`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________________
`
`
`IBG LLC,
`INTERACTIVE BROKERS LLC, TRADESTATION GROUP, INC.,
`TRADESTATION SECURITIES, INC.,
`Petitioners
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`
`Case CBM2015-00161
`Patent No. 6,766,304
`_____________________
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`MOTION TO SUBMIT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
`AND BRIEFING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.223(b)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop “Patent Board”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Case CBM2015-00161 of
`U.S. Patent No. 6,766,304
`
`
`I.
`
`TT could have approached the district court at any time to seek relief
`from the protective order, but it chose to wait. .......................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`TT does not explain why it delayed until June 2016 when it had
`much of the material since late in 2015. ............................................... 3
`
`TT’s ability to get relief from the protective order never
`depended on Petitioners’ waiver, or the Board granting TT any
`discovery. .............................................................................................. 5
`
`TT should have promptly sought relief from the district court
`once it knew of a need to use discovery subject to the protective
`order. ...................................................................................................... 5
`
`II.
`
`It is not in the interests of justice to allow TT to submit new
`arguments and evidence less than three weeks before Petitioners’
`Reply is due. ................................................................................................... 7
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`TT fails to establish the relevance of this evidence under the
`applicable legal standards for patentability. .......................................... 8
`
`Petitioners would be further prejudiced if TT’s motion is
`granted. ................................................................................................ 14
`
`III. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 15
`
`
`
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`Case CBM2015-00161 of
`U.S. Patent No. 6,766,304
`The Board should deny Trading Technologies International, Inc.’s (TT) mo-
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`
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`tion to submit supplemental information and briefing in this case. (Paper 90.)
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`TT seeks to introduce over 1,000 pages of additional evidence and 10 pages
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`of new argument to an already enormous record. But TT has not demonstrated why
`
`the interests of justice merit a supplementation of its 77 page Patent Owner Re-
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`sponse and thousands of pages of evidence submitted in support thereof. Rather,
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`TT expends most of its motion attempting to shift the blame to Petitioners for its
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`own failure to seek appropriate relief under the district court’s protective order.
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`In the district court, the parties agreed long ago in 2011 to the terms of the
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`protective order, and the parties produced confidential discovery in reliance there-
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`on. The terms of that protective order preclude any party—Petitioners and TT—
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`from using confidential information in proceedings before the Office without either
`
`the consent of the disclosing party or a further order from the district court. That
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`restriction makes sense because this proceeding concerns different issues and is
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`supposed to be a streamlined, cost-effective procedure with very limited discovery.
`
`Because TT has had at least some of the documents it now seeks to submit since
`
`2015, it could have sought relief from the district court sooner but elected to wait
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`until June 13, 2016. TT has nobody but itself to blame for its own delay.
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`TT also offers no reasonable explanation for its delay. Instead, TT casts
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`blame on Petitioners for not consenting to TT’s unrestricted use of their confiden-
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`Case CBM2015-00161 of
`U.S. Patent No. 6,766,304
`tial information. (Paper 90 at 5.) But Petitioners have consented to limited uses of
`
`
`
`their information, while objecting to TT’s demand for a wholesale abrogation of
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`the protective order. For example, Petitioners agreed that TT could submit a subset
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`of confidential documents to the Board so that TT could refer to them when asking
`
`for additional discovery. And for purposes of this motion, Petitioners agreed that
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`TT could summarize and refer to Petitioners’ confidential information. Petitioners
`
`have been reasonable; TT has not.
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`TT has also not shown that the interests of justice warrant the submission of
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`supplemental information. Among other things, TT is attempting to shift its theory
`
`of commercial success from its own product to TS and IBG products. TT acknowl-
`
`edges that its Patent Owner Response does not address whether Matrix and Book-
`
`Trader windows embody the challenged claims, promising to cover this issue in
`
`supplemental briefing. But Rule 42.223(b) is not a vehicle for changing theories.
`
`Even if the Board authorizes TT to file supplemental evidence, TT should not be
`
`permitted to argue new theories of patentability midstream.
`
`Finally, TT’s request for 10 additional pages of briefing would be unduly
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`prejudicial to Petitioners. Petitioners’ Reply is due in 15 business days. The burden
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`of responding to any brief submitted by TT accompanied by these numerous, vo-
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`luminous exhibits would be a significant hardship. While the number of documents
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`at issue has been narrowed from almost 100 to the present 10, that is still 10 docu-
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`Case CBM2015-00161 of
`U.S. Patent No. 6,766,304
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`ments too many two months too late.
`
`I.
`
`TT could have approached the district court at any time to seek relief
`from the protective order, but it chose to wait.
`
`Under Rule 42.223(b), TT bears the burden of establishing that it “reasona-
`
`bly could not have” obtained the information earlier and submitted it with its Pa-
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`tent Owner Response. TT cannot establish that it reasonably could not have gone
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`to the district court for relief from the protective order earlier than it did.
`
`TT has had many of the documents it now seeks to introduce in its posses-
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`sion since 2015. Thus, TT had reason to know that it needed relief from the protec-
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`tive order last year. TT attempts to excuse its delay by accusing Petitioners of ob-
`
`struction. That characterization is false. TT’s ability to get relief from the protec-
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`tive order never depended on Petitioners’ waiving any objection. Nor did it depend
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`on the Board granting TT any discovery. TT had the obligation to seek relief from
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`the district court once it knew that it wanted to use Petitioners’ confidential infor-
`
`mation in this proceeding. TT offers no explanation for what it did, if anything, to
`
`approach the district court before June, when it filed its emergency motion.
`
`A. TT does not explain why it delayed until June 2016 when it had much
`of the material since late in 2015.
`
`TT obscures how long it has had many of these documents, claiming that it
`
`“did not receive all of the documents, testimony, or authentication of the evidence
`
`until the second week of June” and thus could not have submitted it sooner. (Paper
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,766,304
`90 at 2.) But it is irrelevant that TT did not have “all” of what it now seeks to sub-
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`
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`mit. Many of these documents were produced late in 2015, including Exhibits
`
`2143-2145.1 Knowing as early as November 2015 that it had documents subject to
`
`the protective order, TT should have raised the issue with the district court prompt-
`
`ly. If the district court had granted TT relief from the protective order, TT would
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`not have faced further obstacles to submitting any later obtained documents.
`
`During the conference call authorizing this motion, the Board asked Peti-
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`tioners why they did not agree to waive the terms of the protective order earlier.
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`(Ex. 2393 at 11:20-13:20.) The answer to the Board’s inquiry is that Petitioners
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`reasonably exercised their right not to voluntarily grant exceptions to the standing
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`protective order. TT initially asked Petitioners to agree that any confidential infor-
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`mation produced in the district court could be used in this proceeding. Petitioners
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`believed that TT’s request was over broad, and the district court ultimately agreed
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`with Petitioners. (Ex. 2402 at 13:9-25.) When TT eventually approached the dis-
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`trict court, Petitioners agreed to a compromise so as to minimize the burden to the
`
`district court. Had TT approached Petitioners sooner with a more limited subset of
`
`
`1 TT represents that it did not “discover the relevance of” PDX 3043 until
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`June 2016. (Paper 90 at 12.) But that is not the standard. TT similarly does not in-
`
`dicate when it obtained possession of proffered Exhibit 2158. (Paper 90 at 15.)
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`documents, the parties may have been able to reach a resolution. Petitioners have
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`
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`never agreed to a blanket waiver of the protective order, given the sensitive nature
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`and lack of relevance to these proceedings of most of the produced documents.
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`Regardless of these circumstances, Rule 42.223(b) concerns whether the
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`proponent reasonably could have obtained the information earlier. TT reasonably
`
`could have gone to the district court at any time, notwithstanding Petitioners’ op-
`
`position. It does not matter whether or why Petitioners withdrew their objections.
`
`B. TT’s ability to get relief from the protective order never depended on
`Petitioners’ waiver, or the Board granting TT any discovery.
`
`In its motion, TT paints the picture that Petitioners have been the sole obsta-
`
`cle to getting relief from the protective order. That is incorrect. TT always could
`
`have obtained, and eventually did obtain, relief from the district court. (Ex. 2402 at
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`13:9-25) (opening the protective order for the purpose of allowing TT to submit
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`certain materials to the Board). Indeed, the protective order fully contemplates that
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`parties will apply to the district court for modifications. (Ex. 2407 at 17.) Had TT
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`simply approached the district court within a reasonable amount of time before its
`
`due date, TT could have obtained permission to use litigation discovery in its Pa-
`
`tent Owner Response. Despite the convenience of blaming someone else, it is not
`
`Petitioners’ fault that TT failed to pursue the proper relief in a timely manner.
`
`C. TT should have promptly sought relief from the district court once it
`knew of a need to use discovery subject to the protective order.
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`TT also claims that the Board’s denial of its discovery request on June 24
`
`
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`meant that “there was no time for TT to seek relief from the district court prior to
`
`filing the PORs.” (Paper 90 at 4.) But when a protective order issued by a district
`
`court limits the use of discovery in a proceeding before the Office, parties are obli-
`
`gated to seek relief from the district court before availing themselves of discovery
`
`before the Board, which is limited by design. See, e.g., Meyer Products, LLC v.
`
`Douglas Dynamics, L.L.C., IPR2015-01247, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2016)
`
`(explaining that a party “must first seek such guidance from the District Court for
`
`relief in the first instance” where it seeks to use confidential documents subject to a
`
`district court protective order); Daifuku Co., Ltd. v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.,
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`IPR2015-00083, Paper 17 (P.T.A.B. July 2, 2016) (same); Electronic Frontier
`
`Foundation v. Personal Audio, LLC, IPR2014-00070, Paper 32 (P.T.A.B. July 29,
`
`2014) (same). As such, TT’s inappropriate efforts to compel discovery before the
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`Board do not count as diligence. TT’s recourse has never been limited by the
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`Board’s ability to grant discovery, or Petitioners unwillingness to waive the protec-
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`tive order. Neither the Board’s denial, nor Petitioners’ objection, excuses TT’s de-
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`lay in seeking relief before the district court.
`
`In sum, TT’s motion lacks any explanation as to why TT did not pursue re-
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`lief from the district court promptly. For this reason alone, TT has not met its bur-
`
`den under Rule 42.223(b). Such relief likely would have been granted, as the dis-
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`trict court has since opened the protective order to allow TT to use the documents
`
`
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`in question for appropriate purposes before the Board. (Ex. 2402 at 13:9-25.)
`
`II.
`
`It is not in the interests of justice to allow TT to submit new arguments
`and evidence less than three weeks before Petitioners’ Reply is due.
`
`Even if TT’s unexplained delay can be overlooked, it is not in the interests
`
`of justice to allow additional evidence and briefing at this stage in the proceeding.
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`Importantly, much of TT’s new evidence relates to arguments it did not directly
`
`raise in its Patent Owner response. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion essentially
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`seeks leave to raise new arguments in addition to supplemental evidence.
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`TT cites a Board decision for the proposition that supplemental information
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`should be admitted because “trial is, first and foremost, a search for the truth.” (Pa-
`
`per 90 at 6) (citing Edmund Optics, Inc. v. Semrock, Inc., IPR2014-00599, Paper
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`44 at 4 (P.T.A.B. May 5, 2015)). But in Edmunds Optics, the Board was evaluating
`
`evidence that would aid in “discern[ing] whether the scientific evidence that is
`
`submitted in an IPR is reliable.” Id. In contrast, the evidence TT proffers here ap-
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`pears only to bolster the atmospherics of its Patent Owner Response. As in its Pa-
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`tent Owner Response, TT fails to establish the relevance of this evidence under the
`
`applicable legal standards. Consequently, TT has failed to demonstrate that any of
`
`the documents will meaningfully inform an issue of patentability in this trial.
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`With respect to timing and prejudice, it is almost two months after TT filed
`
`its Patent Owner Response, and less than three weeks before Petitioners’ Reply is
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`due. As demonstrated below, it is onerous to address even one of these documents.
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`
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`TT should not be rewarded for its unjustified delay, to Petitioners’ detriment.
`
`A. TT fails to establish the relevance of this evidence under the applicable
`legal standards for patentability.
`
`Much of the evidence that TT seeks to introduce evidence relates to various
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`commercial products and is premised on the vague assertion that they embody fea-
`
`tures of the patent. (Paper 90 at 8-15.) There is a fundamental dispute, however,
`
`concerning whether the MD_Trader product, Matrix, and BookTrader windows
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`embody any of the claims at issue in this proceeding. With respect to MD_Trader,
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`TT relies on a 2010 Federal Circuit decision that refers to MD_Trader as “one of
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`TT’s commercial embodiments of the [’304 and ’132] patents.” (Paper 90 at 8)
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`(quoting Trading Tech. v. eSpeed, Int’l, 595 F.3d 1340, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (em-
`
`phasis added.)). But this isolated quote does not establish that any claims at issue
`
`in this proceeding embody MD_Trader, or any other commercial product. Without
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`first establishing that the proffered evidence refers specifically to a commercial
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`embodiment of a challenged claim, the proffer lacks relevance to an issue in trial.3
`
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`3 ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp., 700 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
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`2012) (explaining that nexus must be with respect to “the claimed combination of
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`elements that constitutes the invention, rather than [what] was not claimed and al-
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`ready known in the prior art, or from other unclaimed features”).
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`With respect to the Matrix and BookTrader windows products, TT’s Patent
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`
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`Owner Response never argued that these are commercial embodiments of any
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`claim. TT concedes as much by asking the Board for 10 pages of additional brief-
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`ing to make this argument. (Paper 90 at 8.) But if TT wished to rely upon those
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`products to support its theories of patentability, it could have done so in its Patent
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`Owner Response. Rule 42.223(b) should not be used as an opportunity to change
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`theories midstream. TT’s belated attempt to pivot its theory should be rejected.
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`1. Bartleman Deposition Transcripts
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`TT seeks to introduce two deposition transcripts from John Bartleman, the
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`CEO of TS. (Paper 90 at 9-11.) TT argues these are relevant to patent eligibility
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`and nonobviousness. (Id.) TT took the depositions at issue on June 8-9, 2016.
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`The Bartleman deposition transcripts are not relevant to whether the chal-
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`lenged claims recite patent eligible subject matter. Patent eligibility is a question of
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`law. See, e.g., In re Roslin Inst., 750 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Section
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`101 patent eligibility is a question of law . . . .”) Bartleman is a corporate officer .
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`His testimony does not inform whether the claims as a whole, in light of the speci-
`
`fication, recite patent eligible subject matter. See Internet Patents Corp. v. Active
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`Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that the “directed
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`to” inquiry regarding the claims is “in light of the specification” to evaluate wheth-
`
`er “their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”)
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`With respect to whether the claims are obvious, TT has not explained how
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`
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`Bartleman’s testimony supports nonobviousness from the perspective of a person
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`having ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
`
`417 (2007). TT has not established that what is cited in Bartleman’s deposition tes-
`
`timony represents evidence that is “reasonably commensurate in scope with the
`
`claims,” and that is not solely attributable to elements disclosed in the prior art. S.
`
`Alabama Med. Sci. Found. v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 823, 827 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`Specifically, evidence of commercial success is relevant only if it is shown
`
`that there is nexus between the commercial success and the claimed subject matter.
`
`See In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2012). TT has
`
`failed to offer proof that the proffered evidence of nonobviousness resulted direct-
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`ly from the unique characteristics of the claimed subject matter, as opposed to what
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`was known in the prior art. Id. at 1299-1300. Absent even a facial showing of nex-
`
`us, the proffered evidence is irrelevant to nonobviousness.
`
`The same nexus requirement applies to copying, and again TT has failed to
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`present even a facial showing of nexus. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Ad-
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`ams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] nexus between the
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`copying and the novel aspects of the claimed invention must exist for evidence of
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`copying.”) Furthermore, TT has not explained how Bartleman’s testimony consti-
`
`tutes evidence of “efforts to replicate a specific product,” through evidence akin to
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`“internal company documents, direct evidence such as disassembling a patented
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`
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`prototype, photographing its features, and using the photograph as a blueprint to
`
`build a replica, or access to the patented product combined with substantial similar-
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`ity to the patented product.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2010). Evidence that a corporate executive merely “look[ed] at” something, as
`
`TT alleges, fails to meet this standard by a wide margin. (Paper 90 at 11.)
`
`2. Exhibit 2144 and PDX 3043
`
`TT seeks to introduce Exhibit 2144, described as a document that allegedly
`
`provides technical specifications for TS’s Matrix product. (Paper 90 at 11-12.) TT
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`admits that it had possession of this document in December 2015. TT also seeks to
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`introduce PDX 3043, described as a website printout related to MD_Trader. TT
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`does not indicate when it had possession of this document. TT argues that both
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`documents are relevant to patent eligibility and nonobviousness.
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`TT alleges that “copying of the claimed features of TT’s product is evident”
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`from comparing Exhibit 2144 and PDX 3043 side by side. (Paper 90 at 12.) This
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`does not meet the standard for relevance with respect to copying either. See Wyers,
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`616 F.3d at 1246 (“Not every competing product that arguably falls within the
`
`scope of a patent is evidence of copying.”) TT comes nowhere close to alleging
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`that the proffered evidence shows “direct evidence” of copying. Id. Nor does TT
`
`provide a substantiated theory for why Exhibit 2144 is probative as evidence of
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`why the claims are “not obvious” or recite “an inventive concept” from the per-
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`
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`spective of a person having ordinary skill in the art. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
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`3. Exhibit 2145
`
`TT seeks to introduce Exhibit 2145, described as a TS Options Manual. (Pa-
`
`per 90 at 12-13.) TT admits that it received this document in November 2015. TT
`
`argues that the document is relevant to patent eligibility, but is conclusory and fails
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`to explain why it is probative. Patent eligibility is a question of law assessed based
`
`on the claims in light of the specification. In re Roslin Inst., 750 F.3d at 1335; In-
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`ternet Patents Corp., 790 F.3d at 1346. TT provides no support for the relevance of
`
`such extrinsic evidence to this inquiry. TT similarly does not substantiate, but
`
`merely asserts, that some benefit is “directly attributable to the claimed features.”
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`(Paper 90 at 13.) TT does not specify which features or why this is the case.
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`4. Exhibit 2143
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`TT seeks to introduce Exhibit 2143, described as an interview given by Mr.
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`Bartleman. (Paper 90 at 13.) TT admits that it had possession of this document in
`
`November 2015. TT argues that Exhibit 2143 is relevant to alleged evidence of
`
`commercial success. As explained, such evidence is only relevant if TT first estab-
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`lishes a valid nexus. S. Alabama Med. Sci. Found., 808 F.3d at 827; In re Applied
`
`Materials, 692 F.3d at 1299. Having failed to specify even a basis for nexus, the
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`evidence is irrelevant.
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`5. PDX 3046
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`TT seeks to introduce PDX 3046, described as an e-mail from a TS employ-
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`ee. (Paper 90 at 14.) TT admits that it had possession of this document in May
`
`2016. TT argues that the document is relevant as alleged evidence of commercial
`
`success. As explained, such evidence is only relevant if TT first establishes a valid
`
`nexus. S. Alabama Med. Sci. Found., 808 F.3d at 827; In re Applied Materials, 692
`
`F.3d at 1299. Having failed to specify even a basis for nexus, the evidence is irrel-
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`evant.
`
`6. Exhibit 2154
`
`TT seeks to introduce Exhibit 2154, which is a deposition transcript of Milak
`
`Galik of IB. (Paper 90 at 14.) TT took the depositions at issue on June 13, 2016. It
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`is entirely unclear from TT’s motion under what theory TT believes the evidence is
`
`relevant. Exhibit 2154 is proffered as evidence concerning whether GUIs are pure-
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`ly nonfunctional. TT does not associate this contention with any point made in its
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`Patent Owner Response. The probative value of such a contention, even if true, is
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`further limited because TT has not explained how it is relevant to patentability.
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`7. Exhibit 2156
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`TT seeks to introduce Exhibit 2156, described as an e-mail from Mr. Galik.
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`(Paper 90 at 14-15.) TT claims that the document was produced in June 2016. TT
`
`argues that the document is relevant to patent eligibility and nonobviousness.
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`TT’s motion is conclusory with respect to the alleged relevance of Exhibit
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`
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`2156. As explained, patent eligibility is a question of law assessed based on the
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`claims in light of the specification. In re Roslin Inst., 750 F.3d at 1335; Internet
`
`Patents Corp., 790 F.3d at 1346. TT provides no support for the relevance of such
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`extrinsic evidence to this inquiry. TT asserts that “there is a nexus between the
`
`claimed inventions’ features and commercial success.” (Paper 90 at 15.) But the
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`alleged evidence does not tend to show commercial success merely because a sin-
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`gle user disparaged a product that lacked a feature, without more. In re Applied
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`Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d at 1299-1300 (explain that the source of nexus cannot be
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`attributed to other economic and commercial factors present in the prior art).
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`8. Exhibit 2158
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`TT seeks to introduce Exhibit 2158, described as an e-mail from Mr. Galik.
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`(Paper 90 at 15.) TT does not indicate when it was first in possession of the docu-
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`ment. TT argues that the document is relevant to patent eligibility. Patent eligibility
`
`is a question of law assessed based on the claims in light of the specification. In re
`
`Roslin Inst., 750 F.3d at 1335; Internet Patents Corp., 790 F.3d at 1346. TT pro-
`
`vides no support for the relevance of such extrinsic evidence to this inquiry.
`
`B. Petitioners would be further prejudiced if TT’s motion is granted.
`
`TT repeatedly asserts that Petitioners will not be prejudiced. That is incor-
`
`rect. Petitioners have already been prejudiced and stand to be prejudiced more.
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`TT’s repeated attempts to circumvent the protective order have injected un-
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`
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`necessary delay and vexation into these proceedings, culminating with the present
`
`motion. While TT’s quest to submit close to a hundred documents has been nar-
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`rowed to 10, that is 10 documents too many and two months too late. TT should
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`not get a second bite at the apple, either with respect to additional briefing or the
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`opportunity to submit evidence. As a matter of fairness, Petitioners’ Reply is due in
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`less than three weeks and the burden of responding to any brief submitted by TT in
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`addition to these exhibits would impose a significant hardship on Petitioners.
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`TT suggests that the Board must grant its motion because much of it relates
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`to secondary considerations. (Paper 90 at 7.) But the Federal Circuit has clarified
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`that nothing in the regulation “require[s] an automatic acceptance of, supplemental
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`information.” Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 448
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`(Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, TT is in no way entitled to submit belated argument and ev-
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`idence in support of a case it should of have made over two months ago.
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`III. Conclusion
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`For the reasons set forth above, TT’s motion to file supplemental infor-
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`mation (Paper 90) should be denied.
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`Case CBM2015-00161 of
`U.S. Patent No. 6,766,304
` Respectfully Submitted,
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`Date: August 22, 2016
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`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005-3934
`(202) 371-2600
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`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
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`/Robert Sokohl/
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`Robert E. Sokohl, Reg. No. 36,013
`Attorney for Petitioners
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`- 16 -
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`Case CBM2015-00161
`Attorney Docket No: 41919-0005CP1
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Pursuant to 37 CFR §§ 42.6(e)(4) and 42.205(b), the undersigned certifies
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`that on August 22, 2016, a complete and entire copy of this Petitioners’ Opposition
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`to Patent Owner’s Motion to Submit Supplemental Information and Briefing was
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`provided via email to the Patent Owner by serving the correspondence address of
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`record as follows:
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`Erika H. Arner, Joshua L. Goldberg, Kevin D. Rodkey,
`Rachel L. Emsley and Cory C. Bell
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
`Email:
`erika.arner@finnegan.com
`joshua.goldberg@finnegan.com
`kevin.rodkey@finnegan.com
`rachel.emsley@finnegan.com
`cory.bell@finnegan.com
`trading-tech-CBM@finnegan.com
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`Steven F. Borsand
`Trading Technologies International, Inc.
`Email:
`tt-patent-cbm@tradingtechnologies.com
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`Michael D. Gannon, Leif R. Sigmond, Jr. and Jennifer M. Kurcz
`McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP
`Email:
`gannon@mbhb.com
`sigmond@mbhb.com
`kurcz@mbhb.com
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`/Diana Bradley/
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`Diana Bradley
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`60 South Sixth Street, Suite 3200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`(858) 678-5667
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`