Case 2:13-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 71 Filed 08/28/14 Page 1 of 54 PageID #: 11463
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`ALFONSO CIOFFI, et al.
`
`v.
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`GOOGLE INC.
`
` CASE NO. 2:13-CV-103-JRG-RSP
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`
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`§§§§§§
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
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`On August 14, 2014, the Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of the
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`
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`disputed claim terms in United States Patents No. RE43,103, RE43,500, RE43,528, and
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`RE43,529. After considering the arguments made by the parties at the hearing and in the parties’
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`claim construction briefing (Dkt. Nos. 56, 66, and 67),1 the Court issues this Claim Construction
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`Memorandum and Order.
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`1 Citations to documents (such as the parties’ briefs and exhibits) in this Claim Construction
`Memorandum and Order refer to the page numbers of the original documents rather than the
`page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docket unless otherwise indicated.
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`Google - Exhibit 1012, page 1
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`Table of Contents
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`BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................... 3 
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES ................................................................................................................. 4 
`THE PARTIES’ STIPULATED TERMS ................................................................................... 6 
`CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................................. 6 
`A. “web browser process” ......................................................................................................... 7 
`B. “wherein the second web browser process is capable of accessing data contained in the
`second memory space” ....................................................................................................... 15 
`C. “first memory space” ........................................................................................................... 19 
`D. “second memory space” and “second protected memory space” ....................................... 25 
`E. “the second electronic data processor is operating in a protected mode” ........................... 27 
`F. “the at least one electronic data processor configured to execute the first web browser
`process within the common operating system, wherein the first web browser process is
`capable of accessing data of a website via the network, accessing data contained in the
`first memory space” ............................................................................................................ 28 
`G. “intelligent cellular telephone capability” .......................................................................... 28 
`H. “critical file” ........................................................................................................................ 35 
`I. Defendant’s 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 Invalidity Arguments as to All Asserted Claims ............ 41 
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 52 
`APPENDIX A .............................................................................................................................. 54 
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`BACKGROUND
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`
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`Plaintiffs bring suit alleging infringement of United States Patents No. RE43,103 (“the
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`‘103 Patent”), RE43,500 (“the ‘500 Patent”), RE43,528 (“the ‘528 Patent”), and RE43,529 (“the
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`‘529 Patent”) (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”).
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`All four patents-in-suit are reissues of United States Patent No. 7,484,247 (“the ‘247
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`Patent”), which issued on January 27, 2009, from an application filed August 7, 2004. All five
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`patents are titled “System and Method for Protecting a Computer System from Malicious
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`Software.”
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`The ‘103 Patent issued on January 10, 2012, from an application filed August 10, 2010.
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`The ‘500 Patent issued on July 3, 2012, from an application filed March 9, 2010. The ‘528
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`Patent and the ‘529 Patent both issued on July 17, 2012, the first from an application filed
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`March 9, 2010, and the second from an application filed November 7, 2010.
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`The Abstracts of the four patents-in-suit and the ‘247 Patent are the same and state:
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`In a computer system, a first electronic data processor is communicatively
`coupled to a first memory space and a second memory space. A second electronic
`data processor is communicatively coupled [to] the second memory space and to a
`network interface device. The second electronic data processor is capable of
`exchanging data across a network of one or more computers via the network
`interface device. A video processor is adapted to combine video data from the
`first and second electronic data processors and transmit the combined video data
`to a display terminal for displaying the combined video data in a windowed
`format. The computer system is configured such that a malware program
`downloaded from the network and executing on the second electronic data
`processor is incapable of initiating access to the first memory space.
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`The four patents-in-suit, as well as the ‘247 Patent, share a substantially identical
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`
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`specification.2 The parties’ briefing cites the specification of the ‘247 Patent. This Claim
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`2 The ‘529 Patent includes a “Term Description” section that does not appear in the other patents.
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`Construction Memorandum and Order therefore cites the specification of only the ‘247 Patent
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`unless otherwise indicated.
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`LEGAL PRINCIPLES
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`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
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`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
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`by considering the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1313; see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical
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`Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns
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`Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims
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`themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R.
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`Bard, 388 F.3d at 861. Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as
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`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the
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`entire patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; accord Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d
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`1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of
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`particular claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim
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`can be very instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can aid in determining the
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`claim’s meaning because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
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`Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For
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`example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
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`the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314-15.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
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`at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
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`(en banc)). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
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`Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips,
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`415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
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`1996)); accord Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This
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`is true because a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than
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`the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d
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`at 1316. In these situations, the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id. The specification may also
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`resolve the meaning of ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of
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`the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be
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`ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. But, “[a]lthough the
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`specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular
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`embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the
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`claims.” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
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`(quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988));
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`accord Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
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`
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`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
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`construction because a patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home
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`Diagnostics, Inc., v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the
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`specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”). “[T]he prosecution
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`history (or file wrapper) limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that
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`may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance.”
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`Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “less significant than the intrinsic record
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`in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
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`(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a
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`court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might
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`use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too
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`broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly,
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`expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining
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`the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
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`assertions as to a term’s definition are entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
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`evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
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`claim terms.” Id.
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`THE PARTIES’ STIPULATED TERMS
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`The parties have reached agreements as to several terms, as stated in their June 2, 2014
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`Patent Local Rule 4-3 Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement (Dkt. No. 52 at 1-2)
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`and their August 11, 2014 Joint Claim Construction Chart (Dkt. No. 68, Ex. A at 5). The parties’
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`agreements are set forth in Appendix A to this Claim Construction Memorandum and Order.
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`CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
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`As submitted by the parties, most of the disputed terms appear in all of the asserted
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`claims of one or more of the patents-in-suit, as set forth as to each disputed term, below. In the
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`parties’ Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement, Defendant identified the asserted
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`claims as follows:
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`The asserted claims of the ‘500 Patent are Claims 21, 23, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37,
`38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 52, 66, 67 and 70.
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`The asserted claims of the ‘528 Patent are Claims 1, 2, 5, 21, 23, 25, 30, 44, 46,
`52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 64, 65, 66, 67 and 70.
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`The asserted claims of the ‘529 Patent are Claims 21, 23, 28, 30, 36, 38, 45,
`[and] 49.
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`The asserted claim of the ‘103 Patent is Claim 21.
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`(Dkt. No. 52, Ex. B at 1 nn.2-5.)
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`
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`Shortly before the start of the August 14, 2014 hearing, the Court provided the parties
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`with preliminary constructions of the disputed terms with the aim of focusing the parties’
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`arguments and facilitating discussion. Those preliminary constructions are set forth within the
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`discussion of each term, below.
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`A. “web browser process”
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`Plaintiffs’ Proposed Construction
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`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
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`No Construction: Plain and ordinary meaning
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`“process that performs the retrieval of web
`pages”3
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`(Dkt. No. 56 at 7; Dkt. No. 66 at 18.) Plaintiffs submit that this disputed term appears in all
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`asserted claims of the ‘500, ‘528, and ‘529 Patents. (Dkt. No. 56 at 7 n.13.)
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`Shortly before the start of the August 14, 2014 hearing, the Court provided the parties
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`with the following preliminary construction: “process that can access data on websites.”
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`3 Defendant submits in its briefing: “To address Plaintiffs’ stated concern about unduly limiting
`the functions of the web browser process, [Defendant] is amenable to an alternate construction
`that requires the web browser process to be capable of ‘at least’ performing the retrieval of web
`pages or a construction that merely acknowledges that the web browser process claimed ‘cannot
`be a secure renderer.’” (Dkt. No. 66 at 20 n.14.)
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`(1) The Parties’ Positions
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`Plaintiffs argue that “Defendant’s proposed construction seeks to import a discussion of
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`‘retrieval of web pages’ from the prosecution history into the claim meaning, and in doing so,
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`completely ignores the fact that the claims themselves describe the web browser process.” (Dkt.
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`No. 56 at 8.) Plaintiffs further submit:
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`The plain meaning of web browser process would certainly include, among other
`attributes, the capabilities of (1) accessing data of at least one website via the
`network, and (2) generating video data from the at least one website accessed via
`the network. While the inventors have expressly identified these characteristics of
`the claimed web browser process depending on whether it is the first web browser
`process or the second web browser process, they in no way altered the plain and
`ordinary meaning of this commonly understood term.
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`(Id.)
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`As to the prosecution history regarding the “Narin” reference (United States Patent
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`Application Publication No. 2002/0002673), cited by Defendant, Plaintiffs argue that the
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`patentees “argued that Narin consistently teaches away from the first logical process ever being a
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`web browser process,” and “[n]owhere did they say their invention is different because the first
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`logical process must retrieve web pages.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs further submit that “they were
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`distinguishing Narin on the basis that their first browser process could access Internet sites
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`and/or data (not specifically retrieval of web pages).” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiffs conclude: “To be
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`sure, a web browser process may retrieve web pages but the requirement that it must does not
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`flow from the intrinsic evidence.” (Id.)
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`Defendant responds that “[d]uring reissue prosecution, the Applicants distinguished prior
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`art reference Narin by explaining that the Applicants’ ‘browser process’ was different than
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`Narin’s rendering process because it performed the retrieval of web pages.” (Dkt. No. 66 at 18.)4
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`More specifically, Defendant argues, “the prosecution history makes clear that the term ‘web
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`browser process’ was intended to be narrower than the ‘browser process’ language previously
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`used in the claims.” (Id. at 19.) Defendant concludes that “a construction that gives effect to the
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`addition of the word ‘web’ must be adopted to make clear that both the first and second ‘web
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`browser’ processes exclude a renderer, like the one in Narin, that does not perform the retrieval
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`of web pages.” (Id. at 20.) Finally, Defendant submits that its proposed construction does not
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`limit “the web browser process to only performing the retrieval of web pages” but rather
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`“permits the process to perform any of the other web browsing functions that Plaintiffs recite.”
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`(Id.)
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`Plaintiffs reply that the prosecution history relied upon by Defendant “is nowhere close to
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`the inventors stating their browser processes are distinct from Narin because they ‘retr[ie]ve web
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`pages’ as Defendant would have the Court believe.” (Dkt. No. 67 at 1-2.) Plaintiffs also argue:
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`“The inventors responded [to the examiner’s rejection] by adding ‘web’ in[]front of ‘browser
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`process’ and making the first web browser process ‘capable of accessing data of a website via the
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`network.’ Defendant’s focus on the addition of the term ‘web’ does not tell even half the story
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`as to why the rejections were made and what the inventors did in response.” (Id. at 2.) Further,
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`Plaintiffs note, Defendant’s proposed construction “renders the language ‘capable of accessing
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`4 The “secure rendering process” in Narin is, for example, an application for playing audio or
`video content that is protected by Digital Rights Management (DRM). See Narin at ¶ 46. “Such
`a system must protect itself and the content from attacks—i.e., the application must resist
`attempts by a hacker to ‘steal’ decrypted content or a decryption key. Since the decrypted
`content and/or the key may be stored in memory (e.g., in the address space of the process that
`runs the application), unknown or non-secure executable objects cannot be granted access to that
`address space, and thus cannot run in the same process as the secure rendering application.” Id.
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`data of the at least one website via the network’ irrelevant because that capability is already
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`implied by being able to carry out the narrower function of retrieving web pages.” (Id. at 2 n.3.)
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`(2) Analysis
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`The specification uses the terms “web browser” and “website” but does not define those
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`terms:
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`[T]here may be a variety of files that a user may wish to have automatically
`cleaned or deleted upon closing a protected process session. For example,
`temporary internet files, cookies, browser plug-ins, etc., may be deleted or
`scanned for malware automatically. A user may also wish to have websites that
`contributed to a malware infection noted, and may wish to place the offending
`websites in a block list, such that the offending websites cannot be accessed in the
`future without the user specifically authorizing access. As part of the malware
`scan, the malware scanner may automatically log the offending website(s), and
`block future access.
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` *
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` * *
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`Referring again to FIG. 9, the functions carried out by processors 920 and 940
`may comprise separate, secure logical processes executing on the same physical
`processor. For example, a first logical process may comprise executing
`instructions necessary to carry out the functions of an operating system, or the
`first logical process may comprise executing instructions necessary to carry out
`the functions of a first computer program, including but not limited to a word
`processor. A second logical process may comprise executing instructions
`necessary to carry out the functions of a web browser program, or may comprise
`executing instructions necessary to carry out the functions of an instant messenger
`program, for example.
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`‘247 Patent at 13:53-64 & 16:22-34 (emphasis added).
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`During prosecution of the reissue application that led to the ‘528 Patent, the examiner
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`cited the “Narin” reference (United States Patent Application Publication No. 2002/0002673) as
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`a basis for rejecting various claims. (See Dkt. No. 57-3, Ex. C, 4/29/2011 Office Action
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`at ¶¶ 10-59.) As explained by the patentees, Narin discloses running a “closed or protected
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`application” that controls a separate auxiliary process that runs an “open or untrusted
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`application.” (Dkt. No. 58-1, Ex. D, 8/29/2011 Amendment Under 37 CFR §1.111 at 21.) In
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`particular, Narin discloses:
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`FIG. 3 shows a secure application which uses a non-secure software object to
`perform an action or provide a service. Secure application 312 runs inside
`process 310. Application 312 is “secure” in the sense that it includes some type
`of defense against observation or modification. For example, secure
`application 312 may be an application that renders encrypted content, and which
`prevents or deters a user from learning the decryption key used to decrypt the
`content, or from copying the decrypted content itself. Typically, secure
`application 312 is relied upon by some system (e.g., a digital rights management
`system, or the participants therein) to behave in a predictable way (e.g., the
`distributors of content in a digital rights management system may rely on secure
`application 312 to render content only when permitted by the terms of a license).
`Secure application 312 may, optionally, host a software object 314.
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`Narin at ¶ 35.
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`The patentees argued:
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`. . . Narin teaches away from the closed process being a browser process.
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` *
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` * *
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`Narin describes a web browser as being an example of . . . a non-secure software
`object, meaning that a web browsing program cannot be part of the secure
`application.
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` *
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` * *
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`Narin . . . draw[s] the clear distinction between a web browser and a secure
`application, again, clearly teaching away from the secure application ever being a
`web browser process.
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` *
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` * *
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`Narin makes the clearest distinction below between the browser and the secure
`application, referring to the web browsing function as being a separate program
`running in a separate process. Narin here is clearly teaching away from the secure
`application and the non-secure application both comprising browser processes.
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`(Dkt. No. 58-1, Ex. D, 8/29/2011 Amendment Under 37 CFR §1.111 at 21, 22, 23 & 24.) The
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`patentees also quoted various passages from Narin, including the following:
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`If the user clicks on any of the links, the browsing program will retrieve the web
`page associated with that link and display it to the user. It should be observed that
`it is the browsing program, and not the secure rendering application, that performs
`the retrieval of web pages.
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`(Id. at 24 (quoting Narin at ¶ 49); see also Dkt. No. 66, Ex. 14, ’500 Patent File History,
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`10/13/2011 Amendment Under 37 CFR §1.111 at 17 (same).)
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`After the patentees made these amendments and arguments, the examiner again rejected
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`claims based on Narin, noting that “the features upon which applicant relies, such as the first
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`browser process accessing Internet sites and/or data, are not recited in the rejected claims.” (See
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`Dkt. No. 59-1, Ex. E, 11/14/2011 Office Action at ¶ 8; see also Dkt. No. 66, Ex. 17, ‘500 Patent
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`File History, 11/17/2011 Office Action at ¶ 5 (“Throughout his arguments, the Applicant makes
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`reference that the first browser process is a web process. It is noted that the features upon which
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`applicant relies, that the claimed browsers are actually web browsers, are not recited in the
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`rejected claims.”); id. at ¶ 7 (“[T]he secure rendering application of the prior art does teach the
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`first browser process in a first logical process when that limitation is interpreted in light of the
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`specification to include web browsers, video games, and word processing applications.”).)
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`The patentees responded by amending the claims so as to recite a “web” browser rather
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`than simply a browser, and the patentees further added that the first web browser process is
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`“capable of accessing data of a website via the network.” For example, the patentees amended
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`Claim 1 of the ‘528 Patent as follows (additions underlined, as in original):
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`1. (Currently Amended) A method of operating a computer system capable of
`exchanging data across a network of one or more computers and having at least a
`first and second electronic data processor capable of executing instructions using
`a common operating system, comprising:
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`executing a first web browser process, capable of accessing data of a
`website via the network, in a first logical process within the common operating
`system using the first electronic data processor, wherein the first logical process is
`capable of accessing data contained in a first memory space;
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`executing a second web browser process in a second logical process
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`within the common operating system using the second electronic data processor,
`wherein the second logical process is capable of accessing data contained in the
`second memory space; and
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`displaying data from the first logical process and the second logical
`process, wherein a video processor is adapted to combine data from the first and
`second logical processes and transmit the combined data to a display;
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`wherein the computer system is configured such that the second electronic
`data processor is operating in a protected mode and data residing on the first
`memory space is protected from corruption by a malware process downloaded
`from the network and executing as part of the second web browser process.
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`(See, e.g., Dkt. No. 60-1, Ex. F, 1/24/2012 Amendment Accompanying RCE at 28.)
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`
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`Thus, the patentees relied on claiming a “web” browser process, and that reliance should
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`be given effect by requiring that a “web browser process” is capable of accessing data on
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`websites. See Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
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`(“The patentee is bound by representations made and actions that were taken in order to obtain
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`the patent.”); see also Southwall Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
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`1995) (“Claims may not be construed one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a
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`different way against accused infringers.”); Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 1333
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`(Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that where “phrase[s] were added to gain allowance of the claims after
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`. . . repeatedly unsuccessful attempts to gain allowance of claims without those phrases[,] [w]e
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`must . . . give them weight, for the patentability of the claims hinged upon their presence in the
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`claim language”); Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
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`2007) (“An applicant’s invocation of multiple grounds for distinguishing a prior art reference
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`does not immunize each of them from being used to construe the claim language. Rather, as we
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`have made clear, an applicant’s argument that a prior art reference is distinguishable on a
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`particular ground can serve as a disclaimer of claim scope even if the applicant distinguishes the
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`reference on other grounds as well.”).
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`- 13 -
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`Google - Exhibit 1012, page 13
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 71 Filed 08/28/14 Page 14 of 54 PageID #: 11476
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`
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`Defendant has failed, however, to establish that the constituent term “web” necessarily
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`refers to “web pages.” The Court rejects Defendant’s proposal in that regard.
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`At the August 14, 2014 hearing, Defendant stated that it could agree to the Court’s
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`preliminary construction with an understanding that the construction refers to “direct” access.
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`Plaintiffs responded that they could agree to the Court’s preliminary construction with an
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`understanding that the construction does not require “direct” access. The parties’ reactions to the
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`Court’s preliminary construction thus revealed a dispute as to whether a “web browser process”
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`must be able to access websites “directly.”
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`On balance, introducing the word “direct” would tend to confuse rather than clarify the
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`scope of the claims. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
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`1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to
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`clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the
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`determination of infringement.”). Also, Plaintiffs have noted that Claim 21 of the ‘528 Patent,
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`for example, recites, in relevant part (emphasis added): “wherein the first web browser process is
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`capable of opening the second web browser process and is further capable of passing data to the
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`second web browser process.”
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`To be clear, “can” in the Court’s construction does not mean “must” and instead refers to
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`a capability. For this capability to be meaningful and consistent with the prosecution history,
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`however, a “web browser process” must be capable of accessing a website without using another
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`web browser process. In other words, although the Court’s construction does not preclude a web
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`browser process from accessing websites by using another web browser process, a web browser
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`process’s capability of accessing websites must not require using another web browser process.
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`- 14 -
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`Google - Exhibit 1012, page 14
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 71 Filed 08/28/14 Page 15 of 54 PageID #: 11477
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`The Court thus hereby construes “web browser process” to mean “process that can
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`access data on websites.”
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`B. “wherein the second web browser process is capable of accessing data contained in the
`second memory space”5
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`Plaintiffs’ Proposed Construction
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`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
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`No Construction: Plain and ordinary meaning
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`“wherein the second web browser process is
`only capable of accessing data in the second
`memory space”
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`(Dkt. No. 56 at 10; Dkt. No. 66 at 23.) Plaintiffs submit that this disputed term appears in all
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`asserted claims of the patents-in-suit. (Dkt. No. 56 at 10 n.20.)
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`Shortly before the start of the August 14, 2014 hearing, the Court provided the parties
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`with the following preliminary construction: “Plain meaning [Expressly reject Defendant’s
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`proposal that the second web browser can access only the second memory space].”
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`(1) The Parties’ Positions
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`Plaintiffs submit that “[a]ll the asserted independent claims clearly state that the second
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`web browser process ‘is capable of accessing data contained in the second memory space’ but
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`say nothing about the second web browser process being limited to ‘only’ accessing data
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`contained in the second memory space.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 10-11.) Plaintiffs further argue that
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`“the specification flatly contradicts Defendant’s proposal and teaches that the second web
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`5 In their Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement, as well as in their Joint Claim
`Construction Chart, the parties submit this disputed term together with the following disputed
`terms: “wherein the second web browser process is configured to access data contained in the
`second memory space”; “wherein the second logical process is capable of accessing data
`contained in the second memory space”; “the second logical process being configured to access
`data contained in the second memory space”; “at least one second protected web browser process
`is configured to access data contained in the second protected memory space”; and “at least one
`secure browser process configured to: . . . access data contained in the second mem