throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________
`
`
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`VERSATA SOFTWARE, INC.
`Patent Owner.
`
`______________
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,825
`
`CBM Case No.: 2016-00100
`
`
`
`______________
`
`
`
`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`Introduction
`
`
`
`I.
`
`On March 20, 2017, the United States Patent Trial and Appeal Board denied
`
`institution of a covered business method patent review of claims 1–4, 6–9, 11–14,
`
`and 17–19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,805,825 B1 (“the ‘825 patent”). Pursuant to 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Ford asks for rehearing.
`
`II. Background
`
`On January 11, 2017, Ford filed a Petition for Post-Grant Review (Covered
`
`Business Method Review) under 35 U.S.C. § 321 and § 18 of the Leahy-Smith
`
`America Invents Act with respect to claims 1-20 of the ‘825 patent. (Paper 1.)
`
`Claims 1, 6, and 11 are independent claims.
`
`In its Petition, Ford argued, “[t]he ‘825 Patent is a covered business method
`
`because the claims cover sorting (i.e., prioritizing) configurations based on financial
`
`attributes such as price and cost.” (Paper 1 at 7, see also Paper 1 at 10, “In other
`
`words, the claimed inventions of the ‘825 Patent are applicable to sales of products
`
`and ‘financial services’ as well as other financial applications such as sales.”) For
`
`example, dependent claim 5 of the ’825 patent expressly confirms that the
`
`“products” being configured in claim 1 are “vehicles, computers, and financial
`
`1
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`products.”1 Thus, Ford’s primary argument was that claims 1-20 are used in the
`
`practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service under AIA
`
`§ 18. (Paper 1 at 7-10.) Ford mentioned, only secondarily and only in a single
`
`sentence, that the claims are “at least ‘incidental to’ or ‘complimentary to’ a financial
`
`activity.” (Paper 1 at 10-11.)
`
`Before filing its Preliminary Response (Paper 6), Patent Owner disclaimed
`
`dependent claims 5, 10, and 15 which expressly recited “financial products.” (See
`
`Paper 6 at 13.) Soon after the disclaimer was filed, but before Patent Owner filed its
`
`Preliminary Response, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Unwired Planet,
`
`LLC v. Google, Inc., 841 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, Patent Owner was able
`
`to address both the disclaimer and Unwired Planet in its Preliminary Response.
`
`Because the disclaimer and Unwired Planet occurred after Ford filed its
`
`Petition, the Board allowed both parties to file 3-page briefs addressing the effects
`
`of: (1) Patent Owner’s disclaimer of claims 5, 10, and 15, and (2) Unwired Planet.
`
`In its Preliminary Reply, Ford again argued that the properly construed claims recite
`
`“‘finance-related activities’ covered by the CBM statute.” (Paper 10 at 1.)
`
`
`1 Throughout this document, all emphasis is added unless otherwise stated.
`
`Dependent claims 10 and 15 define “products” identically for their respective
`
`independent claims.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`The decision denying institution was based on the Board’s conclusion that:
`
`(1) Versata’s disclaimer removed claims 5, 10, and 15 from consideration, and (2)
`
`the remaining claims of the ‘825 patent were not CBM eligible after the disclaimer
`
`and Unwired Planet. All three Administrative Patent Judges held that institution
`
`should be denied, but each did so on somewhat different grounds. Judge Medley
`
`and Judge Turner relied on their view that Unwired Planet, Secure Axcess, LLC v.
`
`PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n,2 and Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc.,3 created a standard
`
`that prevents claims from serving as the basis for CBM review where the claims
`
`cover financial products and services but also cover more than just those products
`
`or services. Judge Arpin concurred because the “Patent Owner’s disclaimer of
`
`claims 5, 10, and 15 [] narrowed the scope of [independent] claims 1, 6, and 11,”
`
`and thus made the claims ineligible for CBM review. (Paper 12 at 6, Arpin, APJ
`
`concurring.)
`
`III. Argument
`
`A. Versata’s disclaimer did not remove claims 5, 10, and 15
`from consideration
`
`On April 17, 2017, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential opinion in
`
`
`2 No. 2016-1353, 2017 WL 676601, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2017).
`
`3 815 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`3
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP v. Samsung Electronics Co., Case No. 2016-
`
`1729 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 17, 2017). In that decision, the Federal Circuit distinguished a
`
`disclaimer’s effect on the patent owner from its effect on the public.
`
`In Rembrandt, patent owner had licensed claim 40 of its patent to a third party,
`
`who did not mark the products it sold with the patent’s number. Rembrandt then
`
`sued Samsung, who raised a marking defense. Within days, Rembrandt disclaimed
`
`claim 40 and asserted that the marking defense did not apply. The district court
`
`agreed:
`
`The court accepted Rembrandt’s argument that any prior obligation to
`
`mark products embodying claim 40 vanished once it disclaimed claim
`
`40. Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the District
`
`Judge relied on the proposition that “[u]nder Federal Circuit
`
`precedent, a disclaimed patent claim is treated as if it never existed.”
`
`Id., slip op. at 19 (citation omitted).
`
`The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling. The Federal Circuit
`
`explained that a disclaimer does not relinquish the public’s rights:
`
`[W]hile we have held that a disclaimer relinquishes the rights of the
`
`patent owner, we have never held that the patent owner’s disclaimer
`
`relinquishes the rights of the public. Indeed, our precedent and that of
`
`other courts have not readily extended the effects of disclaimer to
`
`situations where others besides the patentee have an interest that relates
`
`to the relinquished claims.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`Id., slip op. at 21 (citation omitted).
`
`For support, the court cited Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1996) as “holding disclaimer of an allegedly interfering claim did not divest the
`
`Board of jurisdiction over interference proceeding.” Id. The Federal Circuit
`
`concluded that Rembrandt’s disclaimer of claim 40 did not defeat Samsung’s
`
`marking defense because “the marking statute’s focus is not only the rights of the
`
`patentee, but the rights of the public.” Id., slip op. at 21-22.
`
`The CBM statute, AIA § 18, focuses on the rights of the public to be free of
`
`patent claims that do not meet the statutory requirements for patentability. Because
`
`the statute protects the public, Versata’s disclaimer of claims 5, 10, and 15 after
`
`Ford filed its CBM petition does not remove those claims from consideration by the
`
`Board under Rembrandt. A district court cannot ignore disclaimed claims under the
`
`marking statute. Rembrandt, Case No. 2016-1729, slip op. at 21-22. Likewise, the
`
`Board cannot ignore disclaimed claims 5, 10, and 15 under AIA § 18.
`
`From the Board’s opinions, it is apparent that at least judges Turner and Arpin
`
`would have found claims 5, 10, and 15 CBM-eligible but for the disclaimer.4 (Paper
`
`
`4 Judge Medley may also have held that view, although it is not clear from her
`
`opinion.
`
`5
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`12 at 2, Turner, APJ concurring;5 Paper 12 at 6, Arpin, APJ concurring.6) The stated
`
`basis for ignoring claims 5, 10, and 15 was the view rejected in Rembrandt (and
`
`Guinn) that those claims must “be treated as if they never existed.” (Paper 12 at 8,
`
`Medley, APJ; Paper 12 at 1, Turner, APJ concurring; Paper 12 at 4, Arpin, APJ
`
`concurring.) Applying the Federal Circuit’s Rembrandt analysis to AIA § 18, the
`
`Board wrongly disregarded claims 5, 10, and 15 in deciding whether claims of the
`
`‘825 patent are directed to financial products or services. Because those dependent
`
`claims, which cannot be ignored, explicitly recite financial products, the ‘825 patent
`
`remains eligible for CBM review. For this reason alone, the Board should grant this
`
`Petition for Rehearing and reconsider its decision denying institution of CBM
`
`review.
`
`
`
`
`5 “Had claim 5 not been disclaimed, it is readily apparent that claim 5 would have
`
`been found to be a method or apparatus for performing data processing or other
`
`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product
`
`or service.”
`
`6 “Thus, initially, I would find that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term
`
`‘product,’ in independent claims 1, 6, and 11, encompasses ‘financial services.’”
`
`6
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`B.
`
`The Board is reading the recent Unwired Planet, Secure
`Axcess, and Blue Calypso cases too narrowly
`
`Putting aside claims 5, 10, and 15, the remaining claims of the ‘825 patent are
`
`well-within § 18 of the America Invents Act. While the disclaimed claims are no
`
`longer enforceable, the remaining claims, including claim 1, remain eligible for a
`
`CBM given that the statutory language defines eligibility of a CBM as “a patent that
`
`claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
`
`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product
`
`or service.” See Section 18(d)(1).
`
`In the decision denying the petition, the Board applied the Federal Circuit’s
`
`Unwired Planet, Secure Axcess, and Blue Calypso cases too narrowly and
`
`determined that the remaining claims in the patent were not CBM eligible. Due to
`
`this misapprehension of the statute and mistaken interpretation of the Federal
`
`Circuit’s decisions, the Board abused its discretion when it denied Ford’s CBM
`
`Petition.
`
`In the decision, Judge Turner found that “independent claims 1, 6, and 11 are
`
`sufficiently broad to cover their use with financial products, and the clear intent was
`
`for them to be applied to financial products . . . .” (Paper 12 at 2, Turner, APJ
`
`concurring.) Judge Turner even noted that the Board’s decision not to institute the
`
`trial was troubling because it “allows for a broader claim, intended to be directed to
`
`7
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`a financial product, to escape review.” (Id. at 3.) Nonetheless, he concluded that
`
`the result was mandated by Unwired Planet. (Id.)
`
`But, contrary to the Board’s interpretation, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in
`
`Unwired Planet does not require that claims, which are directed to a financial
`
`product or service, be denied CBM review merely because the claims also cover
`
`other products or services. Unwired Planet does not require that a claim must cover
`
`only financial products or services to be eligible for CBM review.
`
`In Unwired Planet, the Federal Circuit did away with the Board’s prior CBM
`
`review standard, which captured claims that were only “incidental to” or
`
`“complementary to” a financial activity. Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382. The
`
`Federal Circuit held, “CBM patents are limited to those with claims that are directed
`
`to methods and apparatuses of particular types and with particular uses ‘in the
`
`practice, administration, or management of a financial produce or service.’” Id.
`
`Unwired Planet set a floor for CBM review eligibility, but it did not set a ceiling—
`
`i.e., it did not prohibit a CBM review for an otherwise-covered business method
`
`claim that also covers other, non-financial, products or activities.
`
`In Ford’s view, the Board has misapplied Federal Circuit law to set an
`
`artificially low ceiling for CBM eligibility, which results in nearly every patent –
`
`whether the patent can be asserted against financial products or not – CBM
`
`ineligible. It is not the case that
`
`8
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
` [u]nder Unwired Planet and Blue Calypso, to provide CBM eligibility,
`
`a claim must be limited, explicitly or inherently, to ‘a method or
`
`corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
`
`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a
`
`financial product or service.” AIA § 18(d)(1). The fact that a claim is
`
`broad enough to encompass a finance-related activity does not
`
`necessarily mean that the claim, as a whole, is limited to that finance-
`
`related activity.
`
`Kayak Software Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., CBM2016-00078, Paper 15 at 9
`
`(Dec. 15, 2016), see also Ford, CBM2016-00100, Paper 12 at 2 (Turner, APJ,
`
`concurring) (“even though independent claims 1, 6, and 11 are sufficiently broad to
`
`cover their use with financial products, and the clear intent was for them to be
`
`applied to financial products, they cannot render the ’825 patent to be subject to a
`
`covered business method patent review.”).
`
`Ford does not dispute that, under Unwired Planet, a claim is not eligible for
`
`CBM review merely because “a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the
`
`specification speculates such a potential sale might occur.” But, the Federal Circuit
`
`never indicated a claim is rendered ineligible simply because it is directed to more
`
`than financial services. Id. Such a reading is unsupported by the statute or the
`
`holding of Unwired Planet.
`
`AIA § 18(d) only requires that a claim be “directed to methods and
`
`9
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`apparatuses of particular types and with particular uses ‘in the practice,
`
`administration, or management of a financial produce or service.” Unwired Planet,
`
`841 F.3d at 1382. Nowhere does the text of the statute, or the legislative history for
`
`that matter, support the interpretation that directed to means “solely directed to” or
`
`“primarily directed to.” Determining which claims are “primarily” directed to
`
`financial services would lead to arbitrary results because there is no clear way to
`
`measure whether such matters exist.
`
`The Federal Circuit was concerned with the PTAB’s “incidental to” or
`
`complimentary to” standard because it could render virtually every claim CBM
`
`review eligible because “[a]ll patents, at some level, relate to potential sale of a good
`
`or service.” Id. at 1382. This concern is embodied in the Federal Circuit’s example
`
`of a patent for a novel lightbulb that is found to work particularly well in bank vaults.
`
`Id. The financial nature of the hypothetical light bulb is at best incidental or
`
`complementary, as the light bulb is not directly related to “methods and apparatuses
`
`of particular types and with particular uses ‘in the practice, administration, or
`
`management of a financial produce or service.” Id.
`
`To remedy the problem, the Federal Circuit only established a floor for
`
`review: “[i]t is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the
`
`specification speculates such a potential sale might occur.” Id. The Federal Circuit’s
`
`analysis does not require the Board to impose a ceiling.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`Reading the Federal Circuit cases as creating a ceiling frustrates the very
`
`purpose of CBM reviews by allowing patentees to escape review by merely
`
`broadening their claims, as Judge Turner points out. (Paper 12 at 3, Turner, APJ
`
`concurring.) If a patentee can evade CBM review by simply claiming financial
`
`products and more, it becomes virtually impossible to find a patent claim eligible
`
`for CBM review, essentially eliminating all CBM reviews. “Such a result should be
`
`troubling for accused infringers, utilizing such financial products, who cannot avail
`
`themselves of post-grant proceedings for patents directed to what such reviews were
`
`intended to cover.” Id.
`
`In the present case, Ford’s primary argument, in its Petition and in its
`
`Preliminary Reply, was that the challenged claims themselves are directed to
`
`financial activities, as opposed to being merely “incidental” or “complimentary” to
`
`a financial activity. (Paper 1 at 6-11; Paper 10 at 1-2.)
`
`Judge Arpin found that, absent the Patent Owner’s disclaimer, the term
`
`“product” in the independent claims “encompasses ‘financial services.’” (Paper 12
`
`at 6, Arpin, APJ concurring.) Judge Turner agreed, saying, “the clear intent was for
`
`[the independent claims] to be applied to financial products.” (Paper 12 at 2, Turner,
`
`APJ, concurring.) Yet, Judges Medley and Turner denied CBM review premised on
`
`the view that such claims are not “directed to methods and apparatuses . . . with
`
`particular uses ‘in the practice, administration, or management of a financial produce
`
`11
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`or service’” under Unwired Planet, Secure Axcess, and Blue Calypso.
`
`Under Judge Medley’s and Judge Turner’s analyses, Versata’s disclaimer did
`
`not remove “financial products” from the scope of claim 1.7 Accordingly, under
`
`those analyses, claim 1 still covers “financial products,” which are definitionally,
`
`“performing data processing or other operations used
`
`in
`
`the practice,
`
`administration, or management of a financial product or service.” AIA § 18. But
`
`for the improper interpretation of the Federal Circuit cases, Judges Medley and
`
`Turner should have held that claim 1 remains eligible for CBM review despite
`
`Versata’s statutory disclaimer.
`
`
`
`
`7 In contrast, Judge Arpin held that Versata’s disclaimer narrowed claim 1 by
`
`removing the products enumerated in claim 5, including “financial products,” from
`
`the scope of the term “products” in claim 1. (Paper 12 at 7, Arpin, APJ concurring.)
`
`12
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`IV. Conclusion
`
`For the reasons given above, the Board should reconsider and institute trial on
`
`claims 1– 4, 6–9, 11–14, and 17–19 of the ‘825 patent.
`
`
`Dated: April 19, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
` /Christopher C. Smith/
`Christopher C. Smith (Reg. No. 59,669)
`John S. LeRoy (Reg. No. 48,158)
`Thomas A. Lewry (Reg. No. 30,770)
`Frank A. Angileri (Reg. No. 36,733)
`John P. Rondini (Reg. No. 64,949)
`Jonathan D. Nikkila (Reg. No. 74,694)
`Brooks Kushman P.C.
`1000 Town Center, 22nd Floor
`Southfield, MI 48075
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Atty. Dkt. No.: FPGP0130CBMR1
`
`Case No.: CBM 2016-00100
`Patent No.: 8,805,825
`
`
`
`Certificate of Service
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing REQUEST FOR
`REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) was served in its entirety on April
`19, 2017, upon the following parties by electronic mail at PTAB@skgf.com, rsterne-
`PTAB@skgf.com; sbezos-PTAB@skgf.com; holoubek@skgf.com;
`jmutsche-
`PTAB@skgf.com;
`jtuminar-PTAB@skgf.com;
`kchambers@tcchlaw.com;
`sharoon.saleem@jonesspross,com:
`
`Lead Counsel
`Robert Greene Sterne
`Reg. No. 28,912
`rsterne-PTAB@skgf.com
`STERNE, KESSLER,
`GOLDSTERN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`
`
`Back Up Counsel
`Salvador M. Bezos, Reg. No. 60,889
`Michelle K. Holoubek, Reg. No. 54,179
`Joseph E. Mutschelknaus, Reg. No. 63,285
`Jonathan Tuminaro, Reg. No. 61,327
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN &
`FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`
`Back Up Counsel
`Sharoon Saleem, Reg. No. 63,711
`Sharoon.saleem@jonesspross,com
`JONES & SPROSS, P.L.L.C.
`1605 Lakecliff Hills Ln., Suite 100
`Austin, TX 78732-2437
`
`
`
` /Christopher C. Smith/
`Christopher C. Smith (Reg. No. 59,669)
`Brooks Kushman P.C.
`1000 Town Center, 22nd Floor
`Southfield, MI 48075
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`
`14
`
`Back Up Counsel
`Kent B. Chambers
`Reg. No. 38,839
`kchambers@tcchlaw.com
`TERRILE, CANNATTI,
`CHAMBERS, HOLLAND, L.L.P.
`11675 Jollyville Road, Suite 100
`Austin, TX 78759
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket