`______________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________
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`
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`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`VERSATA SOFTWARE, INC.
`Patent Owner.
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`______________
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,825
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`CBM Case No.: 2016-00100
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`
`
`______________
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`
`
`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
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`
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`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
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`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
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`Introduction
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`
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`I.
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`On March 20, 2017, the United States Patent Trial and Appeal Board denied
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`institution of a covered business method patent review of claims 1–4, 6–9, 11–14,
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`and 17–19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,805,825 B1 (“the ‘825 patent”). Pursuant to 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Ford asks for rehearing.
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`II. Background
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`On January 11, 2017, Ford filed a Petition for Post-Grant Review (Covered
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`Business Method Review) under 35 U.S.C. § 321 and § 18 of the Leahy-Smith
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`America Invents Act with respect to claims 1-20 of the ‘825 patent. (Paper 1.)
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`Claims 1, 6, and 11 are independent claims.
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`In its Petition, Ford argued, “[t]he ‘825 Patent is a covered business method
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`because the claims cover sorting (i.e., prioritizing) configurations based on financial
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`attributes such as price and cost.” (Paper 1 at 7, see also Paper 1 at 10, “In other
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`words, the claimed inventions of the ‘825 Patent are applicable to sales of products
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`and ‘financial services’ as well as other financial applications such as sales.”) For
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`example, dependent claim 5 of the ’825 patent expressly confirms that the
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`“products” being configured in claim 1 are “vehicles, computers, and financial
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`1
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`products.”1 Thus, Ford’s primary argument was that claims 1-20 are used in the
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`practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service under AIA
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`§ 18. (Paper 1 at 7-10.) Ford mentioned, only secondarily and only in a single
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`sentence, that the claims are “at least ‘incidental to’ or ‘complimentary to’ a financial
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`activity.” (Paper 1 at 10-11.)
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`Before filing its Preliminary Response (Paper 6), Patent Owner disclaimed
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`dependent claims 5, 10, and 15 which expressly recited “financial products.” (See
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`Paper 6 at 13.) Soon after the disclaimer was filed, but before Patent Owner filed its
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`Preliminary Response, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Unwired Planet,
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`LLC v. Google, Inc., 841 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, Patent Owner was able
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`to address both the disclaimer and Unwired Planet in its Preliminary Response.
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`Because the disclaimer and Unwired Planet occurred after Ford filed its
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`Petition, the Board allowed both parties to file 3-page briefs addressing the effects
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`of: (1) Patent Owner’s disclaimer of claims 5, 10, and 15, and (2) Unwired Planet.
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`In its Preliminary Reply, Ford again argued that the properly construed claims recite
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`“‘finance-related activities’ covered by the CBM statute.” (Paper 10 at 1.)
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`1 Throughout this document, all emphasis is added unless otherwise stated.
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`Dependent claims 10 and 15 define “products” identically for their respective
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`independent claims.
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`2
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`The decision denying institution was based on the Board’s conclusion that:
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`(1) Versata’s disclaimer removed claims 5, 10, and 15 from consideration, and (2)
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`the remaining claims of the ‘825 patent were not CBM eligible after the disclaimer
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`and Unwired Planet. All three Administrative Patent Judges held that institution
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`should be denied, but each did so on somewhat different grounds. Judge Medley
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`and Judge Turner relied on their view that Unwired Planet, Secure Axcess, LLC v.
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`PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n,2 and Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc.,3 created a standard
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`that prevents claims from serving as the basis for CBM review where the claims
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`cover financial products and services but also cover more than just those products
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`or services. Judge Arpin concurred because the “Patent Owner’s disclaimer of
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`claims 5, 10, and 15 [] narrowed the scope of [independent] claims 1, 6, and 11,”
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`and thus made the claims ineligible for CBM review. (Paper 12 at 6, Arpin, APJ
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`concurring.)
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`III. Argument
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`A. Versata’s disclaimer did not remove claims 5, 10, and 15
`from consideration
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`On April 17, 2017, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential opinion in
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`2 No. 2016-1353, 2017 WL 676601, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2017).
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`3 815 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`3
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`Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP v. Samsung Electronics Co., Case No. 2016-
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`1729 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 17, 2017). In that decision, the Federal Circuit distinguished a
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`disclaimer’s effect on the patent owner from its effect on the public.
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`In Rembrandt, patent owner had licensed claim 40 of its patent to a third party,
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`who did not mark the products it sold with the patent’s number. Rembrandt then
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`sued Samsung, who raised a marking defense. Within days, Rembrandt disclaimed
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`claim 40 and asserted that the marking defense did not apply. The district court
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`agreed:
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`The court accepted Rembrandt’s argument that any prior obligation to
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`mark products embodying claim 40 vanished once it disclaimed claim
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`40. Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the District
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`Judge relied on the proposition that “[u]nder Federal Circuit
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`precedent, a disclaimed patent claim is treated as if it never existed.”
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`Id., slip op. at 19 (citation omitted).
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`The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling. The Federal Circuit
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`explained that a disclaimer does not relinquish the public’s rights:
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`[W]hile we have held that a disclaimer relinquishes the rights of the
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`patent owner, we have never held that the patent owner’s disclaimer
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`relinquishes the rights of the public. Indeed, our precedent and that of
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`other courts have not readily extended the effects of disclaimer to
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`situations where others besides the patentee have an interest that relates
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`to the relinquished claims.
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`4
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`Id., slip op. at 21 (citation omitted).
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`For support, the court cited Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
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`1996) as “holding disclaimer of an allegedly interfering claim did not divest the
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`Board of jurisdiction over interference proceeding.” Id. The Federal Circuit
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`concluded that Rembrandt’s disclaimer of claim 40 did not defeat Samsung’s
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`marking defense because “the marking statute’s focus is not only the rights of the
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`patentee, but the rights of the public.” Id., slip op. at 21-22.
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`The CBM statute, AIA § 18, focuses on the rights of the public to be free of
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`patent claims that do not meet the statutory requirements for patentability. Because
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`the statute protects the public, Versata’s disclaimer of claims 5, 10, and 15 after
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`Ford filed its CBM petition does not remove those claims from consideration by the
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`Board under Rembrandt. A district court cannot ignore disclaimed claims under the
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`marking statute. Rembrandt, Case No. 2016-1729, slip op. at 21-22. Likewise, the
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`Board cannot ignore disclaimed claims 5, 10, and 15 under AIA § 18.
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`From the Board’s opinions, it is apparent that at least judges Turner and Arpin
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`would have found claims 5, 10, and 15 CBM-eligible but for the disclaimer.4 (Paper
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`4 Judge Medley may also have held that view, although it is not clear from her
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`opinion.
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`5
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`12 at 2, Turner, APJ concurring;5 Paper 12 at 6, Arpin, APJ concurring.6) The stated
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`basis for ignoring claims 5, 10, and 15 was the view rejected in Rembrandt (and
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`Guinn) that those claims must “be treated as if they never existed.” (Paper 12 at 8,
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`Medley, APJ; Paper 12 at 1, Turner, APJ concurring; Paper 12 at 4, Arpin, APJ
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`concurring.) Applying the Federal Circuit’s Rembrandt analysis to AIA § 18, the
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`Board wrongly disregarded claims 5, 10, and 15 in deciding whether claims of the
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`‘825 patent are directed to financial products or services. Because those dependent
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`claims, which cannot be ignored, explicitly recite financial products, the ‘825 patent
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`remains eligible for CBM review. For this reason alone, the Board should grant this
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`Petition for Rehearing and reconsider its decision denying institution of CBM
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`review.
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`5 “Had claim 5 not been disclaimed, it is readily apparent that claim 5 would have
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`been found to be a method or apparatus for performing data processing or other
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`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product
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`or service.”
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`6 “Thus, initially, I would find that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term
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`‘product,’ in independent claims 1, 6, and 11, encompasses ‘financial services.’”
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`6
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`B.
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`The Board is reading the recent Unwired Planet, Secure
`Axcess, and Blue Calypso cases too narrowly
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`Putting aside claims 5, 10, and 15, the remaining claims of the ‘825 patent are
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`well-within § 18 of the America Invents Act. While the disclaimed claims are no
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`longer enforceable, the remaining claims, including claim 1, remain eligible for a
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`CBM given that the statutory language defines eligibility of a CBM as “a patent that
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`claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
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`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product
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`or service.” See Section 18(d)(1).
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`In the decision denying the petition, the Board applied the Federal Circuit’s
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`Unwired Planet, Secure Axcess, and Blue Calypso cases too narrowly and
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`determined that the remaining claims in the patent were not CBM eligible. Due to
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`this misapprehension of the statute and mistaken interpretation of the Federal
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`Circuit’s decisions, the Board abused its discretion when it denied Ford’s CBM
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`Petition.
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`In the decision, Judge Turner found that “independent claims 1, 6, and 11 are
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`sufficiently broad to cover their use with financial products, and the clear intent was
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`for them to be applied to financial products . . . .” (Paper 12 at 2, Turner, APJ
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`concurring.) Judge Turner even noted that the Board’s decision not to institute the
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`trial was troubling because it “allows for a broader claim, intended to be directed to
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`7
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`a financial product, to escape review.” (Id. at 3.) Nonetheless, he concluded that
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`the result was mandated by Unwired Planet. (Id.)
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`But, contrary to the Board’s interpretation, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in
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`Unwired Planet does not require that claims, which are directed to a financial
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`product or service, be denied CBM review merely because the claims also cover
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`other products or services. Unwired Planet does not require that a claim must cover
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`only financial products or services to be eligible for CBM review.
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`In Unwired Planet, the Federal Circuit did away with the Board’s prior CBM
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`review standard, which captured claims that were only “incidental to” or
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`“complementary to” a financial activity. Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382. The
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`Federal Circuit held, “CBM patents are limited to those with claims that are directed
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`to methods and apparatuses of particular types and with particular uses ‘in the
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`practice, administration, or management of a financial produce or service.’” Id.
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`Unwired Planet set a floor for CBM review eligibility, but it did not set a ceiling—
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`i.e., it did not prohibit a CBM review for an otherwise-covered business method
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`claim that also covers other, non-financial, products or activities.
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`In Ford’s view, the Board has misapplied Federal Circuit law to set an
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`artificially low ceiling for CBM eligibility, which results in nearly every patent –
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`whether the patent can be asserted against financial products or not – CBM
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`ineligible. It is not the case that
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` [u]nder Unwired Planet and Blue Calypso, to provide CBM eligibility,
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`a claim must be limited, explicitly or inherently, to ‘a method or
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`corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
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`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a
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`financial product or service.” AIA § 18(d)(1). The fact that a claim is
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`broad enough to encompass a finance-related activity does not
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`necessarily mean that the claim, as a whole, is limited to that finance-
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`related activity.
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`Kayak Software Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., CBM2016-00078, Paper 15 at 9
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`(Dec. 15, 2016), see also Ford, CBM2016-00100, Paper 12 at 2 (Turner, APJ,
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`concurring) (“even though independent claims 1, 6, and 11 are sufficiently broad to
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`cover their use with financial products, and the clear intent was for them to be
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`applied to financial products, they cannot render the ’825 patent to be subject to a
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`covered business method patent review.”).
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`Ford does not dispute that, under Unwired Planet, a claim is not eligible for
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`CBM review merely because “a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the
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`specification speculates such a potential sale might occur.” But, the Federal Circuit
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`never indicated a claim is rendered ineligible simply because it is directed to more
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`than financial services. Id. Such a reading is unsupported by the statute or the
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`holding of Unwired Planet.
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`AIA § 18(d) only requires that a claim be “directed to methods and
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`apparatuses of particular types and with particular uses ‘in the practice,
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`administration, or management of a financial produce or service.” Unwired Planet,
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`841 F.3d at 1382. Nowhere does the text of the statute, or the legislative history for
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`that matter, support the interpretation that directed to means “solely directed to” or
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`“primarily directed to.” Determining which claims are “primarily” directed to
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`financial services would lead to arbitrary results because there is no clear way to
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`measure whether such matters exist.
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`The Federal Circuit was concerned with the PTAB’s “incidental to” or
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`complimentary to” standard because it could render virtually every claim CBM
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`review eligible because “[a]ll patents, at some level, relate to potential sale of a good
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`or service.” Id. at 1382. This concern is embodied in the Federal Circuit’s example
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`of a patent for a novel lightbulb that is found to work particularly well in bank vaults.
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`Id. The financial nature of the hypothetical light bulb is at best incidental or
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`complementary, as the light bulb is not directly related to “methods and apparatuses
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`of particular types and with particular uses ‘in the practice, administration, or
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`management of a financial produce or service.” Id.
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`To remedy the problem, the Federal Circuit only established a floor for
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`review: “[i]t is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the
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`specification speculates such a potential sale might occur.” Id. The Federal Circuit’s
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`analysis does not require the Board to impose a ceiling.
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`Reading the Federal Circuit cases as creating a ceiling frustrates the very
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`purpose of CBM reviews by allowing patentees to escape review by merely
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`broadening their claims, as Judge Turner points out. (Paper 12 at 3, Turner, APJ
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`concurring.) If a patentee can evade CBM review by simply claiming financial
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`products and more, it becomes virtually impossible to find a patent claim eligible
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`for CBM review, essentially eliminating all CBM reviews. “Such a result should be
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`troubling for accused infringers, utilizing such financial products, who cannot avail
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`themselves of post-grant proceedings for patents directed to what such reviews were
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`intended to cover.” Id.
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`In the present case, Ford’s primary argument, in its Petition and in its
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`Preliminary Reply, was that the challenged claims themselves are directed to
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`financial activities, as opposed to being merely “incidental” or “complimentary” to
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`a financial activity. (Paper 1 at 6-11; Paper 10 at 1-2.)
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`Judge Arpin found that, absent the Patent Owner’s disclaimer, the term
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`“product” in the independent claims “encompasses ‘financial services.’” (Paper 12
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`at 6, Arpin, APJ concurring.) Judge Turner agreed, saying, “the clear intent was for
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`[the independent claims] to be applied to financial products.” (Paper 12 at 2, Turner,
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`APJ, concurring.) Yet, Judges Medley and Turner denied CBM review premised on
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`the view that such claims are not “directed to methods and apparatuses . . . with
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`particular uses ‘in the practice, administration, or management of a financial produce
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`or service’” under Unwired Planet, Secure Axcess, and Blue Calypso.
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`Under Judge Medley’s and Judge Turner’s analyses, Versata’s disclaimer did
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`not remove “financial products” from the scope of claim 1.7 Accordingly, under
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`those analyses, claim 1 still covers “financial products,” which are definitionally,
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`“performing data processing or other operations used
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`in
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`the practice,
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`administration, or management of a financial product or service.” AIA § 18. But
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`for the improper interpretation of the Federal Circuit cases, Judges Medley and
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`Turner should have held that claim 1 remains eligible for CBM review despite
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`Versata’s statutory disclaimer.
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`7 In contrast, Judge Arpin held that Versata’s disclaimer narrowed claim 1 by
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`removing the products enumerated in claim 5, including “financial products,” from
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`the scope of the term “products” in claim 1. (Paper 12 at 7, Arpin, APJ concurring.)
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`12
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`IV. Conclusion
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`For the reasons given above, the Board should reconsider and institute trial on
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`claims 1– 4, 6–9, 11–14, and 17–19 of the ‘825 patent.
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`Dated: April 19, 2017
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
` /Christopher C. Smith/
`Christopher C. Smith (Reg. No. 59,669)
`John S. LeRoy (Reg. No. 48,158)
`Thomas A. Lewry (Reg. No. 30,770)
`Frank A. Angileri (Reg. No. 36,733)
`John P. Rondini (Reg. No. 64,949)
`Jonathan D. Nikkila (Reg. No. 74,694)
`Brooks Kushman P.C.
`1000 Town Center, 22nd Floor
`Southfield, MI 48075
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`Attorneys for Petitioner
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`13
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`Certificate of Service
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing REQUEST FOR
`REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) was served in its entirety on April
`19, 2017, upon the following parties by electronic mail at PTAB@skgf.com, rsterne-
`PTAB@skgf.com; sbezos-PTAB@skgf.com; holoubek@skgf.com;
`jmutsche-
`PTAB@skgf.com;
`jtuminar-PTAB@skgf.com;
`kchambers@tcchlaw.com;
`sharoon.saleem@jonesspross,com:
`
`Lead Counsel
`Robert Greene Sterne
`Reg. No. 28,912
`rsterne-PTAB@skgf.com
`STERNE, KESSLER,
`GOLDSTERN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`
`
`Back Up Counsel
`Salvador M. Bezos, Reg. No. 60,889
`Michelle K. Holoubek, Reg. No. 54,179
`Joseph E. Mutschelknaus, Reg. No. 63,285
`Jonathan Tuminaro, Reg. No. 61,327
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN &
`FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`
`Back Up Counsel
`Sharoon Saleem, Reg. No. 63,711
`Sharoon.saleem@jonesspross,com
`JONES & SPROSS, P.L.L.C.
`1605 Lakecliff Hills Ln., Suite 100
`Austin, TX 78732-2437
`
`
`
` /Christopher C. Smith/
`Christopher C. Smith (Reg. No. 59,669)
`Brooks Kushman P.C.
`1000 Town Center, 22nd Floor
`Southfield, MI 48075
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`
`14
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`Back Up Counsel
`Kent B. Chambers
`Reg. No. 38,839
`kchambers@tcchlaw.com
`TERRILE, CANNATTI,
`CHAMBERS, HOLLAND, L.L.P.
`11675 Jollyville Road, Suite 100
`Austin, TX 78759
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