Case 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL Document 127 Filed 06/09/16 Page 1 of 36 PageID# 4882
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`NORFOLK DIVISION
`
`
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`
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`Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL
`
`Hon. Robert G. Doumar
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`)
`‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾
`)
`
`)
`NADER ASGHARI-KAMRANI and
`KAMRAN ASGHARI-KAMRANI,
`)
`)
`)
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE
`ASSOCIATION,
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`Defendant.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ REBUTTAL BRIEF ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`1
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`USAA 1049
`USAA v. Asghari-Kamrani et al.
`CBM2016-00063
`CBM2016-00064
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`

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`Case 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL Document 127 Filed 06/09/16 Page 2 of 36 PageID# 4883
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................2
`
`A.
`
`DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS OF THE ’432 PATENT ..........................................2
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`6.
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`7.
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`8.
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`“dynamic code” ............................................................................................2
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`“central-entity” and “external entity” ..........................................................7
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`“digital identity”.........................................................................................11
`
`“wherein the dynamic code is valid for a predefined time and
`becomes invalid after being used” .............................................................12
`
`“transaction” ..............................................................................................15
`
`“another computer associated with the central-entity” ..............................17
`
`“receiving electronically a request for a dynamic code for the user
`by a computer associated with a central entity” .........................................18
`
`“generating a dynamic code for the user in response to a request
`during the electronic transaction”/ “generating [by the central-
`entity during the electronic transaction] a dynamic code for the
`user”/ “generate a dynamic code for the user” ...........................................22
`
`9.
`
`“first central entity computer”/ “second central entity computer” .............23
`
`B.
`
`USAA’S NEW INVALIDITY ALLEGATIONS ..................................................26
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
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`“Algorithmically Combined” / “Predetermined Algorithm”
`(Claims 2, 9, 10, 28)...................................................................................26
`
`Claims 34, 35, 40-43, 45 ............................................................................27
`
`USAA’s New Means-Plus-Function Contention: “An Apparatus
`for Authenticating a User During an Electronic Transaction with
`an External-Entity” (Claim 25) ..................................................................28
`
`III.
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................29
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`Case 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL Document 127 Filed 06/09/16 Page 3 of 36 PageID# 4884
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`Case
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` Page
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Becton, Dickinson, & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .........................................................................................16
`
`
`Cacace v. Meyer Mktg. (Macau Commercial Offshore) Co., Ltd.,
`812 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) .......................................................................26
`
`
`Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc.,
`519 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)......................................................................................5, 17
`
`
`Control Resources, Inc. v. Delta Electronics, Inc.,
`133 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass Mar. 30, 2001) ..................................................................11
`
`
`Curtiss–Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.,
`438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..........................................................................................22
`
`
`Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC,
`703 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................2
`
`
`Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.,
`264 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001)............................................................................................2
`
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kamushiki Co., Ltd.,
`535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) ..................................................................................................19
`
`
`Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp.,
`754 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)....................................................................................14, 16
`
`
`Grober v. Mako Products, Inc.,
`686 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012).................................................................................. passim
`
`
`HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG,
`667 F.3d 1270, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...............................................................................27
`
`
`Innova/Pure Water v. Safari Water Filtration,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir., 2004) ........................................................................................18
`
`
`Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs, Inc.,
`429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...........................................................................................6
`
`
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.,
`639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .........................................................................................27
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`Case 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL Document 127 Filed 06/09/16 Page 4 of 36 PageID# 4885
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`IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .........................................................................................27
`
`
`Kinik Co. v. International Trade Com'n.,
`362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .........................................................................................19
`
`
`LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc.,
`453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006)............................................................................................6
`
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`517 U.S. 370 (1996) ...........................................................................................................18
`
`
`Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc.,
`520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .........................................................................................27
`
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., No. 13-369,
`2014 U.S. LEXIS 3818 (June 2, 2014) ..........................................................................3, 26
`
`
`nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc.,
`436 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..........................................................................................22
`
`
`Netcraft Corp. v. Ebay, Inc.,
`549 F.3d 1394 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .........................................................................................20
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`
`Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. ValueClick, Inc.,
`684 F.Supp.2d 678 (E.D. Va. 2009) ............................................................................18, 19
`
`
`N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co.,
`215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000)......................................................................................4, 15
`
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`763 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014)......................................................................................4, 15
`
`
`Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.,
`66 F.3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995).......................................................................................... 2-3
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`Pall Corp. v. PTI Techs. Inc.,
`259 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001)......................................................................................4, 15
`
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`PerfectVision Mfg. v. PPC Broadband, Inc., No. 4:12-cv-00623,
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121057 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2014) ...............................................3
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).................................................................................. passim
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`Case 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL Document 127 Filed 06/09/16 Page 5 of 36 PageID# 4886
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`Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. Ag,
`318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................. 4-5, 17
`
`
`Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft,
`305 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..........................................................................................26
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`SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Adv. Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..........................................................................................14
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`
`Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,
`329 F.3d 823 (Fed. Cir. 2003)............................................................................ 4, 16, 25-26
`
`
`Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Zydus Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`743 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .........................................................................................26
`
`
`Thomas Swan & Co. v. Finisar Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00178,
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86209 (E.D. Tex. June 25, 2014) ...................................................3
`
`
`UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co.,
`816 F.3d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................27
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`
`Vanderlande Industries Nederland Bv v. I.T.C.,
`366 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .........................................................................................20
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`
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`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ...........................................................................................18
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`
`Watts v. XL Sys., Inc.,
`232 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ...........................................................................................28
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .........................................................................................28
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`
`Statutes and Rules
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA).......................................................................................................26, 29
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`USAA repeatedly oversteps in its attempt to terminate this litigation with its Opening
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`Claim Construction Brief. The defendant begins audaciously, with an apparent attempt to evade
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`the parties’ agreed-upon page limit by relying on 20 paragraphs of its expert witness’s 36-page
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`declaration in lieu of providing a summary of the patent-in-suit. This voluminous declaration
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`contains a substantial amount of what is effectively attorney argument. Time and again, USAA
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`attempts to manufacture noninfringement arguments from isolated excerpts of the prosecution
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`history, rashly ignoring essential context that renders the alleged disclaimers of scope
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`ambiguous, sometimes irrelevant, and always far from being the “clear and unmistakable
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`disavowal” that the law requires. USAA also feigns prejudice from the absence (in the Joint
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`Claim Construction Statement) of Plaintiffs’ elucidation of what the “plain meanings” of several
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`abundantly clear phrases are, notwithstanding that USAA’s counsel made no mention of this
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`alleged deficiency during the multi-stage meet-and-confer process prior to filing.
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`Several of USAA’s proposals lack grounding in the claim language—for example, an
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`alleged requirement that a newly-generated “dynamic code” to be unique to all previously issued
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`codes and an alleged mandate that such codes be requested “from the” user. For these, USAA is
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`unable to find a suitable element upon which to anchor each imported limitation. USAA instead
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`employs a “throw it against the wall and see what sticks” strategy, brazenly asserting that the
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`patentee necessarily incorporated the same limitations into multiple distinct elements, with the
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`apparent hope that the Court will accept at least one of USAA’s overtures. Finally, USAA
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`attempts to blindside Plaintiffs with a plethora of indefiniteness assertions that were wholly
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`absent from parties Joint Claim Construction Statement [Dkt. No. 95]. But, even without this
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`surprise, USAA’s indefiniteness arguments are meritless and this is neither the time nor the place
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`to entertain them.
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`Plaintiffs’ proposed constructions are based on the claim language, with appropriate and
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`due consideration of both the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. They should be adopted for the
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`reasons expressed in Plaintiffs’ Opening Claim Construction Brief and below.
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`II.
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`
`ARGUMENT
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`A. DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS OF THE ’432 PATENT
`
`1.
`
` “dynamic code”
`
`
`Plaintiffs’ Proposed Construction
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` “A substantially nonpredictable and temporary
`digital code.”
`
`USAA’s Proposed Construction
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`“(aka SecureCode) any secret code, PIN or
`other code that is dynamic, non-predictable,
`time dependent, alphanumeric, and which is
`broadcasted to the user over a communication
`network, and is used as part of a digital identity
`to identify a user as an authorized user, and
`which is generated by the central-entity for this
`transaction and has not been used for any other
`transaction.”
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`
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`USAA argues that the term “substantially nonpredictable” is indefinite. But the Federal
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`Circuit “has repeatedly confirmed that relative terms such as ‘substantially’ do not render patent
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`claims so unclear as to prevent a person of skill in the art from ascertaining the scope of the
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`claim.” Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added);
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`see Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he term
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`‘substantially’ is a descriptive term commonly used in patent claims to ‘avoid a strict numerical
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`boundary to the specified parameter.’”) (quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d
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`Case 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL Document 127 Filed 06/09/16 Page 8 of 36 PageID# 4889
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`1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus1 did not overturn or
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`address the Federal Circuit’s decisions regarding the use of “substantially.” See PerfectVision
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`Mfg. v. PPC Broadband, Inc., No. 4:12-cv-00623, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121057, at *53 (E.D.
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`Ark. Aug. 29, 2014); Thomas Swan & Co. v. Finisar Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00178, 2014 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 86209, at *84 (E.D. Tex. June 25, 2014).
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`In the context of the’432 patent, the expression “substantially nonpredictable” would
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`have been easily understandable to one of ordinary skill. One of ordinary skill would have
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`understood that different methods of generating the claimed “dynamic code” may have varying
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`degrees of nonpredictability, and one of ordinary skill would have selected a degree of
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`nonpredictability that provides the desired degree of security for a given application.
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`Hollingsworth Decl. at ¶¶ 8-11. The term “substantially nonpredictable” applies common
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`parlance, and means that one of ordinary skill would have had confidence that the selected
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`degree of nonpredictability is acceptable from a statistical point of view to achieve a desired
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`degree of security for a given application. Id.
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`USAA additionally tries to impose a requirement that the claimed “dynamic code” can be
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`used only once. [Dkt. No. 115 at 4.] Plaintiffs have explained that, although the dynamic code is
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`newly generated for each subsequent transaction, that does not preclude the possibility that a
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`“dynamic code” generated for one transaction may happen to be regenerated for a subsequent
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`transaction, such as months or years later. In other words, USAA confuses a newly generated
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`code on one hand, with a code that is “new” in the very restrictive sense that it has never been
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`used before on the other hand. The latter is a nonsensical interpretation. See Hollingsworth Decl.
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`at ¶¶ 12-13. One of ordinary skill would have understood the difference, and would have
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`
` Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., No. 13-369, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3818 (June 2, 2014).
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`understood that the ’432 patent claims refer to the former. See id. Nothing in the intrinsic record
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`or extrinsic evidence calls for USAA’s artificial requirement that the claimed “dynamic code”
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`can be used only once.
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`USAA points to the prosecution history, claiming that it supports USAA’s nonsensical
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`interpretation of “dynamic code” as being a code that can never repeat. [Dkt. No. 115 at 5.] But
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`USAA fails to meet its “heavy burden” of proving that there was a “clear and unmistakable
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`disavowal” of claim scope in the IPR. See Grober v. Mako Products, Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1341
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`(Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added); Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323
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`(Fed. Cir. 2003); N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1293-95 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
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`(holding that prosecution disclaimer did not “support the judicial narrowing of a clear claim
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`term” because the inventors’ statements were amenable to multiple interpretations); Pall Corp. v.
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`PTI Techs. Inc., 259 F.3d 1383, 1393-94 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (remanding because the scope of
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`disclaimer over the prior art reference was ambiguous), vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 1109
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`(2002). The Federal Circuit has held that to specifically exclude an embodiment requires a
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`waiver of claim scope that is “both so clear as to show reasonable clarity and deliberateness, and
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`so unmistakable as to be unambiguous evidence of disclaimer.” Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1325-
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`26 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted). USAA has not met this burden of showing
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`disavowal.
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`Even if USAA showed that Plaintiffs’ counsel made an inaccurate statement about “new”
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`dynamic codes in the prosecution history, this would be unavailing for USAA’s construction.
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`Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 832 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A]pplicants’
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`inaccurate statement [in the prosecution history] cannot override the claim language itself, which
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`controls the bounds of the claim.”) (citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081,
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`Case 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL Document 127 Filed 06/09/16 Page 10 of 36 PageID# 4891
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`1089 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); see also Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366,
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`1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“And if the specification expressly defines a claim term and remarks
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`made to distinguish claims from the prior art are broader than necessary to distinguish the prior
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`art, the full breadth of the remark is not ‘a clear and unambiguous disavowal of claim scope as
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`required to depart from the meaning of the term provided in the written description.’”) (internal
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`citations omitted). USAA fails to show that Plaintiffs’ former counsel argued anything other than
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`that the “dynamic code” is “new” in the sense that it is “newly generated”; Plaintiffs’ former
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`counsel did not argue that that the content of the “dynamic code” can never repeat.
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`USAA makes the same mistake in arguing that Plaintiffs disclaimed any “dynamic code”
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`that is not “alphanumeric” during the prosecution history. [Dkt. No. 115 at 5.] In the prosecution
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`history of the application for the ’432 patent, the applicants argued that, unlike the claimed
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`“SecureCode,” U.S. Patent No. 5,883,810 to Franklin et al. (“Franklin”) discloses “merely a
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`numerical value that looks like a credit card number.” [Dkt. No. 115-7 at USAA_AK_0003262.]
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`USAA does not point to any evidence that Plaintiffs’ former counsel differentiated the
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`“SecureCode” from “merely a numerical value that looks like a credit card number” on the basis
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`that the “SecureCode” must be alphanumeric. Thus, USAA’s cited prosecution history is far
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`from a “clear and unmistakable disavowal” of all numeric codes. See Grober, 686 F.3d at 1341
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`(emphasis added).
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`USAA makes another argument about the prosecution history that, in one embodiment,
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`“the SecureCode is capable of being used alone for authentication” and therefore “it is
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`impossible for any two or more people to have the same SecureCode [at the same time].” [Dkt.
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`No. 115 at 5 (citing [Dkt. No. 115-6 at USAA_AK_0005021]).] But this is only a discussion
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`Case 2:15-cv-00478-RGD-LRL Document 127 Filed 06/09/16 Page 11 of 36 PageID# 4892
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`about a benefit that can result from one embodiment, not “clear and unmistakable” disavowal of
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`scope.
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`Furthermore, the arguments that USAA points to in the prosecution history of the parent
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`application (the ’837 patent) in 2005 and the ’432 patent in 2010 were tied to the claim language
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`that was pending at the time and occurred well before the claims were substantially amended,
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`including by an Examiner’s Amendment on May 25, 2012. Thus, the arguments that USAA
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`references were directed to substantially different claim language. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom
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`Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting argument that aspects of prosecution
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`history showing applicants relied on multiple displays to overcome prior art rejections to claims
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`in parent application that expressly recited use of multiple displays did not require reading that
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`limitation into claim in child application that did not expressly recite use of multiple displays);
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`Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting accused
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`infringer’s argument for prosecution history disclaimer where the term at issue in the parent
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`application was different from the term at issue in the continuation application).
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`Finally, USAA’s proposed construction of “dynamic code” in this litigation contradicts
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`USAA’s proposed construction of the same term in its Petition for Inter Partes Review before
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`the U.S.P.T.O.’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). There, USAA construed “dynamic
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`code” as expressly including any code, not just alphanumeric codes. [Dkt. No. 116-10 at 6
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`(USAA stating that “this term should be construed as ‘any dynamic, non-predictable and time
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`dependent alphanumeric code, secret code, PIN or other code . . .”) (emphasis added).] USAA
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`argues that its proposal to the PTAB was the “broadest reasonable interpretation,” but USAA
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`was aware of the same prosecution history then that USAA relies on now for a far more
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`restrictive construction without explaining the reason for the vast discrepancy.
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`2.
`
` “central-entity” and “external entity”
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs’ Construction for
`“Central-Entity”
`
` “An authentication system having at least one
`computer server, which provides authentication
`services to one or more external systems.”
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs’ Construction for
`“External-Entity”
`
`“A computer system, which is physically or
`logically separate from the central-entity, for
`offering goods or services.”
`
`USAA’s Construction for
`“Central-Entity”
`
`“A ‘central-entity’ is any party that has user’s
`personal and/or financial information,
`UserName, Password and generates dynamic,
`non-predictable and time dependable dynamic
`code (SecureCode) for the user. The central-
`entity centralizes users’ personal and financial
`information in a secure environment in order to
`prevent distribution of user’s information in e-
`commerce. This information is then used to
`create digital identity for the users. The users
`may user [sic] their digital identity to identify
`themselves instead of providing their personal
`and financial information to the External-
`Entities.
`
`The ‘central entity’ and ‘external entity’ are
`different entities (i.e., parties) in the
`transaction. The ‘central entity’ and ‘external
`entity’ use separated computers which
`communicate between each other via a
`communication network, the separated
`computers perform different functions and the
`separated computers are not interchangeable.”
`
`
`USAA’s Construction for
`“External-Entity”
`
`“An ‘External-Entity’ is any party offering
`goods or services that users utilize by directly
`providing their UserName and dynamic code
`(SecureCode) as digital identity. A user does
`not have a pre-existing relationship with the
`External-Entity, and the External-Entity does
`not receive users’ personal or confidential
`information.
`
`The ‘central entity’ and ‘external entity’ are
`different entities (i.e., parties) in the
`transaction. The ‘central entity’ and ‘external
`entity’ use separated computers which
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`communicate between each other via a
`communication network, the separated
`computers perform different functions and the
`separated computers are not interchangeable.”
`
`
`
`USAA argues that Plaintiffs ignore the intrinsic evidence. [Dkt. No. 115 at 6.] Far from
`
`doing so, Plaintiffs embrace the ’432 patent’s description of the “external-entity” as a “party” for
`
`“offering goods or services.” The dispute is over whether, contrary to how one of ordinary skill
`
`would have understood “party,” USAA can limit the meaning of “party” to the legal (and non-
`
`technical) concept of a corporate personality. See Hollingsworth Decl. at ¶ 16. Plaintiffs have
`
`explained that one of ordinary skill would have understood a “party,” in the context of the ’432
`
`patent, as a participant in an electronic communication or transaction, where the participant may
`
`be a software process and/or hardware. [See Dkt. No. 116-1 at ¶ 18.] In one example, the ’432
`
`patent makes clear that a “party” can be an “online site,” which directly contradicts USAA’s
`
`proposed construction since “online sites” are not coextensive with corporate personhood. [See
`
`Dkt. No. 70-1 at 2:19–20; Dkt. No. 116-1 at 6 (¶ 26).]
`
`The specification of the ’432 patent also contradicts USAA’s attempt to limit an “entity”
`
`to the legal (and non-technical) concept of a corporate personality. For example, the specification
`
`of the ’432 patent states that examples of “entities” include an “online site.” [Dkt. No. 70-1 at
`
`2:22–23.] One of ordinary skill would have understood that an “online site” is a website operated
`
`on a web server, and that a company can have multiple web servers running multiple “online
`
`sites,” or, alternatively, a single “online site” could be jointly operated by several companies.
`
`[Dkt. No. 116-1 at ¶ 26.] The specification of the ’432 patent also describes examples in which:
`
` [T]he user 10 attempts to access a restricted web site or attempts
`to buy services or products 110, as illustrated in FIG. 4, through a
`standard interface provided by the External-Entity 20.
`
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`. . .
`
`
`
`The External-Entity 20 displays
`the access or purchase
`authorization form requesting the user 10 to authenticate himself
`using his UserName and SecureCode as digital identity.
`
` .
`
` . .
`
`
`The External-Entity 20 might also display the identification and
`authentication response to the user 10.
`
`[Dkt. No. 70-1 at 5:5–8, 5:10–13, 5:41–43 (emphasis added).] One of ordinary skill would have
`
`understood that a computer system, not a corporate personality, “provide[s]” a “standard
`
`interface” and “displays” a form or response to a user. Hollingsworth Decl. at ¶ 17.
`
`Dr. Rubin does not opine that “entity” has no meaning in the art. [See generally Dkt. Nos.
`
`115-1, 126-1.] Indeed, the description given by Johns Hopkins University, where Dr. Rubin
`
`teaches, for a course on “Authentication Technologies in Cybersecurity” describes an “entity” in
`
`the authentication art as: “An entity can be, but is not limited to, software, firmware, physical
`
`devices, and humans.” Ex. I; Nienstadt Decl. at ¶ 9. This matches technical dictionaries and
`
`references in the fields of computing and computer security. [E.g., Dkt. Nos. 116-7, 116-8, 116-
`
`9.] In other words, unlike the construction that USAA proposes, one of ordinary skill would not
`
`have understood “entity” to be bound by the legal (and non-technical) concept of a corporate
`
`personality such as a company name (e.g., “USAA”). There would be no technical reason for
`
`doing so. [Dkt. No. 116-1 at ¶ 25.]
`
`
`
`USAA argues that, if the external-entity is a “computer system,” then the claim language
`
`“computer associated with the external entity” would not make sense.2 But this is plainly wrong.
`
`
`
` 2
`
` Dr. Rubin, meanwhile, misreads Plaintiffs’ proposed construction, when he argues that the
`expressions “computer associated with the central entity” and “computer associated with the
`external entity” mean “a computer associated with a computer.” [See Dkt. No. 115-1 at 26
`(¶ 74).] Dr. Rubin appears to have misread Plaintiffs’ proposed constructions from “central-
`
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`“A computer associated with a computer system” makes perfect sense. See Hollingsworth Decl.
`
`at ¶ 16. This is supported by several technical dictionaries, which describe a computer system as
`
`including one or more “computers” and “associated software.” See Hollingsworth Decl. at ¶ 15;
`
`Exs. C, D, E; Nienstadt Decl. at ¶¶ 3-5.
`
`Similarly, USAA argues that the claim language reciting a user having a “pre-existing
`
`relationship with the external-entity” does not make sense. Again, this is wrong. A user having a
`
`“pre-existing relationship with a computer system” would have made sense to one of ordinary
`
`skill. See Hollingsworth Decl. at ¶ 19. For example, “trust relationships” between users and
`
`computer systems are commonly described in the art. See, e.g., H (describing “a vulnerability in
`
`a website that permits an attacker to leverage the trust relationship that you [the user] have with
`
`that site”); Nienstadt Decl. at ¶¶ 19, 20. Furthermore, the ’432 patent describes an example of a
`
`user forming a “relationship” with a computer system by “register[ing] at the Central-Entity.”
`
`[Dkt. No. 70-1 at 3:1-2.] USAA, meanwhile, does not explain why it believes it would make
`
`sense to say that a user has a “relationship” with an intangible corporate entity, or where the ’432
`
`patent provides an example of what such a relationship would entail.
`
`
`
`Strangely, USAA spends several paragraphs arguing over an undisputed point that the
`
`“central-entity” and “external-entity” are separate. [Dkt. No. 115 at 9, 12-14.] Plaintiffs agree
`
`with USAA that there must be separation, with Plaintiffs positing that these entities must be
`
`“physically or logically separate.”3 One of ordinary skill would have understood that “physical or
`
`
`
`entity” and “external-entity,” which include an “authentication system . . .”