`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case CBM2015-00119
`
`Patent 8,033,458
`
`____________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 2
`III. APPLE’S DUPLICATIVE §101 CHALLENGE DISREGARDS THE
`BOARD’S PREVIOUS EXERCISE OF DISCRETION UNDER 35 U.S.C.
`§ 325(d) TO DECLINE TO INSTITUTE REVIEW OF THESE CLAIMS ... 4
`IV. APPLE’S DUPLICATIVE § 101 CHALLENGE WILL NOT SECURE
`THE JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE RESOLUTION OF THE
`ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ‘458 PATENT ............................................ 5
`V. THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE NOT DIRECTED TO A
`FINANCIAL PRODUCT OR SERVICE ........................................................ 8
`VI. THE CHALLENGED CLAIM OF THE ‘458 PATENT IS A
`TECHNOLOGICAL INVENTION EXEMPT FROM CBM REVIEW ...... 13
`VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`
`
`Exhibit Number
`
`Exhibit Description
`
`2001
`
`2002
`
`Congressional Record - House, June 23, 2011, H4480-4505
`
`Congressional Record - Senate, Sep. 8, 2011, S5402-5443
`
`2003-2057
`
`Reserved
`
`2058
`
`Memorandum Opinion and Order (on Defendants’ Motions
`for Stay Pending the Outcome CBMs) from Smartflash LLC
`et al. v. Apple, Inc., et al., Case No. 6:13-CV-447 (E.D.
`Tex.), Smartflash LLC et al. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd,
`et al., Case No. 6:13-CV-448 (E.D. Tex.), Smartflash LLC et
`al. v. Google, Inc., et al., Case No. 6:14-CV-435 (E.D. Tex.),
`and Smartflash LLC et al. v. Amazon, Inc., et al., Case No.
`6:14-CV-992 (E.D. Tex.) dated May 29, 2015
`
`2059-2060
`
`Reserved
`
`2061
`
`Declaration of Emily E. Toohey in Support of Patent
`Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`2062
`
`Reserved
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, Smartflash LLC (“Patent Owner”) files this
`
`preliminary response to the Petition, Paper 2, setting forth reasons why no new
`
`covered business method review of U.S. Patent 8,033,458 (“the ‘458 Patent”)
`
`should be instituted as requested by Apple Inc. (“Apple” or “Petitioner”).
`
`Arguments presented herein are presented without prejudice to presenting
`
`additional arguments in a later response should the Board institute a covered
`
`business method (CBM) review.1
`
`Petitioner Apple seeks CBM review of claim 11 of the ‘458 Patent as
`
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Paper 2 at 3.
`
`The Board should deny the Petition because (i) Apple’s duplicative
`
`challenge disregards the Board’s previous exercise of discretion under 35 U.S.C. §
`
`325(d) to decline to institute a CBM patent review of these same claims under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 101 in CBM2015-00016 and (ii) instituting review will not “secure the
`
`just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of the Board’s proceedings reviewing the
`
`‘458 Patent claims. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).
`
`
`1 If the Board institutes a CBM review, Patent Owner does not oppose
`
`Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder, Paper 3.
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`The Petition, filed April 30, 2015, is Petitioner Apple’s fourth (out of five to
`
`date) CBM petition filed against claims of the ‘458 Patent in a 14-month span.
`
`Petitioner’s other filings are CBM2014-00106, Paper 2, and CBM2014-00107,
`
`Paper 2 both filed March 31, 2014; CBM2015-00016, Paper 2, filed October 30,
`
`2014; and CBM2015-00123, Paper 2, filed on May 6, 2015.
`
`Petitioner Apple has also filed petitions against each of the 7 patents in the
`
`same Smartflash, LLC patent family:
`
` U.S. Patent 7,334,720: CBM2014-00104, -00105; CBM2015-00028, -
`00029, -00118, and -00127. (6 CBM Petitions.)
` U.S. Patent 7,942,317: CBM2014-00112, -00113; CBM2015-00018,
`and -00124. (4 CBM Petitions.)
` U.S. Patent 8,061,598: CBM2014-00108, -00109; CBM2015-00017, -
`00120, and -00131. (5 CBM Petitions.)
` U.S. Patent 8,118,221: CBM2014-00102, -00103; CBM2015-00015, -
`00117, and CBM2015-00130. (5 CBM Petitions.)
` U.S. Patent 8,336,772: CBM2014-00110,-00111; CBM2015-00031, -
`00032, -00033, and -00133. (6 CBM Petitions.)
` U.S. Patent 8,794,516: CBM2015-00121. (1 CBM Petition.)
`Petitioner Apple has filed 32 CBM Petitions against this family of patents in
`
`14 months.
`
`Petitioner Apple’s Petition against the ‘458 Patent in CBM2015-00016
`
`included a challenge of claims 1, 6, 8, 10, and 11 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 101 and the Board instituted a CBM patent review of claims 1, 6, 8, and 10 under
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`§ 101. CBM2015-00016, Paper 23 at 26 (PTAB April 10, 2015)(Decision,
`
`Institution of Covered Business Method Patent Review and Denying Motion for
`
`Joinder). Thus, this is Petitioner Apple’s second CBM petition challenging claim
`
`11 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`
`In its April 10, 2015 decision in CBM2015-00016 the Board ruled:
`
`[B]ecause we already instituted upon claim 11 under 35
`U.S.C. § 101 in CBM2014-00192, and because whether
`claim 11 is directed to patent-eligible subject matter is an
`issue of law, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 325(d) to decline to institute a covered business method
`patent review of claim 11 under this ground in this
`proceeding.
`
`CBM2015-00016, Paper 23 at 20 (emphasis added).
`
`On April 30, 2015, just 20 days after the Board’s decision in CBM2015-
`
`00016 declining to institute a CBM patent review of claim 11 on §101 grounds in
`
`that case, Petitioner Apple filed the instant Petition again seeking CBM review of
`
`claim 11 on §101 grounds. Paper 2 at 3.
`
`Petitioner Apple’s supporting evidence is literally identical to that filed by
`
`Samsung in CBM2014-00192: “the Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey Bloom, originally
`
`filed by Samsung in CBM2014-00192 and re-filed and relied upon here by Apple.”
`
`Id.
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`III. APPLE’S DUPLICATIVE §101 CHALLENGE DISREGARDS THE
`BOARD’S PREVIOUS EXERCISE OF DISCRETION UNDER 35
`U.S.C. § 325(d) TO DECLINE TO INSTITUTE REVIEW OF THESE
`CLAIMS
`
`Petitioner Apple’s duplicative challenge is an abuse of the CBM process
`
`because it disregards the Board’s clear ruling in CBM2015-00016. The Board
`
`could not have been more clear that it was exercising its discretion under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 325(d) in declining to institute a CBM patent review of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 101 because it already instituted a CBM patent review of the same claims on the
`
`same ground in CBM2014-00192. CBM2015-00016, Paper 23 at 20. Twenty
`
`days later, Petitioner Apple filed the instant Petition, again seeking review of claim
`
`11 alleging the same ground as CBM2015-00016 and using the same evidence on
`
`file in CBM2014-00192, even though the Board already declined to institute
`
`review of claim 11 in CBM2015-00016 because it was addressing the purely legal
`
`issue in CBM2014-00192. This is nothing more than Petitioner Apple using the
`
`Board’s prior decisions in CBM2015-00016 and CBM2014-00192 “to bolster
`
`challenges that were advanced unsuccessfully in the [00016] Petition.” Unilever,
`
`Inc. v. The Proctor & Gamble Company, Case IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 at 8
`
`(PTAB July 7, 2014)(Decision, Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review).
`
`The instant Petition disregards the Board’s exercise of discretion in
`
`CBM2015-00016 and should be denied.
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`IV. APPLE’S DUPLICATIVE § 101 CHALLENGE WILL NOT SECURE
`THE JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE RESOLUTION OF THE
`ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ‘458 PATENT
`
`As noted above, this Petition is Petitioner Apple’s fourth (out of five total)
`
`CBM challenge filed against claims of the ‘458 Patent. Apple’s Petition in
`
`CBM2015-00016 included a challenge of claims 1, 6, 8, 10, and 11 as unpatentable
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the Board instituted a CBM patent review of claims 1,
`
`6, 8, and 10 under § 101. 2 CBM2015-00016, Paper 23 at 2, 18. Having been
`
`unsuccessful in its first attempt in the CBM2015-00016 petition, Petitioner
`
`resurrects its § 101 challenge to claim 11.
`
`Instituting a CBM review of claim 11 of the’458 Patent here would be
`
`contrary to the PTAB’s mandate. “[T]he Board is charged with securing the just,
`
`speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” EMC Corporation, et al.
`
`v. Personal Web Technologies, LLC, Case IPR2013-00082, Paper 33 at 4 (PTAB
`
`June 5, 2013) (Decision, Denying Request for Rehearing)(citing 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.1(b)). “Rules for inter partes review proceedings were promulgated to take into
`
`account the ‘regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the
`
`efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely
`
`complete proceedings.’” Id. at 2 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(b)).
`
`
`2 The Petition in CBM2015-00123 includes 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenges to
`claims 2-5, 7, 9, and 12 thus subjecting every claim of the ‘458 Patent to a § 101
`challenge.
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`As the PTAB acknowledged in CBM2015-00016, “whether claim 11 is
`
`directed to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law” CBM2015-00016,
`
`Paper 23 at 20. The Bloom declaration submitted by Apple here is dated
`
`September 25, 2014, more than a month before Apple filed its Petition in
`
`CBM2015-00016 on October 30, 2014. The present Petition provides no reason
`
`why any of the prior petitions, including the CBM2015-00016 petition raising the
`
`same grounds, did not then include a “full statement of the reasons for the relief
`
`requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence
`
`including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent” as required
`
`by 42.22(a)(2).
`
`Apple was criticized just last week in the parallel Federal Court litigation for
`
`its arguments that, if given credence, “would serve to encourage parties to misuse
`
`CBM review in a manner completely opposite of what Congress intended, by
`
`making it into a cost-increasing, post-trial second chance at additional litigation,
`
`rather than a cost-effective alternative to litigation.” Exhibit 2058, Smartflash LLC
`
`et al. v. Apple, Inc., et al., Case No. 6:13-CV-447 (E.D. Tex.), Smartflash LLC et
`
`al. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd, et al., Case No. 6:13-CV-448 (E.D. Tex.),
`
`Smartflash LLC et al. v. Google, Inc., et al., Case No. 6:14-CV-435 (E.D. Tex.),
`
`and Smartflash LLC et al. v. Amazon, Inc., et al., Case No. 6:14-CV-992 (E.D.
`
`Tex.)(May 29, 2015); Dkt. 558, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 16. That
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Court also noted the effect Apple’s untimely and duplicative CBM petitions are
`
`having in that forum; “Meanwhile, in response to Apple’s eleventh-hour petitions,
`
`the PTAB has just begun its entirely separate effort to duplicate the Court’s
`
`existing determination of a pure question of law. This situation does not reduce the
`
`litigation, it has increased the litigation.” Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
`
`Here, instituting a CBM review based on Apple’s duplicative Petition raising
`
`a purely legal ground of invalidity that has already been raised and denied
`
`encourages repetitive and piecemeal invalidity challenges to Patent Owner’s patent
`
`claims and runs afoul of the PTAB’s charge to “secure the just, speedy, and
`
`inexpensive resolution” of the CBM challenges to the ‘458 Patent. In fact, in the
`
`face of serial petitions by other Petitioners, the PTAB has already held that the
`
`PTAB’s “resources are better spent addressing matters other than [a Petitioner’s]
`
`second attempt to raise a plurality of duplicative grounds against the same patent
`
`claims.” Conopco, Inc. dba Unilever v. The Proctor & Gamble Company, Case
`
`IPR2014-00628, Paper 21 at 21 (PTAB October 20, 2014) (Decision, Declining
`
`Institution of Inter Partes Review). Patent Owner has been subjected to a
`
`continuing barrage of Petitions. In total, the seven patents in the patent family
`
`under review have now been subject to 48 separate CBM petitions – 32 from
`
`Apple, 11 from Samsung, and 5 from Google at a cost of nearly $1.5 million in
`
`USPTO filing fees alone. As in Conopco, Smartflash’s “concern that it will ‘have
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`to continually defend against repetitive challenges’ to the same patent claims is not
`
`without merit, given the multiplicity of grounds applied in each petition.”
`
`Conopco at 12. Patent Owner therefore respectfully requests that the Board again
`
`exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and decline to institute a CBM
`
`patent review of claim 11 of the ‘458 Patent on the reasserted § 101 nonstatutory
`
`subject matter grounds as it did in CBM2015-00016.
`
`V. THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE NOT DIRECTED TO A
`FINANCIAL PRODUCT OR SERVICE
`
`Petitioner has cited claim 11 as being the basis for requesting that a covered
`
`business method review be instituted. Petition at 3. Since claim 11 does not, in
`
`fact, meet the requirements for instituting a review, the Petition should be denied.
`
`As set forth in 37 CFR 42.301(a), to be eligible for CBM review, claim 11
`
`must be found to be claiming “a method or corresponding apparatus for performing
`
`data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or
`
`management of a financial product or service.” In the publication of the Final
`
`Rules for “Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents -
`
`Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent and Technological Invention,” the
`
`PTO stated:
`
`The definition set forth in § 42.301(a) for covered business
`method patent adopts the definition for covered business method
`patent provided in section 18(d)(1) of the AIA. In administering the
`program, the Office will consider the legislative intent and history
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`behind the public law definition and the transitional program itself.
`For example, the legislative history explains that the definition of
`covered business method patent was drafted to encompass patents
`“claiming activities that are financial in nature, incidental to a
`financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.” 157
`CONG. REC. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
`Schumer). This remark tends to support the notion that “financial
`product or service” should be interpreted broadly.
`
`
`Regardless of this explanation, it is improper for this tribunal to rely on the
`
`legislative history of the AIA to determine the specific issue before it, i.e., whether
`
`trial should be instituted on the present petition. The Supreme Court has “stated
`
`time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
`
`means and means in a statute what it says. When the words of a statute are
`
`unambiguous, then, this first canon of construction is also the last: judicial inquiry
`
`is complete.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
`
`“[W]hen the language of the statute is plain, legislative history is irrelevant.”
`
`Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510–11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring-in-
`
`part). This long standing rule is based on the constitutional limitation that
`
`legislators cannot achieve through floor statements what “they were unable to
`
`achieve through the statutory text.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
`
`545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). Because Section 18 is unambiguously limited to
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`“financial product[s] and service[s],” there is no reason to look to the statements of
`
`a single Senator to re-tool text that was approved by both houses of Congress and
`
`signed by the President.
`
`Moreover, the PTO’s synopsis of the legislative history is an improper
`
`oversimplification and does not address that “financial product or service” was
`
`intended to be interpreted narrowly. In fact, when the House of Representatives
`
`debated Congressman Schock’s Amendment to remove Section 18 in its entirety
`
`from the America Invents Act, several members of Congress discussed their
`
`understanding of that narrower interpretation. For example, Mr. Schock himself
`
`discussed at the beginning of his remarks that “Section 18 carves out a niche of
`
`business method patents covering technology used specifically in the financial
`
`industry and would create a special class of patents in the financial services field
`
`subject to their own distinctive post-grant administrative review.” (Exhibit 2001,
`
`Congressional Record - House, June 23, 2011, H4496.) (Emphasis added.)
`
`Similarly, Congressman Shuster expressly discussed his understanding of
`
`the narrow interpretation of the legislation. He stated:
`
`Mr. Chair, I would like to place in the record my understanding
`that the definition of ‘‘covered business method patent,’’ Section
`18(d)(1) of H.R. 1249, the America Invents Act, is intended to be
`narrowly construed to target only those business method patents that
`are unique to the financial services industry in the sense that they are
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`patents which only a financial services provider would use to
`furnish a financial product or service. The example that I have been
`given is a patent relating to electronic check scanning, which is the
`type of invention that only the financial services industry would
`utilize as a means of providing improved or more efficient banking
`services. In contrast, Section 18 would not encompass a patent that
`can be used in other industries, but which a financial services
`provider might also use. Lastly, it is also my understanding from
`discussions with the Committee that Section 18 is targeted only
`towards patents for non-technological inventions.
`
`
`
`Id. at H4497. (Emphasis added.) It was based on that understanding that
`
`Congressman Shuster then voted to keep Section 18 in the bill. (See Id. at H4503.)
`
`Likewise, Congresswoman Waters discussed that Section 18 was directed to
`
`cost savings measures in the banking industry when she stated “too-big-to-fail
`
`banks ... are now coming to Congress in hopes that [Congress] will help them steal
`
`a specific type of innovation and legislatively take other financial services-related
`
`business method patents referenced in H.R. 1249, section 18. ... Financial
`
`services-related business method patents have saved financial services companies
`
`billions of dollars.” Id. at H4496. See also Exhibit 2002, 157 Cong. Rec. S5428
`
`(Rep. Pryor) (“It is of crucial importance to me that we clarify the intent of the
`
`[AIA § 18] process and implement it as narrowly as possible.”)
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`In contrast to the banking or other financial products or services patents,
`
`claim 6 recites:
`
`6. A data access device for retrieving stored data from a data
`
`carrier, the device comprising:
`
`a user interface;
`
`a data carrier interface;
`
`a program store storing code implementable by a processor; and
`
`a processor coupled to the user interface, to the data carrier
`
`interface and to the program store for implementing the stored code,
`
`the code comprising:
`
`code to retrieve use status data indicating a use status of data
`
`stored on the carrier, and use rules data indicating permissible use of
`
`data stored on the carrier;
`
`code to evaluate the use status data using the use rules data to
`
`determine whether access is permitted to the stored data; and
`
`code to access the stored data when access is permitted.
`
`Claim 11 depends from claim 6 and recites “11. A data access device according to
`
`claim 6 wherein said use rules permit partial use of a data item stored on the carrier
`
`and further comprising code to write partial use status data to the data carrier when
`
`only part of a stored data item has been accessed.” Rather than recite the “practice,
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`administration, or management of a financial product or service,” claim 11 actually
`
`makes no mention of payment or specifics of how payment is made and focuses on
`
`technical aspects of accessing data on a data carrier, e.g., code on a data access
`
`device. Claim 11, therefore, does not recite a “financial product or service” when
`
`that phrase is properly construed, both under its plain meaning and in light of the
`
`legislative history showing Congress’ intent of the narrow meaning of that phrase.
`
`VI. THE CHALLENGED CLAIM OF THE ‘458 PATENT IS A
`TECHNOLOGICAL INVENTION EXEMPT FROM CBM REVIEW
`
`As set forth in 37 CFR 42.301(a), even if claim 11 was considered to be
`
`claiming “a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or
`
`other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial
`
`product or service,” Petitioner must show that claim 11 does not meet the
`
`exception of being directed to a technological invention. Section 42.301(b) sets
`
`forth that a claim is directed to a technological invention (and therefore not the
`
`basis for instituting a CBM review) if “the claimed subject matter as a whole
`
`recites a technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art; and
`
`solves a technical problem using a technical solution.”
`
`Claim 11, as a whole, recites at least one technological feature that is novel
`
`and unobvious over the prior art and solves a technical problem using a technical
`
`solution. At least one technological problem solved by the data access device of
`
`claim 11 is retrieving stored data from a data carrier. Moreover, it does so using a
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`technical solution, by using “code to evaluate the use status data using the use rules
`
`data to determine whether access is permitted to the stored data” and “code to
`
`access the stored data when access is permitted.”
`
`Sections III.E. of the Petition does not allege, much less prove, that “code to
`
`evaluate the use status data using the use rules data to determine whether access is
`
`permitted to the stored data” and “code to access the stored data when access is
`
`permitted” were known at the time of the invention of the patent-at-issue. Thus, as
`
`previously held in Epsilon Data Management, LLC et al. v. RPOST Comm. Ltd.,
`
`CBM2014-00017, paper 21, page 8, any analysis in any other portion of the
`
`Petition (other than the portion relating to whether CBM review is proper) need not
`
`be considered in determining that the Petitioner has not met its burden of proving
`
`that the claim at issue is a covered business method patent. Id. (“In addition,
`
`although Patent Owner addresses the analysis in the Declaration of [Petitioner’s
`
`Declarant] (id. at 19), which Petitioner submitted with the Petition, this analysis
`
`was not included in the relevant portion of the Petition (Pet. 2-6), and need not be
`
`considered in determining that the ... Patent[-at-issue] is a covered business method
`
`patent.”) Thus, Petitioner has not proven that claim 11 of the ‘458 patent is not
`
`directed to a technological invention exempt from CBM review.
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`VII. CONCLUSION
`Petitioner Apple’s duplicative Petition should be denied because it
`
`disregards the Board’s previous exercise of discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to
`
`decline to institute a CBM patent review of these same claims on the same ground
`
`in CBM2015-00016, and instituting review will not “secure the just, speedy, and
`
`inexpensive resolution” of the Board’s proceedings reviewing the ‘458 Patent
`
` /
`
` Michael R. Casey /
`
`
`Michael R. Casey
`Registration No. 40,294
`Davidson Berquist Jackson & Gowdey, LLP
`8300 Greensboro Dr., Suite 500
`McLean, VA 22102
`Telephone: (571) 765-7700
`Fax : (571) 765-7200
`Email: mcasey@dbjg.com
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`15
`
`claims. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).
`
`
`Dated: June 1, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that this PATENT OWNER’S
`
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE in CBM2015-00119 and Exhibits 2001, 2002, 2058
`
`and 2061 were served, by agreement of the parties, June 1, 2015 by emailing
`
`copies to counsel for the Petitioner as follows:
`
`J. Steven Baughman (steven.baughman@ropesgray.com)
`Megan Raymond (megan.raymond@ropesgray.com
`Ching-Lee Fukuda (ching-lee.fukuda@ropesgray.com)
`ApplePTABService-SmartFlash@ropesgray.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: June 1, 2015
`
` /
`
`
`
` Michael R. Casey /
`
`Michael R. Casey
`Registration No. 40,294
`Davidson Berquist Jackson & Gowdey, LLP
`8300 Greensboro Dr., Suite 500
`McLean, VA 22102
`Telephone: (571) 765-7700
`Fax : (571) 765-7200
`Email: mcasey@dbjg.com
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