UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________________
`
`GOOGLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`CONTENTGUARD HOLDINGS, INC.
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`
`Case CBM 2015-0040
`
`U.S. Patent 7,774,280
`Filed October 4, 2004
`Issued August 10, 2010
`Title: SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR MANAGING TRANSFER
`OF RIGHTS USING SHARED STATE VARIABLES
`
`____________________
`
`Attorney Docket No. 20318-134631
`Customer No: 22242
`____________________
`
`
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE OF PATENT OWNER
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`United States Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Table of Contents
`
`Page
`
`C. 
`
`I. 
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1 
`THE BOARD MUST DISMISS THE PETITION BECAUSE
`THE ‘280 PATENT IS INELIGIBLE FOR COVERED
`BUSINESS METHOD PATENT REVIEW ........................................ 4 
`A.  Google fails to consider the claims as a whole .......................... 4 
`B. 
`The
`‘280
`claims
`specify data
`access
`control
`technologies, not data processing or other operations
`“used in the practice, administration, or management of
`a financial product or service,” and are hence ineligible
`for CBM review ......................................................................... 8 
`The ‘280 claims specify a “technological invention” and
`are ineligible for CBM review for this additional reason ........ 16 
`III.  THE BOARD SHOULD NOT INSTITUTE TRIAL BASED
`ON THE PETITION’S REDUNDANT PRIOR ART
`GROUNDS ......................................................................................... 21 
`IV.  THE PETITION ADVANCES CERTAIN FLAWED CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTIONS THAT SHOULD BE REJECTED ................... 25 
`A.  Overview of the ‘280 Patent .................................................... 27 
`B. 
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ............................................ 30 
`C. 
`Response to Google’s Proposed Claim Constructions ............ 30 
`1.  Meta-right ...................................................................... 30 
`2. 
`Usage right ..................................................................... 32 
`3. 
`Right(s) .......................................................................... 33 
`4. 
`License ........................................................................... 33 
`5. 
`State variable .................................................................. 34 
`6. 
`Repository ...................................................................... 35 
`a. 
`Physical integrity ................................................. 36 
`b. 
`Communications integrity ................................... 37 
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`V. 
`
`Behavioral integrity ............................................. 37 
`c. 
`7.  Means-plus-function limitations .................................... 38 
`THE CLAIMS OF THE ‘280 PATENT ARE DRAWN TO
`STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER AND ARE NOT
`“ABSTRACT” .................................................................................... 44 
`A. 
`Claims
`that are “necessarily rooted
`in computer
`technology” and that “overcome a problem specifically
`arising
`in
`the realm of computer networks” are
`patentable under Alice and post-Alice DDR decisions ............. 44 
`The ‘280 claims are drawn to a novel technological
`advancement over the prior art, necessarily rooted in
`computer technology in order to overcome a problem
`specifically arising in the realm of computer networks ........... 51 
`Google’s “abstractness” arguments ignore the law and
`are meritless.............................................................................. 56 
`1. 
`Google’s “video store” analogy is badly flawed ........... 56 
`2. 
`The claimed “repository” is not a general purpose
`computer and does not implement a prior known
`method and does not preempt the field of digital
`rights management ......................................................... 59 
`The claim amendments during prosecution are
`irrelevant under Alice and DDR ..................................... 61 
`VI.  TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED ON THE MEANS-
`PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS 12 AND 22 BECAUSE THE
`PETITION FAILS TO PROVIDE A PROPER ANALYSIS OF
`THOSE CLAIMS ............................................................................... 62 
`VII.  THE PETITION DOES NOT MEET GOOGLE’S BURDEN
`TO SHOW IT IS MORE LIKELY THAN NOT TO PREVAIL
`ON ITS REMAINING GROUNDS OF INVALIDITY .................... 63 
`A. 
`Legal Standards ........................................................................ 63 
`B. 
`The Petition Fails to Demonstrate That the Challenged
`Claims Are Anticipated by Stefik ............................................ 68 
`1. 
`Stefik Fails To Disclose: “a meta-right specifying
`a right that can be created when the meta-right is
`exercised” ....................................................................... 70 
`ii
`
`3. 
`
`
`
`

`

`2. 
`
`Stefik Fails To Disclose: “determining, by a
`repository, whether the rights consumer is entitled
`to the right specified by the meta-right” and
`“exercising the meta-right to create the right
`specified by the meta-right if the rights consumer
`is entitled to the right specified by the meta-right” ....... 73 
`The Petition Fails to Demonstrate That the Challenged
`Claims Are Obvious in View of Stefik and the
`Knowledge of a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art ............... 76 
`VIII.  CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 79 
`
`
`C. 
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Table of Authorities
`
`
`Cases
`Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, Inc.,
`728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................. 58
`Activevideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................. 65
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) .................................................................. 45, 46, 48
`Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., In re,
`367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................. 25
`Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada,
`687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................. 55
`Bass, In re,
`314 F.3d 575 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................... 25
`Bilski v. Kappos,
`130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221–27 (2010) .............................................................. 55
`Cal. Institute of Tech. v. Hughes Commcn’s Inc.,
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156763 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) .......... 45, 56, 59
`Canon, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures, LLC,
`IPR2014-00535, Paper 9 (Sept. 24, 2014) ................................................ 25
`Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co.,
`804 F.2d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ................................................................... 64
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
`IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (Aug. 29, 2014) ......................................... 65, 67
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, In re,
`No. 2014-1301, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1699 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 4, 2015) ... 25
`CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................. 50
`Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent
`Litig., In re,
`676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................. 67
`DDR Holdings LLC v. Hotels.com, Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................... 44, 47, 48, 59
`Dell, Inc. v. Elecs & Telecommc’ns Res. Inst.,
`IPR2014-00152, Paper 12 (May 16, 2014) ............................................... 67
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) .................................................................................. 46
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC v. Autoalert, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00223, Paper 9 (August 15, 2013) ............................................. 67
`Donaldson Co., In re,
`16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) ................................................... 62
`Dow Chem. Co., In re,
`837 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ................................................................... 66
`EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00087, Paper 25 (June 5, 2013) ................................................. 22
`Epsilon Data Management, LLC v. RPost Communications Ltd.,
`CBM2014-00017, Paper 21 (Apr. 22, 2014) ....................................... 18, 19
`Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc.,
`523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ........................................................... 38, 39
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................. 62
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ...................................................................................... 64
`GSI Commerce Solutions, Inc. v Lakshmi Arunachalam,
`CBM2014-00101, Paper 10 (Oct. 7, 2014) ............................................... 19
`Helios Software. LLC v. Spectorsoft Corp.,
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135379 (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2014) ................... 48, 49
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper 26 (June 11, 2013) ............................................... 22
`IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc.,
`206 F.3d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ................................................................. 38
`Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch.,
`Case CBM2013-00050, Paper 16 (Mar. 4, 2014) ....................................... 5
`Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Rencol Ltd.,
`IPR2014-00309, Paper 83 (Mar. 23, 2014) ......................................... 64, 67
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................................ 64, 65
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 (Oct. 25, 2012) ..................................... 2, 21, 22
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`133 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) .............................................................................. 45
`Med. Instr. & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,
`344 F.3d 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................. 42
`MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum,
`192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ................................................................. 64
`Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics Inc.,
`976 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ................................................................. 63
`
`v
`
`

`

`Motorola Mobility, LLC v. Intellectual Ventures I,
`LLC, CBM2014-00084, Paper 18 (Aug. 6, 2014) ............................... 19, 20
`Newell, In re,
` 891 F.2d 899 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .................................................................. 66
`NTP, Inc., In re,
`654 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................. 67
`Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
`CBM 2014-00149, Paper 12 (Jan. 13, 2015) .................................. 5, 6, 7, 8
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ................................................. 26
`PNC Bank v. Secure Axcess. LLC,
`CBM2014-00100, Paper 10 (Sept. 9, 2014) .............................................. 50
`PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`CBM2014-00032, Paper 13 (May 22, 2014) .................................. 9, 15, 50
`Salesforce.com, Inc., v. Applications In Internet Time LLC,
`CBM2014-00162, Paper 11 (Feb. 2, 2015) ................................. 8, 9, 13, 14
`SAS Inst. Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC,
`IPR2013-00581, Paper 15 (Dec. 30, 2013) ............................................... 25
`Sony Corp. of America v. Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00092, Paper 21 (May 24, 2013) ............................................... 64
`Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
`655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ........................................................... 25, 67
`TecSec, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
`731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................. 39
`TQP Development LLC v. Intuit, Inc.,
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20077 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2014) .................. 49, 50
`Translogic Tech., Inc., In re,
`504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................. 26
`Travelocity.com L.P. et al. v. Conos Technologies, LLC,
`CBM2014-00082, Paper 12 (Oct. 16, 2014) ............................................... 3
`TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2014-00258, Paper 16 (June 26, 2014) ............................................... 66
`Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................. 38
`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
`722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................. 46
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ............................................................................................. 38
`35 U.S.C. § 324(a) .......................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ........................................................................................ 24
`AIA § 18(d) ............................................................................................. 1, 4, 5
`
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. 42 ........................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`vii
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. (“CG”) respectfully submits this
`
`Preliminary Response in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 323 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.207,
`
`responding to the Petition for Covered Business Method Review (the “Petition”)
`
`filed by Google Inc. (“Google”) regarding claims of United States Patent No.
`
`7,774,280 (“the ‘280 patent”). CG requests that the Board not institute CBM patent
`
`review for several reasons.
`
`The Board has discretion to “deny some or all grounds for unpatentability
`
`for some or all of the challenged claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(b); see 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 324(a). Google bears the burden of demonstrating that it is more likely than not
`
`that it would prevail in showing unpatentability on the grounds asserted in its
`
`Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(c). While it is not required to file a Preliminary
`
`Response (37 C.F.R. § 42.207(a)), CG takes this limited opportunity to point out
`
`substantive and non-substantive reasons the Board should not institute trial.
`
`The Board should reject the Petition because the ‘280 patent does not claim
`
`a system or method for performing data processing or other operations used in the
`
`practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, and it
`
`thus not eligible for CBM patent review. AIA § 18(d)(1); 37 C.F.R. 42.301(a).
`
`Should the Board find the ‘280 patent eligible for CBM patent review, it should
`
`nevertheless reject each of the substantive challenges to its claims.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`The Board should reject the grounds challenging the ‘280 patent under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 101 because its claims are not drawn to an abstract concept and recite
`
`features that solve technical problems arising in the context of digital content
`
`distribution and computer data security. The claims to not simply apply a
`
`fundamental economic principles or a conventional practice to a general purpose
`
`computer environment.
`
`The proposed rejections based on the prior art Stefik patent are horizontally
`
`redundant of grounds proposed in other IPR petitions filed against the ‘280 patent
`
`by Apple, which is a co-defendant with Google in litigation involving the ‘280
`
`patent pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
`
`Accordingly, the Board should exercise its discretion and deny the Petition under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and the redundancy principles established in Liberty Mutual
`
`Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7
`
`(Oct. 25, 2012).
`
`Google’s prior art invalidity arguments are premised on numerous flawed
`
`claim constructions, and are therefore legally unsustainable. Indeed, the Petition
`
`entirely ignores the corresponding disclosed structure of the means-plus-function
`
`limitations of claims 12 and 22 and it makes no attempt to equate any prior art
`
`system to the structural requirements of those claims. Trial must be denied as to at
`
`least those claims for this additional reason.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to demonstrate any likelihood that Google could ever
`
`sustain its grounds of anticipation based on Stefik alone. It concludes that the
`
`claims are anticipated by Stefik only by misinterpreting the scope and meaning of
`
`several claim terms, by ignoring the claims as a whole and interrelationships
`
`among the recited components and steps, and by misreading and/or ignoring key
`
`aspects of Stefik’s disclosure.
`
`Finally, the assertion of obviousness based on Stefik and the knowledge of
`
`persons skilled in the art is conclusory. Because the Petition fails to provide a
`
`persuasive fact-based analysis with some rational underpinning to support this
`
`theory of obviousness, trial must be denied as to this additional ground.
`
`CG does not here attempt to address all of the deficiencies of the poorly
`
`articulated and underdeveloped grounds asserted
`
`in
`
`the Petition. See
`
`Travelocity.com L.P. et al. v. Conos Technologies, LLC, CBM2014-00082, Paper
`
`12 at 10 (Oct. 16, 2014)(“nothing may be gleaned from the Patent Owner’s
`
`challenge or failure to challenge the grounds of unpatentability for any particular
`
`reason”). However, CG respectfully submits that the deficiencies addressed herein
`
`are dispositive, and preclude trial on any grounds asserted in the Petition.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`II. THE BOARD MUST DISMISS THE PETITION BECAUSE THE ‘280
`PATENT IS INELIGIBLE FOR COVERED BUSINESS METHOD
`PATENT REVIEW
`
`The burden is on Google, the petitioner, to establish that the ‘280 patent is
`
`eligible for CBM patent review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a); see also 77 Fed. Reg.
`
`48756, 48763 (Aug. 14, 2012). Google has not meet this threshold burden.
`
`By statute, a patent is subject to CBM review only if the patent “claims a
`
`method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
`
`operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial
`
`product or service . . . .” AIA § 18(d)(1); 37 C.F.R. 42.301(a)(emphasis added).
`
`The ‘280 patent claims are not drawn to “data processing,” nor are they drawn to
`
`“other operations [used for] a financial product or service.” Rather, the ‘280 patent
`
`covers methods, systems, and devices used for data access control in the context of
`
`computer security, specifically, in connection with the creation and management of
`
`usage rights to digital content. Additionally, “technological” inventions are
`
`excluded from the scope of CBM review. Here, claim elements of the ‘280 patent
`
`are drawn to technological aspects of data access control. Even if one could
`
`overlook the absence of a “financial product or service” in the ‘280 claims, CBM
`
`review would still remain unavailable.
`
`A. Google fails to consider the claims as a whole
`
`The AIA defines “a covered business method patent” as:
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`A patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for
`performing data processing or other operations used in the practice
`administration, or management of a financial product or service . . . .
`
`AIA § 18(d)(1); 37 C.F.R. 42.301(a)(emphasis added). In promulgating rules for
`
`covered business method reviews, the USPTO considered the legislative intent and
`
`history behind the AIA’s definition of “covered business method patent.” 77 Fed.
`
`Reg. 48735–36. The “legislative history explains that the definition of covered
`
`business method patent was drafted to encompass patents claiming activities that
`
`are financial in nature, incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a
`
`financial activity.” Id. (citing 157 Cong. Rec. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8,
`
`2011)(statement of Sen. Schumer)(emphasis added).) In making the determination
`
`of whether a given patent is eligible for CBM review, the Board’s focus is thus
`
`“firmly on the claims.” Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
`
`CBM 2014-00149, Paper 12 at 9 (Jan. 13, 2015); see also Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC v.
`
`Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Case CBM2013-00050, Paper 16 at 9 (Mar. 4, 2014).
`
`If the claims of the patent do not specify data processing or operations for a
`
`financial product or service, the patent is not eligible for CBM review, even if the
`
`patent specification discloses some financial aspect of the claimed invention. For
`
`example, in Par Pharmaceutical, the claims were drawn to a “computerized
`
`method of distributing a prescription drug.” The claims specified steps of
`
`“confirming with a patient that educational material has been read prior to shipping
`
`5
`
`

`

`the prescription drug” and “generating with the computer processor periodic
`
`reports . . . to evaluate potential diversion patterns.” Par Pharmaceutical, CBM
`
`2014-00149, Paper 12 at 8. The petitioner argued that the claimed method “would
`
`be used in commerce,” and was “financial in nature.” As support for this
`
`contention, the petitioner and its expert pointed to language in the patent
`
`specification teaching steps for verifying insurance coverage or a patient’s ability
`
`to pay for the prescription, asserting that these “ultimately relate to the financial
`
`transaction of providing a prescription drug.” Id. at 9.
`
`The Board nonetheless determined that the patent was not CBM-eligible.
`
`Observing first that “[t]he claim as a whole recites a method for controlling access
`
`to a prescription drug to guard against potential abuse and unauthorized diversion,”
`
`id. at 10 (emphasis added), the Board framed the issue in dispute as “whether the
`
`claim language recites method steps used in the practice, administration, or
`
`management of a ‘financial’ product or service.” The Board rejected petitioner’s
`
`argument based on the specification, holding that the petitioner and its expert had
`
`not explained “why any of the claimed method steps should be considered
`
`‘financial’ when considered in the context of the claim language as a whole.” Id. at
`
`13–14.
`
`The Board further rejected petitioner’s “used in commerce” theory because
`
`it was “not supported by the plain language of the statute or the legislative history.”
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`“Contrary to Petitioner’s argument,” the Board held, “Congress did not say in the
`
`statute that a business method patent ‘used in commerce’ or covering “core
`
`activities” of running a business is eligible for CBM review.” Id. at 17.
`
`Google’s argument ignores the legally mandated AIA standard, as explicated
`
`in Par Pharmaceutical, and further ignores the claims of the ‘280 patent. Instead,
`
`Google quotes extensively from the specification of the patent. (Pet. at 11–12.) Its
`
`Petition points out that the specification explains how the invention may be used in
`
`scenarios involving the collection of fees for payment for usage rights. (Id.) The
`
`Petition also argues that U.S. Patent 5,634,012, which is incorporated by reference,
`
`describes financial activities relating to the distribution and use of digital content.
`
`(Id.)
`
`Google fails to present any analysis of the claims, much less the claim
`
`language as a whole. All inventions can in some contexts be useful for commercial
`
`purposes, yet this is not the standard for CBM eligibility, as the Board recognized
`
`in Par Pharmaceutical. The Petition fails to address, much less answer, the
`
`relevant question of whether any ‘280 claim as a whole recites a financial product
`
`or service. Since Google doesn’t address the claims at all in this portion of the
`
`Petition, the Petition does not even frame the question correctly and there is no
`
`question that Google has failed to meet its burden to prove that the patent is CBM-
`
`eligible.
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Finally, Google presents an argument based on the classification of the ‘280
`
`patent into class 705. Par Pharmaceutical flatly rejected this attempt to bypass the
`
`required legal analysis. Par Pharmaceutical, CBM 2014-00149, Paper 12 at 20.
`
`The Petition comes nowhere close to meeting its burden of establishing
`
`CBM eligibility, and it therefore fails at the outset.
`
`B.
`
`The ‘280 claims specify data access control technologies, not data
`processing or other operations “used
`in
`the practice,
`administration, or management of a financial product or service,”
`and are hence ineligible for CBM review
`
`When the analysis is focused on the claims as a whole – rather than on
`
`excerpts from the specification– the Board will immediately see that the claims are
`
`not related to financial products or services. Rather, they are drawn to computer
`
`security technology in the context of creating, transferring, managing and
`
`enforcing rights to use digital content.
`
`The term “finance” refers to “the way in which money is used and handled;
`
`. . . 2: the system that includes the circulation of money, the granting of credit, the
`
`making of investments, and the provision of banking facilities.” (Ex. 2003, Finance
`
`Definition,
`
`MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
`
`available
`
`at
`
`http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/finance.) In determining whether a
`
`technology is “financial” in nature, it is insufficient that the technology is
`
`“common in business environments,” see Salesforce.com, Inc., v. Applications In
`
`Internet Time LLC, CBM2014-00162, Paper 11 at 9 (Feb. 2, 2015), or even that the
`
`8
`
`

`

`patent is asserted against a financial entity. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. v.
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC, CBM2014-00032, Paper 13 (May 22, 2014).
`
`Technology that is useful in business environments and that bears “no particular
`
`relation limited to the financial services sector” is ineligible for CBM review.
`
`Salesforce.com, CBM2014-00162, Paper 11 at 9.
`
`The claimed technology is useful generally in a number of commercial
`
`contexts, and is not particularly directed for use “in the practice, administration, or
`
`management of a financial product or service.” Claim 1 of the ‘280 patent may be
`
`taken as representative:
`
`transferring rights
`A computer-implemented method for
`
`adapted to be associated with items from a rights supplier to a rights
`consumer, the method comprising:
`
`obtaining a set of rights associated with an item, the set of
`rights including a meta-right specifying a right that can be created
`when the meta-right is exercised, wherein the meta-right is provided
`in digital form and is enforceable by a repository;
`
`determining, by a repository, whether the rights consumer is
`entitled to the right specified by the meta-right; and exercising the
`meta-right to create the right specified by the meta-right if the rights
`consumer is entitled to the right specified by the meta-right,
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`wherein the created right includes at least one state variable
`based on the set of rights and used for determining a state of the
`created right.
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`(Ex. 1001 at 15:7–22.)
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`This claim is not directed to financial concepts, and instead is drawn to data
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`access control technology, as implemented via usage rights and meta-rights. The
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`claim generally operates in connection with a “usage right” and at least one “meta-
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`right.” (Id.) Neither the “usage right” nor the “meta-right” is a financial construct.
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`As explained in Section IV.C regarding claim construction, “usage rights” refer to
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`“indications that are attached, or treated as attached, to [a digital work / digital
`
`content / content / a digital document] and that indicate the manner in which the
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`[digital work / digital content / content / digital document] may be used or
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`distributed as well as any conditions on which use or distribution is premised.”
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`“Meta-rights” are understood to refer to “a right that, when exercised, creates or
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`disposes of usage rights (or other meta-rights) but that is not itself a usage right
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`because exercising a meta-right does not result in action to content.” (Ex. 2001 at
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`106.) The usage rights and meta-rights are operative elements in particular digital
`
`rights management schemes, and are not financial concepts.
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`The claim also specifies “transferring rights adapted to be associated with
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`items from a rights supplier to a rights consumer,” a step that is accomplished in
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`conjunction with a “repository.” (Id.) Specifically, the claim recites “obtaining a
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`set of rights associated with an item, the set of rights including a meta-right
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`specifying a right that can be created when the meta-right is exercised, wherein the
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`meta-right is provided in digital form and is enforceable by a repository.” (Id.)
`
`Google and CG have agreed that a “repository” refers to “a trusted system in that it
`
`maintains physical, communications, and behavioral integrity in the support of
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`usage rights.” These three integrities are described in the Stefik ‘012 patent, which
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`is incorporated by reference into the ‘280 patent. The specific technical functions
`
`required to implement these integrities are also incorporated into the construction
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`previously given by the Board to “repository” and adopted by the district court.
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`The claim then recites a specific methodology for exercising a meta-right to
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`create a right specified in the meta-right. (Id.) This involves “determining, by a
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`repository, whether the rights consumer is entitled to the right specified by the
`
`meta-right.” (Id.) If the rights consumer is so entitled, the claim then specifies
`
`“exercising the meta-right to create the right specified by the meta-right.” (Id.) The
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`specification provides examples of such conditions, for example, whether the user
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`is a member of a particular group of users, such as “students in a university, or
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`members of a book club.” (Ex. 1001 at 4:43–46.) Again, these are not financial
`
`concepts – these method steps relate to protecting digital content from
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`unauthorized usage.
`
`
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`Claim 1 further specifies that the created right “includes at least one state
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`variable.” (Id. at 15:20.) This state variable is yet another non-financial concept.
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`This term was judicially construed to mean “a variable having a value, or
`
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`identifying a location at which a value is stored, that represents status of an item,
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`rights, license, or other potentially dynamic conditions.” (Ex. 2001 at 114.) For
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`example, the state variable can be used to manage a right to print content a limited
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`number of times or within a limited time period. (Id. at 111.) The dependent claims
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`recite various specific implementations involving shared and inherited state
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`variables to accomplish particular digital rights management schemes. (Ex. 1001 at
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`15:23–18:8.)
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`There is no “financial activity” at all specified in the claim. The entire focus
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`is on data access control – specifically as implemented via usage rights to the
`
`content and as augmented by meta-rights and state variables, all as implemented
`
`using a computer processor running specialized “repository” software. The claimed
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`technology is useful in a large number of contexts, and is not particularly related to
`
`the financial services industry.
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`Google asserts that, because a content creator might charge a fee for the
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`license to content, or because one of the conditions might entail the payment of a
`
`fee, the claims are necessarily “financial.” Google even delves into the
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`specification of the prior art ‘012 patent, arguing this patent discloses a “multiple
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`examples of the use of fee-based grammar elements” and “provides a detailed
`
`example of a billing transaction.” (Pet. at 13.) From this, Google concludes that
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`various terms in the ‘280 patent claims (such as “meta-rights” and “state
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`variables”) must be “financial” in nature. (Pet. at 15.)
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`Google’s arguments are misplaced. It is true that the ‘280 specification
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`teaches generally that fees can be paid for content, and it is likewise true that the
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`prior art ‘012 patent also discusses this concept. However, the claims are