`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`___________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________________
`
`IBG LLC,
`INTERACTIVE BROKERS LLC,
`TRADESTATION GROUP INC., and
`TRADESTATION SECURITIES, INC.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`___________________
`
`Case CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`___________________
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Claim construction ........................................................................................... 1
`
`I.
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`“single action” and “computer readable medium …” ........................... 1
`
`“order entry region” and “setting a plurality of parameters …” ........... 1
`
`“entered order indicator” ....................................................................... 2
`
`“centering instruction” .......................................................................... 2
`
`II.
`
`The ’768 claims a patent-ineligible abstract idea. ........................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Placing an order based on observed (plotted) market information,
`as well as updating market information is abstract. .............................. 3
`
`The claims do not transform the abstract concept into inventive
`concept. .................................................................................................. 7
`
`C.
`
`CQG is not controlling. ......................................................................... 9
`
`III. Claim 23 is patent-ineligible because it covers signals. ................................11
`
`IV. The challenged claims are obvious over the TSE combinations. ..................12
`
`A.
`
`TSE is a prior art printed publication. .................................................12
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`TSE was disseminated to the interested public in August
`1998. ..........................................................................................12
`
`TSE was otherwise publicly available based on its wide,
`unrestricted distribution to the interested public. .....................13
`
`3.
`
`GoPro is not controlling. ..........................................................15
`
`B.
`
`The ’768 claims are obvious. ..............................................................15
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Claims 1 and 23.........................................................................15
`
`Claim 6-9 ...................................................................................17
`
`
`
`- i -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`Claim 11 ....................................................................................18
`
`3.
`
`V.
`
`TT’s alleged secondary considerations fail to demonstrate nonobvious.......19
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`TT’s evidence doesn’t overcome the Petition’s strong prima facie
`obviousness showing. ..........................................................................19
`
`TT fails to establish the requisite nexus. .............................................19
`
`TT’s evidence doesn’t support the alleged secondary
`considerations. .....................................................................................22
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`TT’s global revenue and units sold fails to establish that MD
`Trader was commercially successful. .......................................22
`
`TT conflates copying with competing products that allegedly
`fall within the claims. ................................................................24
`
`TT’s proffered praise for MD Trader isn’t from a competitor
`and is directed to unclaimed features. .......................................25
`
`TT’s licenses resulted from litigation. ......................................26
`
`TT admits that there was no long-felt need. .............................26
`
`TT presents no evidence that others tried and failed to make
`the claimed invention. ...............................................................26
`
`TT’s other alleged secondary considerations are either
`unsupported or simply not relevant. .........................................27
`
`VI. The ’768 is CBM-eligible. .............................................................................28
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`- ii -
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`
`Cases
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)............................................................................................ 5
`
`
`Apple Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1229 (Fed.Cir. 2016) ...........................................................................8, 9
`
`
`Ariosa Diags. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
`778 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir. 2015) ............................................................................... 6
`
`
`Ballard Med. Prods. v. Wright,
`821 F.2d 642 (Fed.Cir. 1987) ...............................................................................10
`
`
`BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 7
`
`
`Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc.,
`815 F.3d 1331 (Fed.Cir. 2016) ...................................................................... 14, 15
`
`
`CLS Bank Intl. v. Alice Corp,
`717 F.3d 1269 (Fed.Cir. 2013) ............................................................................... 4
`
`
`Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.,
`848 F.2d 1560 (Fed.Cir. 1988) .............................................................................14
`
`
`Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Products, Inc.,
`291 F.3d 1317 (Fed.Cir. 2002) .............................................................................12
`
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed.Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 6
`
`
`Digitech Image Tech. LLC v. Elec. for Imaging, Inc.,
`758 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 8
`
`
`Electric Power Gr’p, LLC, v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed.Cir. 2016) ..................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`- iii -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed.Cir. 2016) ...........................................................................3, 6
`
`
`Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP,
`812 F.3d 1023 (Fed.Cir. 2016) .............................................................................23
`
`
`EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc.,
`755 F.2d 898 (Fed.Cir. 1985) ...............................................................................26
`
`
`Ex Parte Mewherter,
`Appeal No. 2012-007692 (P.T.A.B. May 8, 2013) ..............................................11
`
`
`GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding, LLC,
`IPR2015-01078 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2016) ............................................................15
`
`
`Graftech Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Laird Tech’s Inc.,
`2016 WL 3357427 (Fed.Cir. Jun. 17, 2016) ........................................................21
`
`
`Huang,
` 100 F.3d at 139 .....................................................................................................28
`
`IBG LLC et al. v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.
`CBM2015-00181 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2017) ............................................. 15, 17, 18
`
`
`In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation,
`676 F.3d 1063 (Fed.Cir. 2012) .............................................................................26
`
`
`In re Huang,
`100 F.3d 135 (Fed.Cir. 1996) ...............................................................................22
`
`
`In re Merck & Co., Inc.,
`800 F.2d 1091 (Fed.Cir. 1986) ...................................................................... 15, 20
`
`
`In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp.,
`498 F.3d 1290 (Fed.Cir. 2007) ............................................................................... 9
`
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LL v. Capital One Bank (USA),
`792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................................. 6
`
`
`
`
`
`- iv -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`
`Interthinx, Inc. v. Corelogic Solutions, LLC,
`CBM2012-00007 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2014) ............................................................ 9
`
`
`Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,
`292 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ..............................................................................14
`
`
`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`545 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir. 2008) .............................................................................14
`
`
`Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
`485 F.3d 1157 (Fed.Cir. 2007) .............................................................................19
`
`
`Lending Tree LLC v. Zillow, Inc.,
`656 Fed.Appx. 991 (Fed.Cir. 2016) ....................................................................... 5
`
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed.Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 1, 2, 3
`
`
`Line Rothman v. Target Corp.,
`556 F.3d 1310 (Fed.Cir. 2009) .............................................................................19
`
`
`Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A.,
`808 F.3d 829 (Fed.Cir. 2015) ...............................................................................20
`
`
`Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Services, Inc.,
`811 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .............................................................................. 6
`
`
`Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd.,
`357 F.3d 1319 (Fed.Cir. 2004) .............................................................................27
`
`
`Netsirv & Local Motion MN v. Boxbee, Inc.,
`PGR2015-00009 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2015) ...........................................................14
`
`
`Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd.,
`719 F.3d 1346 (Fed.Cir. 2013) .............................................................................22
`
`
`Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., et al.
`2017 WL 192716 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 18, 2016) ............................................... 9, 10, 11
`
`
`
`
`
`- v -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`
`Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., et al.,
`2015 WL 774655 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2015) ..........................................................11
`
`
`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
`722 F.3d 709 (Fed.Cir. 2013) ...............................................................................10
`
`
`Vivid Techs. v. Amer. Science,
`200 F.3d 795 (Fed.Cir. 2000) ................................................................................. 1
`
`
`WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,
`829 F.3d 1317 (Fed.Cir. 2016) .............................................................................20
`
`
`WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC,
`573 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2870 (2014) .................................................................10
`
`
`Wyers v. Master Lock Company,
`616 F.3d 1231 (Fed.Cir. 2010) ...................................................................... 24, 25
`
`
`Statutes
`
`U.S.C. § 101 .................................................................................................... 6, 9, 11
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.1(d) ...................................................................................................11
`37 C.F.R. §42.301(a) ................................................................................................28
`
`
`
`- vi -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`The Board should issue a final written decision finding all ’768 claims
`
`(Ex.1001) patent-ineligible under §101 and obvious under §103.
`
`I.
`
`Claim construction
`A.
`The Board’s constructions are correct and should be maintained. (Paper 10
`
`“single action” and “computer readable medium …”
`
`(“Decision”), 8-9.)
`
`“order entry region” and “setting a plurality of parameters …”
`B.
`The Board need not construe these terms to resolve this dispute. Vivid Techs.
`
`v. Amer. Science, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (need construe only terms
`
`“necessary to resolve the controversy”). (See Ex.1060, 11.) But if it does, it should
`
`not adopt TT’s impermissibly narrow constructions.
`
`TT construes these terms to require a single-action command that both sets
`
`order parameters and sends an order. (POR, 11-13.) In support, it argues that “this
`
`is the only example of order entry disclosed in the specification.” (Id., 12-13.) But
`
`it is improper to read limitations from the specification into the claims, even “if a
`
`patent describes only a single embodiment.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`
`358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (“expressly reject[ing] the contention that if a
`
`patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be
`
`construed as being limited to that embodiment”). Thus, the Board should reject
`
`TT’s legally-flawed constructions.
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`Under the BRI, the claimed “single action” modifies the “sending” clause;
`
`not the “setting” clause that precedes the “and.” (’768, 12:32-36.) Nowhere does
`
`the “setting a plurality of parameters …” limitation recite the word “both.” (Id.)
`
`This is consistent with the “order entry region …” limitation, which recites
`
`“commands”; not one command.
`
`“entered order indicator”
`C.
`Claim 6 defines this term: “the entered order indicator represents an order
`
`pending at the electronic exchange.” No further construction is necessary.
`
`TT improperly construes claim 6 to require “the entered order indicator must
`
`indicate to the user that the user has an order at a particular price level along the
`
`price axis.” (POR, 13.) The Board should reject TT’s construction because it is
`
`inconsistent with the plain language of, and impermissibly reads limitations into,
`
`claim 6. (Id.) Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 904. Claim 6 merely displays any
`
`pending order (“an order”) not necessarily the user’s order.
`
`“centering instruction”
`
`D.
`Claim 11’s “centering instruction” should be given its ordinary and
`
`customary meaning. This term is not limited to a “manual centering command …
`
`sent from a user because the example of a centering command disclosed in the
`
`specification is one from a user,” as TT asserts. (POR, 14.) It is improper to read
`
`limitations from the specification into the claims, even “if a patent describes only a
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`single embodiment.” Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906. Thus, claim 11’s
`
`“centering instruction” can be manual (user generated) or automatic (computer
`
`generated). (See Ex.1063, 21:12-17 (didn’t consider automated centering).)
`
`II. The ’768 claims a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
`Placing an order based on observed (plotted) market information,
`A.
`as well as updating market information is abstract.
`Alice step one looks at the claims’ “focus.” Electric Power Gr’p, LLC, v.
`
`Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.Cir. 2016). The ’768 claims’ focus is
`
`receiving and displaying market information so that a user can place an order.
`
`Thus, the claims are directed to the abstract idea of placing an order based on
`
`observed (plotted) market information, as well as updating market information.
`
`(Petition, 17-19.)
`
`TT’s contention that the claims recite the “structure, make-up, and
`
`functionality” of a “GUI tool” (POR, 82) is inaccurate, an overgeneralization, and
`
`“untethered from the language of the claims,” cf. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`
`822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed.Cir. 2016). The claims merely recite displaying received
`
`market information and an order entry region relative to a price axis, and single-
`
`action order entry; not a “tool” or a structure. TT’s attempt to analogize the claims
`
`to physical entities (POR, 83-84) fails because the claims recite “a method of
`
`placing a trade order,” not a dial or a knob or even a GUI. TT fails to explain how
`
`an arrangement of market data on a screen is “physical.”
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`Nor do the claims improve a computer or address any technological
`
`problems. Contrary to TT’s argument that the “GUI construction causes the
`
`computer to function differently” (POR, 82), the claimed steps (displaying market
`
`data and order entry regions, and single-action order entry) in no way make the
`
`computer run faster, more efficiently, use less energy, or operate in any other
`
`advantageous manner. Indeed, the computer operates the same whether
`
`implementing a FIG. 2-style GUI or the claimed GUI.
`
`The essence of TT’s argument is that the claims aren’t abstract because they
`
`implicate a combination of software and hardware, i.e., turn a general purpose
`
`computer into a specialized one. But this no longer passes muster under §101. CLS
`
`Bank Intl. v. Alice Corp, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed.Cir. 2013)(en banc)(Judge Lourie in a
`
`concurring opinion discussing the Alappat fallacy).
`
`Rather, the ’768 claims merely rearrange and display known data and thus
`
`aren’t patentable, which Electric Power confirms. The Electric Power claims
`
`failed §101 because they did “not go beyond requiring the collection, analysis, and
`
`display of available information in a particular field, stating those functions in
`
`general terms, without limiting them to technical means for performing the
`
`functions that are arguably an advance over conventional computer and network
`
`technology.” Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1351. Likewise, the ’768 claims recite
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`displaying of financial data without being limited to any technical means. (’768,
`
`4:4-8; 4:64-68.)
`
`TT accuses Petitioner of “overgeneraliz[ing]” the claims. (POR, 79.) But,
`
`the CAFC regularly articulates a claim’s abstract ideas in succinct terms without
`
`explicitly giving effect to every limitation when evaluating patent eligibility. See
`
`Lending Tree LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 Fed.Appx. 991 (Fed.Cir. 2016).
`
`This record demonstrates that displaying market data and exchange-based
`
`trading are “fundamental economic practice[s] long prevalent in our system of
`
`commerce,” and are abstract ideas similar to those courts have repeatedly held
`
`ineligible. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014).
`
`Weiss, for example, describes a NYSE specialist’s book, which is a pencil and
`
`paper approach to displaying bids and asks along a price axis. (Ex.1020, 44-46.)
`
`Weiss also teaches that the NYSE displayed this book on a CRT—demonstrating
`
`how conventional it was to put traders’ pencil and paper plots on a display. (Id.,
`
`46; see also Ex.1077, 9 (describing the NYSE’s “Electronic Display Book,” which
`
`was designed to replace “specialist’s handwritten limit order book”).) Thomas
`
`testified that exchange-based commodities trading began sometime in the 1600s
`
`(Ex.1066, 51:18-52:1) and is a fundamental economic practice (id., 55:1-10.) The
`
`migration from floor-based trading to electronic trading began by at least the early
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`1970s. (Ex.1078; Ex.1079.) Thus, the claimed steps reflect abstract ideas about
`
`organizing information for use in fundamental economic practices.
`
`And, TT’s assertion that Petitioners must prove that the claims attempt to
`
`preempt any and all generic ways of accomplishing the abstract idea is without
`
`authority. (POR, 80-81.) “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
`
`matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
`
`eligibility.” Ariosa Diags. v. Sequenom, Inc., 778 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.Cir. 2015).
`
`“[Q]uestions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis” set
`
`forth in Alice, id., which Petitioners applied in their Petition and in this Reply.
`
`DDR and Enfish are inapposite because the claims-at-issue in those cases
`
`sought to solve problems concerning the inner workings of a computer or network.
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed.Cir. 2014);
`
`Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. But here, the alleged non-technical problem was that,
`
`within a trading screen, one market indicator (inside market) remained static while
`
`another market indicator (prices) moved up or down, allegedly causing traders to
`
`“miss their price.” But that problem was merely a consequence of how different
`
`traders chose to view market data on the trading screen.
`
`Finally, TT attempts to distinguish Mortgage Grader and Capital One.
`
`(POR, 86.) But the interfaces at issue in Capital One and Mortgage Grader were
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`recited with as much specificity as the ’768 claims, which are abstract and thus
`
`patent-ineligible for the same reasons.
`
`B.
`
`The claims do not transform the abstract concept into inventive
`concept.
`
`TT’s argument that the ’768 claims “recite an inventive concept” (POR, 87)
`
`fails because it cannot articulate what that inventive concept is (taking the claim
`
`limitations either individually or together as an ordered combination). The closest
`
`TT comes to articulating an inventive concept is asserting that the “claims recite
`
`the structure of a specific GUI that functions differently from prior art GUIs to
`
`solve GUI-centric problems.” (Id., 88.) This vague statement of general
`
`functionality is insufficient under Alice Step 2. BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T
`
`Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed.Cir. 2016).
`
`TT incorrectly alleges that the claims “recite significantly more” than an
`
`abstract idea because they specify “the GIU features and functionalities with great
`
`detail,” the “claimed combination of GUI features and functionality is the solution
`
`rather than pre-solution or post-solution activity,” and because “there is no
`
`evidence that the claimed combination of GUI functionality was routine and
`
`conventional.” (POR, 87.) First, the claims are far from specific in their recitation
`
`of features. Rather, they simply recite broad method steps of displaying (including
`
`“updating” data), setting, and sending information. Absent from the claims is any
`
`description as to how the steps are to be accomplished.
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`Second, the claims merely organize information and recite nothing more
`
`than conventional elements. They solve nothing. “[M]erely selecting information
`
`by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display” doesn’t confer patent-
`
`eligibility. Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1355. Likewise, merely “organizing
`
`information through mathematical correlations” and “manipulat[ing] existing
`
`information to generate additional information” that isn’t tied to any specific
`
`processor also isn’t patent-eligible. Digitech Image Tech. LLC v. Elec. for Imaging,
`
`Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350-51 (Fed.Cir. 2014).
`
`Apple Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., is instructive. 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed.Cir. 2016).
`
`The Apple GUI displayed a first menu having categories and items, and generated
`
`a second menu from that first menu by allowing categories and items to be
`
`selected. The Apple claims recited that the first menu was “display[ed] in a
`
`window of said graphical user interface in a hierarchical tree format.” Apple, 842
`
`F.3d at 1234. Thus, although the Apple GUI recited a specific way (i.e., detailed
`
`structure, makeup, and functionality) to “construct” a GUI the CAFC found the
`
`claims ineligible. The CAFC noted that the Apple claims did “not claim a
`
`particular way of programming or designing the software to create menus that have
`
`these features, but instead merely claim the resulting systems” and were “not
`
`directed to a specific improvement in the way computers operate.” Id. at 1241.
`
`And, in Apple, the “invention merely claim[ed] the addition of conventional
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`components to well-known business practices.” Id. at 1242. Similarly, the ’768
`
`claims recite sending an trade order—a well-known business practice.
`
`Because the ’768 claims “defin[e] a desirable information-based result and
`
`[are] not limited to inventive means of achieving the result, [they] fail under §
`
`101.” Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1351.
`
`C. CQG is not controlling.
`The CAFC’s nonprecedential opinion in CQG (Ex.1081) doesn’t control
`
`this CBM. It involved a different party, in a district court proceeding, without any
`
`record evidence, arguing that claims of different patents (US 6,772,132 and US
`
`6,766,304) reflect a different abstract idea than that addressed in this CBM.
`
`(Ex.1081, *3.) And, the ’768 claims don’t recite a static price axis, which the
`
`CAFC found to be inventive. (Id.)
`
`As non-parties to CQG, Petitioners are entitled to a full and fair opportunity
`
`to litigate the issues of §101 for the ’768 patent. Depriving Petitioners this
`
`opportunity would be an improper use of offensive collateral estoppel and also
`
`violate Petitioner’s due process rights. In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d
`
`1290, 1297 (Fed.Cir. 2007). The Board has recognized the factual nature of the
`
`§101 analysis, and refused to apply collateral estoppel to prevent a petitioner—
`
`who lost a district court §101 challenge—from challenging eligibility. (Ex.1082, 5-
`
`7.) Here, Petitioners present compelling, concrete evidence that the ’768 claims
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`cover an abstract idea and lack an inventive concept—evidence that the CAFC
`
`advised must be considered, if it had been before them. (Ex.1081, *4.)
`
`Context is important: “the public interest in innovative advance is best
`
`served when close questions of eligibility are considered along with the
`
`understanding flowing from review of the patentability criteria of novelty,
`
`unobviousness, and enablement, for when these classical criteria are evaluated, the
`
`issue of subject matter eligibility is placed in the context of the patent-based
`
`incentive to technologic progress.” (Ex.1081, *4.) The CAFC’s reasoning in CQG
`
`extends only as far as the record before the district court and, in turn, the CAFC.
`
`Ballard Med. Prods. v. Wright, 821 F.2d 642, 643 (Fed.Cir. 1987).
`
`While subject matter eligibility may ultimately be a question of law, it is
`
`“rife with underlying factual issues.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d
`
`709, 1339 (Fed.Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial,
`
`LLC, 573 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2870 (2014). The CQG record lacked any evidence
`
`showing that the subject matter had “long existed” and was “routine or
`
`conventional.” (Ex.1081, *3-*4.) That isn’t the case here. Petitioners have
`
`demonstrated that the claimed subject matter was well-known and routine or
`
`conventional. (See id., *4.) Indeed, TT merely appropriated a well-known way to
`
`display trading data and added conventional GUI functions. See infra. Because
`
`these factual inquiries apply to both steps of the eligibility analysis, the Board must
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`independently consider the evidence of record in this CBM before reaching its
`
`determination on either step. Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1353.
`
`Also, Petitioners’ proposed abstract ideas do not include an electronic
`
`exchange, a critical distinction from CQG. There, the district court held that
`
`“placing an order … on an electronic exchange, based on observed market
`
`information, as well as updating the market information,” isn’t “a fundamental
`
`economic or longstanding commercial practice,” and thus not abstract. (Ex.1080,
`
`*3-*4 (emphasis added).) But an electronic exchange is merely a field of use
`
`limitation, not part of the abstract idea. (Petition, 21.)
`
`In CQG, the parties disputed the evidentiary standard that should be applied
`
`to the district court’s §101 analysis: preponderance or clear and convincing.
`
`Lacking meaningful record evidence, the CAFC noted that its holding applied
`
`under either standard. (Ex.1081, *5 fn.2.) That isn’t the case in this CBM. 37
`
`C.F.R. §42.1(d).
`
`III. Claim 23 is patent-ineligible because it covers signals.
`The Board should follow the precedential decision in Ex Parte Mewherter
`
`and hold that claim 23, which recites a term of art in patent law, encompasses
`
`transitory signals and is thus non-statutory. (Petition, 14-15.)
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`IV. The challenged claims are obvious over the TSE combinations.
`A. TSE is a prior art printed publication.
`In related CBMs, this Panel held that TSE is a prior-art printed publication
`
`after considering the same evidence presented here. (Ex.1060, 34-43; Ex.1061, 18-
`
`27; Ex.1062, 30-40.) TT has done nothing to alter this holding, which should be
`
`maintained.
`
`1.
`
`TSE was disseminated to the interested public in August
`1998.
`
`Kawashima’s testimony that TSE was actually disseminated in August 1998
`
`to 200 Tokyo Stock Exchange participants stands un-rebutted. (Petition, 11-13;
`
`Ex.1019, 0112-33.) TT cross-examined Kawashima twice, but cannot point to
`
`anything that contradicts his testimony. (Exs.1019, 2163.) Instead, TT asserts that
`
`Petitioners must prove “who actually picked up the documents,” “whether they
`
`were POSAs,” and “what, if anything, participants did with the manuals.” (POR,
`
`15-16.) But the law doesn’t require proof of these facts.
`
`The relevant public is “the public interested in the art.” Cooper Cameron
`
`Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Products, Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed.Cir. 2002).
`
`Kawashima testified that TSE was disseminated to participants in the Tokyo Stock
`
`Exchange, meaning “securities companies for banks who are able to carry out
`
`futures options trading at the TSE” in order to explain changes being made to
`
`TSE’s trading system and terminals. (Ex.1019, 0012-14.) Thomas testified that
`
`- 12 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`“industry participants” include securities companies for banks who provided their
`
`own “GUI tools for electronic trading.” (Ex.2169, ¶42.) He also testified that
`
`industry participants that developed order-entry software would have employed
`
`people of ordinary skill during the relevant timeframe. (Ex.1065, 136:17-138:1.)
`
`Accordingly, the distribution of TSE to securities companies extends to employees
`
`who meet the definition of a POSITA.
`
`Further, the express purpose of TSE was to alert participants to changes in
`
`how the trading terminals of the Tokyo Stock Exchange operated, explaining in
`
`extensive technical detail how to electronically connect to the exchange. (Ex.1017,
`
`0005, 0010-25.) Thus, TSE would have been directed to the employees of
`
`securities companies who “developed … order entry software.” (Ex.1065, 136:17-
`
`138:1.) A contractual provision relating to the underlying software wouldn’t have
`
`prevented anyone from receiving copies of TSE.
`
`2.
`
`TSE was otherwise publicly available based on its wide,
`unrestricted distribution to the interested public.
`
`Because Petitioners have established that TSE was actually disseminated to
`
`the interested public, it is unnecessary for the Board to reach whether TSE meets
`
`the alternative prong of the printed publication test referring to reasonable
`
`diligence. Nevertheless, the same evidence equally supports the conclusion that
`
`TSE was “made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily
`
`skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence” could have
`
`- 13 -
`
`

`

`CBM2016-00054
`Patent 7,693,768 B1
`located it. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350
`
`(Fed.Cir. 2008).
`
`TT incorrectly argues that TSE must be indexed. (POR, 47-48.) “Indexing is,
`
`of course, not the only manner of proving public accessibility.” Blue Calypso, LLC
`
`v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1349 n.9 (Fed.Cir. 2016). Kawashima’s
`
`testimony supports that TSE was prepared in the ordinary course of business and
`
`maintained in the records of the Tokyo Stock Exchange during the relevant
`
`timeframe. (Ex.1019, 0011-0012.) This evidence of routine business practice is
`
`sufficient to demonstrate public accessibility before the critical date. See Constant
`
`v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1569 (Fed.Cir. 1988). TT’s
`
`challenge to Kawashima’s credibility is un