Paper No. ______
`Filed: June 7, 2017
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`IBG LLC;
`INTERACTIVE BROKERS LLC;
`TRADESTATION GROUP, INC.; and
`TRADESTATION SECURITIES, INC.,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`Case CBM2016-0054
`U.S. Patent 7,693,768
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION
`TO PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`
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`CBM2016-00054
`U.S. Patent 7,693,768
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
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`II.
`
`STANDARD .................................................................................................... 1
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`III. GOULD-BEAR, OLSEN, & ABILOCK DECLARATIONS
`(EXHIBITS 2168, 2174, and 2178) ................................................................ 1
`
`IV. DISTRICT COURT TRANSCRIPTS (EXHIBITS 2211, 2220,
`2222, 2224, 2225, 2228, 2232, 2247, 2251, 2273-2276, 2286,
`2288, and 2292-2296) ...................................................................................... 3
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`V.
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`TRADER DECLARANTS (EXHIBIT 2223) ................................................. 5
`
`A.
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`Exhibit 2223 Is Authentic ..................................................................... 5
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`B.
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`C.
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`Exhibit 2223 Is Not Hearsay ................................................................. 6
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`Exhibit 2223 Qualifies Under the Residual Exception ......................... 7
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`VI. DOCUMENTS PRODUCED IN DISTRICT COURT CASES
`(EXHIBITS 2210, 2223 (pages 13 and 14), 2240-2246, 2250,
`2252-2272, 2277, 2532, 2533) ......................................................................... 7
`
`A.
`
`The Exhibits Are Authentic ................................................................... 7
`
`B.
`
`The Exhibits Are Not Hearsay .............................................................. 9
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`VII. BRUMFIELD SKETCH, ANIMATIONS, & INTERNET
`ARCHIVE PRINTOUT (EXHIBITS 2212-2214, 2405, and
`2535) ..............................................................................................................10
`
`VIII. eSPEED / CQG JURY VERDICT FORMS (EXHIBITS 2034
`and 2278) .......................................................................................................12
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`IX. THOMAS DECLARATION (EXHIBIT 2169, ¶¶ 77, 85-88,
`91-94, 96-99, 103-114, 128-130, 133-136, 138-140, 142, 143,
`153-155, 178, 181) .........................................................................................12
`
`A.
`
`The Board Is Equipped to Properly Assess Mr. Thomas’
`Testimony ............................................................................................12
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`CBM2016-00054
`U.S. Patent 7,693,768
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`B. Mr. Thomas’ Testimony Is Used to Further Appropriate
`Objectives ............................................................................................13
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`C.
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`D.
`
`The Objected-To Statements Prove the Evidence Is Not
`Hearsay ................................................................................................14
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`Petitioner’s Objections Go to The Weight -- Not
`Admissibility .......................................................................................15
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`E.
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`Papers Submitted From Other Proceedings Are Proper ......................15
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`X.
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`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................15
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`CBM2016-00054
`U.S. Patent 7,693,768
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`37 C.F.R. § 42 governs these proceedings, and it “shall be construed to
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`secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” § 42.1(b).
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`The “just” requirement mandates that the Board consider all of the evidence
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`introduced by Patent Owner Trading Technologies International, Inc. (“TT”).
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`II.
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`STANDARD
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`As the movant, Petitioners bear the burden of proving that the challenged
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`exhibits are inadmissible. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty
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`Insurance Co., CBM2012-00002, Paper 66 at 59 (January 23, 2014); 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.20(c). Petitioners have failed to meet this burden. As a matter of policy, the
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`Board disfavors excluding evidence; “it is better to have a complete record of the
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`evidence submitted by the parties than to exclude particular pieces.” Id. at 60-61.
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`III. GOULD-BEAR, OLSEN, & ABILOCK DECLARATIONS
`(EXHIBITS 2168, 2174, and 2178)
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`Petitioners argue that these experts did not analyze the ‘768 patent from the
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`perspective of a POSA. Mot. at 2-3. But this assumes a rule that no expert
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`testimony, no matter the topic, is admissible unless that expert can opine from the
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`perspective of a POSA. There is no such rule. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward &
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`Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding admission of expert
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`testimony proper because expert had the “knowledge, skill, experience, training,
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`[and] education” of a “specialized” nature that was likely to “assist the trier of fact
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`1
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`to understand the evidence); Qomo Hitevision, LLC v. Pathway Innovations and
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`Techs., Inc., IPR2016-00661, 2016 WL 5404096 *4 (PTAB 2016) (declining to
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`disregard expert declaration because expert’s scientific, technical, and other
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`specialized knowledge would be helpful in understanding the evidence).
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`Each expert declaration offers relevant testimony on areas of expertise for
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`which a POSA is not needed. For instance, the Abilock testimony (Exhibit 2178)
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`was offered solely to explain the meaning of particular elements of TSE when
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`translated from Japanese to English. That Mr. Abilock did not review the ‘768
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`Patent, or opine from the perspective of a POSA, is irrelevant because he is not
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`offering an opinion on obviousness. Mr. Abilock’s testimony was directed to
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`identifying and clarifying ambiguous portions of TSE when translated from
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`Japanese to English. POR at 28. Mr. Thomas properly relied on Mr. Abilock’s
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`testimony in forming his opinion under § 103. See, e.g., Exhibit 2169 at ¶ 167.
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`Likewise, Mr. Gould-Bear’s (Exhibit 2168) and Mr. Olsen’s (Exhibit 2174)
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`testimony was offered for the relevant purpose of opining on the nature of GUIs as
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`a general matter in support of patent-eligibility under § 101. More specifically,
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`these declarations were offered to support, inter alia, that (i) GUI tools are
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`technology; (ii) GUIs are integral components of a computer; (iii) allowing a
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`computer to be used in new and inventive ways through the use of a GUI is an
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`improvement to the computer; and (iv) usability issues are technical, classical
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`engineering problems, addressed by the science of human-computer interaction.
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`These are matters relevant to the issue of patent-eligibility that do not need to be
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`from the perspective of a POSA. Tellingly, Petitioners cite no authority to the
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`contrary.
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`As such, these Exhibits are admissible.
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`IV. DISTRICT COURT TRANSCRIPTS
`(EXHIBITS 2211, 2220, 2222, 2224, 2225, 2228, 2232, 2247, 2251, 2273-
`2276, 2286, 2288, and 2292-2296)
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`These Exhibits are admissible because they are sworn trial or deposition
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`testimony from district court cases. They satisfy the “residual exception” to the
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`hearsay rule. FRE 807. To fall under the exception, a “statement must: (1) have
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`equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) be offered as evidence
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`of a material fact; (3) be more probative on the point for which it is offered than
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`any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and
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`(4) be in the interests of justice to admit.” Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2015-
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`00811, Paper 44 at 69 (Sep. 8, 2016) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 807). Tribunals are
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`“accorded wide discretion in applying the residual hearsay exception.” Doe v.
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`United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1076–77 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 510 U.S. 812
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`(1993).
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`In Apple v. VirnetX, the Board found admissible declarations that were
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`prepared for other proceedings and district court trial and deposition testimony.
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`IPR2015-00811, Paper 44 at 68. After recognizing that the party challenging the
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`admissibility of the evidence “chose not to seek the opportunity to cross examine
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`the declaration testimony,” (defined as district court trial and deposition
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`testimony), the Board explained why the residual exception under FRE 807
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`rendered the evidence admissible. Id. at 68-70. “The vast majority of testimony in
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`inter partes reviews is admitted in paper form, as a declaration, instead of as live
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`witness testimony. Thus, whether or not testimony is specifically created for a
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`specific IPR or is created for another proceeding, if the declaration is sworn
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`testimony and the witness is available for cross-examination, the testimony bears
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`the same guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 70.
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`TT’s testimonial evidence and declarations from district court have the same
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`circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as the testimony at issue in Apple. See
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`id. at 69-70. Here, like in Apple, TT’s testimonial evidence from district court is
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`sworn testimony and the witnesses would have been available for cross-
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`examination had Petitioners sought such cross examination.
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`Moreover, TT’s testimonial evidence from district court is also offered as
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`evidence of a material fact, more probative on the point for which it is offered than
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`any other evidence that TT could obtain through reasonable efforts.
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`V. TRADER DECLARANTS (EXHIBIT 22231)
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`A. Exhibit 2223 Is Authentic
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`The authentication requirement is satisfied if the proponent presents
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`“evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims
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`it is.” FRE 901(a). Exhibit 2223 contains sufficient evidence to support a finding
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`that it is authentic. The trader declarations contain distinct characteristics found on
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`the page, including dates, docket numbers, real names, and signatures that are
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`sufficient to support a finding that the exhibit is what TT claims it to be. See
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`Motorola Mobility, LLC v. Intellectual Ventures I, LLC, CBM2015-00004, Paper
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`No. 33 at 15 (March 21, 2016).
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`Further, no “declaration from the author . . . is required to support a finding
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`that the document is what it claims to be.” EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Tech.,
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`LLC, et al., IPR2013-00087, Paper 69 at 38 (May 15, 2014). Petitioners do not
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`provide any substantial reason to doubt the authenticity of the exhibit; indeed, there
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`is none. See id. at 42.
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`Finally, Petitioners’ challenge to the exhibit (e.g., “The exhibits contain, for
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`example, statements by individuals regarding their opinions concerning TT’s
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`1 Exhibit 2223 contains one document at pages 13-14 that is documentary, not
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`testimonial, evidence from district court, so it is addressed in Section VI, below.
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`5
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`alleged commercial embodiments” (Mot. at 5)) is more appropriately addressed as
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`a question of sufficiency of proof, not admissibility. Such challenges should be
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`raised in the case-in-chief, not a Motion to Exclude. See EMC Corp. v. ACQIS
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`LLC, IPR2014-01469, Paper 56 at 20 (March 8, 2016).
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`B.
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`Exhibit 2223 Is Not Hearsay
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`Exhibit 2223 is not hearsay at least because it is not offered for the truth of
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`the matter asserted. Exhibit 2223 was offered as evidentiary support of certain
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`objective indicia of non-obviousness, such as evidence of a problem, unexpected
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`results, skepticism, praise, and copying. Truth of the specific statements in the
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`declarations is irrelevant. See CA, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., 780 F.Supp.2d 196,
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`227-228 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2009) (“The Meininger email is not hearsay because it
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`is not being offered for the truth of its contents. The Meininger email contains
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`statements claiming that the Meininger web page: (1) is ‘a REAL use for
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`DHTML’; (2) behaves just like ‘windowmaker’; (3) is ‘ALL done with javascript
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`and DHTML’; and (4) is ‘VERY graphics intensive,’ etc. However, the Meininger
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`email is not being offered to prove the veracity of the foregoing statements.”)
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`(citations omitted)). Furthermore, as is the case with Petitioners’ objection to the
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`authenticity of the exhibit, their objection relating to hearsay is more appropriately
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`addressed as a question of sufficiency of proof, not admissibility.
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`C. Exhibit 2223 Qualifies Under the Residual Exception
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`For the same reasons discussed above in Section IV., Exhibit 2223 is
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`admissible under the residual exception to hearsay rule. This evidence has the
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`same circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as those declarations actually
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`created for these proceedings because these declarations are sworn testimony made
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`for district court litigation and under penalty of perjury, and were made at or near
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`the time of the events described therein. And like the testimonial evidence above,
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`the witnesses would have been available for cross-examination here had Petitioners
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`sought such cross examination. Petitioners chose not to seek any such cross-
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`examination. Petitioners cannot fail to seek cross-examination of the declarants
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`and then claim that the declarants’ testimony is untrustworthy because Petitioners
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`had no opportunity to cross-examine. Exhibit 223 is admissible.
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`VI. DOCUMENTS PRODUCED IN DISTRICT COURT CASES
`(EXHIBITS 2210, 2223 (pages 13 and 14), 2240-2246, 2250, 2252-2272,
`2277, 2532, 2533)
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`A. The Exhibits Are Authentic
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`First, most of the exhibits are authentic at least because they were previously
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`produced in response to discovery requests in earlier related litigations. Ex. 2337,
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`pp. 1-4. See Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Quality King Dist., Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d 462, 472
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he act of production implicitly authenticated the
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`documents.”). McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust, Co., 779 F.2d 916, 929 (3d Cir.
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`1985). As such, the exhibits are authentic and admissible.
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`Also, the authentication requirement is satisfied if the proponent presents
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`“evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims
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`it is.” FRE 901(a). Here, the exhibits that Petitioners objected to contain sufficient
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`evidence to support a finding that they are authentic. The third-party emails, for
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`example, contain distinct characteristics found on the page, including metadata,
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`contents, and real names of the parties in the body of the emails that are sufficient
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`to support a finding that the exhibit is what TT claims it to be. See, e.g., QSC
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`Audio Products, LLC v. Crest Audio, Inc., IPR2014-00127, Paper 43 at 12 (April
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`29, 2015) (“[H]aving considered and weighed the distinctive characteristics of the
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`articles and the circumstances surrounding their retrieval from the AES E-Library,
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`we find that [the references] are what they appear to be”). Furthermore, no
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`“declaration from the author . . . is required to support a finding that the document
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`is what it claims to be.” EMC Corp., IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 69 at 38.
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`And Petitioners have failed to provide any substantial reason to doubt the
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`authenticity of any of the exhibits, as there is none. See id. at 42 (“[The movant]
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`does not present sufficient or credible evidence to the contrary”). Nor have
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`Petitioners ever provided substantive reasons to doubt the authenticity of these
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`exhibits in the past. In fact, Petitioners neglected to disclose that many of the
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`exhibits (e.g., third-party emails) were actually produced by parties in previous
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`litigations who had the same motivation as the Petitioners here—to invalidate
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`Patent Owner’s patents. And those parties in previous litigation, who would have
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`stood to gain from a denial of admission of these same exhibits, had no reason to,
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`and did not, challenge the authenticity of the exhibits. Ex. 2337, pp. 1-4.
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`Finally, Petitioners’ challenges to the exhibits (e.g., “TT and its technical
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`expert use the Emails here as support for their assertions regarding alleged
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`secondary considerations” (Mot. at 6)) are more appropriately addressed as
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`questions of sufficiency of proof, not admissibility. Such challenges should be
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`raised in the case-in-chief, not a Motion to Exclude.
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`B.
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`The Exhibits Are Not Hearsay
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`The exhibits are not hearsay at least because they are not offered for the
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`truth of the matter asserted. For example, the challenged third-party emails were
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`offered to show secondary considerations of non-obviousness of the invention,
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`such as evidence of a problem, unexpected results, skepticism, praise, and copying.
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`Truth of the specific statements in the emails is irrelevant. See CA, Inc., 780
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`F.Supp.2d at 227-228. Furthermore, Petitioners’ objections relating to hearsay are
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`more appropriately addressed as questions of sufficiency of proof, not
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`admissibility.
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`Finally, regardless of whether the exhibits constitute hearsay or if an
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`exception applies, they are admissible because Mr. Thomas properly relied on
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`them in preparing his declaration, as discussed Section IX.
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`VII. BRUMFIELD SKETCH, ANIMATIONS, & INTERNET ARCHIVE
`PRINTOUT (EXHIBITS 2212-2214, 2405, and 2535)
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`As discussed in Sections V.A and VI.A, Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a)
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`states that the authentication requirement is satisfied when the proponent presents
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`“evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims
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`it is.” As with Exhibit 2223 and the district court evidence, the exhibits objected to
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`here contain sufficient evidence to support a finding that they are authentic. The
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`sketch (Exhibit 2213), animations (Exhibit 2212, 2213, and 2535), and the website
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`printout (Exhibit 2405) contain distinct characteristics found on their pages,
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`including dates, docket numbers, real names, and signatures that are sufficient to
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`support a finding that the exhibits are what TT claims them to be.
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`Further, Exhibits 2212, 2214, and 2535 are admissible under FRE 1006,
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`which states a party “may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content
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`of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently
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`examined in court. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available
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`for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and
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`place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.”
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`This evidence satisfies the four prongs of FRE 1006, namely: (1) the
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`underlying evidence is so voluminous as to make comprehension difficult and
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`inconvenient, although not necessarily literally impossible; (2) the underlying
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`evidence itself must be admissible, although the offering party need not actually
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`enter them; (3) the party introducing the evidence must make the underlying
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`evidence reasonably available for inspection and copying; and (4) the evidence
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`must be accurate and nonprejudicial. See, e.g., U.S. v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350,
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`1359 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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`Here, (1) the animations depict one example of how the claimed invention
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`operates, which makes comprehension of the ‘768 claimed features easier for the
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`Board; (2) the animations demonstrate features of the ‘768 patent, which is
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`admissible; (3) the animations were made reasonably available for inspection and
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`copying because they were served on Petitioners; and (4) the animations are
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`accurate and nonprejudicial because Thomas testified that they depict the claimed
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`invention solving particular problems, and because the Board is well-equipped to
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`discern what the sketch and animations are portraying. See Ex. 2169, ¶¶ 85, 90.
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`Additionally, Exhibits 2212-2214, 2405, and 2535 are not hearsay at least
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`because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. These exhibits
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`were offered as evidence of objective indicia of non-obviousness, such as evidence
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`of a problem and unexpected results as well as copying. In one case, the exhibits
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`were offered to show how the ‘768 claims addressed problems in prior art GUIs.
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`The underlying truth of these exhibits are irrelevant. These exhibits are not
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`hearsay for at least this reason and thus the Board should consider these exhibits.
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`VIII. eSPEED / CQG JURY VERDICT FORMS (EXHIBITS 2034 and 2278)
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`These exhibits are offered for the relevant purpose of showing how
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`another party and a jury reacted to the evidence in these proceedings. They are
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`not hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and
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`because they qualify as public records under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). They were
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`prepared by a jury and court, authorized by law, and recorded in the public
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`office of the U.S. Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
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`IX. THOMAS DECLARATION (EXHIBIT 2169, ¶¶ 77, 85-88, 91-94, 96-
`99, 103-114, 128-130, 133-136, 138-140, 142, 143, 153-155, 178, 181)
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`Petitioners fail to support their assertion that the Thomas’ testimony
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`“exceed[s] the proper boundaries of expert testimony.” Mot. at 10. No case law
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`cited by Petitioners applies to PTAB proceedings. Instead, it focuses on jury-
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`specific issues.
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`A. The Board Is Equipped to Properly Assess Mr. Thomas’
`Testimony
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`The primary reason for excluding expert testimony is juries. Indeed, the
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`principles underlying Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, cited by Petitioners, relate
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`to the effect that hearsay, relied upon by an expert, may have on a jury. 726 F.3d
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`119, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 397-98
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`(2d Cir. 2005) and Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 666
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2007)). Such principles do not apply here. “[U]nlike a lay jury, the
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`Board . . . has significant experience in evaluating expert testimony. Accordingly,
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`the danger of prejudice in this proceeding is considerably lower than in a
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`conventional district court trial.” Lupin Ltd. v. Senju Pharm. Co., Ltd., IPR2015-
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`01097, Paper 70 at 44 (PTAB Sep. 12, 2016).
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`B. Mr. Thomas’ Testimony Is Used to Further Appropriate
`Objectives
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`In this case, Mr. Thomas’ statements are not improper expert testimony,
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`because an expert is allowed leeway to use hearsay reasonably. Indeed, Marvel,
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`cited by Petitioners, acknowledges that the rules grant experts leeway with respect
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`to hearsay evidence, and that an expert could, “for example, help to identify, gauge
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`the reliability of, and interpret evidence that would otherwise elude, mislead, or
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`remain opaque to a layperson.” Marvel, 726 F.3d at 135. Marvel further
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`contemplates that “such a witness might offer background knowledge or context
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`that illuminates or places in perspective past events.” Id. at 136. Mr. Thomas is
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`doing just that—helping interpret evidence that would otherwise elude, mislead, or
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`remain opaque to a layperson, and offering background knowledge or context that
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`illuminates or places in perspective past events.
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`For example, paragraphs 85-88 and 91-94 – characterized by Petitioners as
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`describing and characterizing what motivated the inventors to develop the claimed
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`subject matter and describing the development of a commercial embodiment –
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`provide such background and context. Notably, these paragraphs use Exhibits
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`2212 and 2213 as demonstratives to illustrate the points discussed, not for any
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`hearsay purpose or any other purpose that would require further authentication than
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`that by Mr. Thomas himself.
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`Moreover, “an expert is permitted to disclose hearsay for the limited purpose
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`of explaining the basis for his expert opinion.” United States v. Dukagjini, 326
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`F.3d 45, 58 (2d Cir. 2003). That is what Mr. Thomas is doing here. For example,
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`in paragraphs 96-97, 105, and 106, Mr. Thomas relies upon the experience of
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`others as a basis for his opinion of the state of electronic trading and how MD
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`Trader fit into it.2
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`C. The Objected-To Statements Prove the Evidence Is Not Hearsay
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`Rather than rely on evidence as hearsay, Mr. Thomas articulates the effect
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`the evidence would have had on a person of ordinary skill in the art. The Board
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`2 Petitioners claim that TT, thorough Mr. Thomas, has “shielded” certain declarants
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`from cross-examination. As explained above in Sections IV-V., this is false.
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`Petitioners chose not to seek any such cross-examination. Nothing prevented
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`Petitioners from seeking cross-examination of any declarants.
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`has recognized this distinction in other proceedings, and it should do so here.
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`Lindsay Corp. v. Valmont Indus., Inc., IPR2015-01039, Paper 37 at 44 (Sep. 14,
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`2016) (statements “not hearsay because Petitioner offers those statements for the
`
`effect they would have had on a [POSA], not for the truth of the matter asserted.”).
`
`D.
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`Petitioner’s Objections Go to The Weight -- Not Admissibility
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`“A strong public policy exists for making information filed in a non-jury,
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`quasijudicial administrative proceeding available to the public, especially in an
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`inter partes review, which determines the patentability of claims in an issued
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`patent. The Board has discretion to assign appropriate weight to evidence.” Baby
`
`Trend, Inc., v. Wonderland Nurserygoods Co., Ltd., IPR2015-00841, Paper 77 at
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`88 (Jun. 27, 2016). Petitioners’ arguments thus overstep the appropriate remedy
`
`for faults in expert testimony. At most, Petitioners’ arguments relate to the
`
`appropriate weight to assign the evidence, not its admissibility.
`
`E.
`
`Papers Submitted From Other Proceedings Are Proper
`
`Finally, Petitioners argue that neither the Federal Rules nor the Board’s rules
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`permit expert testimony based on evidence from a different proceeding. Mot. at
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`13. Petitioners are wrong. As discussed in Section IV, it does not matter what
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`proceeding the evidence is from; Mr. Thomas can properly rely on the evidence.
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`X. CONCLUSION
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`For these reasons, the Board should deny Petitioners’ motion to exclude.
`
`15
`
`

`

`
`
`
`Dated: June 7, 2017
`
`By:
`
`
`
`
`CBM2016-00054
`U.S. Patent 7,693,768
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`/Cole B. Richter/
`Cole B. Richter,
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`Reg. No. 65,398
`
`
`
`McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert &
`Berghoff LLP
`300 South Wacker Drive
`Chicago, Illinois 60606
`(312) 913-0001 Telephone
`(312) 913-0002 Facsimile
`
`16
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`U.S. Patent 7,693,768
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Patent
`
`Owner’s Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude was served on June 7, 2017,
`
`via email directed to counsel of record for the Petitioners at the following:
`
`Robert E. Sokohl
`rsokohl-PTAB@skgf.com
`
`Lori A. Gordon
`lgordon-PTAB@skgf.com
`
`Richard M. Bemben
`rbemben-PTAB@skgf.com
`
`John C. Phillips
`CBM41919-0013CP1@fr.com
`
`PTAB@skgf.com
`
`
`
`
`
`/Cole B. Richter/
`Cole B. Richter,
`Counsel for Patent Owner,
`Reg. No. 65,398
`
`
`
`Dated: June 7, 2017
`
`By:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`