throbber

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`Paper 33
`Entered: January 27, 2017
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`Before JENNIFER S. BISK, RAMA G. ELLURU, and
`JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ELLURU, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`
`
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”), filed a Petition to institute covered business
`method patent review of claims 1–17 and 19 of U.S. Patent No. 7,942,317
`B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’317 patent”) pursuant to § 18 of the Leahy-Smith
`America Invents Act (“AIA”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”).1 On November 10, 2015,
`we instituted a covered business method patent review (Paper 7, “Institution
`Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”) based upon Petitioner’s assertion that claims 2–5,
`9–11, 14, 15, 17, and 19 (“the challenged claims”) are directed to patent
`ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Inst. Dec. 252. Subsequent
`to institution, Smartflash LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Patent Owner
`Response (Paper 17, “PO Resp.”) and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 21,
`“Pet. Reply”) to Patent Owner’s Response. Patent Owner, with
`authorization, filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. Paper 28
`(“Notice”). Petitioner filed a Response to Patent Owner’s Notice. Paper 29
`(“Notice Resp.”).
`In our Final Decision, we determined Petitioner had established, by a
`preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2–5, 9–11, 14, 15, 17, and 19 of
`the ’317 patent are directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35
`U.S.C. § 101. Paper 31 (“Final Dec.”), 3, 35. Patent Owner requests
`rehearing of the Final Decision with respect to patent ineligibility of the
`challenged claims under § 101. Paper 32 (“Request” or “Req. Reh’g”).
`
`
`1 Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 296–07 (2011).
`2 We also instituted a review of claim 19 as being indefinite under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112, second paragraph. Id. Because a final written decision determining
`that claims 1, 6–8, 12, 13, and 16 of the ’317 patent are unpatentable under
`§ 103 had already issued in CBM2014-00112, we declined to institute a
`review of claims 1, 6– 8, 12, 13, and 16 in this proceeding. Id. at 6–7.
`
`2
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`Having considered Patent Owner’s Request, we decline to modify our Final
`Decision.
`
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`In covered business method review, the petitioner has the burden of
`showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C.
`§ 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37
`C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states:
`The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with
`the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically
`identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended
`or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously
`addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.
`
`
`ANALYSIS
`Patent Owner’s Request is based on a disagreement with our
`determination that the challenged claims are directed to patent-ineligible
`subject matter. Req. Reh’g 3.
`In its Request, Patent Owner initially presents arguments directed to
`alleged similarities between the challenged claims and those at issue in DDR
`Holdings3, Enfish4, and Bascom5. Id. at 4–11. Those cases were each
`addressed in the Patent Owner Response or Patent Owner’s Notice, as well
`as in our Final Decision. As noted above, our rules require that the
`requesting party “specifically identify all matters the party believes the
`
`
`3 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`4 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`5 BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d
`1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`3
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was
`previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R.
`42.71(d) (emphasis added). In its Request, however, Patent Owner does not
`identify any specific matter that we misapprehended or overlooked.
`Although Patent Owner repeatedly states that the Board “misapprehends”
`Smartflash’s argument (see, e.g., Req. Reh’g 5, 10), it does not offer
`sufficient explanation as to how we misapprehended or overlooked any
`particular “matter [that] was previously addressed in a motion, an
`opposition, or a reply.” Rather than providing a proper request for
`rehearing, addressing particular matters that we previously allegedly
`misapprehended or overlooked, Patent Owner’s Request provides new
`briefing by expounding on argument already made.
`To the extent portions of the Request are supported by Patent Owner’s
`argument in the Patent Owner Response or in Patent Owner’s Notice, we
`considered those arguments in our Final Decision, as Patent Owner
`acknowledges. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 5, 7, 9 (noting that the Board
`“rejected” Smartflash’s argument with respect to each of DDR Holdings,
`Enfish, and Bascom). Our Final Decision, as noted above, addresses Patent
`Owner’s arguments related to DDR Holdings (Final Dec. 17–21), Enfish (id.
`at 12–13), and Bascom (id. at 21–23). Patent Owner’s Request is simply
`based on disagreement with our Final Decision, which is not a proper basis
`for rehearing.
`Patent Owner also presents new arguments directed to alleged
`similarities between the challenged claims and those addressed in McRO6
`
`
`6 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
`2016).
`
`4
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`and Amdocs7, which were issued after Patent Owner’s Notice was filed.
`Req. Reh’g 11–15. Patent Owner alleges that we overlooked the Federal
`Circuit’s decisions in McRO and Amdocs. Id. at 2. The decisions in those
`cases issued before our Final Decision and, although not specifically
`referenced, were considered when we determined that the challenged claims
`are patent-ineligible.
`When addressing McRO, Patent Owner does little, if anything, to
`analogize those claims to the challenged claims, other than summarizing the
`discussion in McRO (id. at 11–13), and concluding that
`[b]ecause the challenged claims are a technological improvement
`over the then-existing systems, and limit transfer and retrieval of
`content based on payment and/or access rules in a process
`specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result
`in conventional industry practice, the challenged claims are not
`directed to an abstract idea.
`Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 22:36–57 (claim 11), 26:4–7 (claim 2–5), 26:58–
`27:17 (claims 14, 15), 28:16–23 (claim 17)). But McRO does not stand for
`the general proposition that use of rules or conditions, such as payment, to
`achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the
`realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed
`improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip
`synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that
`previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313
`(citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO
`transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists
`into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the
`
`
`7 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir.
`2016).
`
`5
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court explained
`that “it [was] the incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the
`computer, that ‘improved [the] existing technological process’ by allowing
`the automation of further tasks.” Id. at 1314 (alteration in original) (quoting
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014)). The
`Court distinguished this from situations “where the claimed computer-
`automated process and the prior method were carried out in the same way.”
`Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978); Bilski v. Kappos,
`561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356)).
`As explained in our Final Decision, the challenged claims “merely
`implement an old practice in a new environment.” Final Dec. 12 (quoting
`FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir.
`2016)). The challenged claims are similar to the claims found ineligible in
`FairWarning, which the Court distinguished from those at issue McRO.
`FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094–95. In FairWarning, the Court explained
`that “[t]he claimed rules ask . . . the same questions . . . that humans in
`analogous situations . . . have asked for decades, if not centuries” and that it
`is the “incorporation of a computer, not the claimed rule, that purportedly
`‘improve[s] [the] existing technological process.’” Id. at 1095 (citing Alice,
`134 S. Ct. at 2358). This is similar to the challenged claims, where the
`“payment data” in claim 17 and the “use rule data” in claim 14, for example,
`are merely conditions for “determin[ing] what access is permitted to data
`stored on the data carrier,” that the ’317 patent explains “will normally be
`dependent upon payments made for data stored on the data carrier” (i.e.,
`allowing access when the data has been purchased). Ex. 1001, 9:17–21.
`
`6
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`With respect to Amdocs, after generally summarizing that case, Patent
`Owner concludes that “the challenged claims of the ’317 Patent are like the
`eligible claim in Amdocs because they solve a problem unique to computer
`networks . . . and use[] an unconventional technological approach.” Req.
`Reh’g 14–15 (citing PO Resp. 17, 39–40)8. We disagree.
`In Amdocs, the Court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two
`because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at
`1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting
`information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to
`enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that
`the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data
`in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows
`which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that,
`although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s
`enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components
`operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in
`computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the
`claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation
`necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and
`other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve
`a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished
`the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction &
`Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed.
`Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily
`
`
`8 This is the only instance where one of Patent Owner’s papers is cited in
`the Request with respect to arguments directed to Amdocs.
`
`7
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`incorporates the invention’s distributed architecture—an architecture
`providing a technological solution to a technological problem,” which
`“provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-
`understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the
`industry.’” Id. (citations omitted).
`We are not persuaded that we misapprehended Amdocs. As noted in
`our Final Decision, “[t]he ’317 patent treats as well-known all potentially
`technical aspects of the challenged claims, which simply require generic
`computer components.” Final Dec. 15. Unlike the generic components at
`issue in Amdocs, the generic components recited in claims 2–5, 9–11, 14, 15,
`17, and 19 of the ’317 patent do not operate in an unconventional manner to
`achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See id. at 17–21. The
`challenged claims of the ’317 patent simply recite generic memories, data
`types, processors, and “code to” perform well-known functions with no
`description of the underlying implementation or programming. See id. at
`14–17.
`Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Request does not apprise us of sufficient
`reason to modify our Final Decision.
`
`
`ORDER
`
`Accordingly, it is:
`ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Request is denied.
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`CBM2015-00124
`Patent 7,942,317 B2
`
`PETITIONER:
`J. Steven Baughman
`Megan F. Raymond
`James R. Batchelder
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`steven.baughman@ropesgray.com
`megan.raymond@ropesgray.com
`james.batchelder@ropesgray.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Michael R. Casey
`Wayne Helge
`DAVIDSON BERQUIST JACKSON & GOWDEY LLP
`smartflash-cbm@dbjg.com
`whelge@davidsonberquist.com
`
`9
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket