such as when the patentee has specifically defined the term in the specification or the
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`term is vague. Importantly, the process of claim construction cannot be used to alter the scope of
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`the claims. Words cannot be added or eliminated, and limitations that do not appear in the
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`language of the claims themselves cannot be imported.
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`Schrader is attempting to pervert this process. Schrader asks the Court to construe
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`nineteen terms, offering the Court constructions that ignore the clear ordinary meaning of the
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`claim language, and instead fundamentally alter the claims by adding limitations found no where
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`in the claims in an attempt to exclude its products. In fact, a number of Schrader’s proposed
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`constructions would exclude even the specific embodiments disclosed in the patents. This is
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`contrary to the objectives of the claim construction process and binding Federal Circuit
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`precedent.
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`Continental’s positions, on the other hand, are true to the fundamental cannons of claim
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`construction. Indeed, Continental asks for only a single construction in the three asserted
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`patents.
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`II.
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`CONTINENTAL’S PATENTED TIRE PRESSURE MONITORING
`TECHNOLOGY
`
`Continental accuses Schrader of infringing three patents: U.S. Patent No. 6,998,973 (the
`
`“’973 Patent”), U.S. Patent No. 7,004,019 (the “’019 Patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 7,284,418
`
`(the “’418 Patent”). Each patent relates to Continental’s tire pressure monitoring (“TPM”)
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`
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`system technology. A TPM system includes a wheel unit1 that resides inside each tire—typically
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`attached to the valve stem—and a receiver in the vehicle itself. The wheel unit measures tire
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`pressure and other data and wirelessly transmits that information to the receiver in the vehicle.
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`The TPM technology claimed in each patent is described below.
`
`A.
`
`The ‘973 Patent
`
`The technology in the ‘973 Patent minimizes collisions of the wireless signals transmitted
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`by each of the respective wheel units, which is important because collisions disrupt the
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`transmission of data to the receiver. The ‘973 Patent teaches that such collisions can be avoided
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`or minimized by using wheel units that contain imprecise internal clocks. Much like a personal
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`computer, each wheel unit contains an internal clock in its microchip to regulate the timing of its
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`operations, including when to send a wireless transmission to the receiver. These clocks are
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`typically “oscillators” that can take the form of electronic circuits or crystals that “tick” like a
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`watch by producing a pulsing electronic signal.
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`Conventional prior art wheel units tried to avoid collisions by using precise crystal clocks
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`to keep all four wheel units perfectly in sync, and then staggering the transmissions through a
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`software algorithm or similar means. Continental’s engineers discovered that collisions could be
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`minimized in a cheaper and less power-intensive way by using less precise clocks that resulted in
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`a natural time lag between the clocks in the various wheel units. The natural time lag between
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`those clocks injects sufficient randomness in the transmissions to minimize collisions.
`
`B.
`
`The ‘019 Patent
`
`The ‘019 Patent teaches a method for detecting an air pressure drop in a tire that, among
`
`other things, compensates for the effect of temperature on pressure readings. Temperature
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`affects the pressure reading in various ways. For example, the principle known as Boyle’s law
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`1 Also referred to as a tire pressure monitor or a tire pressure sensor.
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`2
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`says that when temperature increases so does pressure. Thus, on a particularly cold morning, tire
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`pressure may decrease and cause a low tire pressure light to illuminate on the dashboard. This
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`light would likely turn off half way to the dealer as the day warms and the tire heats.
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`Another example is the effect of temperature on the wheel unit’s pressure sensor itself.
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`TPM systems typically determine pressure based on the voltage output by the pressure sensor.
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`However, the voltage output by the pressure sensor also changes with temperature. Thus, if two
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`cars both have the same tire pressure, but one is in Alaska where it is cold and the other is in
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`Arizona where it is hot, their respective pressure sensors will output different voltages. This can
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`result in different pressure readings even though the actual tire pressure for both cars is the same.
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`In general, the method for detecting a drop in air pressure disclosed by the ‘019 Patent
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`fixes these problems by measuring temperature and creating a temperature compensated air
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`pressure reading. It then compares the temperature compensated air pressure to a predetermined
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`reference air pressure to determine how it fluctuates over time. If these fluctuations exceed a
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`predetermined threshold, an alarm is generated.
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`C.
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`The ‘418 Patent
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`The invention disclosed in the ‘418 Patent is a low profile tire pressure sensor assembly
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`(i.e., wheel unit). The low profile wheel unit has a number of advantages over prior art wheel
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`units. In prior art wheel units, the battery was on top of the printed circuit board (“PCB”),
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`resulting in a bulky, thick device. Due to their size, prior art wheel units were prone to damage
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`when the tire was changed. They also did not fit snugly to the wheel well, which caused
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`additional stresses on the wheel unit when the vehicle was in motion.
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`The low profile design disclosed by the ‘418 Patent fixes these problems. The battery
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`was moved to the side of the PCB and at an angle, which allowed for a longer, flatter housing.
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`The housing was also adapted to conform to the curved surface of the wheel well. This is shown
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`3
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`
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`in the patent by angling down each side of the housing, although the invention is not limited to
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`this embodiment and includes all other ways of adapting the wheel unit to the wheel well. By
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`lowering and elongating the wheel unit, it is out of the way of tire changers and can better
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`withstand the forces of a moving tire.
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`III. THE LAW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`The Court must determine the “meaning and scope” of a patent’s asserted claims prior to
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`performing any invalidity or non-infringement analysis. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
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`52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Claim construction is
`
`an issue of law for the Court to decide. Id. at 977-78. The words of a claim are generally given
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`their ordinary and customary meaning, which is the meaning the words would have to a person
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`of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`
`F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). Where the words of the claim
`
`have an unambiguous ordinary meaning, the Court need not formally construe the claim. Indeed,
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`“claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify
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`and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the
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`determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical
`
`Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Toshiba Corp. v. Hynix
`
`Semiconductor Inc., No. C-04-4708, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63313, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
`
`2006) (declining to construe “coupled between” where defendant’s proposed construction would
`
`not “assist the jury perform its duties better than” the claim language).
`
`When the words of the claim do not have an unambiguous ordinary meaning to one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art, they are properly subject to construction by the court. See Markman, 52
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`F.3d at 970-71. In so doing, the Court should look first to the patent’s specification, described
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`by the Federal Circuit in Phillips as “the best source for understanding a technical term.” 415
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`4
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`
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`F.3d at 1315 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The specification may reveal that the
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`patentee acted as his own lexicographer and gave a special definition to a claim term that differs
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`from its ordinary meaning; in such cases that special definition governs. Id. at 1316 (citations
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`omitted). The specification may also “reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim
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`scope by the inventor,” and if so, that interpretation governs the claims. Id. (citations omitted).
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`In addition to the specification, a court should also consider the patent’s prosecution history. See
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`id. at 1317.
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`The claims, specification, and prosecution history are known as the intrinsic evidence.
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`Extrinsic evidence, which is anything other than the intrinsic evidence, is “less significant” in
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`determining the meaning of claims. See id. at 1319.
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`IV. CONTINENTAL’S PATENT CLAIMS USE WELL UNDERSTOOD TERMS AND
`THEIR PLAIN MEANING CONTROLS
`
`A.
`
`The ‘973 Patent
`
`1.
`
`
`
`“natural time lag” (Claim 1)
`
`“internal time lag” (Claim 2)
`
`These two claim terms do not need to be construed by the Court, because they are clear
`
`on their faces. Schrader proposes that these terms be given a common construction: “an ever-
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`present, inherent, delay of various RC oscillator clocks that causes transmissions to be
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`transmitted at different times.” Schrader’s proposal should be rejected for two reasons.
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`First, there is no basis to limit claim 1—which claims “natural time lag” between
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`“internal clocks” —to the time lag determined by RC oscillator clocks. Although the
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`specification discloses a preferred embodiment which uses a microcontroller whose internal
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`clock consists of an RC oscillator, see, e.g. the ‘973 Patent (attached hereto as Exhibit B) at 3:22-
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`27, the Federal Circuit has “repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those
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`5
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`embodiments.” See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
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`Second, Schrader’s construction violates the doctrine of claim differentiation2 because it
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`would result in claim 1 having the same scope as claim 2, which expressly claims a time lag
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`determined by RC oscillator clocks. Had the patentee wanted to limit claim 1 to an RC oscillator
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`clock, it would have done so and there would be no need for dependent claim 2.
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`2.
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`“precision of an RC-type oscillator” (Claim 2)
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`This term does not need to be construed by the Court, because it has an unambiguous
`
`ordinary meaning. An RC oscillator is a type of clock that keeps time for the operations of the
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`microprocessor. See, e.g., Exh. B at 3:22-25. This is commonly understood and is not disputed
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`by the parties. Similarly, the word “precision” does not need construction, because it is used in
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`its ordinary way—to specify how accurate the clock is—and is commonly understood (e.g., the
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`average juror would easily understand what is meant by the “precision” of a clock or
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`wristwatch).
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`Schrader asks the Court to construe this term as “inherent, internal variance in frequency
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`output [of an RC Oscillator circuit].” Schrader’s construction should be rejected because it
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`substitutes more complicated, technical terms for more easily understood ones used in the
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`claims. There is no need to confuse the jury with additional concepts such as “frequency output”
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`or use more complicated terms such as “internal variance” when the language of this claim term
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`is clear as written.
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`3.
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`“used to prevent collisions” (Claim 1)
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`This is the only term that Continental proposes to construe because, unlike the others, it
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`uses a word—“prevent”—that has more than one commonly understood meaning and, thus,
`
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`2 Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, an independent claim ordinarily should not be construed as containing
`a limitation that is explicitly called out in one of its dependent claims. See SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM
`Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`
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`could be confusing to the jury. For example, “prevent” can mean to completely prohibit from
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`occurring (as in, “the locked door prevented the thief from entering”), or it can mean to reduce
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`the chance of something occurring (as in, “flu shots prevent people from getting sick”). In the
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`‘973 Patent, “prevent” is used in a way that clearly encompasses the latter example. Therefore,
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`Continental proposes that this term be construed as “used to avoid or minimize the risk of a
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`collision,” which is directly supported by the way the term is used in the patent’s specification.
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`See Exh. B at 3:39-43 (explaining that “the transmission sequence of the various messages
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`coming from the various wheels makes it possible to avoid (or minimize) the risk of a collision
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`between the transmitted data” (emphasis added)). And, of course, the patentee’s use of the term
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`in the patent’s specification is among the most persuasive and reliable guides for its construction.
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`See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
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` Schrader proposes that this term be construed as “the natural, internal time lag by itself
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`creates sufficiently random intervals between frames transmitted by each sensor to ensure that
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`the frames transmitted from multiple sensors cannot be sent at the same time to the same vehicle
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`receiver, without using any additional time shifting method.” The Court should reject Schrader’s
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`proposed construction for the following three reasons.
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`First, Schrader’s construction improperly reads into the claim a limitation that would
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`require the natural time lag “by itself” to prevent frames from being transmitted at the same time
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`“without using any additional time shifting method.” Nowhere does the claim prohibit the use of
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`other methods to avoid collisions. And there is no basis anywhere in the specification or
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`prosecution history to justify reading such a limitation into the claim. Nor is there any legal
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`basis. Indeed, whether an accused product has additional features beyond those claimed is
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`irrelevant. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 374, n.1 (“a claim for a ceiling fan with three blades
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`7
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`
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`attached to a solid rod connected to a motor would not only cover fans that take precisely this
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`form, but would also cover a similar fan that includes some additional feature, e.g., such a fan
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`with a cord or switch for turning it on and off....” (citations omitted)).
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`Second, the other language in Schrader’s construction is complicated, confusing, and
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`inferior to the language of the claim. The claim is focused on a result—preventing collisions—
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`and the specification makes clear that preventing is “avoiding or minimizing.” Schrader’s
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`proposed construction does not define the term “prevent” itself. Rather, it tries to limit the claim
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`to a single method of accomplishing the result of prevention—namely that “the frames
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`transmitted from multiple sensors cannot be sent at the same time.” This is backward and results
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`in a confusing and improperly limited construction. For example, portions of frames that are not
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`sent at the exact same time, but close in time, could still collide and it is not clear from
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`Schrader’s definition whether this is covered or not.
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`Third, Schrader’s construction adds the word “internal” to “natural time lag.” This is
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`simply wrong because the claim says the natural time lag between internal clocks is used to
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`prevent collisions, and does not say a natural time lag internal to the clocks prevents collisions.
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`B.
`
`The ‘019 Patent
`1.
`“converting measured air pressure into a temperature compensated
`second air pressure, said converting being in accordance with said
`measured temperature” (Claim 1)
`
`“converting said air pressure into a temperature compensated air
`pressure corresponding to said temperature” (Claim 11)
`
`Continental contends the plain meaning of these claim terms is clear and needs no
`
`construction. Schrader proposes these terms should be construed as: “converting the value of
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`the measured air pressure to an equivalent value on a different scale or reference based on
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`measured temperature; the equivalent value is the temperature compensated air pressure or
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`8
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`Page 1007-13
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`
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`temperature compensated second air pressure.” This construction should be rejected because it
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`confuses the plain meaning of the claim and improperly imports limitations from the
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`specification.
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`The language is clear on its face and merely requires converting the air pressure that was
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`measured into an air pressure value that has been compensated for temperature (i.e., a
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`temperature compensated second air pressure). Nothing in the specification or prosecution
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`history dictates or limits how this can be accomplished. Rather, the specification makes clear
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`that any method of converting measured air pressure into a temperature compensated air pressure
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`is covered. See the ‘019 Patent (attached hereto as Exhibit D) at 4:36-39 (“the pressure values
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`are not only compensated dependant upon the measured temperature in step 36, but dependant on
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`further parameters influencing the internal pressure of the tires”).
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`Schrader’s construction fundamentally redrafts the claim by changing the phrase
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`“converting a measured air pressure into a temperature compensated air pressure” into
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`“’[c]onverting the value of the measured air pressure to an equivalent value on a different
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`scale or reference based on measured temperature” (emphasis added). There is no basis to do
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`so. The claim does not say anything about changing the “scale or reference”—a term whose
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`meaning is itself vague. Rather, the specification discloses a clear example of temperature
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`compensation that does not change the scale or reference of the measured air pressure value.3
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`See id. at 4:6-12.
`
`
`3 The specification describes compensating for temperature by multiplying the measured air pressure by the ratio of
`a temperature constant and the measured temperature. See Exh. D at 4:6-11. The passage also states that “[t]he
`temperatures are in absolute temperature values,” meaning that the temperatures use the same unit of measure (i.e.,
`Kelvin). Id. at 4:12-13. The temperature ratio is, therefore, simply a number (i.e., not in Kelvin nor any other unit
`of temperature). Thus, when this “unitless” temperature value is multiplied by the air pressure, the resulting
`temperature compensated second air pressure will be in the same units—and on the same scale or reference—as the
`measured air pressure.
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`9
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`Page 1007-14
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`2:11-cv-14525-SJM-MJH Doc # 34 Filed 06/26/12 Pg 15 of 26 Pg ID 443
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`
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`2.
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`temperature
`said
`of
`fluctuation(s)
`temporal
`“determining
`fluctuations being
`in
`compensated second air pressure, said
`accordance with a difference between said temperature compensated
`second air pressure and a predetermined temperature compensated
`reference air pressure” (Claim 1)
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`Continental contends this term needs no construction because it has an unambiguous
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`ordinary meaning: to determine how the temperature compensated second air pressure changes
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`over time compared to a predetermined reference air pressure. For this reason alone, the Court
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`should agree with Continental and refuse to construe the claim.
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`Schrader’s construction, on the other hand, impermissibly seeks to redraft this term to
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`require the “predetermined temperature compensated reference air pressure” to be a “pre-stored
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`constant air pressure.” Schrader’s proposed construction is as follows: “identifying the
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`difference between a temperature compensated measured pressure value and a pre-stored
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`constant air pressure value that has been subject to the same temperature compensation
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`conversion as the measured pressure, and against which all ‘temperature compensated’ measured
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`air pressures are compared over time” (emphasis added).
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`There is no basis to limit the “predetermined…reference air pressure” to “a pre-stored
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`constant air pressure.” Claim 1 only specifies that the reference air pressure be “predetermined.”
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`It does not require that the reference air pressure be constant. Rather, it could change over time,
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`as detailed in the specification where the reference air pressure is described as a previously
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`measured air pressure. See Exh. D at 4:66-5:2 (“In step 50, the difference between the current
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`and a previously determined measured or compensated value Δp is calculated.”). Schrader’s
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`proposed construction must therefore be rejected because it would improperly exclude an
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`embodiment disclosed in the specification. Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276-78
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`(Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`10
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`Page 1007-15
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`2:11-cv-14525-SJM-MJH Doc # 34 Filed 06/26/12 Pg 16 of 26 Pg ID 444
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`
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`3.
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` “determining” (Claim 11)
`
`“Determining” is readily understood, and there is no need to construe it. See, e.g.,
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`Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., No. 2:05-cv-463, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20458, at *32-
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`*33 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2007) (agreeing with plaintiff that the claim term “determine” required
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`no construction”).
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`In fact, Shrader’s construction for this term shows the danger in trying to define
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`commonly understood terms. Schrader’s proposed construction for “determining” in claim 11 is
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`a “fixed or set process of evaluating.” This construction merely creates confusion, while adding
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`nothing. Indeed, both claim 1 and claim 11 contain the phrase “determining temporal
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`fluctuation[s] of said temperature compensated [second] air pressure,” yet, in its construction for
`
`claim 1, Schrader proposed that “determining” means something different: “identifying the
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`difference between” (see Section IV(B)(2)). This alone shows the fallacy of Schrader’s proposed
`
`constructions, because a term which appears in different claims cannot be given different
`
`meanings unless it is clear from the specification and the prosecution history that the terms have
`
`different meanings at different portions of the claims. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
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`States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Unless the patent otherwise
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`provides, a claim term cannot be given different meaning in the various terms of the same
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`patent.”). Here, there is no indication in the patent that the word “determining” has a different
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`meaning in claims 1 and 11, and Schrader’s attempt to construe it differently should be rejected.
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`4.
`
`“threshold (value)” (Claims 1, 11)
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`The meaning of “threshold (value)” is readily apparent, the specification does not define
`
`it in any contrary way, and it therefore needs no construction. Schrader’s construction—“a
`
`predetermined, constant, stored value above which something will take place and below which it
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`will not”—should be rejected because, just like it did with “reference air pressure,” Schrader
`
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`11
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`Page 1007-16
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`2:11-cv-14525-SJM-MJH Doc # 34 Filed 06/26/12 Pg 17 of 26 Pg ID 445
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`
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`tries to construe “threshold (value)” as a constant, stored value without any basis for doing so.
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` As explained above with “reference air pressure,” the claim only requires the threshold
`
`to be predetermined, not that its value is constant. The te