`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`____________
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`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`____________
`
`
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`TRADESTATION GROUP INC.,
`TRADESTATION SECURITIES, INC., IBG LLC, and INTERACTIVE
`BROKERS LLC.,
`Petitioners,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`
`Case CBM2015-001611
`Patent No. 6,766,304
`
`___________
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`
`1 Case CBM2016-00035 has been joined with this proceeding.
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`Case CBM2015-00161
`Attorney Docket No. 41919-0005CP1
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
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`II. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 3
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`A. The eSpeed/CQG Transcripts: Exhibits 2029, 2211, 2220, 2222, 2224,
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`2225, 2228, 2232, 2247, 2251, 2274–2276, 2286–2288, and 2292–2296 ............. 3
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`B. The 32 Electronic Trader Declarants: Exhibits 2223 .................................... 4
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`C. Third Party Emails: Exhibits 2240–2246, 2250, 2252–2273, and 2277 ....... 6
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`D. Brumfield Sketch and Animations: Exhibits 2212, 2213, and 2214 ............. 8
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`E.
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`eSpeed/CQG Jury Verdict Forms & Docket Entry: Exhibits 2030, 2032,
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`2278 9
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`F. Confidential Declaration of Christopher Thomas: Exhibit 2169B (¶¶ 75,
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`83–86, 89–92, 94–97, 102–104, 106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34, 136–138, 140,
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`141, 151–153, 172 ) .............................................................................................. 11
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`III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 15
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`
`
`i
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Case CBM2015-00161
`Attorney Docket No. 41919-0005CP1
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`TT’s Patent Owner Response (“TT’s POR”) dumps into the record and
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`buries the Board with hundreds of pages of documents without regard to their
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`admissibility. But this proceeding is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence
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`and those Rules set fair boundaries on the admissibility of evidence. TT’s ignores
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`those rules.
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`TT knows that its evidence suffers from significant admissibility problems.
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`Indeed, it preemptively sought a blanket waiver from the Board so that TT could
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`rely on a “large volume of documents produced in previous district court cases”
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`without regard to the Board’s Rules and Federal Rules of Evidence 802 and 901.
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`Paper 38, 2–3. The Board denied TT’s request. See id. Having been denied
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`permission to do so, TT proceeded to file a tremendous number of documents from
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`the district court cases without regard to the Board’s order and the rules governing
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`this proceeding. That evidence should be stricken.
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`A significant number of the documents submitted by TT violate the
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`prohibition on hearsay. See FRE 802. Absent one of the well-established
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`exceptions to hearsay, such as the unavailability of a declarant, hearsay is
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`inadmissible. TT disregards this Rule entirely by introducing hearsay statements
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`from dozens of individuals in an effort to defend the patentability of its claims.
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`A significant number of TT’s documents also fail to meet the basic
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`
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`requirements of authenticity required by Federal Rule of Evidence 901. Despite
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`Petitioners’ timely objection, TT offered no competent evidence that cures this
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`objection leaving the Board and Petitioners with no basis to gauge whether the
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`documents are genuine.
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`TT’s evidence also ignores the proper boundaries of expert witness
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`testimony in contravention of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rule 702 permits an
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`expert to offer opinions based on his specialized knowledge in the field. But
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`significant portions of Mr. Thomas’ declaration are not opinions of Mr. Thomas.
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`Rather, Mr. Thomas purports to offer factual testimony that is not based on his
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`own perception but is instead based upon his review of district court depositions
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`and trial transcripts. That underlying evidence should not be admitted in this
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`proceeding as TT may not use Mr. Thomas “simply as a conduit for introducing
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`hearsay under the guise that the testifying expert used the hearsay as the basis of
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`his testimony.” Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2013)
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`(citation omitted). This testimony is improper and, therefore, should be excluded.
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`See, e.g., United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 58 (2d Cir. 2003).
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`Moreover, the evidence is inadmissible under FRE 402 because is it not
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`relevant to patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the sole remaining issue in this
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`proceeding. Indeed, no court has ever considered evidence of secondary
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`2
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`considerations in a Section 101 analysis.
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`Accordingly, Petitioners file this motion pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c)
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`and in accordance with the Board’s May 12, 2016 Order modifying Due Date 4.
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`(Paper 38 at 8.)
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`II. ARGUMENT
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`A. The eSpeed/CQG Transcripts: Exhibits 2029, 2211, 2220, 2222,
`2224, 2225, 2228, 2232, 2247, 2251, 2274–2276, 2286–2288, and 2292–2296
`The Board should exclude Exhibits 2211, 2220, 2222, 2224, 2225, 2228,
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`2232, 2247, 2251, 2274–2276, 2286–2288, 2292–2296 (“eSpeed/CQG
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`Transcripts”) because they are hearsay to which no valid exception applies. Most
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`of these exhibits are cited in TT’s POR. See Paper 67 at 13, 31–34, 38, 41–45, 47,
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`51, and 67; see also Paper 70 (providing limited citations to the record for TT
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`exhibits). In addition, as discussed further in section II.E. infra, TT’s technical
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`expert Mr. Thomas relies upon these transcripts to support the assertions in his
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`declaration (Ex. 2169) regarding, for example, the background of the claimed
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`invention and alleged secondary considerations, including “commercial success,”
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`“initial skepticism followed by acceptance,” “widespread copying,” “failure of
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`others,” “praise and accolades,” and “unexpected results.” Petitioners timely
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`objected to each of the eSpeed/CQG Transcripts on the basis of, among other
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`things, hearsay. See Paper 22 at 16; Paper 69 at 14–16.
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`The eSpeed/CQG Transcripts purports to be excerpts of a trial or deposition
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`
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`transcript from district court proceedings involving third parties. The eSpeed/CQG
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`Transcripts are hearsay as none were made while testifying for the current
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`proceeding and all are being offered for the truth of the matters asserted. FRE 801.
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`None of these statements fall under any proper hearsay exception. For example, TT
`
`has not shown that the witnesses are unavailable. See FRE 804. Nor has TT shown
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`that any specific exception under FRE 803. Likewise, the residual exception does
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`not apply here as TT cannot credibly argue that the eSpeed/CQG Transcripts are
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`somehow more probative evidence that any other evidence it could have obtained
`
`through reasonable efforts. See FRE 807.
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`Accordingly, the Board should exclude the eSpeed/CQG Transcripts.
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`B. The 32 Electronic Trader Declarants: Exhibits 2223
` The Board should exclude the exhibit that purports to contain declarations
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`from 32 individuals in the electronic trading industry (Exhibit 22232) (“Electronic
`
`Trader Declarants Exhibits”); there is no evidence of record that these exhibits are
`
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`2 Exhibit 2223 includes Exhibits 2210, 2216, 2218, 2219, 2221, 2227, 2229, and
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`2239, which TT separately submitted. The Board should exclude these separately
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`submitted declarations for the same reasons discussed above regarding Exhibit
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`2223.
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`authentic and each is hearsay to which no exception applies.
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`The Electronic Trader Declarants Exhibits are offered by TT as evidence in
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`support of secondary considerations of non-obviousness. See Paper 67 at 30, 32,
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`33, 38, 39, 41–44, 46, 48, 53–55. Portions of these exhibits are discussed by TT’s
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`expert. (Ex. 2169, ¶¶ 75, 102–04, 106–08, 126, 127, 153.) The exhibits contain, for
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`example, statements by individuals regarding their opinions concerning TT’s
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`alleged commercial embodiments. See Ex. 2223. Petitioners objected to all of these
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`declarations on the basis of, among other things, authenticity and hearsay. (Ex.
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`1052 at 14–17.)
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`At the outset, the Board should exclude Electronic Trader Declarants
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`Exhibits for lack of authentication because TT has offered no evidence that each
`
`exhibit is what it purports to be. FRE 901. In fact, at least one of the exhibits
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`contained within Exhibit 2223 is anything but a “declaration.”3 TT chose to forego
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`filing any supplemental evidence to cure Petitioners’ authenticity objections to
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`these exhibits.
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`In addition, each of these declarations is hearsay as none were made while
`
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`3 Exhibit 2210 (also contained within Exhibit 2223) purports to be a declaration of
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`Mr. Daniel Durkin. Exhibit 2210 actually appears to be an email between Inventor
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`Mr. Harris Brumfield and Mr. Durkin.
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`testifying for the current proceeding and all are being offered for the truth of the
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`matters asserted. FRE 801. None of the declarations are excluded from the hearsay
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`rule because they are not being used for a purpose permitted under FRE 801(d).
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`For example, TT has not shown that any of the declarants whose testimony it relies
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`upon are unavailable. FRE 804. Nor has TT shown that any specific exception
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`under FRE 803 or the residual exception under FRE 807 applies here. Indeed, TT
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`cannot credibly argue that 2004 declaration testimony has equivalent
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`circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as that of testimony from these same
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`declarants if Petitioners had an opportunity for vigorous cross examination. TT has
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`not shown that this is an “exceptional case” under FRE 807. See, e.g., Conoco Inc.
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`v. Dep’t of Energy, 99 F.3d 387, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The two residual hearsay
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`exceptions . . . were meant to be reserved for exceptional cases.”). Accordingly, the
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`Board should exclude the declarations as hearsay.
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`C. Third Party Emails: Exhibits 2240–2246, 2250, 2252–2273, and
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`2277
`The Board should exclude Exhibits 2240–2246, 2250, 2252–2273, and 2277
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`each (the “Third Party Emails”) for lack of authenticity and because they are
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`hearsay to which no exception applies. The Third Party Emails each purports to be
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`an email (or a demonstrative depicting an email) that is allegedly from employees
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`of third parties eSpeed or CQG. These exhibits are cited in TT’s POR. (See Paper
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`67 at 32, 51.) And both TT and its technical expert use them here to support their
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`assertions regarding alleged copying of the claimed invention by others. See Ex.
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`2169 at ¶¶ 127, 133, 136–38. Petitioners timely objected to these emails on the
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`basis of, among other things, authenticity and hearsay. (Ex.1052 at 14–16.)
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`Like the Electronic Trader Declarations discussed above, the Board should
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`exclude the Third Party Emails for lack of authentication. FRE 901. In response to
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`Petitioners’ timely objections, TT attempted to cure some, but not all, of
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`Petitioners’ objections to the Third Party Emails through submission of the
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`Declaration of TT’s counsel, Ms. Jennifer Kurcz. (See Ex. 2337 ( citing Third
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`Party Email Exhibits 2240–46, 2250, 2252, 2254, 2258, 2260, 2262, 2270–2272,
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`and 2277).) However, TT’s attempt to cure its evidentiary shortcomings fails
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`because Ms. Kurcz provided no evidence that these exhibits are true and correct
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`copies of what TT claims as required by FRE 901. Indeed, Ms. Kurcz does not
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`assert that she has knowledge that these exhibits are true and correct copies nor
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`does she purport to know the origin other than they were produced by a third party
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`during discovery. See Ex. 2337, ¶ 3. Ms. Kurcz’s assertion that these documents
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`were admitted in district court does not mean that they are admissible here.
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`Accordingly, the Third Party Emails be excluded for lack of authenticity.
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`Each of the Third Party Emails also constitutes hearsay as all are being
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`offered for the truth of the matters asserted. FRE 801. TT has not suggested that
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`there is a non-hearsay purpose for any of the Third Party Emails. See, e.g., FRE
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`801(d). Nor has TT shown that the witnesses whose statements it relies upon are
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`unavailable. FRE 804. It also has not shown that any specific exception under FRE
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`803 or the residual exception under FRE 807 applies. Indeed, TT cannot credibly
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`argue that the Third Party Emails have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
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`trustworthiness or that the other elements of FRE 807 are met such that the Board
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`should consider this is an “exceptional case.” See, e.g., Conoco Inc., 99 F.3d at
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`392. Accordingly, the Board should exclude the emails as hearsay.
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`D. Brumfield Sketch and Animations: Exhibits 2212, 2213, and 2214
`The Board should exclude the sketch and animations for lack of authenticity
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`and because they are hearsay to which no exception applies. Exhibit 2213 purports
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`to depict a 1998 sketch of Mr. Brumfield’s claimed invention and is cited in TT’s
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`POR at page 38. Exhibits 2212 and 2214 each purport to be video animations of
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`unknown provenance. TT cites to Exhibits 2213 and 2214 in its POR; it never cites
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`to Ex. 2212. See Paper 67 at 38 (Ex. 2213); 39 (Ex. 2214). In addition, Mr. Thomas
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`improperly uses these animations as evidence of how TT’s product and some prior
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`art actually operates. See Ex. 2169B at 59, ¶ 83 (Ex. 2212); 63–64, ¶ 85 (Ex. 2213),
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`¶ 88 (Ex. 2214). Petitioners timely objected to all of these exhibits. (Ex. 1052 at
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`14–17.)
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`Rule 901 requires that evidence be supported by sufficient evidence to
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`demonstrate that an item is what the proponent purport it to be. In the case of Ex.
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`2212, 2213, and 2214, TT has offered no such evidence. As a consequence, these
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`exhibits should be excluded from the record on that basis.
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`Moreover, Exhibits 2212, 2213, and 2214 are also hearsay for which no
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`exception applies. Ex. 2212, although not cited in the TT’s POR, is purportedly a
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`sketch prepared by inventor Mr. Brumfield. To the extent TT offers Ex. 2212 for
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`evidence of whatever it purports to illustrate, it should be excluded. Ex. 2213 and
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`2214 purport to be computer–generated cartoons showing how actual software
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`products are operated. TT offers these exhibits as evidence of the alleged benefits
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`of the invention and the problems associated with the prior art. (Paper 67, at 38-
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`39.) TT did not respond to any of Petitioners’ timely objections, so there is no
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`evidence showing who prepared these cartoons or under whose direction. Thus,
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`each clip was made by unidentified animators who are not testifying in this
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`proceeding, and TT is using each clip to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
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`Therefore, they are hearsay and should be excluded. FRE 801.
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`E. eSpeed/CQG Jury Verdict Forms & Docket Entry: Exhibits 2030,
`2032, 2278
`The Board should exclude Exhibits 2030, 2032, and 2278, which purport to
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`be jury verdict forms (Exs. 2030, 2278) and a docket entry (Ex. 2032) associated
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`with Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04-cv-05312 (Exs. 2030,
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`2032) and Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., No. 05-cv-4811(Ex.
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`2278). These Exhibits are inadmissible because each is irrelevant and hearsay.
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`Petitioners timely objected to Exhibits 2030, 2032, and 2278 on the basis of,
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`among other things, lack of relevance and hearsay. See Paper 22, at 17–19; Paper
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`69, at 14–16.
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`Both TT and its technical expert Mr. Thomas directly rely on Exhibit 2278
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`in support of their assertions that others copied TT’s alleged commercial
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`embodiment. See Paper 15 at 57, Paper 67 at 63 n.9; Ex. 2169 at ¶¶ 133, 141.
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`These Exhibits do not tend to make any facts in this proceeding more or less
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`probable. For example, the CQG jury’s determination is of no consequence to the
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`Board’s determination of whether copying of the claimed invention exists. See,
`
`e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Not every
`
`competing product that arguably falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of
`
`copying ; otherwise, ‘every infringement suit would automatically confirm the
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`nonobviousness of the patent.’”).
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`TT offered Exhibits 2030 and 2032 as evidence that the “TSE” reference
`
`does not qualify as prior art. See Paper 15 at 57, Paper 67 at 63 n.9. The fact that
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`the eSpeed jury found that a third party defendant did not meet its burden of
`
`proving the patent obvious under the clear and convincing evidence standard is
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`not relevant to whether Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating the ’132
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`patent to be unpatentable under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Nor
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`are these documents relevant to whether the ’056 patent claims eligible subject
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`matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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`Because irrelevant evidence is not admissible, the Board should exclude
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`Exhibits 2030, 2032, and 2278. FRE 402. The Board should also exclude these
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`exhibits because they are hearsay being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
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`FRE 801. Exhibit 2030, 2032, and 2278 do not meet any of the conditions set forth
`
`in FRE 801(d) such that they could be deemed non-hearsay. Accordingly, the
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`Board should exclude them from the record.
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`F. Confidential Declaration of Christopher Thomas: Exhibit 2169B
`(¶¶ 75, 83–86, 89–92, 94–97, 102–104, 106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34, 136–
`138, 140, 141, 151–153, 172 )
`Several portions of the Declaration of Christopher Thomas (Exhibit 2169B),
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`TT’s expert, exceeds the proper boundaries of expert testimony and should be
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`stricken from the record. TT relies on Thomas’s declaration testimony throughout
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`its POR. See Paper 67 at 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 13, 23, 24, 27–45, 47–58, 61, 67–72, 74,
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`76. Petitioners timely objected to Exhibit 2169 on the basis of, among other things,
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`inadmissible hearsay and improper expert testimony in violation of at least FRE
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`701, 702 and 703. (Ex. 1052 at 14–17.) The Board should exclude at least the
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`portions of Exhibit 2169B (including paragraphs ¶¶ 75, 83–86, 89–92, 94–97, 102–
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`104, 106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34, 136–138, 140, 141, 151–153, and 172) that
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`purport to provide testimony concerning the conception of the invention, the
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`problem purportedly solved by the inventor, and alleged secondary considerations.
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`Although Mr. Thomas is offered as an “expert witness,” substantial portions
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`of his testimony are not expert opinions. Rather, Mr. Thomas merely repeats,
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`summarizes, and/or characterizes various statements made by declarants outside of
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`this proceeding. This is not testimony based on “scientific, technical, or other
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`specialized knowledge” as contemplated by Rule 702. Rather, TT is impermissibly
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`using Mr. Thomas “as a conduit for introducing hearsay under the guise that the
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`testifying expert used the hearsay as the basis of his testimony.” Marvel
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`Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
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`The Federal Rules contemplate that an expert’s testimony will be based on
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`three sources: (1) first hand observation by the expert; (2) presentation at trial; or
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`(3) the kinds of facts or data that that an expert in the field would reasonably rely
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`on in forming an opinion. FRE 703, 1972 Advisory Committee Notes. None of
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`these sources apply to the testimony set forth below. Rather, Mr. Thomas offers
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`testimony based upon evidence presented at a different trial, before a different
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`tribunal, involving different parties. Neither the Federal Rules nor the Board’s rules
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`permit such testimony from an expert.
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`Examples of Mr. Thomas’s improper “opinion” testimony include:
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` at ¶ 75, explaining and characterizing as “remarkable” a third party’s alleged
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`reaction to TT’s alleged commercial embodiment;
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` at ¶¶ 83–86, describing and characterizing what motivated the inventors to
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`develop the claimed subject matter;
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` at ¶¶ 89–92, describing the alleged development of a commercial embodiment;
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` at ¶¶ 94–95, describing what one inventor “believed” the benefits of the
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`invention to be and the inventor’s purported efforts to commercialize the
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`alleged invention;
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` at ¶ 96, offering testimony that the inventor’s “belief in the potential of the
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`invention was justified;”
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` at ¶¶ 102–103, summarizing and providing direct quotes of third parties to
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`characterize the alleged initial skepticism of TT’s alleged commercial
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`embodiment as “significant”;
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` at ¶ 106, describing and characterizing what one inventor and other third parties
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`considered “unexpected” about the results of the claimed subject matter;
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` at ¶¶ 104, characterizing 37 direct quotes from third parties concerning the
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`alleged commercial embodiment as “widespread praise”;
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` ¶¶ 107–109, quoting and paraphrasing what some third parties said about the
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`value of the alleged commercial embodiment;
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` at ¶ 110, directly quoting and describing what one former TT executive said
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`about TT’s alleged commercial growth;
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` at ¶¶ 111, 126–128, 131, 133, 134, 136–138, 140, 141, providing images of
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`what purport to be demonstrative exhibits from the eSpeed trial regarding
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`alleged copying, directly quoting and paraphrasing what third parties have said
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`concerning copying, and characterizing third party actions as “widespread
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`copying”;
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` at ¶¶ 151–52, repeating and paraphrasing deposition testimony of third parties
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`regarding their beliefs concerning the obvious nature of the claimed invention;
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` at ¶ 153, characterizing direct quotes of three witnesses’ testimony from the
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`eSpeed district court proceedings as evidence that others in the industry
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`attempted but failed to develop improved GUI tools;
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` at ¶¶ 172, quoting and paraphrasing how other experts from the eSpeed and
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`CQG cases characterized the claimed invention.
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`All of the paragraphs discussed summarize, characterize, and/or quote from
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`transcripts, exhibits, and declarations from TT’s prior litigations. See, e.g., Ex.
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`2169B at ¶ 75 (Ex. 2210); ¶ 83 (Ex. 2211); ¶ 84–86 (Ex. 2211, Ex. 2213); ¶ 89
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`(Exs. 2211, 2216); ¶ 90–92 (Exs. 2211, 2218, 2219); ¶ 94–95 (Ex. 2211); ¶ 96
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`(Exs. 2171, 2173). Mr. Thomas is not offering expert opinions, but is instead
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`improperly acting as a “mouthpiece” for declarants who TT has shielded from
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`cross examination. See, e.g., Loeffel Steel Prod., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F.
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`Supp. 2d 794, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Rule 703 was never intended to allow oblique
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`14
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`evasions of the hearsay rule.”).
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`While an expert may generally rely on hearsay, expert testimony cannot be
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`used as a vehicle to evade the hearsay requirement. See Dukagjinih, 326 F.3d at
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`57–59. Rule 702 requires that expert testimony be “based on sufficient facts or
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`data” to be admissible. FRE 702(b). By simply repeating or summarizing the
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`hearsay testimony discussed, Thomas has crossed the line from permissibly relying
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`on hearsay to form his expert opinion to impermissibly being a mere conduit for
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`hearsay. Dukagjinih, 326 F.3d at 57–59; see also Lakah v. UBS AG, 996 F. Supp.
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`2d 250, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The Board should therefore exclude at least the rank
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`hearsay portions of Exhibit 2169B paragraphs 75, 83–86, 89–92, 94–97, 102–104,
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`106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34, 136–138, 140, 141, 151–153, and 172.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons set forth above, Exhibits 2210–2214, 2216, 2218–2225,
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`2227–2229, 2232, 2239–2247, 2250-2278, 2283, 2286-2288, and 2292-2296
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`should be excluded. In addition, at least Paragraphs 75, 83–86, 89–92, 94–97, 102–
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`104, 106–111, 126–128, 131, 133–34, 136–138, 140, 141, 151–153, and 172 of the
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`Thomas Declaration (Ex. 2169B) should also be excluded.
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`Dated: September 23, 2016
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/John C. Phillips/
`John C. Phillips, Reg. No. 35,322
`Attorney for Petitioners
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`15
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`Case CBM2015-00161
`Attorney Docket No. 41919-0005CP1
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Pursuant to 37 CFR §§ 42.6(e)(4) and 42.205(b), the undersigned certifies
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`that on September 23, 2016, a complete and entire copy of this Petitioner’s Motion
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`to Exclude was provided via email to the Patent Owner by serving the
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`correspondence address of record as follows:
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`Erika H. Arner, Joshua L. Goldberg, Kevin D. Rodkey,
`Rachel L. Emsley, and Cory C. Bell
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
`Email: erika.arner@finnegan.com
`joshua.goldberg@finnegan.com
`kevin.rodkey@finnegan.com
`rachel.emsley@finnegan.com
`cory.bell@finnegan.com
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`Steven F. Borsand
`Trading Technologies International, Inc.
`Email: tt-patent-cbm@tradingtechnologies.com
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`Michael D. Gannon, Leif R. Sigmond, Jr., and Jennifer M. Kurcz
`McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP
`Email: gannon@mbhb.com
`sigmond@mbhb.com
`kurcz@mbhb.com
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`/Diana Bradley/
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`Diana Bradley
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`60 South Sixth Street, Suite 3200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`(858) 678-5667
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