Case CBM2015-00032
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`______________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________________
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`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`Patent Owner
`______________________
`
`Case CBM2015-00032
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
`______________________
`
`Before JENNIFER S. BISK, RAMA G. ELLURU, GREGG I. ANDERSON, and
`MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
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`Case CBM2015-00032
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. 
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
`PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO PO’S STATEMENT OF FACTS ............. 3 
`II. 
`III.  THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE NOT § 101 PATENT ELIGIBLE ..... 3 
`A.  PO Fails to Identify any Inventive Concept ............................................... 4 
`B.  The DDR Claims Are Not Analogous to the Claims ................................. 7 
`1. 
`The Claims Do Not Address an Internet-Specific Problem ............. 8 
`2. 
`The Claims Do Not “Override” Routine and Conventional
`Computer Action ............................................................................ 10 
`The Claims Do Not “Parallel” the DDR Claims ............................ 12 
`3. 
`C.  PO’s Preemption Arguments Are Misplaced ........................................... 14 
`IV.  PO’S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE MERITS .... 18 
`A.  Mr. Wechselberger Was Not Required to Recite an “Evidentiary
`Standard” or a “Standard for Statutory Subject Matter” .......................... 18 
`B.  PO’s Construction of “Payment Data” Ignores the Explicit Teachings
`of the ’772 Patent ...................................................................................... 21 
`C.  PO’s “Estoppel” Arguments Are Unfounded ........................................... 22 
`1. 
`Neither the ’772 Patent’s Prosecution Nor the AIA Prohibits
`the Board from Considering § 101 Here ........................................ 22 
`Non-Final § 101 Determinations in District Court Litigation
`Have No Impact On This Proceeding ............................................ 23 
`D.  Covered Business Method Reviews Are Constitutional .......................... 24 
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`2. 
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`Case CBM2015-00032
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`CASES
`Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc.,
`728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................ 5, 14, 24
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`Page(s)
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) .................................................................................passim
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
`788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................passim
`
`Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,
`958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .......................................................................... 24
`
`Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.,
`687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 4, 14, 16
`
`buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
`765 F.3d 1350-52 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................... 5, 10, 12
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .............................................................. 1, 4, 5, 12
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................passim
`
`Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc.,
`758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 6
`
`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... 21
`
`Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg,
`849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) .......................................................................... 24
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`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 23
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`Case CBM2015-00032
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
`Gottschalk v. Benson,
`409 U.S. 63 (1972) ............................................................................................ 1, 9
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`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA)
`(“IV”), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .......................................................passim
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`Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck,
`959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds ........... 25
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.,
`132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) .................................................................................passim
`
`McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co.,
`169 U.S. 606 (1898) ............................................................................................ 25
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`OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................passim
`
`Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff,
`758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................ 25
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`SmartGene, Inc. v. Adv. Biological Labs., SA,
`555 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ....................................................................... 6
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`Suffolk Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc.,
`752 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 21
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`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
`772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .....................................................................passim
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`Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
`793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 21, 22, 23
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`PTAB RULINGS
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`CBM2012-00007, Paper 15 & 58 ............................................................................ 24
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`CBM2013-00013, Paper 61 ....................................................................................... 5
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`CBM2014-00079, Paper 28 ................................................................................. 2, 15
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`CBM2014-00102, Paper 52 ............................................................................... 18, 22
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`CBM2015-00015, Paper 28 ..................................................................................... 17
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`Patent 8,336,772 B2
`CBM2015-00059, Paper 13 ................................................................................. 2, 15
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`IPR2013-00048, Paper 15 ........................................................................................ 21
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`IPR2013-00172, Paper 50 .................................................................................... 3, 18
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`STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
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`35 U.S.C. § 101 .................................................................................................passim
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`35 U.S.C. § 145 ........................................................................................................ 25
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`35 U.S.C. § 282(b) ................................................................................................... 23
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`35 U.S.C. § 324(a) ................................................................................................... 23
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.65 ..................................................................................................... 18
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`Case CBM2015-00032
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
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`LIST OF EXHIBITS
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`EXHIBIT LIST
`1301
`U.S. Patent No. 8,336,772
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`1302
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`1303
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`1304
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`1305
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`1306
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`1307
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`1308
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`1309
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`1310
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`1311
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`1312
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`1313
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`1314
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`1315
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`1316
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`1317
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`1318
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`1319
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`Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,925,127
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,940,805
`Russell Housley and Jan Dolphin, “Metering: A Pre-pay Tech-
`nique,” Storage and Retrieval for Image and Video Databases V,
`Conference Volume 3022, 527 (January 15, 1997)
`U.S. Patent No. 4,999,806
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,675,734
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`U.S. Patent No. 4,878,245
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`File History for U.S. Patent No. 8,336,772
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,942,317
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,103,392
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,530,235
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,629,980
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,915,019
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`European Patent Application, Publication No. EP0809221A2
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`International Publication No. WO 99/43136
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`JP Patent Application Publication No. H11-164058 (translation)
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`Eberhard von Faber, Robert Hammelrath, and Franz-Peter Heider,
`“The Secure Distribution of Digital Contents,” IEEE (1997)
`Declaration of Anthony J. Wechselberger In Support of Apple
`Inc.’s Petition for Covered Business Method Patent Review
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`1321
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`Case CBM2015-00032
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`EXHIBIT LIST
`1320
`U.S. Patent No. 8,033,458
`Declaration of Michael P. Duffey In Support of Apple Inc.’s Peti-
`tion for Covered Business Method Patent Review
`Declaration of Megan F. Raymond In Support of Apple Inc.’s Peti-
`tion for Covered Business Method Patent Review
`Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion from Smartflash LLC
`v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-cv-447 (Dkt. 229)
`File History for U.S. Patent No. 8,061,598
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`1322
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`1323
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`1324
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`1325
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`1326
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`1327
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`1328
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`1329
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`1330
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`1331
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`1332
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`1333
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`1334
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`1335
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`1336
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`1337
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`1338
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`U.S. Patent No. 4,337,483
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375
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`International Publication No. WO 95/34857
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`JP Patent Application Publication No. H10-269289 (translation)
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`File History for U.S. Patent No. 7,942,317
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`File History for U.S. Patent No. 8,033,458
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,061,598
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,118,221
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`File History for U.S. Patent No. 8,118,221
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,334,720
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`File History for U.S. Patent No. 7,334,720
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,646,992
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`Excerpts from the Deposition Transcript of Jonathan Katz, Ph.D.
`Vol. 1, April 8, 2015, taken in connection with CBM2014-
`00102, -00106, -00108, and 00112
`Smartflash LLC, et al. v. Apple Inc., et al., No. 6:13-cv-447, Dkt.
`585, Order (E.D. Tex. July 8, 2015)
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`Case CBM2015-00032
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`EXHIBIT LIST
`U.S. Patent No. 8,083,137
`1339
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`1340
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`1341
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`1342
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,603,382
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,970,713
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`Declaration of Michael P. Duffey In Support of Petitioner’s Reply
`to Patent Owner’s Response
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`GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
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`
`Description
`Shorthand
`’772 Patent or ’772 United States Patent No. 8,336,772
`§ 101
`35 U.S.C. § 101
`BRI
`Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
`Petition or P
`Case CBM2015-00032 Corrected Petition, Paper 5
`Decision or Dec
`Case CBM2015-00032 Institution Decision, Paper 11
`PO
`Patent Owner
`POSITA
`Person of ordinary skill in the art
`Response or R
`Case CBM 2015-00032 Patent Owner Response, Paper 23
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`Case CBM2015-00032
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
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`PO does not dispute that claims 14, 19, and 22 of the ’772 (“Claims”) are di-
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`rected to an abstract idea under step 1 of the patent-eligibility test in Mayo Collab-
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`orative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296-97 (2012) and Alice
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`Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). PO argues only
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`that the Claims have an “inventive concept” sufficient to satisfy step 2, but does
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`not identify even one inventive concept, let alone one “‘sufficient to ensure that the
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`patent … amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
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`itself.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
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`Instead, in an effort to circumvent Mayo’s two-step analysis, PO relies ex-
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`clusively on conclusory attorney argument that the invention involves a computer-
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`related problem and solution, and erroneously analogizes the Claims to those in
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`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1255-59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`And while the DDR claims are entirely distinguishable, PO ignores important case
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`law finding claims similar to the Claims to be patent ineligible. See, e.g., Alice, 134
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`S. Ct. 2347; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
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`LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
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`Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014); OIP Techs., Inc. v.
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`Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
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`Capital One Bank (USA) (“IV”), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). And, in any case,
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`DDR does not allow PO to circumvent the two-step Mayo inquiry.
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`PO also misapplies the preemption concern underlying 101 and incorrectly
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`argues that, separate from the two-step Mayo inquiry, the Claims are patent eligible
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`because they do “not result in inappropriate preemption.” R27-34. This same ar-
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`gument—contradicted by Mayo in language PO fails to mention—has been con-
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`sidered and rejected in recent decisions, which PO also entirely ignores. See, e.g.,
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`Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
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`OIP, 788 F.3d at 1362-63. Indeed, preemption is not an alternative or addition to
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`the Mayo test, but rather the underlying “concern that drives” that same inquiry.
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`Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. The Mayo test acts as a “proxy” for making judgments
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`about how much future innovation is preempted. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. Indeed,
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`the Board has correctly recognized, “questions on preemption are inherent in and
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`resolved by the § 101 analysis,” and “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to
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`disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework ... preemption
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`concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379 1 ;
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`CBM2015-00059, Pap.13 at 5; CBM2014-00079, Pap.28 at 19. Thus, the extent of
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`non-infringing alternatives is irrelevant, as ineligible subject matter is not rendered
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`patentable by the existence of non-infringing alternatives. E.g., Ariosa, 788 F.3d at
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`1379; OIP, 788 F.3d at 1362-63.
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`1 All emphases herein added unless otherwise indicated.
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`Finally, PO’s arguments about claim construction, the weight to accord Peti-
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`tioner’s unrebutted expert opinions, the Board’s authority to review the Claims,
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`and the constitutionality of CBMs are legally incorrect and irrelevant.
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`II.
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`PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO PO’S STATEMENT OF FACTS
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`As to PO’s alleged facts (1) and (2), Petitioner admits that the phrases “pre-
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`ponderance of the evidence” and “more likely than not” do not appear in Mr.
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`Wechselberger’s declaration. The evidentiary standard need not be recited in ex-
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`pert declarations. See, e.g., IPR2013-00172, Pap.50 at 42. Petitioner otherwise de-
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`nies these allegations. Petitioner further states the following material fact: PO did
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`not submit any expert opinion in this proceeding.
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`III. THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE NOT § 101 PATENT ELIGIBLE
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`PO does not dispute the Claims are directed to an abstract idea under Mayo
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`step 1. Cf. R15-16.2 Thus, the only remaining question is whether, under Mayo step
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`2 See also Dec12 (“[T]he heart of the claimed subject matter is restricting access to
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`stored data based on supplier-defined access rules and validation of payment.”);
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`Ex.2049 17-18 (“The asserted claims recite abstract ideas. ... [C]onditioning and
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`controlling access to data based on payment—is abstract and a fundamental build-
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`ing block of the economy in the digital age.”); Ex.2050 1-2; Ex.2076 18:5-21,
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`20:25-21:9, 86:15-87:7, 91:8-11, 92:25-93:7; cf. Pap.12 at 3 (arguments not raised
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`in response are waived.); Ex.2068 11:16-12:7, 65:16-66:20, 67:1-68:20, 69:8-70:5.
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`2, the Claims include “additional features” amounting to an “inventive concept”
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`that is “significantly more” than the claimed abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
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`2355, 2357. “[I]mplement[ing] the abstract idea with ‘routine, conventional activ-
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`it[ies],’ ... is insufficient to transform the patent-ineligible abstract idea into patent-
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`eligible subject matter.” Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716. “There is no ‘inventive
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`concept’ in [the] use of a generic ... computer to perform well-understood, routine,
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`and conventional activities commonly used in industry.” Content Extraction, 776
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`F.3d at 1348; see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.,
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`687 F.3d 1266, 1278-80 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As discussed below, the Claims recite
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`only well-known, routine, and conventional computer activities.
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`A.
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`PO Fails to Identify any Inventive Concept
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`PO fails to identify any “inventive concept” in the Claims in its brief discus-
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`sion of Mayo step 2. PO describes the Claims as directed to “retrieving content on-
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`ly after payment validation data has been received.”3 R17. But simply retrieving
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`3 PO’s’772 “Overview” (R11-14) discusses, e.g., “us[ing] the use status data and
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`use rules to determine what access is permitted to data stored on the data carrier,”
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`“stor[ing] content use rules pertaining to allowed use of stored data items,” and
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`“track[ing] a use of [content] such that a system could limit its playback to [sic]
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`number of times (e.g., three times) or determine that the [content] had only been
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`partially used.” R12-14. But none of these is tied to or recited in the Claims.
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`and receiving data are all well-understood, routine, conventional computer activi-
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`ties—not inventive concepts. Ex.1319 ¶¶ 79-96. Indeed, unpatentable claims in Al-
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`ice similarly recited limitations for sending/receiving data, storing multiple types
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`of information, and ensuring that valuation rules were met. See, e.g., P26-31;
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`Ex.1326 cl. 26; Ex.1319 ¶¶ 79-96; Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 nn.1-2 (rep. cl. 33),
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`2360 (no inventive concept in reciting generic computer components; “[n]early
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`every computer ... [is] capable of performing [] basic calculation, storage, and
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`transmission functions”); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1345 (rep. cl. 1), 1347-
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`49 (no inventive concept in collecting, recognizing, and storing data); Ultramer-
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`cial, 772 F.3d at 712 (rep. cl. 1), 715-16 (“selecting an ad,” “restricting public ac-
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`cess,” “facilitating display,” “allowing the consumer access,” “updating the activi-
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`ty log,” and “receiving payment,” add no inventive concept; “that the system is ac-
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`tive ... and restricts public access also represents only insignificant pre-solution ac-
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`tivity”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350-52, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
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`(“a computer [that] receives and sends [] information over a network ... is not even
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`arguably inventive”; (rep. cls. 1, 14)); Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guide-
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`wire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1338, 1344-46 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (claims (rep.
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`cl. 1) reciting only “generalized software components” for “generating tasks [based
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`on] rules ... to be completed upon the occurrence of an event” unpatentable);
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`CBM2013-00013, Pap.61 at 8, 16 (claims (rep. cl. 1) reciting “an abstract method,
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`i.e., performing a real-time Web transaction,” including “transferring funds (i.e.,
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`debiting or crediting) in response to user signals from an input device” unpatenta-
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`ble); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351
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`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (generating, combining two data sets into a device profile ineligi-
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`ble); SmartGene, Inc. v. Adv. Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2014) (“claim … assumes the availability of physical components for input,
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`memory, look-up, comparison, and output.”).
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`The Claims recite no more than generic computer elements and functions
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`that were well-known, routine, and conventional to a POSITA at the time of filing.
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`See, e.g., Ex.1319 ¶¶ 79-96; P26-31; Ex.2076 22:3-16, 36:5-24, 50:12-51:4,
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`135:14-137:19, 142:4-24, 148:15-149:22, 154:10-155:9, 161:8-23, 175:25-178:9,
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`180:9-21, 181:19-183:11, 192:1-6; Ex.1301 4:7-8, 16:55-58, 18:16-20; cf. also
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`Ex.2076 100:1-22, 103:15-104:18, 145:7-147:14; Ex.2068 14:17-15:1, 69:8-70:5,
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`77:7-18, 78:6-11, 87:19-88:11, 96:6-18, 96:25-98:24, 99:7-23, 100:6-101:8. PO
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`has submitted no contrary evidence. “[M]ere recitation of a generic computer can-
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`not transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Al-
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`ice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. See also P26-31.4
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`4 PO parrots the district court’s statement that the “asserted claims ... recite specific
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`ways of using distinct memories” (R27 (quoting Ex.2049 19)), but the Claims do
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`not recite distinct memories.
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`B.
`The DDR Claims Are Not Analogous to the Claims
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`PO’s entire argument regarding Mayo step 2 rests on its flawed assumption
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`that the Claims are patent eligible because PO alleges they resemble the DDR
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`claims. To begin with, DDR does not overturn Mayo’s two-step inquiry. If the
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`Claims are directed to an abstract idea (they are), and if there is no “inventive con-
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`cept” in the Claims “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to sig-
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`nificantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself” (there is none),
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`then the Claims are patent ineligible. PO does not dispute that the Claims are di-
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`rected to an abstract idea (step 1), and has provided no evidence of any “inventive
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`concept” (step 2). That is dispositive. Superficial comparisons to the DDR claims
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`cannot substitute for Mayo’s two-step inquiry. In any case, the DDR claims are not
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`analogous, and the Claims are much more similar to claims found patent ineligible.
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`The patent in DDR addressed the problem of retaining website visitors when
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`clicking on an advertisement within the host’s website. See 773 F.3d at 1257. Un-
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`der the conventional Internet function, clicking an advertisement hyperlink would
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`transport a website visitor away to, e.g., a third-party advertiser’s website. Id. The
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`patented claims provided a solution where the visitor is no longer transported to the
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`third-party website, but, instead, an outsource provider automatically generates a
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`hybrid web page combining visual “look and feel” elements from the host website
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`and product information from the third-party website. Id. This allows the host web-
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`site to retain the visitors but still enables visitors to purchase the product from the
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`third-party. Id. at 1257-58. The court distinguished this Internet-centric problem by
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`stating this practice “introduces a problem that does not arise in the ‘brick and
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`mortar’ context” as “[t]here is ... no possibility that by walking up to [a kiosk in a
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`warehouse store], the customer will be suddenly and completely transported out-
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`side the warehouse store and relocated to a separate physical venue associated with
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`the third-party.” Id. at 1258. Specifically, the court found the claimed method
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`“overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by”
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`routine and conventional computer action and is not directed to the general abstract
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`idea of “‘use of the Internet’ to perform an abstract business practice (with insig-
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`nificant added activity).” Id. In contrast, the Claims do not address an Internet-
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`specific problem, nor do they override routine and conventional processes.
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`1.
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`The Claims Do Not Address an Internet-Specific Problem
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`PO incorrectly argues the Claims are like those in DDR because they alleg-
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`edly address a “technological problem,” are rooted in computer technology and are
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`directed to a challenge particular to the Internet/computer networks. R16-18. But
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`“data piracy”—the business problem the ’772 addresses—is not a technological
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`problem or a “problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
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`See, e.g., Ex.1319 ¶¶ 76-77; Ex.2076 158:2-159:9; Dec9-10; cf. also Ex.2068
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`15:17-16:5, 25:3-16, 76:10-77:6. Indeed, unlike the DDR claims, which addressed
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`“a problem that does not arise in the ‘brick and mortar’ context,” PO’s Claims ad-
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`
`
`
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`dress a problem of controlling access based on payment or rules—an age-old busi-
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`ness problem long solved outside the context of the Internet, such as in apartment
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`rentals, movie rentals, movie tickets, subscription plans, and pay-per-view pro-
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`gramming. See, e.g., Ex.1319 ¶¶ 31, 76-77; see also, e.g., Ex.1308 Abstract, 4:27-
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`35 (pay-per-use cable system); cf. also Ex.2068 42:11-43:15. Thus, that data piracy
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`(and providing access to goods based on rules/payment) may also exist on the In-
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`ternet does not render it a “‘challenge particular to the Internet’” (R18 (quoting
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`DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257)). See, e.g., Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716 (“Narrowing the
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`abstract idea of using advertising as a currency to the Internet is an ‘attempt[] to
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`limit the use’ of the abstract idea ‘to a particular technological environment,’
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`which is insufficient to save a claim.” (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358)). Thus,
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`the Claims are not analogous to DDR, where “the claimed solution [was] necessari-
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`ly rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically aris-
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`ing in the realm of computer networks.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. And, even if the
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`Claims’ only practical application is use with a computer, that would not render the
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`claim patent eligible. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-74 (cls. 8 and 13 ineligible
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`despite “no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital
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`computer”). Regardless, because the claims here “do not address problems unique
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`to the Internet ... DDR has no applicability.” IV, 792 F.3d at 1371.
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`Further, the data piracy problem undisputedly exists outside the context of
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`
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`the Internet/computer networks, e.g., content copy protection with digital water-
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`marking. See Ex.1301 5:13-16 (“where the data carrier stores ... music, the pur-
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`chase outright option may be equivalent to the purchase of a compact disc (CD),
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`preferably with some form of content copy protection such as digital watermark-
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`ing”). Similarly, video on demand was used to prevent video data piracy (copying
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`and misuse), time-limited promotional trials were used to prevent software data pi-
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`racy (e.g., in prior art Poggio), and region codes and encryptions were used to pre-
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`vent DVD piracy well before the ‘772 priority date. See Ex.1319 ¶ 77; see also,
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`e.g., Ex.1315 1:13-23 (discussing purchasing “try and buy” software in a store).
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`Thus, the business problem and purported solution addressed by the Claims
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`are more like those for claims held patent ineligible, despite their applicability to
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`the Internet. E.g., Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16 (using advertising as currency
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`on Internet); buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (creating transaction performance guaran-
`
`ty on Internet); IV, 792 F.3d at 1367-71 (tracking financial transactions and tailor-
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`ing advertisements on Internet).
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`2.
`
`The Claims Do Not “Override” Routine and Conventional
`Computer Action
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`Contrary to PO’s assertion (R17-18), and unlike the DDR claims, the Claims
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`do not “override” routine and conventional computer action, and thus remain ineli-
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`gible. See DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258; id. at 1256 (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no
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`doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineli-
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`
`
`
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`gible claim patent-eligible.”). As the ’772 itself acknowledges, the Claims simply
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`recite computer-based limitations acting in a routine and conventional manner,
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`e.g., a data carrier that may be a generic device such as a “standard smart card,”
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`Ex.1301 11:33-35, and generic components, e.g., “a wireless interface,” “non-
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`volatile memory,” “a processor,” “a program store,” “a user interface,” “code” and
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`“a display.” See Ex.1301 4:7-8, 16:55-58, 18:16-20 (describing components as
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`“conventional”); P29-30; Ex.1319 ¶¶ 79-96. Further, the Claims recite generic
`
`computer functions, such as requesting, receiving, retrieving, presenting, transmit-
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`ting, writing, identifying, displaying, and selecting. See, e.g., supra Section III.A.
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`The Claims do not override routine and conventional computer actions—they
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`claim such actions.
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`Indeed, the Claims are analogous to numerous claims held unpatentable. For
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`example, the patent-ineligible claims in IV recited “generic computer elements”
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`(e.g., “a database, a user profile,” “a communication medium”) and steps (e.g.,
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`“storing” data (i.e., user profile) in the database, “causing communication” be-
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`tween database and “receiving device,” employing “interactive interface” that was
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`simply “a generic web server with attendant software, tasked with providing web
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`pages to and communicating with the user’s computer”) “that d[id] nothing more
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`than spell out what it means to ‘apply it on a computer.’” 792 F.3d at 1366-71 (an-
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`alyzing Pat. Nos. 8,083,137 (Ex.1339) and 7,603,382 (Ex.1340)). The IV claims
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`
`
`
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`were distinguishable from the DDR claims that “recited a specific series of steps
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`that resulted in a departure from the routine and conventional sequence of events
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`after the click of a hyperlink advertisement.” Id. at 1371. Here, the Claims recite
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`generic computer elements performing routine and conventional computer activity.
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`Similarly, the ineligible claims in OIP “merely recite[d] ‘well-understood,
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`routine conventional activit[ies],’ either by requiring conventional computer activi-
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`ties or routine data-gathering steps” (e.g., “sending ... messages over a network to
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`devices,’ the devices being ‘programmed to communicate,’” “storing test results in
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`a ‘machine-readable medium’”). 788 F.3d at 1360-63 (analyzing Pat. No.
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`7,970,713 (Ex.1341)) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359). There, the Federal Cir-
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`cuit confirmed application of DDR is limited to claims “recit[ing] a specific ma-
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`nipulation of a general-purpose computer such that the claims do not rely on a
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`‘computer network operating in its normal, expected manner.’” Id. at 1363 (citing
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`DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258-59). Here too, the Claims recite only routine, conventional
`
`computer-based limitations that operate in a normal, expected manner—and are pa-
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`tent ineligible. See also, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360; Content Extraction, 776
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`F.3d at 1347-49; Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16; buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355.
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`3.
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`The Claims Do Not “Parallel” the DDR Claims
`
`Contrary to PO’s assertion, a direct comparison of the Claims to DDR’s
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`claims reveals the stark differences between them. Although PO provides a table
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`
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`that purports to show how two Claims “parallel” a DDR claim, even a cursory
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`analysis reveals they have little in common. For example, the last limitation in the
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`DDR claim requires “automatically generat[ing] ... a second web page that dis-
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`plays: (A) information associated with the commerce object associated with the
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`link that has been activated, and (B) the plurality of visually perceptible elements
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`visually corresponding to the source page,” whereas the so-called “[s]imilar claim
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`element from [’772] claim 14” requires simply code to “transmit payment data …
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`for said selected [multimedia content] … for validation by a payment validation
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`system,” “receive payment validation data,” “retrieve said selected [multimedia
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`content],” and “write said retrieved [multimedia content] into said non-volatile
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`memory, wherein said user interface is operable to enable a user to select said se-
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`lected [multimedia content].” R21-23. Similarly, so-called “[s]imilar claim element
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`from [’772] claim 19” requires simply code to “receive payment validation data,”
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`“retrieve said selected at least one content data item,” and “write said retrieved at
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`least one content data item into said data carrier.” R26. Even in PO’s chosen ex-
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`amples, it is readily apparent that DDR’s limitation, which alters the normal opera-
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`tion of clicking an advertisement hyperlink within a webpage, requires substantive-
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`ly more than the Claims, which simply recit