`______________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________________
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`APPLE INC., SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., and SAMSUNG
`ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., and GOOGLE, INC.
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`Patent Owner
`______________________
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`Case CBM2015-000311,2
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
`______________________
`
`Before the Honorable JENNIFER S. BISK, RAMA G. ELLURU, GREGG I.
`ANDERSON, and MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S OPPOSITION TO
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c)
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`
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`1 The challenge to claims 5 and 10 based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 in CBM2015-00059
`has been consolidated with this proceeding.
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` The challenge to claims 1, 5, 9, and 10 based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 in CBM2015-
`00132 has been consolidated with this proceeding.
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` 2
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`Case CBM2015-00031
`Patent 8,336,772 B2
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. THE BOARD SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE EXHIBIT 1202 ............................. 2
`II. THE BOARD SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE EXHIBITS 1224, 1229-30,
`1233, OR 1235 ................................................................................................... 3
`III. THE BOARD SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE EXHIBITS 1203-04, 1206-08,
`1211-18, 1225-28, OR 1236 ............................................................................... 4
`IV. THE BOARD SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE EXHIBIT 1219 ............................. 6
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`Patent 8,336,772 B2
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`In response to Patent Owner’s (“PO”) Motion to Exclude (“Mot.”, Pap. 29),
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`Petitioner respectfully submits that the Board, sitting as a non-jury tribunal with
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`administrative expertise, is well-positioned to determine and assign appropriate
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`weight to the evidence presented here, without resorting to formal exclusion that
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`might later be held reversible error. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Guenthner, 395 F. Supp. 2d
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`835, 842 n.3 (D. Neb. 2005); Builders Steel Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,
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`179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950) (vacating Tax Court decision for exclusion of
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`competent, material evidence); Donnelly Garment Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations
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`Bd., 123 F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1941) (NLRB’s refusal to receive testimonial evi-
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`dence was denial of due process). See also, e.g., Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. F.T.C.,
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`148 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) (“Even in
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`criminal trials to a jury it is better, nine times out of ten, to admit, than to exclude, .
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`. . and in such proceedings as these the only conceivable interest that can suffer by
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`admitting any evidence is the time lost, which is seldom as much as that inevitably
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`lost by idle bickering about irrelevancy or incompetence.”). But even under strict
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`application of the Rules of Evidence, cf. 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,616 (Aug. 14,
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`2012) (“42.5(a) and (b) permit administrative patent judges wide latitude in admin-
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`istering the proceedings to balance the ideal of precise rules against the need for
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`flexibility to achieve reasonably fast, inexpensive, and fair proceedings”), Petition-
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`er’s evidence here is entirely proper while PO’s objections—many of which have
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`Patent 8,336,772 B2
`already been rejected by the Board in prior proceedings on related patents—are
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`baseless.
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`I.
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`The Board Should Not Exclude Exhibit 1202
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`Petitioner did not rely on Ex. 1202 for “evidence of the content” of the ’772
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`patent (cf. Mot. 2), but rather to show that PO’s own characterization of the sub-
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`ject matter of the ’772 patent supports Petitioner’s contention—and the Board’s
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`conclusion—that the ’772 patent relates to a financial activity or transaction and is
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`thus subject to the Board’s review as a covered business method patent. See Pap. 5
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`at 10. PO’s characterization of the ’772 patent in another proceeding is not found
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`in the patent itself; thus, Ex. 1202 is not cumulative of the ’772 patent, and FRE
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`1004 is inapplicable. Indeed, as PO admits, the Board declined to exclude the
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`same exhibit in other proceedings on related patents because the Board found “[Pa-
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`tent Owner’s] characterization of the [related] patent in prior proceedings are rele-
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`vant to the credibility of its characterization of the [] patent in this proceeding.”
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`Mot. 3 (citing CBM2014-00102, Pap. 52 at 36); see also CBM2014-00106, Pap. 52
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`at 25; CBM2014-00108, Pap. 50 at 19; CBM2014-00112, Pap. 48 at 24. Contrary
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`to PO’s claim that its characterization of the ’772 patent is not at issue (Mot. 3),
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`PO disputed the financial nature of the ’772 patent here, see Pap. 8 at 5-11, and its
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`highly relevant admission to the contrary should not be excluded.
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`The Board Should Not Exclude Exhibits 1224, 1229-30, 1233, Or 1235
`II.
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`PO’s assertion that Exs. 1224, 1229-30, 1233, and 1235 are not cited in the
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`Wechselberger Declaration (Mot. 3-4) is simply wrong: all were cited as “Materi-
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`als Reviewed and Relied Upon,” see Ex. 1219, App. C, and properly filed with the
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`Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(c). (Indeed, Petitioner respectfully submits PO
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`would now be objecting if Petitioner had failed to provide these cited exhibits.)
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`PO also incorrectly argues that “mere review” of an exhibit by an expert in reach-
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`ing his opinions does not render an exhibit relevant or admissible because FRE 703
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`allows experts to rely on facts or data that may not be admissible. Mot. 4. The fact
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`that FRE 703 allows experts to rely on material that may not be admissible does
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`not render all material relied on by experts irrelevant or inadmissible. Indeed, as
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`PO admits, in another proceeding on a related patent, the Board denied PO’s re-
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`quest to exclude similar exhibits, finding that “[b]ecause Mr. Wechselberger attests
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`that he reviewed these exhibits in reaching the opinions he expressed in this case,
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`Patent Owner has not shown that they are irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402.”
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`Mot. 4 (citing CBM2014-00102, Pap. 52 at 37); see also CBM2014-00106, Pap. 52
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`at 25; CBM2014-00108, Pap. 50 at 19-20; CBM2014-00112, Pap. 48 at 24. To the
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`extent PO’s objection is based on imaginings that Petitioner will advance at oral
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`hearing arguments about these documents not presented in previous papers, this is
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`baseless–Petitioner intends to comply fully with the Board’s rules (e.g., Trial Prac-
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`tice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012)).
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`III. The Board Should Not Exclude Exhibits 1203-04, 1206-08, 1211-18,
`1225-28, Or 1236
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`Contrary to PO’s assertions, Exs. 1203-04, 1206-08, 1211-13, 1216, 1218,
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`and 1225-28 (“Prior Art Exhibits”) are certainly relevant to the Board’s § 101
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`analysis.3 More specifically, such evidence is relevant to Mayo’s two-step inquiry
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`for patent eligibility to determine, for example, whether the claims contain an “in-
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`ventive concept.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357,
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`2359 (2014) (internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., YYZ, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard
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`Co., No. 13-136-SLR, 2015 WL 5886176, at *8 (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2015) (“Although
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`the § 101 inquiry is focused on the claim language, extrinsic evidence [, such as
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`prior art,] may be helpful in terms of understanding the state of the art . . . , and
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`whether the problem to which the patent was directed is solved using computer
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`technology in unconventional ways.”); cf. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
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`793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming Board’s reliance on peti-
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`tioner’s expert in determining claimed steps were well-known, routine, and con-
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`ventional and Board’s finding that “claims at issue do not recite any improvement
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`3 Ex. 1205 was not relied on here. While exclusion of Ex. 1205 is unnecessary, Pe-
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`titioner would not oppose it.
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`4
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`in computer technology”).4 Both the Petition and the Wechselberger Declaration
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`describe Prior Art Exhibits as evidence of that knowledge. See, e.g., Pap. 5 at 6-8
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`(Overview of Field of the Claimed Invention); Ex. 1219 ¶¶ 28-51 (State of the
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`Art).
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`Moreover, the Petition and Wechselberger Declaration specifically rely on
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`the Prior Art Exhibits to show either that (1) the basic concept of controlling access
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`based on payment and/or rules—to which the challenged claims are directed—was
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`well-known in the prior art, or (2) the elements disclosed by the challenged claims
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`were well-known, routine, and conventional. See, e.g., Pap. 5 at 31-32 (analogiz-
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`ing challenged claims to those held ineligible in Alice (Ex. 1226)); Ex. 1219 ¶¶ 76-
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`77 (citing “State of the Art” discussion and Exs. 1215 and 1225), ¶¶ 81-87 (citing
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`“State of the Art” discussion and Exs. 1206-07, 1211-13, 1215). The Prior Art Ex-
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`hibits are unquestionably relevant to the § 101 analysis; there is no basis to exclude
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`them.
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`PO’s assertion that Exs. 1214-15, 1217, and 1236 are irrelevant is similarly
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`meritless. As with the other Prior Art Exhibits, these exhibits are relevant to the
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`Board’s § 101 analysis because they provide evidence of the state of the art. See
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`YYZ, 2015 WL 5886176, at *8. While the Board did not institute review based on
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`grounds calling out Exs. 1214-15, 1217, and 1236, they nonetheless establish the
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`4 All emphasis herein is added unless otherwise indicated.
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`state of the art and provide context for the § 101 inquiry—and the Wechselberger
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`Declaration specifically relies on them for this purpose. See Ex. 1219 ¶¶ 34-35,
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`39-40, 42 (“State of the Art” discussion), ¶¶ 76-77 (citing “State of the Art” dis-
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`cussion in § 101 analysis and Ex. 1215), ¶ 84 (citing Ex. 1215), ¶ 87. Moreover,
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`the named inventor has plainly admitted, in related proceedings that both parties
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`have cited to the Board (Pap. 5 at 15-16; Pap. 6 at 3), that he did not invent claimed
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`concepts or elements, such as use rules or access rules in connection with the
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`online sale of content or payment validation data. See, e.g., Smartflash LLC, et al.
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`v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-cv-447, Dkt. 511 (CBM2015-00127, Ex. 1045) at 118:6-
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`119:14, 120:14-121:8, 122:19-125:25, 126:11-129:18. Nonetheless, it appears that
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`PO intends to argue in this proceeding that these admitted prior art elements could
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`somehow provide an inventive concept sufficient to satisfy the second step of the
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`Mayo analysis (see, e.g., Patent Owner Response, Pap. 23 at 17 (arguing claims
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`“allow[] access to stored content only after payment validation data has been re-
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`ceived”)—making such evidence unquestionably relevant here. There is thus no
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`merit in PO’s assertion that “nothing in the Alleged Prior Art Exhibits makes a fact
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`of consequence in determining this action more or less probable than it would be
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`without the Alleged Prior Art Exhibits.” Mot. 7.
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`IV. The Board Should Not Exclude Exhibit 1219
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`Despite the Board’s rejection on multiple occasions of PO’s argument that
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`the Wechselberger Declaration should be disregarded for not reciting the eviden-
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`tiary standard, PO repeats it again here. Mot. 8-11; see also CBM2014-00102,
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`Pap. 8 at 4 n.8; CBM2014-00106, Pap. 8 at 4 n.11; CBM2014-00108, Pap. 8 at 16
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`n.5; CBM2014-00112, Pap. 7 at 4 n.9; CBM2014-00102, Pap. 52 at 39;
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`CBM2014-00106, Pap. 52 at 27-28; CBM2014-00108, Pap. 50 at 21-22;
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`CBM2014-00112, Pap. 48 at 26. But, as the Board properly found in prior pro-
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`ceedings on related patents, experts like Mr. Wechselberger are “not required to
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`recite the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard expressly in order for the ex-
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`pert testimony to be accorded weight, much less admissibility.” CBM2014-00102,
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`Pap. 52 at 39; see also CBM2014-00106, Pap. 52 at 27; CBM2014-00108, Pap. 50
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`at 21-22; CBM2014-00112, Pap. 48 at 26. “Rather, it is within [the Board’s] dis-
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`cretion to assign the appropriate weight to be accorded to evidence based on
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`whether the expert testimony discloses the underlying facts or data on which the
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`opinion is based.” See IPR2013-00172, Pap. 50 at 42. The Wechselberger Decla-
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`ration sufficiently “disclose[s] the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is
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`based,” as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), and cites specific evidence supporting
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`each of the opinions. PO’s meritless request that the Board simply ignore this evi-
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`dence should be rejected.
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`PO also seeks to exclude the portions of the Wechselberger Declaration that
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`cite prior art to describe the state of the art and provide context for his § 101 opin-
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`ions as well as “any other portion . . . that is directed to patentability under 35
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`U.S.C. §§ 102/103.” Mot. 11 (identifying paragraphs 28-68). First, as detailed in
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`§ III, supra, the Wechselberger Declaration’s description of the art at the relevant
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`time is clearly relevant to the § 101 inquiry. For the same reasons the Prior Art
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`Exhibits and Exs. 1214-15, 1217, and 1236 are relevant, expert analyses of those
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`exhibits are relevant under FRE 401 and should not be excluded. Mr. Wechsel-
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`berger’s conclusions regarding what would be considered well-known, routine, and
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`conventional (see, e.g., Ex. 1219 ¶ 74) are entitled to weight.
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`PO further seeks to exclude the portions of the Wechselberger Declaration
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`that provide Mr. Wechselberger’s opinions on the patent eligibility of the chal-
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`lenged claims, arguing that § 101 is a “strictly legal issue . . . for which Mr. Wech-
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`selberger is not an expert.” Mot. 12 (identifying paragraphs 69-96). But PO’s ar-
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`gument ignores that “[p]atent eligibility under § 101 presents an issue of law . . . .
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`[that] may contain underlying factual issues.” Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v.
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`Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Ar-
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`rhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1992) (“[D]etermination of [statutory subject matter] may require findings of
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`underlying facts specific to the particular subject matter and its mode of claim-
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`ing.”); YYZ, 2015 WL 5886176, at *8; cf. Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334 (affirming
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`Board’s reliance on petitioner’s expert over patent owner’s expert in determining
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`claimed steps were well-known, routine, and conventional). And there is no dis-
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`pute that Mr. Wechselberger is competent to opine on the factual issues. Cf. Mot.
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`12. Moreover, there is no basis for PO’s objections to Mr. Wechselberger’s expert
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`testimony under FRE 602, as the rule plainly states it “does not apply to a wit-
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`ness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.” Thus, PO’s FRE 602 objection to para-
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`graphs 69-96 of the Wechselberger Declaration should be rejected for this addi-
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`tional, independent reason.
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`For the foregoing reasons, PO’s most recent attempts to exclude relevant,
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`admissible evidence should again be rejected.
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`December 3, 2015
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`Respectfully submitted,
`By /J. Steven Baughman/
`J. Steven Baughman, Lead Counsel
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing PETITIONER
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`APPLE INC.’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EX-
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`CLUDE was served on December 3, 2015, to the following counsel via e-mail,
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`pursuant to the parties’ agreement concerning service:
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`Michael R. Casey
`J. Scott Davidson
`DAVIDSON BERQUIST JACKSON & GOWDEY LLP
`8300 Greensboro Drive, Suite 500
`McLean, VA 22102
`Telephone: (571) 765-7700
`Facsimile: (571) 765-7200
`mcasey@dbjg.com
`jsd@dbjg.com
`docket@dbjg.com
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`Attorneys for Patent Owner Smartflash LLC
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`Walter Renner
`Thomas Rozylowicz
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`axf@fr.com
`CBM39843-0008CP3@fr.com
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`Attorneys for Petitioners Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and
`Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
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`Raymond Nimrod
`Andrew Holmes
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
`raynimrod@quinnemanuel.com
`QE-SF-PTAB-Service@quinnemanuel.com
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`Attorneys for Petitioner Google Inc.
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`/s/ Sharon Lee
`Sharon Lee
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`ROPES & GRAY LLP
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`11