throbber

`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
`
`IBG LLC; INTERACTIVE BROKERS LLC, TRADESTATION GROUP INC.;
`TRADESTATION SECURITIES, INC.; TRADESTATION TECHNOLOGIES,
`INC.; and IBFX, INC.;
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`Patent Owner
`_________
`
`CBM2015–00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`___________________
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313–1450
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 2
`I.
`II. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 4
`A. The eSpeed/CQG Transcripts ........................................................................... 4
`
`B. The 32 Electronic Trader Declarants ................................................................ 5
`
`C. Third Party Emails ............................................................................................ 7
`
`D. Brumfield Sketch and Animations .................................................................... 9
`
`E. eSpeed/CQG Jury Verdict Forms & Docket Entry .........................................10
`
`F. Confidential Declaration of Christopher Thomas ...........................................12
`
`III. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................16
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`TT’s Patent Owner Response (“TT’s POR”) dumps into the record and
`
`buries the Board with hundreds of pages of documents without regard to their
`
`admissibility. But this proceeding is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence
`
`and those Rules set fair boundaries on the admissibility of evidence. TT’s ignores
`
`those rules.
`
`TT knows that its evidence suffers from significant admissibility problems.
`
`Indeed, it preemptively sought a blanket waiver from the Board so that TT could
`
`rely on a “large volume of documents produced in previous district court cases”
`
`without regard to the Board’s Rules and Federal Rules of Evidence 802 and 901.
`
`(See Paper 38, 2–3 in CBM2015-00182.) The Board denied TT’s request. See id.
`
`Having been denied permission to do so, TT proceeded to file a tremendous
`
`number of documents from the district court cases without regard to the Board’s
`
`order and the rules governing this proceeding. That evidence should be stricken.
`
`A significant number of the documents submitted by TT violate the
`
`prohibition on hearsay. See FRE 802. Absent one of the well-established
`
`exceptions to hearsay, such as the unavailability of a declarant, hearsay is
`
`inadmissible. TT disregards this Rule entirely by introducing hearsay statements
`
`from dozens of individuals in an effort to defend the patentability of its claims.
`
`
`
`
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`

`A significant number of TT’s documents also fail to meet the basic
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`requirements of authenticity required by Federal Rule of Evidence 901. Despite
`
`Petitioners’ timely objection, TT offered no competent evidence that cures this
`
`objection leaving the Board and Petitioners with no basis to gauge whether the
`
`documents are genuine.
`
`TT’s evidence also ignores the proper boundaries of expert witness
`
`testimony in contravention of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rule 702 permits an
`
`expert to offer opinions based on his specialized knowledge in the field. But
`
`significant portions of Mr. Thomas’ declaration are not opinions of Mr. Thomas.
`
`Rather, Mr. Thomas purports to offer factual testimony that is not based on his
`
`own perception but is instead based upon his review of district court depositions
`
`and trial transcripts. That underlying evidence should not be admitted in this
`
`proceeding as TT may not use Mr. Thomas “simply as a conduit for introducing
`
`hearsay under the guise that the testifying expert used the hearsay as the basis of
`
`his testimony.” Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2013)
`
`(citation omitted). This testimony is improper and, therefore, should be excluded.
`
`See, e.g., United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 58 (2d Cir. 2003).
`
`Accordingly, Petitioners file this motion pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c)
`
`and in accordance with the Board’s May 12, 2016 Order modifying Due Date 4.
`
`(Paper 38 at 8.)
`
`
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`II. ARGUMENT
`A. The eSpeed/CQG Transcripts: Exhibits 2033, 2211, 2220, 2222, 2224,
`2225, 2228, 2232, 2247, 2251, 2273–2276, 2286–2288, and 2292–2296
`The Board should exclude Exhibits 2033, 2211, 2220, 2222, 2224, 2225,
`
`2228, 2232, 2247, 2251, 2273–2276, 2286–2288, 2292–2296 (“eSpeed/CQG
`
`Transcripts”) because they are hearsay to which no valid exception applies. Most
`
`of these exhibits are cited in TT’s Response. (See Paper 76 at 12, 19, 31, 32, 36,
`
`37, 39–44, 46, 48–51, 55, and 68; see also Paper 79 (providing limited citations to
`
`the record for TT exhibits).) In addition, as discussed further in section II.E infra,
`
`TT’s technical expert Mr. Thomas relies upon these transcripts to support the
`
`assertions in his declaration (Ex. 2169) regarding, for example, the background of
`
`the claimed invention and alleged secondary considerations, including
`
`“commercial success,” “initial skepticism followed by acceptance,” “widespread
`
`copying,” “failure of others,” “praise and accolades,”, and “unexpected results.”
`
`Petitioners timely objected to each of the eSpeed/CQG Transcripts on the basis of,
`
`among other things, hearsay. See Paper 29 at 20; Paper 78 at 5–13.
`
`The eSpeed/CQG Transcripts purport to be excerpts of a trial or deposition
`
`transcript from district court proceedings involving third parties. The eSpeed/CQG
`
`Transcripts are hearsay as none were made while testifying for the current
`
`proceeding and all are being offered for the truth of the matters asserted. FRE 801.
`
`None of these statements fall under any proper hearsay exception. For example, TT
`
`
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`

`has not shown that the witnesses are unavailable. See FRE 804. Nor has TT shown
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`that any specific exception under FRE 803. Likewise, the residual exception does
`
`not apply here as TT cannot credibly argue that the eSpeed/CQG Transcripts are
`
`somehow more probative evidence that any other evidence it could have obtained
`
`through reasonable efforts. See FRE 807.
`
`Accordingly, the Board should exclude the eSpeed/CQG Transcripts.
`
`B.
`
`The 32 Electronic Trader Declarants: Exhibits 2223
`
` The Board should exclude the exhibit that purports to contain declarations
`
`from 32 individuals in the electronic trading industry (Exhibit 22231) (“Electronic
`
`Trader Declarants Exhibits”); there is no evidence of record that these exhibits are
`
`authentic and each is hearsay to which no exception applies.
`
`The Electronic Trader Declarants Exhibits are offered by TT as evidence in
`
`support of secondary considerations of non-obviousness. See Paper 76 at 32, 33,
`
`38, 39, 46, 48, 53–55. Portions of these exhibits are discussed by TT’s expert. (Ex.
`
`2169, ¶¶ 104, 106, 153.) The exhibits contain, for example, statements by
`
`
`1 Exhibit 2223 includes Exhibits 2210, 2216, 2218, 2219, 2221, 2227, 2229,
`
`and 2239, which TT separately submitted. The Board should exclude these
`
`separately submitted declarations for the same reasons discussed above regarding
`
`Exhibit 2223.
`
`
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`

`individuals regarding their opinions concerning TT’s alleged commercial
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`embodiments. See Ex. 2223. Petitioners objected to all of these declarations on the
`
`basis of, among other things, authenticity and hearsay. (Ex. 1052 at 14–17.)
`
`At the outset, the Board should exclude Electronic Trader Declarants
`
`Exhibits for lack of authentication because TT has offered no evidence that the
`
`each exhibit is what it purports to be. FRE 901. In fact, at least one of the exhibits
`
`contained within Exhibit 2223 is anything but a “declaration.”2 TT chose to forego
`
`filing any supplemental evidence to cure Petitioners’ authenticity objections to
`
`these exhibits.
`
`In addition, each of these declarations is hearsay as none were made while
`
`testifying for the current proceeding and all are being offered for the truth of the
`
`matters asserted. FRE 801. None of the declarations are excluded from the hearsay
`
`rule because they are not being used for a purpose permitted under FRE 801(d).
`
`For example, TT has not shown that any of the declarants whose testimony it relies
`
`upon are unavailable. FRE 804. Nor has TT shown that any specific exception
`
`under FRE 803 or the residual exception under FRE 807 applies here. Indeed, TT
`
`
`2 Exhibit 2210 (also contained within Exhibit 2223) purports to be a
`
`declaration of Mr. Daniel Durkin. Exhibit 2210 actually appears to be an email
`
`between Inventor Mr. Harris Brumfield and Mr. Durkin.
`
`
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`

`cannot credibly argue that 2004 declaration testimony has equivalent
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as that of testimony from these same
`
`declarants if Petitioners had an opportunity for vigorous cross examination. TT has
`
`not shown that this is an “exceptional case” under FRE 807. See, e.g., Conoco Inc.
`
`v. Dep’t of Energy, 99 F.3d 387, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The two residual hearsay
`
`exceptions . . . were meant to be reserved for exceptional cases.”). Accordingly, the
`
`Board should exclude the declarations as hearsay.
`
`C. Third Party Emails: Exhibits 2240–2246, 2250, 2252–2272, and 2277
`The Board should exclude Exhibits 2240–2246, 2250, 2252–2272, and 2277
`
`each (the “Third Party Emails”) for lack of authenticity and because they are
`
`hearsay to which no exception applies. The Third Party Emails each purports to be
`
`an email (or a demonstrative depicting an email) that is allegedly from employees
`
`of third parties eSpeed or CQG. These exhibits are cited in TT’s Response. (See,
`
`e.g., Paper 76 at 30, 50.) And both TT and its technical expert use them here as
`
`support for their factual assertions regarding alleged copying of the claimed
`
`invention by others. See Ex. 2169 at ¶ 129. Petitioners timely objected to these
`
`emails on the basis of, among other things, authenticity and hearsay. (Ex.1052 at
`
`14–16.)
`
`Like the Electronic Trader Declarations discussed above, the Board should
`
`exclude these Third Party Emails for lack of authentication. FRE 901. In response
`
`
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`

`to Petitioners’ timely objections, TT attempted to cure some, but not all, of
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`Petitioners’ objections to the Third Party Emails through submission of the
`
`Declaration of TT’s counsel, Ms. Jennifer Kurcz, who cited Third Party Email
`
`Exhibits 2240–46, 2250, 2252, 2254, 2258, 2260, 2262, 2270–2272, and 2277.
`
`However, TT’s attempt to cure its evidentiary shortcomings fails because Ms.
`
`Kurcz provided no evidence that these exhibits are true and correct copies of what
`
`TT claims as required by FRE 901. Indeed, Ms. Kurcz does not assert that she has
`
`knowledge that these exhibits are true and correct copies nor does she purport to
`
`know the origin other than they were produced by a third party during discovery.
`
`Ms. Kurcz’s assertion that these documents were admitted in district court does not
`
`mean that they are admissible here. Accordingly, the Third Party Emails should be
`
`excluded for lack of authenticity.
`
`Each of the Third Party Emails also constitutes hearsay as all are being
`
`offered for the truth of the matters asserted. FRE 801. TT has not suggested that
`
`there is a non-hearsay purpose for any of the Third Party Emails. See, e.g., FRE
`
`801(d). Nor has TT shown that the witnesses whose statements it relies upon are
`
`unavailable. FRE 804. It also has not shown that any specific exception under FRE
`
`803 or the residual exception under FRE 807 applies. Indeed, TT cannot credibly
`
`argue that the Third Party Emails have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
`
`trustworthiness or that the other elements of FRE 807 are met such that the Board
`
`
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`

`should consider this is an “exceptional case.” See, e.g., Conoco Inc., 99 F.3d at
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`392. Accordingly, the Board should exclude the emails as hearsay.
`
`D. Brumfield Sketch and Animations: Exhibits 2212, 2213, and 2214
`The Board should exclude the sketch and animations for lack of authenticity
`
`and because they are hearsay to which no exception applies. Exhibit 2213 purports
`
`to depict a 1998 sketch of Mr. Brumfield’s claimed invention and is cited in TT’s
`
`POR at page 37. Exhibits 2212 and 2214 each purport to be video animations of
`
`unknown provenance. TT cites to Exhibits 2213 and 2214 in its POR; it never cites
`
`to Ex. 2212. See Paper 76 at 37 (Ex. 2213); 38 (Ex. 2214). In addition, Mr. Thomas
`
`improperly uses these animations as evidence of how TT’s product and some prior
`
`art actually operates. See Ex. 2169 at ¶ 83 (Ex. 2212); ¶ 85 (Ex. 2213), ¶ 88 (Ex.
`
`2214). Petitioners timely objected to all of these exhibits. (Ex. 1052 at 14–17.)
`
`Rule 901 requires that evidence be supported by sufficient evidence to
`
`demonstrate that an item is what the proponent purport it to be. In the case of Ex.
`
`2212, 2213, and 2214, TT has offered no such evidence. As a consequence, these
`
`exhibits should be excluded from the record on that basis.
`
`Moreover, Exhibits 2212, 2213, and 2214 are also hearsay for which no
`
`exception applies. Ex. 2212, although not cited in the TT’s POR, is purportedly a
`
`sketch prepared by inventor Mr. Brumfield. To the extent TT offers Ex. 2212 for
`
`evidence of whatever it purports to illustrate, it should be excluded. Ex. 2213 and
`
`
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`

`2214 purport to be computer–generated cartoons showing how actual software
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`products are operated. TT offers these exhibits as evidence of the alleged benefits
`
`of the invention and the problems associated with the prior art. (Paper 76, at 37–
`
`38.) TT did not respond to any of Petitioners’ timely objections, so there is no
`
`evidence showing who prepared these cartoons or under whose direction. Thus,
`
`each clip was made by unidentified animators who are not testifying in this
`
`proceeding, and TT is using each clip to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
`
`Therefore, they are hearsay and should be excluded. FRE 801.
`
`E.
`
`eSpeed/CQG Jury Verdict Forms & Docket Entry: Exhibits 2034,
`2036, 2278
`
`The Board should exclude Exhibits 2034, 2036, and 2278, which purport to
`
`be jury verdict forms (Exs. 2030, 2278) and a docket entry (Ex. 2032) associated
`
`with Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04-cv-05312 (Exs. 2034,
`
`2036) and Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., No. 05-cv-4811 (Ex.
`
`2278). These Exhibits are inadmissible because each is irrelevant and hearsay.
`
`Petitioners timely objected to Exhibits 2034, 2036, and 2278 on the basis of,
`
`among other things, lack of relevance and hearsay. See Paper 29, at 19.
`
`Both TT and its technical expert Mr. Thomas directly rely on Exhibit 2278
`
`in support of their assertions that others copied TT’s alleged commercial
`
`embodiment. See Ex. 2169 at ¶, 141. These Exhibits do not tend to make any facts
`
`
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`

`in this proceeding more or less probable. For example, the CQG jury’s
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`determination is of no consequence to the Board’s determination of whether
`
`copying of the claimed invention exists. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616
`
`F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Not every competing product that arguably falls
`
`within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying ; otherwise, ‘every
`
`infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the
`
`patent.’”).
`
`TT offered Exhibits 2034 and 2036 as evidence that the “TSE” reference
`
`does not qualify as prior art. See Paper 22 at 26, 28, 47, Paper 76 at 64 n.10. The
`
`fact that the eSpeed jury found that a third party defendant did not meet its burden
`
`of proving the patent obvious under the clear and convincing evidence standard is
`
`not relevant to whether Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating the ’411
`
`patent to be unpatentable under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Nor
`
`are these documents relevant to whether the ’411 patent claims eligible subject
`
`matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`
`Because irrelevant evidence is not admissible, the Board should exclude
`
`Exhibits 2034, 2036, and 2278. FRE 402. The Board should also exclude these
`
`exhibits because they are hearsay being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
`
`FRE 801. Exhibit 2034, 2036, and 2278 do not meet any of the conditions set forth
`
`
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`

`in FRE 801(d) such that they could be deemed non-hearsay. Accordingly, the
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`Board should exclude them from the record.
`
`F. Confidential Declaration of Christopher Thomas: Exhibit 2169
`(¶¶ 75, 83–86, 89–92, 94–97, 102–104, 106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34,
`136–138, 140, 141, 151–153, 172 )
`
`Several portions of the Declaration of Christopher Thomas (Exhibit 2169),
`
`TT’s expert, exceed the proper boundaries of expert testimony and should be
`
`stricken from the record. TT relies on Thomas’s declaration testimony throughout
`
`its POR. See Paper 76 at 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 23, 24, 26–44, 46–59, 62, 68–76.
`
`Petitioners timely objected to Exhibit 2169 on the basis of, among other things,
`
`inadmissible hearsay and improper expert testimony in violation of at least FRE
`
`701, 702 and 703. (Ex. 1052 at 14–17.) The Board should exclude at least the
`
`portions of Exhibit 2169—including paragraphs ¶¶ 75, 83–86, 89–92, 94–97, 102–
`
`104, 106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34, 136–138, 140, 141, 151–153, and 171—
`
`that purport to provide testimony concerning the conception of the invention, the
`
`problem purportedly solved by the inventor, and alleged secondary considerations.
`
`Although Mr. Thomas is offered as an “expert witness,” substantial portions
`
`of his testimony are not expert opinions. Rather, Mr. Thomas merely repeats,
`
`summarizes, and/or characterizes various statements made by declarants outside of
`
`this proceeding. This is not testimony based on “scientific, technical, or other
`
`specialized knowledge” as contemplated by Rule 702. Rather, TT is impermissibly
`
`
`
`- 12 -
`
`

`

`using Mr. Thomas “as a conduit for introducing hearsay under the guise that the
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`testifying expert used the hearsay as the basis of his testimony.” Marvel
`
`Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
`
`The Federal Rules contemplate that an expert’s testimony will be based on
`
`three sources: (1) first hand observation by the expert; (2) presentation at trial; or
`
`(3) the kinds of facts or data that that an expert in the field would reasonably rely
`
`on in forming an opinion. FRE 703, 1972 Advisory Committee Notes. None of
`
`these sources apply to the testimony set forth below. Rather, Mr. Thomas offers
`
`testimony based upon evidence presented at a different trial, before a different
`
`tribunal, involving different parties. Neither the Federal Rules nor the Board’s rules
`
`permit such testimony from an expert.
`
`Examples of Mr. Thomas’s improper “opinion” testimony include:
`
`• at ¶ 75, explaining and characterizing as “remarkabl[e]” a third party’s
`
`alleged reaction to TT’s alleged commercial embodiment;
`
`• at ¶¶ 83–86, describing and characterizing what motivated the inventors
`
`to develop the claimed subject matter;
`
`• at ¶¶ 89–92, describing the alleged development of a commercial
`
`embodiment;
`
`• at ¶¶ 94–95, describing what one inventor “believed” the benefits of the
`
`invention to be and the inventor’s purported efforts to commercialize the
`
`
`
`- 13 -
`
`

`

`alleged invention;
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`• at ¶ 96, offering testimony that the inventor’s “belief in the potential of
`
`the invention was justified;”
`
`• at ¶¶ 102–103, summarizing and providing direct quotes of third parties
`
`to characterize the alleged initial skepticism of TT’s alleged commercial
`
`embodiment as “significant”;
`
`• at ¶ 106, describing and characterizing what one inventor and other third
`
`parties considered “unexpected” about the results of the claimed subject
`
`matter;
`
`• at ¶¶ 104, characterizing 37 direct quotes from third parties concerning
`
`the alleged commercial embodiment as “widespread praise”;
`
`• ¶¶ 107–109, quoting and paraphrasing what some third parties said about
`
`the value of the alleged commercial embodiment;
`
`• at ¶ 110, directly quoting and describing what one former TT executive
`
`said about TT’s alleged commercial growth;
`
`• at ¶¶ 111, 126–128, 131, 133, 134, 136–138, 140, 141, providing images
`
`of what purport to be demonstrative exhibits from the eSpeed trial
`
`regarding alleged copying, directly quoting and paraphrasing what third
`
`parties have said concerning copying, and characterizing third party
`
`actions as “widespread copying”;
`
`
`
`- 14 -
`
`

`

`• at ¶¶ 151–52, repeating and paraphrasing deposition testimony of third
`
`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`
`parties regarding their beliefs concerning the obvious nature of the
`
`claimed invention;
`
`• at ¶ 153, characterizing direct quotes of three witnesses’ testimony from
`
`the eSpeed district court proceedings as evidence that others in the
`
`industry attempted but failed to develop improved GUI tools;
`
`• at ¶¶ 171, quoting and paraphrasing how other experts from the eSpeed
`
`and CQG cases characterized the claimed invention.
`
`All of the paragraphs discussed summarize, characterize, and/or quote from
`
`transcripts, exhibits, and declarations from TT’s prior litigations. See, e.g., Ex.
`
`2169 at ¶ 75 (Ex. 2210); ¶ 83 (Ex. 2211); ¶ 84–86 (Ex. 2211, Ex. 2213); ¶ 89 (Exs.
`
`2211, 2216); ¶ 90–92 (Exs. 2211, 2218, 2219); ¶ 94–95 (Ex. 2211). Mr. Thomas is
`
`not offering expert opinions, but is instead improperly acting as a “mouthpiece” for
`
`declarants who TT has shielded from cross examination. See, e.g., Loeffel Steel
`
`Prod., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Rule
`
`703 was never intended to allow oblique evasions of the hearsay rule.”).
`
`While an expert may generally rely on hearsay, expert testimony cannot be
`
`used as a vehicle to evade the hearsay requirement. See Dukagjinih, 326 F.3d at
`
`57–59. Rule 702 requires that expert testimony be “based on sufficient facts or
`
`data” to be admissible. FRE 702(b). By simply repeating or summarizing the
`
`
`
`- 15 -
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00181
`Patent 7,676,411
`
`hearsay testimony discussed, Thomas has crossed the line from permissibly relying
`
`on hearsay to form his expert opinion to impermissibly being a mere conduit for
`
`hearsay. Dukagjinih, 326 F.3d at 57–59; see also Lakah v. UBS AG, 996 F. Supp.
`
`2d 250, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The Board should therefore exclude at least the rank
`
`hearsay portions of Exhibit 2169 paragraphs 75, 83–86, 89–92, 94–97, 102–104,
`
`106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34, 136–138, 140, 141, 151–153, and 172.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the reasons set forth above, Exhibits 2033, 2034, 2036, 2210–2214,
`
`2216, 2218–2225, 2227–2229, 2232, 2239–2247, 2250-2278, 2283, 2286-2288,
`
`and 2292-2296 should be excluded. In addition, at least Paragraphs 75, 83–86, 89–
`
`92, 94–97, 102–104, 106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34, 136–138, 140, 141, 151–
`
`153, and 172 of the Thomas Declaration (Ex. 2169) should also be excluded.
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`
`
`
`/Robert E. Sokohl/
`
`
`
`Robert E. Sokohl (Reg. No. 36,013)
`Lori A. Gordon (Reg. No. 50,633)
`Richard M. Bemben (Reg. No. 68,658)
`Attorneys for Petitioners
`
`
`Date: September 23, 2016
`
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005–3934
`(202) 371–2600
`
`
`
`- 16 -
`
`

`

`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e))
`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing PETITIONERS’
`
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE was served electronically via e–mail on September 23,
`
`2016, in its entirety on Attorneys for Patent Owner:
`
`Erika H. Arner, Joshua L. Goldberg, Kevin D. Rodkey,
`Rachel L. Emsley, Cory C. Bell
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`
`Erika.arner@finnegan.com
`Joshua.goldberg@finnegan.com
`Kevin.rodkey@finnegan.com
`Rachel.emsley@finnegan.com
`Cory.bell@finnegan.com
`Trading–Tech–CBM@finnegan.com
`
`Steven F. Borsand
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`tt–patent–cbm@tradingtechnologies.com
`
`Michael D. Gannon, Leif R. Sigmond, Jr., and Jennifer M. Kurcz
`MCDONNELL BOEHNEN HULBERT & BERGHOFF LLP
`gannon@mbhb.com
`sigmond@mbhb.com
`kurcz@mbhb.com
`
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`
`
`/Robert E. Sokohl/
`
`
`Robert E. Sokohl (Reg. No. 36,013)
`Lori A. Gordon (Reg. No. 50,633)
`Richard M. Bemben (Reg. No. 68,658)
`Attorneys for Petitioners
`
`
`Date: September 23, 2016
`
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005–3934
`(202) 371–2600
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket