`
`____________
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`
`
`TRADESTATION GROUP, INC.,
`TRADESTATION SECURITIES, INC., IBG LLC, and
`INTERACTIVE BROKERS LLC,
`Petitioners,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`
`Case CBM2015-001721
`Patent No. 7,783,556
`
`___________
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Case CBM2016-00040 has been joined with this proceeding.
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`
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`Case CBM2015-00172
`Attorney Docket No. 41919-0002CP1
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
`I.
`II. TT’S CLAIMED METHOD OF DISPLAYING MARKET
`INFORMATION IS NOT A TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE ......................... 2
`III. TT’s CLAIMS ENCOMPASS AN ABSTRACT IDEA UNDER ALICE
`STEP 1 ....................................................................................................................... 4
`a.
`The Board’s articulation of the abstract idea is proper and correct .............. 4
`b.
`TT’s claims do not improve the functioning of the computer ...................... 5
`c.
`TT’s claims are abstract ................................................................................ 9
`d.
`TT’s claims are directed to a fundamental economic or longstanding
`commercial practice .............................................................................................. 12
`e.
`TT’s preemption arguments are flawed ...................................................... 13
`IV. TT’s CLAIMS FAIL ALICE STEP 2 ............................................................ 14
`a.
`TT claims do not include an “inventive concept” ....................................... 14
`b.
`TT’s claims are not “more technological than the claims in DDR” ........... 18
`c.
`TT’s claims do not pass the machine-or-transformation test ...................... 20
`V. CBM JURISDICTION ................................................................................... 21
`VI. THE CLAIMS COVER SIGNALS ............................................................... 23
`VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 24
`
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`
`ii
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`Case CBM2015-00172
`Attorney Docket No. 41919-0002CP1
`EXHIBIT LIST
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,783,556 to Scott F. Singer, et al. (“’556
`patent”)
`Prosecution History of the ’556 patent
`Lodewijk Petram, “The World’s First Stock Exchange”
`Ellen Terrell, “History of the American and NASDAQ Stock
`Exchanges”, September, 2006 (Updated October, 2012)
`U.S. Patent 6,317,728 (Kane)
`Case No. 10-cv-0715 (N.D. Ill.) (Complaint for Patent
`Infringement)
`CRS Advanced Technologies, Inc. v. Frontline Technologies,
`Inc., CBM2012-00005, Paper No. 17 (Jan. 23, 2013)
`157 Cong. Rec. S5402 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011)
`SAP v. Versata, CBM2012-00001, Paper No. 36 (Jan. 9, 2013)
`The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
`4th Ed.
`The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3d
`Ed.
`MPEP 2106
`Patent Trial Practice Guide
`Volusion, Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc., CBM2013- 00018,
`Institution Decision, Paper No. 8
`Declaration in support of Unopposed Motion for Pro Hac Vice
`Admission of Adam Kessel
`Webster’s New World College Dictionary (4th ed.), definition
`of “data processing”
`Deposition transcript of Eric Gould-Bear
`Excerpts from deposition transcript of Dan R. Olsen, Jr., IBG
`LLC v. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. (P.T.A.B. July 28, 2016)
`Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.), definition
`of “data processing”
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TS 1001
`
`TS 1002
`TS 1003
`TS 1004
`
`TS 1005
`TS 1006
`
`TS 1007
`
`TS 1008
`TS 1009
`TS 1010
`
`TS 1011
`
`TS 1012
`TS 1013
`TS 1014
`
`TS 1015
`
`TS 1016
`
`TS 1017
`TS 1018
`
`TS 1019
`
`iii
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`I.
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`Case CBM2015-00172
`Attorney Docket No. 41919-0002CP1
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`INTRODUCTION
`Throughout its Response (“POR”), Patent Owner (“TT”) casts its invention
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`as the “features and functionality of a GUI tool.” POR, 6. But that’s not what is
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`claimed. Rather, the claims recite method steps that use a GUI to receive market
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`information, compute values based on that information, and then display the
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`computed values at locations on a screen – i.e., to perform basic computer
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`functions. The claims make no mention of a “tool,” nor do they include structure,
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`other than a generic “computing device,” for performing the recited functions.
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`And the specification states that those functions can be accomplished using
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`conventional components and programming techniques. See, e.g., ‘556 patent, Fig.
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`3; 3:59-4:11, 5:1-9, 5:49-6:14, 6:46-58. There is nothing new about the
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`information being displayed, and TT admits that it is not processed or used to
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`generate new data. See POR, 32-33 (asserting that its GUI does not “change”
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`data). Consequently, recent appellate guidance removes any doubt that TT’s
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`claims fail Section 101.
`
`Specifically, in Electric Power, LLC, v. Alstom S.A., the court held ineligible
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`“claims [that] do not go beyond requiring the collection, analysis, and display of
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`available information in a particular field, stating those functions in general terms,
`
`without limiting them to technical means for performing the functions that are
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`arguably an advance over conventional computer and network technology.” Elec.
`
`Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., No. 2015-1778, 2016 WL 4073318, at *1 (Fed.
`1
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`Cir. Aug. 1, 2016). Here, TT’s claims recite the display of information in a
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`particular field, namely financial markets, and do so without limiting them to any
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`unconventional technological means. Indeed, the patent expressly discloses that
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`“the present invention [is] appropriate for use in any electronic trading screen, and
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`work[s] particularly well with a trading screen similar to that shown in [prior art]
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`FIG. 2.” ‘556 patent, 3:8-11. Consequently, TT’s claims fall squarely within the
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`definition of patent-ineligible subject matter.
`
`TT’s other arguments are similarly flawed as discussed below. Accordingly,
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`the Board should find TT’s claims patent-ineligible.
`
`II. TT’S CLAIMED METHOD OF DISPLAYING MARKET
`INFORMATION IS NOT A TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE
`The first six pages of the POR disingenuously recasts its claimed method as
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`a “GUI tool,” based on an inapt analogy to a physical device. In doing so, TT
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`attempts to mask the fact that its purported invention is nothing more than a
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`method of using a GUI that includes steps for receiving market information,
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`computing profit & loss (“P&L”) values based on that information, and then
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`displaying the P&L values at locations on a screen – all basic computer functions.
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`The claims do not recite a “tool,” nor do they include structure for performing the
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`recited functions, other than a generic “computing device.”
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`Despite these facts, TT argues that its claims are eligible because “no claim
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`… is merely directed to calculating a P&L value or simply displaying financial
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`2
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`information received from exchange data feeds to facilitate trading on a generic
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`display.” POR, 2. But TT fails to identify a single claim element to support this
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`position, nor could it as that is exactly what its claims are “merely directed to.”
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`Rather, TT waves its hand asserting “[t]he claims require a specialized GUI that
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`does not exist on generic computers or display.” Id. But this assertion contradicts
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`the ‘556 patent, which throughout discloses that “[t]he system and method of the
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`preferred embodiments are appropriate for use in any electronic trading
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`environment,” which the patent then goes on to depict in Fig. 3, and describe as
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`“comprising various elements … all of which will be apparent to one of ordinary
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`skill in the art.” ‘556 patent 3:59-4:11. See also 5:1-9 (“Gateways … may include
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`any computing device such as a main-frame, super minicomputer, minicomputer,
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`workstation, or personal computer.”); 5:49-6:14 (describing that generic displays,
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`processors, and memory may be used); 6:46-58 (describing that the system
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`software may be “any other suitable programming language.”).
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`TT further argues that its claims include “inventive features” that confer
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`eligibility because “[i]n the Notice of Allowance, the PTO found novelty and
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`nonobviousness in the claimed GUI over the prior art of record.” POR, 5. But this
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`assertion merely states a truism: every patent was deemed allowable over the prior
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`art during original prosecution. As such, that the ‘556 patent was allowed is
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`irrelevant. Moreover, even if TT’s claims included a novel or non-routine element,
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`3
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`which they do not,2 that alone is insufficient to impart eligibility. Ultramercial,
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`Inc. v. Hulu LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he addition of merely
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`novel or non-routine components to the claimed idea [does not] necessarily turn[]
`
`an abstraction into something concrete.”). See also, Ass’n for Molecular
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`Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013)
`
`(“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy
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`the § 101 inquiry.”)
`
`III. TT’s CLAIMS ENCOMPASS AN ABSTRACT IDEA UNDER
`ALICE STEP 1
`a. The Board’s articulation of the abstract idea is proper and correct
`As the Board correctly found in the Institution Decision (“ID”), TT’s claims
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`are directed to the abstract idea of “providing a trader with financial information to
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`facilitate market trades.” ID, 22. Contrary to TT’s assertions (POR, 8-10), in
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`formulating that abstract idea neither the Board nor Petitioner improperly
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`“overgeneralized” the claim or “ignore[d] almost of the claim terms.” POR, 8.
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`The CAFC explained that the Alice Step 1 analysis looks “at the ‘focus’ of the
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`claims, their ‘character as a whole,’” rather than performing a word-for-word
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`comparison of the claim language to the idea to which the claims are directed.
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`Alstom, 2016 WL 4073318, at *3. Only at step two should the court look “more
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`precisely at what the claim elements add.” Alstom, 2016 WL 4073318, at *3.
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`2 See, e.g., Petition at 30-31.
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`4
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`Moreover, the CAFC has regularly articulated a claim’s abstract idea in
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`
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`succinct terms, even for verbose claims, without giving effect to each limitation.
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`See, e.g., LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., No. 2014-1435, 2016 WL 3974203, at
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`*4 (Fed. Cir. July 25, 2016) (reducing an 11-step claim to a two-word abstract
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`idea: “coordinating loans”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714 (reducing an 11-step
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`claim to “[using an] advertisement as an exchange or currency”); Mortgage
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`Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016) (“anonymous loan shopping”); Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
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`Mobility LLC, No. 2015-1763, 2016 WL 3514158, at *5 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2016)
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`(“filtering content”); OIP Techs. V. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1361-62
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`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“offer-based price optimization”). In each of these cases, plus
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`others, the court reduced a lengthy claim to a few words that encapsulated its
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`focus. Accordingly, in formulating the abstract idea here, the Board properly
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`followed the court’s guidance.
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`b. TT’s claims do not improve the functioning of the computer
`Contrary to TT’s assertions (POR, 10-13), the method steps recited by the
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`claims, when performed by a computer, do not “improve the functioning of the
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`computer.” Rather, the computer merely performs a step for receiving market
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`information from another computer (the exchange), steps to “identify” and
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`“comput[e]” certain values, and then three steps for displaying information based
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`5
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`on the identification and computation steps.3 But receiving, identifying, computing
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`and displaying information are what computers have been doing for decades;
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`indeed, that is what they were designed to do. The recited steps in no way make
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`the computer run faster, more efficiently, use less energy, etc. Even TT’s expert
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`admitted that no such improvements to the computer occur as a result of
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`performing similar steps. (Ex. 1018; Olsen Dep., 57:18-58:13.) To the contrary,
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`the computer itself remains essentially the same before, during and after
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`performing the method steps. Indeed, the ‘556 patent acknowledges that the prior
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`art computers performed essentially the same functions as claimed. See, e.g., ‘556
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`patent, 1:52-2:4 (describing the prior art trading screen shown in Fig. 1, which
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`includes “pre-set fields, properties, and buttons that can help someone trade
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`quickly and efficiently.”) and 2:5-17 (describing the prior art trading screen shown
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`in Fig. 2, which “displays, among other things, bids 202 and offers 204 in
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`association with price values along axis 206. Thus, a trader may view the market as
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`it moves relative to price values on axis 206.”). What is displayed may differ, but
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`the basic computer functions are the same whether the trader is using the prior art
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`3 Although independent claims 1 and 12 use the term “displaying” only twice, the
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`“moving” step is effectively a displaying step because it causes the GUI display to
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`change such that a “first indicator” visually moves from “a first location” to “a
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`second location” on the screen.
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`6
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`Fig. 1 and 2 GUIs or the allegedly inventive Fig. 8 GUI. In short, nothing about
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`receiving, identifying, computing, or displaying information is an improvement to
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`the computer’s functioning.
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`Ignoring that reality, TT argues that “[t]he claimed invention improves the
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`functioning of the computer because it solves problems that were previously
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`caused by the computer.”4 POR, 11. But the claimed method is not like the DDR
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`or Enfish inventions where claims were directed at solving problems in the inner
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`workings of the computer or network. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com,
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`L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claimed solution is necessarily
`
`rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising
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`in the realm of computer networks.”); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
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`1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to “a specific type of data structure
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`designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory.”).
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`Rather, the problem according to the ‘556 patent was that traders needed to “make
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`quick mental calculations, using charting software, or look to other sources to
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`provide additional insight beyond what is normally provided by an exchange or a
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`typical trading screen.” ‘556 Patent, 2:28-30. As the Board correctly found “[t]his
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`is not a technical problem but a business problem.” ID, 15. And the solution –
`
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`4 The Board should give no weight to TT's Experts Olsen and Gould-Bear because
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`they did not analyze or the '556 patent. Ex. 1018 at p.20; Ex. 1017 at p.40-41.
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`7
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`simply using “known computer technology, such as display devices or software” to
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`display another item of well-known market information – is not a technical
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`solution. Id.
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`TT also asserts that computer functioning is improved by “a new, particular
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`value axis and display and movement of indicators along the value axis to provide
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`access to highly relevant information that was not previously accessible or
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`understandable in an efficient manner.” Id. In other words, TT asserts that simply
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`adding a “value axis” to the prior art interface of Fig. 2, as shown below, improves
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`the functioning of the computer. Id.
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`
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`But the supposedly inventive “value axis” does not improve or otherwise
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`change the basic functionality of the computer. Rather, adding the value axis does
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`nothing more than make use of the existing functionality of a computer to perform
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`simple arithmetic, which could be and traditionally was performed mentally,5 or
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`using a pen and paper, and display the result on the screen. Using a computer “for
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`no more than its most basic function—making calculations or computations—fails
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`to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental
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`processes.” Bancorp Serv., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266,
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`1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). And simply displaying an additional column of well-known
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`information – P&L – also is insufficient to confer eligibility. Alstom, 2016 WL
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`4073318, at *5 (“[T]he claim requirement of ‘displaying concurrent visualization’
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`of two or more types of information” does not impart patentability).
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`With regard to usability, TT’s GUI does not provide any new functionality
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`or make it any simpler to interact with the GUI – the user still reads market
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`information from a grid displayed on the GUI. The data displayed is no more
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`accurate than in the prior art, and TT’s GUI does not respond any faster to
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`changing market data. TT’s assertion that usability of the GUI is improved simply
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`has no basis in reality.
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`c. TT’s claims are abstract
`In asserting that its claims are “undoubtedly not abstract,” TT analogizes its
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`“GUI tool” to physical entities “such as a chip architecture, an LED display and the
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`5 Indeed, the ’556 patent recognizes that such “quick mental calculations” were
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`traditionally performed by traders. ’556 patent, 2:22-25.
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`9
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`like.” POR, 13. In that regard, TT asserts that “a GUI is as much a physical and
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`integral part of a computer as a processor or memory.” Id. TT is misguided.
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`First, TT’s claims do not recite a “GUI tool” much less a “physical entity,”
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`but rather a “method for displaying market information.” ‘556 patent, claim 1; 1:8-
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`9 (“[T]he present invention relates to displaying market information on a screen.”).
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`As noted above, the mere rearrangement and display of information is not patent-
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`eligible. Alstom, 2016 WL 4073318, at *5 (“[T]he claim requirement of
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`‘displaying concurrent visualization’ of two or more types of information” does not
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`impart patentability); CyberSource, 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The
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`mere manipulation or reorganization of data” does not impart patent eligibility.).
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`Second, TT never attempts to explain how an arrangement of data on a
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`trading screen is “physical.” Unlike in Enfish, where the claim in question was
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`directed at something physical – “a data storage and retrieval system” – TT’s
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`claims are directed at method steps – simply receiving market data, performing
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`identification and computation operations on that data, and then displaying the
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`results. As the court noted, the claims in Enfish actually changed something about
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`how the computer operated—how the computer stored and received data in
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`memory). Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. In contrast, TT’s claims recite steps about
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`what is shown on the screen. The basic structure and functionality of the computer
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`is unaffected. In no sense does changing the format of data on a screen change the
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`fundamental operation of the computer– it still performs calculations and displays
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`information using conventional hardware and software both before and after TT’s
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`alleged invention.
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`TT further argues that its claims survive Alice Step 1 because “GUIs are
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`clearly technology.” POR, 14. TT is misguided for the following reasons.
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`First, the Step 1 inquiry does not hinge on whether the claimed subject
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`matter is “technology.” Rather, the inquiry is whether the claims are directed to an
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`abstract concept, such as “providing a trader with financial information to facilitate
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`market trades,” as the Board correctly found in the ID.
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`Further, even if a GUI is considered “technology,” the mere fact that an
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`otherwise abstract claim also includes bits of conventional technology – e.g., a
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`generic reference to a “graphical user interface” – is irrelevant. Many claims have
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`been found fatally abstract even though they included conventional elements such
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`as user interfaces, computers, databases, and the like. See, e.g., Internet Patents
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`Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (patent
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`ineligible claim reciting “[a] method of providing an intelligent user interface”);
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`Mortgage Grader, Inc., 811 F.3d at 1324-1325 (patent ineligible claim including
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`components such as “a computer system,” “a database,” and first and second
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`“interface[s]”). TT’s claims are no more “technological” than the foregoing
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`examples because the elements that arguably may be deemed “technology” – a
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`graphical user interface, a computing device, and an electronic exchange – all are
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`conventional components being used in their customary manner to achieve
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`predictable results, and thus are insufficient to impart patent eligibility.
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`d. TT’s claims are directed to a fundamental economic or longstanding
`commercial practice
`TT further argues that its claims are not abstract because they are “not
`
`directed to a fundamental economic or longstanding commercial practice.” POR,
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`16. But TT ignores the fact that, according to the patent, “[t]he present invention
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`relates to electronic trading.” ‘556 patent, 1:7. And the claims refer to “tradeable
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`object[s],” which the specification defines as including “stocks, options, bonds,
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`futures, currency, and warrants, as well as funds, derivatives … and all types of
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`commodities, such as grains, energy, and metals.” Id., 4:35-38. Trading on such
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`things is “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
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`commerce,” and is an abstract idea similar to those courts have repeatedly held
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`abstract and ineligible. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356.
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`TT further argues that “[t]he claimed GUI is unlike the generic GUIs
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`mentioned in … Mortgage Grader or Capital One.” POR, 18. But those
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`interfaces were no more “generic” than TT’s. In Capital One the claim recited “an
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`interactive interface” configured to display certain information (navigation data) to
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`a user, just as the ‘556 patent claims a method for “displaying” certain information
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`(P&L) to the user. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792
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`F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Also, the Capital One claim recited that the
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`“interactive interface” was divided into separate display portions that displayed
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`different information, just as the ‘556 patent claims displaying information in
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`different “locations.” Id. at 1369.
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`Similarly, in Mortgage Grader the claim recited “a first interface” and “a
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`second interface,” the latter of which included separate components and a display
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`region (e.g., “borrower grading module,” display of “total cost” of each loan).
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`Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1381. In other words, the interfaces in Capital One
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`and Mortgage Grader were recited with specificity similar to TT’s claims, and they
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`were held patent-ineligible. TT’s claims are abstract and thus ineligible for the
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`same reason.
`
`e. TT’s preemption arguments are flawed
`TT asserts that its claims are patent-eligible because they do not preempt the
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`abstract idea of “providing a trader with financial information to facilitate market
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`trades.” POR, 19. But a preemption analysis is unnecessary because “questions on
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`preemption are inherent in and resolved by the §101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics,
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`Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). And not only is a
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`separate analysis of preemption unnecessary, TT’s attempt at such an analysis is
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`flawed.
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`First, to the extent preemption is considered in a patent-eligibility analysis, it
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`is used to determine whether the claims include an inventive concept, not whether
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`they are directed to an abstract idea as TT suggests. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358.
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`Second, “the mere existence of a non-preempted use of an abstract idea does
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`not prove that a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter.” Vehicle
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`Intelligence and Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 635 F. App’x 914, 918
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`(Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379 (“the absence of complete
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`preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility”); OIP, 788 F.3d at 1362-63
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`(“that the claims do not preempt all price optimization . . . do not make them any
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`less abstract”). Accordingly, that there may be other methods for providing a
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`trader with financial information to facilitate market trades does not establish that
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`TT’s claims here are not directed to an abstract idea.
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`IV. TT’s CLAIMS FAIL ALICE STEP 2
`a. TT claims do not include an “inventive concept”
`TT argues that its claims pass Alice Step 2 because they recite the inventive
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`concept of “displaying via the computing device the plurality of values along a
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`value axis.” POR, 26. In other words, TT asserts that simply adding a “value
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`axis” displaying well-known financial information (P&L) to the prior art interface
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`of Fig. 2 represents an inventive concept. Notably, TT cites no authority for the
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`proposition that using a computer to display information can confer patent
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`eligibility, nor could it because every CAFC decision that has considered that issue
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`has held to the contrary.
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`For example, in Alstom, the court held “claims [that] do not go beyond
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`requiring the collection, analysis, and display of available information in a
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`particular field, stating those functions in general terms, without limiting them to
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`technical means for performing the functions that are arguably an advance over
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`conventional computer and network technology.” Alstom, 2016 WL 4073318, at
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`*1. More particularly, the Alstom court considered the claim element “displaying
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`concurrent visualization of measurements from the data streams and the dynamic
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`stability metrics” and found that, even if it was understood to require a specific
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`functionality (i.e., “time-synchronized display”), it did not qualify as an inventive
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`concept because “the patent contains [no] suggestion that the displays needed for
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`that purpose are anything but readily available.” Id. at *5. Here too, the ‘556
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`patent claims lack an inventive concept because they merely display well-known
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`information in a particular arrangement and do so using the conventional computer
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`technology shown in Fig. 3 and described at 3:59-4:11, 5:1-9, 5:49-6:14, and 6:46-
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`58. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d at 1370 (holding that neither the “dynamic
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`presentation of data” nor an “interactive interface” qualified as an inventive
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`concept); Mortgage Grader, 811F.3d at 1381 (claims reciting “a first interface”
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`and “a second interface” lacked an inventive concept).
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`TT further argues that the claims “recite significantly more” than an abstract
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`idea for three reasons. POR, 21-22. TT is wrong on all three counts.
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`First, TT wrongly asserts that “the claimed combination specifies the GUI
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`features and functionality with a high level of detail rather than at a high level of
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`generality.” Id. As explained above, the claims simply recite receiving market
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`data, processing it (“identifying” and “computing”), and then displaying the
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`results. The claims lack an inventive concept because they comprise steps
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`identifying what information is to be displayed, but they fail to specify any
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`technological details about how those steps are to be carried out by a computer. As
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`the CAFC explained, even lengthy claims that “do not go beyond requiring the
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`collection, analysis, and display of available information in a particular field,
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`stating those functions in general terms, without limiting them to technical means
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`for performing the functions that are arguably an advance over conventional
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`computer and network technology,” are not patent-eligible. Alstom, 2016 WL
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`4073318, at *1. And the specification discloses that the claimed method is
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`performed on conventional computer equipment using conventional software. See,
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`e.g.,’556 patent, Fig. 3, 3:59-4:11, 5:1-9, 5:49-6:14, 6:46-58. Such conventional
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`components and techniques add nothing to the abstract claims because they are
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`generic and represent “basic functions.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354, 2359.
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`Moreover, receiving market data, processing it, and then displaying the
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`results, regardless of how much detail is recited, is simply a matter of applying the
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`abstract idea. Id. at 2350 (“Neither stating an abstract idea while adding the words
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`‘apply it,’ nor limiting the use of an abstract idea ‘to a particular technological
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`environment is enough for patent eligibility’”) (internal citations omitted).
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`Second, TT argues that the claims recite “significantly more” because “the
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`claimed combination of GUI features and functionality is the solution rather than
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`pre-solution or post-solution activity.” POR, 21-22 (emphasis theirs). What the
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`emphasized language is supposed to mean, or how it is relevant to the Step 2
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`analysis, is not explained. Regardless, claims such as here that merely receive,
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`process, and display market information, without otherwise reciting anything more
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`than conventional elements, lack an “inventive concept.” See Alstom, 2016 WL
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`4073318, at *3 (“[m]erely selecting information by content or source, for
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`collection, analysis, and display” is not patent eligible.).
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`Third, TT argues that the claims recite “significantly more” because “there is
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`no evidence that the claimed combination of GUI functionality was routine and
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`conventional.” POR, 22. But, as explained above, the patent admits that prior art
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`trading GUIs such as in Fig. 2 received, processed, and displayed market
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`information in trading screens having an axis. Fig. 2, 2:5-17. And even if the
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`specific arrangement of information displayed was deemed to be novel, that alone
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`is insufficient to impart patent eligibility. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (“[T]he
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`addition of merely novel or non-routine components to the claimed idea [does not]
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`necessarily turn[] an abstraction into something concrete.”).
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`Further, TT repeats its argument – this time in the context of Alice Step 2 –
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`that the claims are eligible because “the PTO found that the particular claimed GUI
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`features are novel and nonobvious in view of the same art cited in the Petition.”
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`POR, 25 (emphasis theirs). But, as discussed above, TT is simply stating a truism
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`that has no relevance to this trial, namely, that all patents were previously allowed.
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`Moreover, (i) the presumption of validity accorded to an issued patent, which TT is
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`effectively asserting, does not apply in PTO proceedings, and (ii) the ‘556 patent
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`was not examined under the current Mayo/Alice standard, which compels a
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`different result than the §101 standard in effect when the patent was examined.
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`Nevertheless, TT continues, asserting that both Petitioner and the Board
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`failed to address the “reasons for allowance,” which state that the claims were
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`allowable “[e]ven though[] the prior art of record teaches a method for displaying
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`market information on a [GUI].” Id. This generic statement, TT argues, somehow
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`establishes that “[t]he Examiner found novel and nonobvious features of the claims
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`(i.e., features that present even more than an ‘inventive concept’) beyond the
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`alleged abstract idea.” POR, 25-26. TT is confused. Where, as here, a “novel and
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`nonobvious feature” (i.e., the “value axis, according to TT) is itself abstract, it
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`cannot qualify as an inventive concept for eligibility