Trials@uspto.gov Paper 21
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`Entered: May 2, 2013
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
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`SYNOPSYS, INC.
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION
`Patent Owner
`_______________
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`Case IPR2012-00041
`Patent 6,947,882 B1
`_______________
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`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, and
`JENNIFER S. BISK, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`BISK, Administrative Patent Judge.
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`DECISION
`Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
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`Case IPR2012-00041
`Patent 6,947,882 B1
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Petitioner Synopsys, Inc. requests rehearing (Paper 20, “Rehearing Req.”) of
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`the Decision mailed February 22, 2013 (Paper 16, “Decision”) denying Petitioner’s
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`request for inter partes review of claims 1-14 and 17-20 of U.S. Patent 6,947,882
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`(the “’882 patent”) (Ex. 1001). The request for rehearing is denied.
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`II. BACKGROUND
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`Petitioner sought inter partes review of claims 1-14 and 17-20 of the ’882
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`patent on September 26, 2012. Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The ’882 patent is directed to a
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`regionally time multiplexed system for emulating a circuit design. For a fuller
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`description of the technology of the ’882 patent, see Decision 3-4. The Petitioner
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`challenged the enumerated claims as anticipated or obvious over several
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`references, alone and in combination. See Pet. 4-5. In its Decision, the Board
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`determined that Petitioner had failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of
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`prevailing over any of the proposed grounds, and therefore denied the petition.
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`Decision 18. Petitioner now seeks reconsideration of that denial on the ground that
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`claims 1-14 and 17-20 are anticipated by U.S. Patent 5,960,191 (the “’191 patent”)
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`(Ex. 1002).
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`III. ANALYSIS
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`A. Claim Construction
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`Petitioner’s main argument is that in construing the claim term
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`“independent,” the Board failed to apply the “broadest reasonable interpretation.”
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`Rehearing Req. 2-8. We do not agree.
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`Before moving on to the merits of this argument, we point out that Petitioner
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`did not set forth an explicit proposed interpretation for the claim term
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`“independent” (or any other claim term) in the petition and therefore cannot
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`Case IPR2012-00041
`Patent 6,947,882 B1
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`identify where this matter was addressed in the petition. We could not have
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`misapprehended or overlooked something not adequately explained in the initial
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`petition. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to supplement the initial
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`petition. Regardless, we are not persuaded that our Decision was incorrect.
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`In our Decision, we construed the claim terms “wherein clocking of the
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`second time multiplexed interconnection is independent of clocking of the first
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`time multiplexed interconnection” as required by independent claim 1 and
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`“wherein the signal routing clock signal is independent of the first clock signal and
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`the second clock signal” as required by independent claim 5 (collectively, “the
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`independent clock signal limitation”). Decision 5-7. Petitioner implicitly
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`proposed that the interpretation of this term includes signals that are described as
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`“asynchronous.” See Discussion in Decision 5-7; Pet. 17, 25. We disagreed,
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`finding that the plain and ordinary meaning of “independent” is not synonymous
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`with “asynchronous.” Decision 6.
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`In its motion for rehearing, Petitioner appears to propose that in the context
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`of the ’882 patent, the independent clock signal limitation should be construed to
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`mean that “there is no required relationship between [the] two clock signals.” See
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`Rehearing Req. 6. However, there are many types of relationships between signals
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`other than being synchronous. Thus, a description of two signals as asynchronous
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`does not mean that the signals have no relationship. Because Petitioner’s proposed
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`definition is not synonymous with asynchronous clock signals, we are not
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`persuaded that, even if we adopted this construction, the outcome of our Decision
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`would be different.
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`B. Anticipation
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`Petitioner’s “Detailed Explanation” of the asserted grounds for anticipation
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`of the challenged claims by the ’191 patent consisted solely of a claim chart. Pet.
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`Patent 6,947,882 B1
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`14. Thus, the Board had no analysis or explanation to accompany the quoted
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`language from the ’191 patent with which to determine whether Petitioner had met
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`the threshold burden required by 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)—“that there is a reasonable
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`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
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`challenged in the petition.” Decision 10. In the Decision, we explained that
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`because Petitioner did not specify that any element of the claims is included
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`inherently in the ’191 patent, we must assume that the ’191 patent explicitly
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`discloses each and every limitation of all the challenged claims arranged as in the
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`claim. Id.
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`The only language of the ’191 patent relied on by Petitioner, and thus the
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`only basis on which to determine whether Petitioner would prevail with respect to
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`the independent clock signal limitation, are two paragraphs in the ’191 patent and
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`one sentence in Chen (Ex. 1003). Decision 10-12; Pet. 17, 25. None of this
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`language, however, explicitly satisfies all the requirements of the limitation even if
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`we use Petitioner’s newly proposed definition—“no required relationship between
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`the signals.” Two of the sections merely disclose that the signals “need not be
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`synchronized between any two chips” or “are assumed asynchronous.” Pet. 17, 25
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`(citing ’191 patent, col. 11, ll. 40-50; Chen, col 8, ll. 18-19). As explained above,
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`two signals being asynchronous does not preclude another type of relationship
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`between the same two signals. Therefore, these passages do not even satisfy
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`Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of the independent clock signal limitation.
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`The last passage of the ’191 patent relied on by Petitioner discloses using
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`“different pairs of emulation boards 200 to have different clocks.” Pet 17, 25.
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`And, while we explained that this may indeed disclose independent clocking, it
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`does not disclose explicitly that the independent clocks are for the first and second
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`“time multiplexed interconnection” as required by claim 1, or that the two signals
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`Patent 6,947,882 B1
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`are “at least one of the first input/output circuitry and the second input/output
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`circuitry” as required by claim 5. Decision 11-12. Thus, no matter what
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`interpretation of the independent clock signal limitation we adopt, the passages
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`relied upon by Petitioner do not disclose explicitly each of the elements arranged
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`as in the claim as required to prove anticipation. We are not persuaded by
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`Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary. Rehearing Req. 9-12. We also note that
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`these arguments refer to and explain many sections of the ’191 patent not
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`mentioned in the petition. See, e.g., Rehearing Req. 10-11 (citing ’191 patent col.
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`11, l. 22-col. 14, l. 5, Figs. 8-10). Again, we could not have misapprehended or
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`overlooked something not adequately explained initially. Moreover, a request for
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`rehearing is not an opportunity to supplement a petition.
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`Finally, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the conclusion of
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`our Decision was flawed because “if the disclosure of the ’191 patent is viewed in
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`the same light as the ’882 patent, it likewise clearly discloses separate sources for
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`[its] clock signals” and therefore the ’191 patent anticipates the independent clock
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`signal limitation. Rehearing Req. 15. First, as explained above, we are not
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`persuaded that the cited language discloses the elements arranged as in the claims
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`even if the independent clock signal limitation were satisfied. Second, Petitioner’s
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`extensive comparison of the specifications of the ’882 and the ’191 patents is
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`irrelevant. See Rehearing Req. 12-15. The only proper comparison in this
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`anticipation challenge is between the language of the ’191 patent relied upon by
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`the Petitioner and the subject matter of the challenged claims. In re Morsa, 2013
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`WL 1352514, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2013) (“[T]he anticipation exercise must
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`assess the . . . prior art reference in light of the proposed claims.”).
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`As explained in our Decision, and discussed above, after such comparison,
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`we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that
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`Patent 6,947,882 B1
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`it would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`Petitioner has not carried its burden of demonstrating that the Board’s
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`Decision misapprehended or overlooked any matters. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The
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`Motion is DENIED.
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`For Petitioner:
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`William Wright
`wwright@orrick.com
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`Travis Jensen
`tjensen@orrick.com
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`For Patent Owner:
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`Christopher McKee
`mentoripr@bannerwitcoff.com
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`Michael Cuviello
`mentoripr@bannerwitcoff.com
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