`
`
`
`EXHIBIT 1026
`
`
`
`
`TO PETITIONER GOOGLE INC.’S
`PETITION FOR COVERED BUSINESS
`METHOD REVIEW OF
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,334,720
`
`

`

`PRACTICAL AVIATION
`SECU RITY
`
`PREDICTING AND PREVENTING FUTURE THREATS
`fiEEUHD EBITIDN
`
`—'—
`__._
`
`Jiffrw [. Prim, HI and Jrfirw 5. Farm“. Phil
`
`11m
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00001
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00001
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00001
`
`

`

` I‘M
`
`5'5
`
`'I
`_
`':
`:14";
`
`"-'
`I: "
`g
`':__
`I,
`I
`' H ,m '
`
`PREDICTING AND PREVENTING FUTURE THREATS
`
`‘suuua EDITION _
`
`PRACTICAL AVIATION
`SECURITY
`
`
`
`Jeffrey C. Price, HA and Jeffrey S. Forrest, PhD
`
`L
`
`t.
`
`:1;
`.'
`'
`
`\-___
`
`r1.-
`
`_ r
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00002
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00002
`
`

`

`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00003
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00003
`
`

`

`Practical Aviation Security
`
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00004
`
`

`

`Predicting and Preventing Future Threats
`
`Second Edition
`
`Jeffrey C. Price, MA
`
`Jeffrey S. Forrest, PhD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00005
`
`

`

`Copyright
`
`
`Acquiring Editor: Pamela Chester
`Senior Editorial Project Manager: Amber Hodge
`Project Manager: Priya Kumaraguruparan
`Designer: Greg Harris
`
`Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier
`225 Wyman Street, Waltham, MA 02451, USA
`The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford OX5 1 GB UK
`
`First edition 2009
`Second edition 2013
`
`© 2013, 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
`
`No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information
`storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Details on how to seek permission, further information about the Publisher’s permissions
`policies and our arrangements with organizations such as the Copyright Clearance Center and the Copyright Licensing Agency, can be found at our website:
`www.elsevier.com/permissions.
`
`Notice
`No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from
`any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in
`particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made
`
`
`
`British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
`A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
`
`Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
`Price, Jeffrey C.
` Practical aviation security : predicting and preventing future threats / Jeffrey C. Price, MA, Jeffrey S. Forrest, PhD. — Second edition.
` pages cm
` Includes bibliographical references and index.
`1. Aeronautics—Security measures. I. Forrest, Jeffrey S. II. Title.
` TL725.3.S44P746 2013
` 387.7068′4–dc23
`2012050432
`
`ISBN: 978-0-12-391419-4
`
`For information on all Butterworth-Heinemann publications visit our web site at store.elsevier.com
`
`
`
`Printed and bound in United States of America
`13 14 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00006
`
`

`

`Introduction
`
`Throughout most of the history of aviation, terrorists and criminals have used aircraft and airports to conduct many forms of unlawful activity. Examples include special-
`interest groups or terrorists using aviation to gain geopolitical attention and criminals using commercial or general aviation to smuggle drugs. In these cases, aviation has
`provided a public stage for the former and an expedient distribution channel for the latter. Aviation is essential to sustaining the economic viability of world commerce, the
`movement of people and cargo, and the flow of information and knowledge throughout society. Therefore, it is essential that those responsible for protecting the aviation
`industry are proactive in developing and implementing strategic and tactical systems that are effective in helping to mitigate criminal and terrorist activity.
`The aviation industry is composed of a series of overlapping operational areas or “systems of systems” that security personnel must protect. Examples include the
`management of passenger needs, such as parking, baggage check-in, screening (Figure 1.1), and other requirements (health concerns, guarding secured areas, etc.). Those
`responsible for each area must work in harmony to maintain aviation as an effective form of global transportation. Evaluating effectiveness in aviation security requires a
`variety of methods—from ratios used to develop metrics (baggage throughput, passenger flow, etc.), to extensive security evaluations conducted by various government
`agencies and private corporations.
`
`
`
`Figure 1.1 Passengers go through security screening at Denver International Airport.
`Aviation is an effective and efficient mode of transportation affecting worldwide social and economic stability. As such, aviation is a target that both terrorists and
`criminals highly desire.
`The ability of aviation to move people and property faster than competing forms of transportation is essential to its economic viability. The Internet and related
`technologies such as videoconferencing and telecommuting provide additional options to transport information, knowledge, or products and services. The advantage aviation
`has over rail, trucking, and watercraft is speed, whereas its advantage over videoconferencing is that people still generally prefer face-to-face communication.
`Sustained criminal or terrorist activity on aviation could cause a shift in passenger demand from airline travel, of which business travel is a significant percentage, to
`alternate forms of interaction or travel, such as videoconferencing or privately owned or chartered aircraft. These types of changes in demand for transporting people,
`cargo, or information could present airlines with serious economic challenges.
`If business travelers switch to alternate modes of travel, commercial airlines will have to increase the cost of tickets to those passengers (usually leisure travelers) who
`cannot afford business rates. As costs increase, leisure travelers may not be able to afford air travel, resulting in more “staycations,” which do not require air travel.
`Airlines would then have to raise prices to compensate as more leisure flyers switch to ground transportation. Additionaly, many industries, such as the hotel, rental, and
`tourist industries, rely heavily on air transportation for their businesses to be successful. Repeated attacks on aviation could lead to a significant restructuring of commercial
`aviation.
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00007
`
`

`

`Aviation Industry: An Overview
`
`Despite its complex nature, the aviation industry’s primary infrastructure consists of aircraft operations, airports, and supporting agencies. Many types of aircraft are used
`in various operations around the world. These are commonly categorized as commercial service, private operations (i.e., general aviation, or GA), and military operations.
`Airports are usually categorized as commercial service, general aviation, private, or military.
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00008
`
`

`

`Aviation Security and Responding to Threats
`
`The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), were designed to damage global security and the U.S. economy—an economy reliant on aviation.
`A critical strategy for responding to terrorist threats is to moderate the response so it is appropriate and does not cause further deterioration to the economy or stability of a
`society. Terrorist organizations understand that they usually do not have the forces or resources to defeat an enemy in a traditional military conflict. Therefore, terrorists
`operate more asymmetrically, striking in ways that cause targeted countries or societies to incur loss of life, economic damage, changes in policies, or other effects. These
`attacks are usually designed with the hope that countries or societies will overreact in ways that further diminish the ability to protect or sustain safety and economic
`viability. Terrorists also know that with each subsequent attack, the targeted populace gives up more of its freedom through changes in laws and policies or by accepting
`that intrusion into private lives is unavoidable and required. In these ways, terrorists can cause economic and social degradation within nations and societies.
`In addition to appropriate responses to terrorist or criminal attacks, those charged with protecting aviation must ensure that strategies and technologies remain current
`and viable for defending against new threats. Security practitioners employing outdated strategies and tactics create opportunities for terrorists to use these systems to their
`advantage. For instance, the 9/11 attacks showed ingenuity and were organized using modern technologies (e.g., the Internet) to defeat what was then a 1970’s aviation
`security system.
`Flawed management in designing and implementing modern security systems can also create opportunity for criminals or terrorists. For example, industry is responding
`to terrorism by investing billions of dollars in research and development for improved explosives detection equipment. Of concern is that much of this technology has not
`undergone extensive testing before deployment. Although technologies used in various explosives detection equipment1 are mostly valid, the mean time before failure for
`these technologies is often low when used in a nonairport environment. The deployment of the PTDs proved to be ineffective when the units were not resilient enough to
`handle the airport environment. Many early-model explosive detection devices were not designed or tested to sustain the day-to-day usage at commercial service airport
`screening checkpoints. The industry is still catching up in developing other security strategies, such as employee security awareness and passenger profiling—strategies
`that other nations have used since the 1980s—and, perhaps most critically, the ability of our intelligence agencies to penetrate groups that represent credible threats. The
`increased focus on tracking and either arresting or eliminating known threats, such as the attack on and subsequent death of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki, have
`weakened one of aviation’s primary enemies, al-Qaeda, but others will take their place.
`In response to the challenges in aviation security, the U.S. National 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission)2 and other
`security and policy experts developed and recommended strategies that should be effectively and efficiently implemented. However, implementing new aviation security
`methods has traditionally been reactive rather than proactive. Those charged with protecting the aviation industry must adopt a philosophy of sustained proactive
`improvement. Therefore, a premise to the knowledge presented in this text is as follows:
`
`
`
`In aviation security, we must not stop moving forward in implementing proactive forms of security—our foes are committed to their cause and we must
`be exceedingly committed to ours.
`
`Although time is of the essence in commerce, it is critical in the aviation industry. Passengers must travel safely and efficiently. However, reasonable compromises need
`to be made for the system to continue functioning. A terrorist attack may be devastating and certainly tragic. Nevertheless, it would be even more tragic to allow such an
`attack to cause further economic and social damage by impeding global aviation. The ability of a security system to appropriately respond and quickly recover is a
`fundamental principle in planning and managing aviation security systems.
`As discussed, aviation is vital to the survival and growth of the world’s economy (Figure 1.2). Aviation is also a symbol of prosperity and stability among societies. An
`essential responsibility of those charged with protecting aviation is to balance responses to threats with the requirement to facilitate safe, secure, and efficient transportation
`of passengers.
`
`
`
`Figure 1.2 Aviation security embraces the protection of passengers, airports, airlines, and the national aviation system.
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00009
`
`

`

`Aviation Economics
`
`According to a study by DRI-WEFA, Inc. (2002), the economic impact of civil aviation within the United States exceeds $900 billion and provides 11 million jobs. This
`represents 9% of the U.S. gross domestic product (FY 2000). Commercial aviation is responsible for 88% of this contribution, and general aviation for 12% (p. 7).
`Commercial airlines carry between 600 and 800 million people per year and move 20–25 billion tons of cargo. Additionally, more than 160 million people travel on general
`aviation aircraft every year within the United States (DRI-WEFA, Inc., 2002).
`The United States is geographically (and socially) oriented to rely on air travel. Unlike many countries with well-organized systems that enable efficient travel internally
`and internationally by rail (and thus have less of a need for air travel), the United States has no national high-speed railway system. Additionally, the United States shares
`borders with Canada and Mexico only, further limiting opportunities for international commerce by land. As a result, the United States relies on air travel to enable
`commerce with the rest of the world.
`Although most of the world’s freight still moves via sea, the demand of just-in-time goods delivery is increasing. The primary advantages of just-in-time shipping are
`that it allows for shorter production and development cycles and eliminates excessive inventory. DRI-WEFA, Inc. (2002) also provides this summary of the influence of
`aviation on the world economy:
`
`Aviation is the primary means for economic growth with a significant influence on the quality of life of populations around the globe. Aviation
`facilitates the world economy and promotes the international exchange of people, products, investment, and ideas. Indeed, to a very large extent, civil
`aviation has enabled small community and rural populations to enter the mainstream of global commerce by linking such communities with worldwide
`population, manufacturing, and cultural centers. (p. 3)
`
`
`
`The impact of 9/11 on the aviation industry was devastating. Overall, the aviation industry experienced direct losses of $330 million per day (Kumar et al., 2003). Not
`included in this figure are losses to rental car, hotel, and tourist industries dependent on the aviation industry for customers. In addition to the direct loss of revenue, airlines
`and airports had to bear an increased cost of doing business to meet government-mandated security improvements. The costs to airports of purchasing new security
`technology and reconfiguring terminals to accept the larger security screening devices have caused airport operators to shift money from other airport capital improvement
`projects, such as runway and taxiway maintenance and expansion, to security measures. Additionally, airport operators lost revenue-producing space to accommodate new
`Transportation Security Administration (TSA) equipment and personnel, and with the deployment of advanced imaging technology (AIT), the so-called “body imagers,”
`airports have had to sacrifice even more space to make way for larger equipment and longer passenger screening lines.
`The national airspace system is both economically and operationally fragile. A delay of just 10 minutes can cost the airport and airlines significant money. Gate
`assignments at airports are often scheduled back to back, meaning that if one flight does not depart on time, the next flight will probably also depart late. This domino effect
`influences many operational considerations. In 2000, delays averaged 12 minutes per flight, totaling 142 million hours of passenger delays, and nearly $10 billion in
`associated costs to the U.S. aviation industry (DRI-WEFA, Inc., 2002, p. 7).
`Commercial aviation is composed of a myriad of coupled systems (Figure 1.3). When one part is affected, it forces change in many of the other systems. When airport
`flight operations shut down because of weather or aircraft have to be rerouted around bad weather, the entire national airspace system is impacted. When compared to
`criminal activity or terrorism, weather is relatively predictable and airport operators know how to adjust operations for the kinds of weather in their region. More important,
`weather (with few exceptions) does not generally destroy essential components of the airport and scare the public from travel, as tends to happen with a terrorist attack.
`
`
`
`Figure 1.3 Dozens of aircraft are stranded in Halifax, Nova Scotia, during the shutdown of the U.S. aviation system on 9/11.
`The importance of protecting aviation as a driver of the global economy is clear. However, the various systems used to protect aviation can impede aviation’s
`efficiencies. Security managers must balance their efforts for protecting lives and infrastructure with policies and methods that enable aviation to provide commerce with
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00010
`
`

`

`efficient and reliable service.
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00011
`
`

`

`Introduction
`
`Security policies in the United States and abroad have largely been created through public reaction to specific security incidents. Airlines started using air marshals after
`numerous hijackings in the 1960s, and the U.S. government created laws governing air piracy. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the frequency of hijackings exceeded the
`ability of the air marshals to handle them. As a result, passenger and carry-on baggage screening were adopted using technology designed to counter those specific threats.
`Hijackers were known to use guns and hand grenades in their attacks, so metal detectors and X-ray machines were used to screen for such items. When aircraft were
`bombed in the 1960s and 1970s, dynamite was often the preferred explosive, which can be identified by an X-ray operator. Plastic explosives were not commonly used at
`that time, so security policy makers did not focus on the detection of plastics. Even as plastics became the explosive of choice in the 1980s and 1990s, airlines did not adjust
`and continued using conventional X-ray machines and metal detectors, neither of which can reliably detect plastic explosives.
`In the 1980s, new security strategies were developed in response to the Air India Flight 182 and Pan Am Flight 103 bombings. Two notable hijackings in the 1980s,
`TWA Flight 847 and PSA Flight 1771, spurred additional policy and procedural development, specifically in the areas of airport access control and credentialing (i.e.,
`badging and background checks). The 1990s brought more security legislation, and more policies and procedures as legislators responded to the bombing of the World
`Trade Center in 1993, and in 1995 to the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City and Operation Bojinka.1 In 2001, the United States implemented the largest
`aviation security system overhaul ever in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were a watershed event for global aviation
`security.
`Unfortunately, the industry as a whole did not keep up with the evolving terrorist threat until after 9/11, and debate continues over whether the United States should, or
`could, have done more to prevent the 9/11 hijackings. Policy makers face a dilemma in determining the development of national security policy: If there has not been a
`major incident to incite massive change (and massive government spending), then the populace criticizes the government for wasting money. If, however, there is a
`significant incident, the populace criticizes the government for not acting soon enough. Without the events of 9/11 and regardless of the intelligence available beforehand, it
`is likely that there would have been little public support for the massive changes and spending the U.S. government subsequently implemented.
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00012
`
`

`

`International Civil Aviation Organization
`
`When security practitioners need guidance and help, they can often look to the ICAO. The ICAO was established at the Convention on International Civil Aviation in
`Chicago on December 7, 1944. Its purpose is to “secure international cooperation and highest possible degree of uniformity in regulations and standards, procedures, and
`organization regarding civil aviation matters” (ICAO, 2006). Most of the security regulations in place at the world’s airports can be traced either to ICAO Annex 17 or to
`the ICAO Security Manual. Although ICAO’s guidelines are not mandated, they are commonly practiced throughout the U.S. aviation security system. Over time, the
`U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contributed significantly to the development of ICAO policies.
`The ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with the administration of the principles laid out at the convention, which includes ensuring the safe
`and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world. The ICAO’s mission also includes developing standards related to airport, airway, and air navigation
`facility development, and to promote the safety of flight in international air navigation. The assembly meets at least once every three years. Each contracting state is
`entitled to one vote, and decisions of the assembly are decided by a majority. There are now 188 member states.
`Related to aviation security is Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention and the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for safeguarding international civil
`aviation.2 The ICAO publishes a security manual that contains guidance on the interpretation and implementation of SARPs. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on
`September 11, 2001, the ICAO developed an Aviation Security Plan of Action for strengthening aviation security worldwide.
`A significant concept developed at the Chicago Convention in 1944 was that of an “aircraft in distress.” It is a fundamental humanitarian principle to assist another
`contracting state when an entity of that state is in danger. This principle has long required vessels from other countries on the high seas to respond to vessels in distress, no
`matter the reason for that distress, and render all available assistance. The Chicago Convention felt that this “law” should include aircraft from contracting states and
`therefore included “aircraft in distress” as part of the convention. The committee drafting the convention did not provide descriptors of what constituted “distress,” thus
`allowing countries to come up with their own definitions. The freedom of a contracting state to decide what constitutes distress has been criticized. This policy was
`questioned in the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, when flight controllers in Beirut and Algiers repeatedly denied permission for the hijacked flight to land.
`
`ICAO Annex 17: Security
`
`Annex 17 to the ICAO Convention—Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference—addresses findings and guidance developed over
`the years related to aviation security practices. The best practices are provided in the ICAO’s The Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of
`Unlawful Interference.
`Annex 17 set the first definitions in the industry for terms such as screening, regulated agent, and security-restricted area. Annex 17 also established guidance on
`key security issues including the following:
`• Measures and procedures to prevent unauthorized access to the airfield
`• Development of training programs
`• Isolation of security-processed passengers
`• Inspection of aircraft for concealed weapons or other dangerous devices
`• Prisoner transport
`• Law enforcement officer checked-baggage transport
`• Cargo and mail screening
`• Incorporation of security considerations into airport design
`• Background checks for aviation employees
`• Passenger/baggage reconciliation
`• Security measures for catering supplies and operators
`And, after 2001:
`• Access control standards
`• New standards for passenger, carry-on, and checked-baggage screening
`• In-flight security personnel
`• Protection of the cockpit
`An interesting contrast can be made in comparing ICAO standards and international security practices and aviation security practices in the United States. The
`following demonstrates that contrast: On August 25, 2006, dynamite was found in the checked-baggage hold of a Continental Airlines flight as it arrived into the
`Houston/Bush Intercontinental Airport from Buenos Aires, Argentina. After this discovery, newspaper services referenced a U.S. Department of Homeland Security
`study. The study found that many countries, while exceeding ICAO standards for checked-baggage screening, do not meet the U.S. standards. Internationally, checked-
`baggage screening systems consist of five levels of scrutiny: conventional X-ray, operator review of X-ray imagery, explosive detection system (EDS) review, operator
`review of EDS imagery or explosive trace detection (ETD) testing, and physical search or denial of loading.
`Although the accuracy of the findings is not in question, it should be noted that the United States did not screen checked baggage on domestic flights at all before 9/11.
`When the United States started screening checked baggage following the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA 2001) legislation, the baseline for
`screening was established at a higher standard.
`There are four major ICAO conventions that have significantly impacted aviation security policy making. The Tokyo Convention in 1963 set the stage for many
`subsequent aviation security policies. The convention addressed unlawful acts committed onboard an aircraft that affect the safety of flight and, most important, allow the
`pilot in command to take reasonable measures to protect those onboard, including the ability to have a passenger restrained or removed from the flight. The convention also
`addressed how countries should handle a hijacked aircraft. Specifically, contracting states are obligated to take appropriate measures to restore or maintain control of the
`aircraft to the pilot in command. These appropriate measures extend only to the limit of what the country can feasibly and legally do (Abeyratne, 1998, p. 151). The
`convention required contracting states that receive a hijacked aircraft to permit the aircraft and all passengers and crew to proceed to their destination, and further
`specified that the country in which the aircraft is registered has jurisdiction over a hijacked aircraft. The issue of jurisdiction is a continuing problem.
`By 1970, hijackings worldwide were reaching epidemic proportions. Thus, the Hague Convention that year made hijacking a distinct offense, calling for severe
`punishment of hijackers (Abeyratne, 1998, p. 157). The convention defined the unlawful seizure of an aircraft (hijacking) as committed by any person(s) who “unlawfully,
`by force, or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempt to perform any such act; or is an accomplice of a
`person who performs or attempts to perform any such act” (Abeyratne, 1998, p. 157). The convention also obligated the states to return a seized aircraft to the country in
`which the aircraft is registered, including its passengers and cargo, without delay. The Hague Convention also addressed jurisdiction over hijacked aircraft. Jurisdiction goes
`first to the contracting state in which the aircraft is registered. If that state refuses or is unable to respond, jurisdiction passes to the contracting state where the aircraft
`first lands.
`Issues related to prosecution were more difficult to address because many contracting states refuse to extradite to countries that have the death penalty. Although the
`Hague Convention required contracting states to make hijackings punishable by severe penalties and to either extradite or prosecute hijackers, some nations chose to ignore
`this requirement. The Hague Convention also did not list the penalties that should be imposed for hijacking or specify policies against extradition or a refusal to prosecute
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00013
`
`

`

`hijackers (or prosecute with severe penalties). This made some contracting states safe havens for hijackers and bombers.
`The Hague Convention only addressed hijackings committed on an aircraft in flight, which did not cover acts of sabotage committed on the ground including at an
`airport. In 1971, the Montreal Convention expanded the focus to cover any attack on an aircraft, regardless of whether it occurred in flight. It also expanded coverage to
`air navigation facilities, including airports.
`An aircraft is defined as being “in flight” from the moment all external doors are closed until such time when any door is opened for disembarkation. This definition
`remains in effect. The Montreal Convention added to the list of perpetrators of an attack on an aircraft those who are not actually onboard the aircraft, such as saboteurs,
`bombers, and those who help facilitate the attack.
`The Montreal Convention defined five types of aviation offenses:
`1. Committing an act of violence against a person onboard an aircraft in flight that endangers the safety of the flight.
`2. Destroying an aircraft or causing damage to an aircraft, rendering it incapable of flight, or endangering its safety while in flight.
`3. Placing or causing to be placed a device or substance likely to destroy or damage an aircraft.
`4. Destroying or interfering with air navigation facilities.
`5. Communicating false information that interferes with the safety of a flight (including bomb threats).
`The convention also required all contracting states to implement passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and a national security agency to be in place at all major
`airports. This provision requiring deployment of a national security force is the first international guidance to come forth regarding airport perimeter security at nonmilitary
`airports. In the United States, this requirement is normally addressed by local police agencies.
`
`ICAO Post-9/11
`
`The 33rd session of the ICAO assembly met in September–October 2001 and adopted Resolution A33-1, Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of
`Destruction and Other Terrorist Acts Involving Civil Aviation. This resolution directed the ICAO council and the United Nations secretary general to consider the
`establishment of an audit program relating to airport security arrangements and civil aviation security programs. It also directed the council to convene an international high-
`level, ministerial conference on aviation security with the objective of strengthening ICAO’s role in the adoption of standards and recommended practices in the field of
`aviation security and in the auditing of their implementation.
`A central element of ICAO’s global aviation security strategy was the Aviation Security Plan of Action, which includes regular, mandatory, systematic, and harmonized
`audits to enable the evaluation of aviation security in all member states (ICAO, 2006).
`The plan addresses the need to identify and assess global responses to new threats and take action to protect airports, aircraft, and air traffic control centers. The
`ICAO provides significant guidance on conducting aviation security audits. This includes the execution of an ICAO audit program, in which the ICAO will assist a
`contracting state, airport, or aircraft operator in developing programs to address deficiencies in aviation security capabilities. The program, the ICAO Universal Security
`Audit Program (USAP), is part of a larger effort to establish a global aviation security system.
`The USAP audit is conducted in a way that states have the opportunity to monitor, comment, and respond to the audit. The results of USAP audits understandably
`remain confidential as sensitive security information. See Figure 3.1 for an illustration of the USAP audit process.3
`
`
`
`Figure 3.1 USAP audit process.
`To assist states in implementing the standards contained in Annex 17, the ICAO also developed a training program for aviation security. The program includes
`instruction on the following:
`• The protection of aircraft, including preflight precautions, aircraft searches, and control of access to aircraft
`• Access control, including physical security measures, background checks, personnel identification system design, and vehicle permits
`• Quality control, including security inspections and audits, security tests, and training of security staff
`
`Google Exhibit 1026 Page 00014
`
`

`

`• Airport design as it relates to security, including minimizing the effects of an explosion on people and facilities
`• Managing responses to unlawful acts
`• Security equipment (e.g.