Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (2014)
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501
`
`
`
`KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
` Distinguished by Evicam International, Inc. v. Enforcement Video,
`LLC, E.D.Tex., November 2, 2016
`755 F.3d 1367
`United States Court of Appeals,
`Federal Circuit.
`
`HILL–ROM SERVICES, INC., Hill–
`Rom Company, Inc., and Hill–Rom
`Manufacturing, Inc., Plaintiffs–Appellants,
`v.
`STRYKER CORPORATION (doing business
`as Stryker Medical) and Stryker Sales
`Corporation, Defendants–Appellees.
`
`No. 2013–1450.
`|
`June 27, 2014.
`
`Synopsis
`Background: Patentee brought
`infringement action
`against a competitor, alleging that the competitor
`infringed on its patents for systems and methods for
`enabling hospital personnel to remotely monitor the status
`of hospital beds. The United States District Court for
`the Southern District of Indiana, Jane Magnus–Stinson,
`J., 2013 WL 364568, granted summary judgment to the
`competitor. The patentee appealed.
`
`Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Moore, Circuit Judge,
`held that:
`
`[1] term “datalink” was not limited to wired connections;
`
`[2] term “interface board including a processor” did not
`require that messages be sent to a remote location via a
`wall interface unit;
`
`[3] term “message validation information” meant one or
`more data fields within a message that is used to verify that
`the message was received exactly the same as it was sent;
`and
`
`[4] term “bed condition message” meant a message that
`indicates the status of a monitored bed condition.
`
`Reversed and remanded.
`
`Reyna, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.
`
`Attorneys and Law Firms
`
`*1370 David K. Callahan 1 , Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, of
`Chicago, IL, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. With him on
`the brief were Mary E. Zaug and Joshua M. Reed.
`
`1
`
`Mr. Callahan subsequently withdrew from the case.
`
`Steven E. Derringer, Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar
`& Scott LLP, of Chicago, IL, argued for defendants-
`appellees. With him on the brief were Christopher J. Lind
`and Brian C. Swanson.
`
`Before MOORE, SCHALL, and REYNA, Circuit
`Judges.
`
`Opinion
`
`Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MOORE.
`Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.
`
`MOORE, Circuit Judge.
`
`Hill–Rom Services, Inc., Hill–Rom Company, Inc., and
`Hill–Rom Manufacturing, Inc. (collectively, Hill–Rom)
`appeal from the district court's grant of summary
`judgment that Stryker Corporation and Stryker Sales
`Corporation (collectively, Stryker) do not
`infringe
`asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,699,038 (′038
`patent), 6,147,592 (′592 patent), and 7,538,659 (′659
`patent). Because
`the district court's
`judgment of
`non-infringement was premised on erroneous claim
`constructions, we reverse and remand.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`The patents-in-suit, which claim priority to the same
`parent application, 2 are directed to systems and methods
`for enabling hospital personnel to remotely monitor the
`status of hospital beds. ′038 patent col. 1 l. 61–col. 2 l.38.
`The patents-in-suit disclose hospital beds equipped with
`sensors that monitor bed parameters, such as the patient's
`presence in the bed and the bed height. Id. col. 2 ll. 6–9, col.
`5 l. 63–col. 6 l. 23. These systems send data about the status
`
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`Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (2014)
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501
`
`of a hospital bed to a remote location for monitoring by
`hospital personnel. Id. col. 2 ll. 59–65. Claim 1 of the ′038
`patent, from which asserted claim 13 depends, contains
`three of the four disputed claim limitations and is treated
`by the parties as representative:
`
`2
`
`The ′592 and the ′659 patents are continuations of
`the ′ 038 patent.
`
`A bed status information system ... comprising:
`
`at least one bed condition input signal generator ...;
`
`an interface board including a processor ... said interface
`board operable for receiving said bed condition input
`signal and processing said input signal to create
`bed condition messages indicating the status of the
`monitored condition;
`
`a processing station remote from the bed and coupled
`with said interface *1371 board by a datalink, the
`processing station operable for receiving said bed
`condition messages over the datalink and processing
`said messages ... such that the status of the monitored
`condition of the patient bed is indicated to attending
`personnel at a location remote from the bed.
`
`′038 patent claim 1 (emphases added). Claim 17 of the
`′592 patent includes the fourth disputed claim term and
`recites: “The patient monitoring system ... wherein the
`message includes message validation information.” ′592
`patent claim 17 (emphasis added).
`
`suit against Stryker alleging
`Hill–Rom brought
`infringement of various claims. The parties stipulated to
`non-infringement based on the court's construction of
`the claim terms “datalink,” “interface board including
`a processor,” “message validation information,” and
`“bed condition message.” Hill–Rom appeals. We have
`jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`[3]
`[2]
`[1]
` We review claim construction de novo.
`
`
`Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am.
`Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276–77 (Fed.Cir.2014) (en banc).
`Claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary
`meanings to one of skill in the art when read in the context
`of the specification and prosecution history. See Phillips
`v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en
`
`banc). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule:
`1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full
`scope of the claim term either in the specification or during
`prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2012).
`
`A. “datalink”
`
`[4]
` The district court construed the term “datalink” to
`mean “a cable connected to the bed that carries data.”
`Hill–Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:11–CV–
`1120, 2013 WL 364568, at *8 (S.D.Ind. Jan. 30, 2013)
`(District Court Decision ). Hill–Rom argues that the
`district court erred by limiting “datalink” to a “cable,”
`i.e., a wired datalink. It argues that “datalink” should
`be given its plain and ordinary meaning, which is a link
`that carries data and encompasses both wired and wireless
`connections. Stryker argues that the district court was
`correct that the plain and ordinary meaning of “datalink”
`is limited by the specification to a wired connection. We
`agree with Hill–Rom.
`
` [6]
`[5]
` While we read claims in view of the specification,
`of which they are a part, we do not read limitations
`from the embodiments in the specification into the claims.
`Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904
`(Fed.Cir.2004). We depart from the plain and ordinary
`meaning of claim terms based on the specification in only
`two instances: lexicography and disavowal. Thorner, 669
`F.3d at 1365. The standards for finding lexicography and
`disavowal are exacting. “To act as its own lexicographer, a
`patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed
`claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning” and
`must “clearly express an intent to redefine the term.” Id.
`at 1365 (quotations omitted).
`
`“[T]his court has expressly rejected the contention that if
`a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims
`of the patent must be construed as being limited to
`that embodiment.” Liebel–Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906
`(listing cases rejecting attempts to import limitations
`from the *1372 specification into the claims). The court
`continued, “[e]ven when the specification describes only
`a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not
`be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated
`a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words
`or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’ ” Id.
`
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`Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (2014)
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501
`
`(quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d
`1313, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2002)).
`
`Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T–Mobile USA Inc., 450
`F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed.Cir.2006).
`
`[7]
` Disavowal requires that “the specification [or
`prosecution history] make[ ] clear that the invention does
`not include a particular feature,” SciMed Life Sys., Inc.
`v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
`1341 (Fed.Cir.2001), or is clearly limited to a particular
`form of the invention, Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook
`Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“[W]hen the
`preferred embodiment is described in the specification
`as the invention itself, the claims are not necessarily
`entitled to a scope broader than that embodiment.”)
`(quotation omitted). For example, we have held that
`disclaimer applies when the patentee makes statements
`such as “the present invention requires ...” or “the
`present invention is ...” or “all embodiments of the
`present invention are....” See Regents of Univ. of Minn.
`v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 936 (Fed.Cir.2013);
`Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312,
`1316–19 (Fed.Cir.2006); SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1343–44;
`AstraZeneca AB v. Hanmi USA, Inc., 554 Fed.Appx.
`912, 915 (Fed.Cir.2013) (nonprecedential). We have
`also found disclaimer when the specification indicated
`that for “successful manufacture” a particular step was
`“require[d].” Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC,
`474 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Those statements
`are not descriptions of particular embodiments, but
`are characterizations directed to the invention as a
`whole.”). We found disclaimer when the specification
`indicated that the invention operated by “pushing (as
`opposed to pulling) forces,” and then characterized the
`“pushing forces” as “an important feature of the present
`invention.” SafeTCare Mfg., Inc. v. Tele–Made, Inc., 497
`F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (Fed.Cir.2007). We found disclaimer
`when the patent repeatedly disparaged an embodiment
`as “antiquated,” having “inherent inadequacies,” and
`then detailed the “deficiencies [that] make it difficult”
`to use. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int'l Sec.
`Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2012) (“[T]he
`specification goes well beyond expressing the patentee's
`preference ... and its repeated derogatory statements
`about [a particular embodiment] reasonably may be
`viewed as a disavowal....”). Likewise, we found disclaimer
`limiting a claim element to a feature of the preferred
`embodiment when the specification described that feature
`as a “very important feature ... in an aspect of the present
`invention” and disparaged alternatives to that feature.
`
`There is no such disclaimer or lexicography here. There are
`no words of manifest exclusion or restriction. The patents-
`in-suit do not describe the invention as limited to a wired
`datalink. There is no disclosure that, for example, the
`present invention “is,” “includes,” or “refers to” a wired
`datalink and there is nothing expressing the advantages,
`importance, or essentiality of using a wired as opposed
`to wireless datalink. Nor is there language of limitation
`or restriction of the datalink. Nothing in the specification
`or prosecution history makes clear that the invention
`is limited to use of a cable as a datalink. Absent such
`language, we do not import *1373 limitations from the
`specification into the claims.
`
`[8]
` It is true that the specifications of the patents-
`in-suit use the terms “datalink 39,” “cable 39,” and
`“serial datalink 39” to describe the same component
`of the preferred embodiment. ′038 patent col. 12 ll.
`61–64, col. 6 ll. 29–33, 47–50. However, those terms
`are used synonymously only in describing a particular
`numbered component in the figure depicting the preferred
`embodiment, and never in describing the datalink of the
`invention generally. See id. This disclosed embodiment
`undisputedly uses a cable to convey data, and the patent
`does not disclose an alternative embodiment that uses a
`wireless datalink. However, absent some language in the
`specification or prosecution history suggesting that the
`wired connection is important, essential, necessary, or the
`“present invention,” there is no basis to narrow the plain
`and ordinary meaning of the term datalink to one type of
`datalink—a cable. There are no magic words that must be
`used, but to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning
`of a claim term to one of skill in the art, the patentee must,
`with some language, indicate a clear intent to do so in the
`patent. And there is no such language here.
`
`In fact, this specification states that the figures depicting
`the use of a wired datalink merely “illustrate embodiments
`of the invention.” ′038 patent col. 4 ll. 59–65; see also
`id. col. 5 ll. 30–31 (“DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF
`SPECIFIC EMBODIMENTS”); id. col. 22 ll. 20–31 (the
`“description of various embodiments” is not intended “to
`restrict or in any way limit the scope of the appended
`claims to such detail”). Nothing in the language of the
`specification suggests that datalink should be limited to
`the cable used in the preferred embodiment. Therefore,
`
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`Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (2014)
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501
`
`we see no basis for deviating from the plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`[9]
` An examiner's statement during prosecution of later
`unrelated U.S. Patent Application No. 13/336,044 (′044
`application) that the ′038 patent does “not teach ... the
`bed having a wireless receiver” does not convince us that
`one of skill in the art at the time of filing (i.e., the effective
`filing date of the patents-in-suit) would understand
`“datalink” to be limited to wired connections. The
`examiner stated only that the ′038 patent specification
`does “not teach” a wireless receiver, and he expressed
`no views on the meaning of the term “datalink.” No
`doubt the patentee would agree with the examiner that the
`specification does not contain an embodiment that teaches
`use of a wireless receiver. However, a patent specification
`need not disclose or teach what is known in the art.
`Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d
`1269, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2012) (“It is well-established ... that a
`specification need not disclose what is well-known in the
`art.”); see also Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
`Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed.Cir.1986). The absence
`of an embodiment teaching a wireless receiver does not
`prevent the claimed datalink from being given its plain and
`ordinary meaning at the relevant time. Holding that the
`plain meaning of datalink at the time of the filing included
`both wired and wireless connections for carrying data is
`not inconsistent with the examiner's statement that the ′
`038 patent does not teach a wireless receiver. We do not
`interpret the examiner's statement about the teachings of
`the specification as one about his understanding of the
`meaning of the term “datalink” to one of skill in the art
`at the time of filing.
`
`*1374 Indeed, the only evidence in the record of how
`one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing
`would understand the term “datalink” is from Hill–Rom's
`expert. He testified that as of the effective filing date
`of the patents-in-suit, “a person of ordinary skill would
`understand that ‘datalink’ does not refer solely to physical
`connection” and “can be established over wired, wireless,
`optical, or other connection.” J.A. 454, 472.
`
`Stryker does not dispute that wireless datalinks were
`known at the time the patent was filed, nor does it suggest
`that the plain meaning of datalink at the relevant time
`was a cable. Instead, Stryker insists that “datalink” ought
`to be given its plain and ordinary meaning in the context
`of the specification. We agree. This is not, however, a
`
`license to read limitations from the embodiments in the
`specification into the claims. The plain and ordinary
`meaning of datalink at the relevant time is a connection
`that carries data. And neither the specification nor the
`prosecution history gives reason to limit the term to a
`wired connection.
`
`[10]
` This construction—a datalink is a link that carries
`data and can be wired or wireless—is supported by the
`claims of the patent. The ′659 patent contains several
`dependent claims that expressly recite the requirement
`of a wired datalink, and they depend from independent
`claims that do not contain such a requirement. Claim
`2, which depends from claim 1, recites “[t]he system of
`claim 1, wherein the datalink comprises a wired datalink.”
`′659 patent claim 2. The only distinction between claim
`1 and claim 2 is the limitation that the “datalink” is a
`wired datalink. See also id. claims 10, 18. “[T]he presence
`of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation
`raises a presumption that the limitation in question is
`not found in the independent claim.” Liebel–Flarsheim,
`358 F.3d at 910. This presumption is especially strong
`where the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful
`difference between an independent and dependent claim.
`Id. Of course, claim differentiation is not a hard and
`fast rule, and the presumption can be overcome by a
`contrary construction required by the specification or
`prosecution history. Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C–COR,
`Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2005). However,
`nothing in this specification or prosecution history rebuts
`the presumption established by the doctrine of claim
`differentiation.
`
`[13]
`[12]
`[11]
` The district court explained that if
`
`
`datalink was not limited to a wired link, and in
`particular, if the term were construed to “include wireless
`communication,” the claim would not be enabled. District
`Court Decision at *7. Enablement concerns do not
`justify departing from the plain and ordinary meaning of
`“datalink.” Where the meaning of a claim term is clear,
`as it is here, we do not rewrite the claim to preserve its
`validity. Liebel–Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 911. Moreover, the
`parties point to no evidence in this record that establishes
`an enablement problem and the district court did not cite
`to any. Id. Courts should be cautious not to allow claim
`construction to morph into a mini-trial on validity. Claim
`terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning
`to one of skill in the art at the relevant time and cannot
`be rewritten by the courts to save their validity. We hold
`
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`Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (2014)
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501
`
`that “datalink” in the claims at issue is any link over which
`data is transferred and can be wired or wireless.
`
`the time of the patent filing would be a link that carries
`data in a wired or wireless fashion.
`
`The dissent argues that our construction is incorrect
`because it defines “datalink” in functional terms. But, as
`we have previously explained, defining a particular claim
`*1375 term by its function is not improper and “is not
`sufficient to convert a claim element containing that term
`into a ‘means for performing a specified function’ within
`the meaning of [35 U.S.C. § 112(6) ].” Greenberg v. Ethicon
`Endo–Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1996).
`Indeed, “[m]any devices take their names from the
`functions they perform. The examples are innumerable,
`such as ‘filter,’ ‘brake,’ ‘clamp,’ ‘screwdriver,’ or ‘lock.’ ”
`Id. There is nothing improper about defining “datalink”
`as a link that conveys data. If one of skill in the art at the
`relevant time would understand that datalinks can be both
`wired and wireless, then the patentee is entitled to the full
`range of that claim term. 3
`
`3
`
`The dissent also raises a concern that our construction
`of “datalink” could theoretically cover unknown
`technologies created in the future. Dissent at 2. Such
`unknown technologies are not at issue here, however,
`and we see no persuasive reason to depart from the
`plain and ordinary meaning of a term based on such
`unknowns.
`
`Next, the dissent contends that a person of ordinary
`skill could not have understood “datalink” to include
`wireless connections because there is no evidence that
`wireless connections were known to persons of ordinary
`skill in the art at the relevant time. To the contrary,
`the record evidence establishes that wireless connections
`were known and used by persons of ordinary skill
`during the relevant time frame. The Background of the
`Invention of the patents-in-suit describes a prior art patent
`disclosing a “personnel locating system” using “infrared
`transmitters,” i.e., wireless transmitters, to transmit a
`“pulse-coded signal which corresponds to the identity of
`the wearer.” ′038 patent col. 1 ll. 42–46 (describing U.S.
`Patent No. 4,275,385). This is an unequivocal disclosure,
`in the patent itself, of wireless datalinks. Furthermore,
`Hill–Rom's expert testified that at the time of the patent's
`filing, a person of ordinary skill would have understood
`“datalink” to include a wireless connection. J.A. 454, 472.
`Even Stryker does not dispute that, at the relevant time
`period, data could be carried through a wired or wireless
`connection. We hold that, consistent with the record
`evidence, the plain and ordinary meaning of datalink at
`
`B. “interface board including a processor”
`
`[14]
` The district court construed “interface board
`including a processor” as “a board that processes an
`input signal to create bed condition messages and sends
`those messages to a remote location via the wall interface
`unit.” District Court Decision at *9. The court noted
`that “[i]t can also receive messages through the wall
`interface unit.” Id. Hill–Rom argues that the “interface
`board including a processor” should be given its plain and
`ordinary meaning, which is the interface between the bed
`components and the off-bed components that processes
`the bed condition input signals into bed condition
`messages. First, Hill–Rom argues that the district court
`improperly imported “the wall interface unit” limitation
`into “interface board including a processor.” Second,
`it contends that the district court erred by requiring
`the “interface board including a processor” to receive
`messages from a remote location.
`
`Stryker responds that the district court's inclusion of the
`“wall interface” unit in its construction is supported by
`the specification, and argues further that the construction
`should require “a board that *1376 includes the
`electronics that control the sending of messages to, and
`the receiving of messages from, a remote location.” It
`argues that the patents-in-suit describe the invention as
`including an interface board that is capable of sending and
`receiving messages from a remote location through the
`wall interface unit. See ′038 patent col. 3 ll. 53–56; col. 4
`ll. 18–21; col. 19 ll. 4–17. Moreover, Stryker argues that
`several dependent claims describe sending messages to the
`interface board, suggesting that the interface board must
`be capable of receiving messages from a remote location.
`See id. claims 9, 13, 14, 15, 24.
`
`[15]
` We hold that the “interface board including a
`processor” is the interface between the bed components
`and the off-bed components that processes the bed
`condition input signals. An interface is a point of
`interaction. Interface devices are sometimes capable of
`both sending and receiving data and sometimes limited
`to sending data. Claim 1 of the ′038 patent articulates
`with specificity the functions that the claimed interface
`board must perform: the interface board must “receiv[e] ...
`
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`Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (2014)
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501
`
`bed condition input signal[s],” “process[ ] said input
`signal to create bed condition messages,” and send “bed
`condition messages over the datalink” to “the [remote]
`processing station.” ′038 patent claim 1. That is all
`this claim requires in terms of the functionality of the
`interface board. Thus the “interface board including
`a processor” must receive bed condition inputs, create
`the bed condition message, and send it to the remote
`processing station. Asserted claim 13 adds the limitation
`that the interface board must include a “network port
`electrically coupled to the operating network for receiving
`said network data message, the interface board operable
`to process said data message and create a bed condition
`message.” While the plain meaning of claim 1 does not
`require that the interface board be capable of receiving
`messages from the remote processing station, claim 13
`adds this functional requirement. Dependent claims 9, 13,
`14, 15, and 24 each add, among other requirements, the
`functional requirement that the interface board receive
`messages from a remote location. ′038 patent claims 9, 13,
`14, 15, 24. Under the principles of claim differentiation,
`the independent claims are presumed to be broader.
`Liebel–Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 910.
`
`The asserted claims of the ′038 patent are 13, 20,
`and 26. The district court is correct that the interface
`board of claim 13 must be capable of both sending and
`receiving messages from a remote location because the
`claim expressly includes these limitations. Claim 20, in
`contrast, does not require the interface board to receive
`messages from a remote location. Claim 20 depends from
`independent claim 19. Claim 19, like claim 1, only requires
`that the interface board receive bed condition inputs,
`create the bed condition message, and send it to the
`remote processing station. Claim 20 only adds a limitation
`regarding a data field in the bed condition message that
`will allow the processing station to determine the identity
`of the patient bed that generated the message. Claim
`20 does not include any limitation that would require
`the interface board to receive messages from a remote
`station. Therefore, claim 20 is not so limited. In fact, claim
`24 adds this limitation to claim 19 and under principles
`of claim differentiation, claim 20 is presumed not to
`include it. Finally, claim 26 is an independent claim that,
`like independent claims 1 and 19, requires only that the
`interface board receive bed condition inputs, create the
`bed condition message, and send it to the *1377 remote
`processing station. The interface board of claim 26 is not
`
`required to be capable of receiving messages from a remote
`location.
`
`To be clear, the plain meaning of interface could include
`one-way or two-way communication. The claims of this
`patent expressly define the requirements of the interface
`board. Some of the claims require the interface board to
`be able to send messages to a remote location and other
`claims require it be capable of both sending and receiving
`messages from a remote location.
`
`There is no disavowal or lexicography in this specification
`that causes us to import the receiving from a remote
`location limitation into the claims in which it does not
`appear. The specification discloses embodiments in which
`the interface board receives messages from a remote
`location. ′038 patent col. 3 ll. 56–59, col. 18 ll. 27–44.
`But there is nothing in the specification that requires that
`the interface board include this functionality. There is no
`language that extolls the virtues of interfaces that both
`send and receive messages or language that disparages
`interfaces that only send messages. There is no language in
`this patent that an interface board capable of both sending
`and receiving is an important, essential, or critical part of
`the present invention. The “interface board including a
`processor” in claim 20 and 26 is a board with a processor
`that is capable of receiving bed condition inputs, creating
`the bed condition message and sending it to the remote
`processing station.
`
`Finally, the “interface board including a processor” in
`the asserted claims is not required to send messages to
`a remote location through a wall interface unit. While
`it is true that the specification discloses embodiments
`in which the interface board sends the message to a
`wall interface unit, which then sends it to a remote
`location, such a disclosure does not cause the importation
`of this structure into the claims at issue. See, e.g.,
`id. col. 3 ll. 34–44. The specification states: “In one
`embodiment of the invention ... [t]he LON messages
`would be received by an appropriate line transceiver 160
`from lines 159 and processed by microprocessor 140 and
`sent to the wall interface unit 40 in accordance with
`the present invention.” Id. col. 12 ll. 41–54. The fact
`that the specification indicates that in one embodiment,
`messages are sent to the wall interface unit “in accordance
`with the present invention,” does not mean that a wall
`interface unit must be present in all embodiments of
`the invention. The specification contains no discussion
`
` © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
`
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`Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (2014)
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1501
`
`of the importance, essentiality, or criticality of the wall
`unit to the present invention. In fact, the specification
`discloses an embodiment in which the interface board
`sends information to a remote location without using
`a wall interface unit intermediary. Id. col. 2 ll. 49–52.
`The claims at issue do not require, or even mention, a
`wall interface unit. There is no lexicography or disavowal
`that would support importing this structural limitation
`from the specification into the claims. Finally, there are
`dependent claims that expressly add this structure. See
`id. claims 7, 23 (adding an “interface unit electrically
`coupled between said interface board and said processing
`station”). Under principles of claim differentiation, we
`presume that the claims without this limitation do not
`require it. Liebel–Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 910. To the
`extent that the district court required the “interface board
`including a processor” of the claims at issue to send
`messages to a remote location via a wall interface unit, it
`erred.
`
`C. “message validation information”
`
`[16]
` The term “message validation information” appears
`only in asserted claim *1378 17 of the ′592 patent, which
`recites that “the message includes message validation
`information.” ′592 patent claim 17. The district court
`construed “message validation information” as “a data
`field within a message that is used to verify that
`the message was received exactly the same as it was
`sent.” District Court Decision at *13. Relevant to this
`conclusion is the district court's undisputed construction
`of “message” as “[a] plurality of data fields of appropriate
`length assembled into a defined structure.” Id. at *9.
`
`Hill–Rom contends that the term should be given its
`plain and ordinary meaning: “information that validates
`a message.” It argues that the specification describes
`message verification as simply a status message that
`indicates that a bed condition message “was received
`properly or was not received properly.” ′592 patent
`col. 14 ll. 12–13. It argues that the message verification
`embodiment disclosed in the specification detects the
`presence of certain errors, but cannot evaluate all aspects
`of a received message to confirm that it is exactly the same
`as the sent message. See id. col. 18 ll. 20–35. It argues
`that the district court's construction would exclude this
`embodiment, and is therefore presumptively incorrect.
`
`As an initial matter, we see no reason that “message
`validation information” must be limited to a single data
`field. There is nothing in the plain meaning of the
`term or in the specification that requires all message
`validation information to be contained to a single data
`field. The district court is correct that “message validation
`information” must be limited to data fields because, based
`on the claim language, “message validation information”
`is part of a message, and the parties do not dispute that
`a message is limited to “a plurality of data fields.” Id.
`claim 17. The summary of the invention states that the
`message includes “a field for verifying that the message
`was received by a node exactly the same as it was sent
`by the sending node.” Id. col. 3 ll. 55–57. The preferred
`embodiment also discloses using a CHECKSUM for the
`verification field. Id. col. 13 ll. 47–51. These references
`are not sufficient to limit the structure of the message
`validation information to a single field. There is no
`suggestion that utilizing only a single field is important,
`essential, critical, or valuable to the present invention.
`There are no words of manifest exclusion. We conclude
`that “message validation information” is limited to data
`fields within the message, but is not limited to a single data
`field.
`
`The parties also dispute what it means to validate the
`m