UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________________
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`________________________
`Case CBM2015-00016
`Patent 8,033,458 B2
`________________________
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S
`REQUEST FOR REHEARING,
`RENEWED REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO TERMINATE,
`AND CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR ORAL HEARING
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`III. ARGUIVIENT ..................................................................................................... ..5
`
`Petitioner ......................................................................................................... . .5
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION / STATEMENT OF PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED ...... 1
`I.
`INTRODUCTION/ STATEMENT OF PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED .... ..l
`I.
`II. STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE RELIEF REQUESTED ................... 1
`II. STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE RELIEF REQUESTED ................. ..l
`III. ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 5
`A. The Board Does Not Have Statutory Authority to Proceed Without A
`A. The Board Does Not Have Statutory Authority to Proceed Without A
`Petitioner ........................................................................................................... 5
`1. The Board Misapprehends Progressive ........................................................ 7
`l. The Board Misapprehends Progressive ...................................................... ..7
`2. The Board Overlooks the Substantive Statutory Differences Between § 327
`2. The Board Overlooks the Substantive Statutory Differences Between § 327
`and § 325(e)(1) ............................................................................................ 10
`and § 325(e)(l) .......................................................................................... ..lO
`B. Smartflash Should Be Granted Leave to File a Motion to Terminate ............ 12
`C. If the Board Insists on Proceeding, Smartflash is Statutorily Entitled to a
`C. If the Board Insists on Proceeding, Smartflash is Statutorily Entitled to a
`Hearing ............................................................................................................ 13
`Hearing .......................................................................................................... ..l3
`IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 14
`
`IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ ..l4
`
`B. Smartflash Should Be Granted Leave to File a Motion to Terminate .......... ..l2
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF PRECISE RELIEF
`REQUESTED
`
`Patent Owner Smartflash LLC hereby requests rehearing pursuant to 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.71(d) of certain aspects the Board’s November 4, 2015 Order –
`
`Conduct of the Proceedings 37 C.F.R. § 42.5. CBM2015-00016, Paper 50. Patent
`
`Owner also hereby renews its request for leave to file a Motion to Terminate
`
`CBM2015-00016 with respect to claim 1 of U.S. Patent 8,033,458 (“the ‘458
`
`Patent”) in light of Petitioner Apple’s 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) estoppel confirmed by
`
`the Board. CBM2015-00016, Paper 50 at 4-5, 7-8. Finally, in the event that the
`
`Board does not permit rehearing and/or does not grant Patent Owner leave to file a
`
`Motion to Terminate, Patent Owner requests that it be granted an oral hearing in
`
`CBM2015-00016 on claim 1 of the ‘458 Patent.
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`On petitions filed by Apple Inc., the Board instituted Covered Business
`
`Method review on 35 U.S.C. § 101 grounds of claim 1 only of the ‘221 Patent in
`
`CBM2015-00015 (CBM2015-00015, Paper 23 at 21-22), on claims 1, 6, 8, and 10
`
`in CBM2015-000161 (CBM2015-0016, Paper 23 at 26) and on claim 18 only of the
`
`‘317 Patent in CBM2015-00018 (CBM2015-00018, Paper 15 at 14).
`
`
`1 The Board also instituted review of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. §112, second
`
`paragraph in CBM2015-00016.
`
`1
`
`

`
`Also on petitions filed by Apple Inc., on September 25, 2015 the Board
`
`issued final written decisions, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 328(a), finding certain
`
`claims invalid on 35 U.S.C. § 103 grounds in CBM2014-00102 (claims 1, 2, and
`
`11-14 of the ‘221 Patent (CBM2014-00102, Paper 52 at 43)); CBM2014-00106
`
`(claim 1 of the ‘458 Patent, (CBM2014-00106, Paper 52 at 31)); and CBM2014-
`
`00112 (claims 1, 6-8, 12, 13, 16, and 18 of the ‘317 Patent (CBM2014-00112,
`
`Paper 48 at 29)).
`
`Thus, for claim 1 of the ‘221 Patent in CBM2015-00015, claim 1 of the ‘458
`
`Patent in CBM2015-00016, and claim 18 of the ‘317 Patent in CBM2015-00018,
`
`as of September 25, 2015 Apple was a petitioner in CBM proceedings on claims
`
`for which the Board had issued a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) in
`
`CBM2014-00102, -00106, and -00112 on petitions brought by Apple.
`
`By Order dated October 9, 2015, the Board requested briefing on whether
`
`Apple was estopped from arguing the § 101 unpatentability of claim 1 of the ‘221
`
`Patent in CBM2015-00015 and claim 1 of the ‘458 Patent in CBM2015-00016 in
`
`then-upcoming hearings on November 9, 2015. CBM2015-00015, Paper 42;
`
`CBM2015-00016, Paper 42. The Board did not request briefing on the estoppel
`
`impact of the final written decision in CBM2014-00112 as to claim 18 in
`
`CBM2015-00018.
`
`2
`
`

`
`The parties submitted briefs in response to the Board’s October 9, 2015
`
`Order. Smartflash argued that Apple was estopped from maintaining its CBMs
`
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) and requested leave to file a Motion to
`
`Terminate CBM2015-00015 and CBM2015-00016 as to claim 1. CBM2015-
`
`00015, Paper 45 at 1-2; CBM2015-00016, Paper 46 at 1-2.
`
`By Order dated November 4, 2015, the Board agreed with Smartflash’s
`
`estoppel position, determining that:
`
`§ 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 1
`of the ’221 [in CBM2015-00015] patent and claim 1 of
`the ’458 patent [in CBM2015-00016]. Apple was the
`petitioner in CBM2014-00102, which resulted in a final
`written decision with respect to claim 1 of the ’221 patent
`and in CBM2014-00106, which resulted in a final written
`decision with respect to claim 1 of the ’458 patent.
`CBM2014-00102, Paper 52, 43; CBM2014-00106, Paper
`52, 31. Thus, pursuant to § 325(e)(1), Apple cannot
`“request or maintain” a proceeding before the Office with
`respect to these claims “on any ground” that Apple “raised
`or reasonably could have raised” during CBM2014-00102
`and CBM2014-00106.
`
`CBM2015-00015, Paper 49 at 3; CBM2015-00016, Paper 50 at 3; CBM2015-
`
`00018, Paper 37 at 3. The Board further determined that:
`
`Apple “reasonably could have raised” a § 101 challenge
`to claim 1 of the ’221 patent and claim 1 of the ’458
`patent. Thus, § 325(e)(1) is applicable to these claims.
`
`Id. at 4. Moreover, the Board found that:
`
`Apple also was the petitioner in CBM2014-00112 that
`resulted in a final written decision with respect to the
`
`3
`
`

`
`claim—claim 18—challenged in CBM2015-00018. The
`analysis provided above with respect to CBM2015-00015
`and CBM2015- 00016 is applicable to these claims as
`well. … Apple may not present argument with respect to
`the patentability of claim 18 of the ’317 patent and we
`dismiss Apple as a Petitioner from CBM2015-00018.
`
`Id. at 7.
`
`The Board dismissed Apple as a Petitioner from CBM2015-00015, from
`
`CBM2015-00016 with respect to claim 1 of the ’458 patent, and from CBM2015-
`
`00018. Id. at 8.
`
`The Board denied Patent Owner Smartflash’s request for leave to file a
`
`Motion to Terminate CBM2015-00015 and -00016 as to claim 1. Id.
`
`The Board also concluded that it could still reach a decision in CBM2015-
`
`00015, -00016 (as to claim 1), and -00018 because “these proceedings are in the
`
`late stages of Covered Business Method patent reviews with a fully developed
`
`record” and “[t]here is a public interest in resolving the issues raised by these
`
`challenges because the record is fully developed.” Id. at 6.
`
`The Board further ruled “we will not hear any argument with respect to
`
`CBM2015-00015 at the hearing on November 9, 2015” (id. at 5, n.3); and “we will
`
`not hear any argument with respect to CBM2015-00018 at the hearing on
`
`November 9, 2015.” Id. at 7-8, n.6.
`
`4
`
`

`
`III. ARGUMENT
`Despite the Board agreeing with Patent Owner that Apple is estopped under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) from maintaining a proceeding before the Office on claim 1
`
`of the ‘221 Patent and claim 1 of the ‘458 Patent on § 101 grounds, and finding sua
`
`sponte that Apple is estopped under § 325(e)(1) from maintaining a proceeding on
`
`claim 18 of the ‘317 Patent on § 101 grounds, and despite dismissing Apple as a
`
`Petitioner from CBM2015-00015, from CBM2015-00016 with respect to claim 1
`
`of the ’458 patent, and from CBM2015-00018, the Board denied Patent Owner
`
`Smartflash’s request for leave to file a Motion to Terminate CBM2015-00015 and
`
`-00016 with respect to claim 1. Then the Board went even further, finding that it
`
`could still reach a decision in CBM2015-00015, -00016 (as to claim 1), and -00018
`
`even though it simultaneously ruled it would not hear any argument with respect to
`
`CBM2015-00015 and -00018 at the hearing on November 9, 2015.
`
`The end result of all of the Board’s November 4, 2015 rulings is that the
`
`Board appears poised to render final written decisions in CBM2015-00016 as to
`
`claim 1 without a petitioner and without a hearing as to claim 1. In so doing, the
`
`Board is acting beyond its statutory authority. The proper result would be for the
`
`Board to terminate CBM2015-00016 as to claim 1.
`
`A. The Board Does Not Have Statutory Authority to Proceed
`Without A Petitioner
`
`The Board justifies its decision to proceed to a final written decision despite
`
`5
`
`

`
`dismissing Apple in CBM2015-00015, in CBM2015-00016 as to claim 1, and in
`
`CBM2015-00018 by stating that “[s]ection 325(e)(1) speaks to actions that may
`
`not be undertaken by Petitioner (or its real party in interest or privy)” but “does not
`
`proscribe actions that we may take.” CBM2015-00015, Paper 49 at 5; CBM2015-
`
`00016, Paper 50 at 5; CBM2015-00018, Paper 37 at 5 (citing Progressive Cas. Ins.
`
`Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL 5004949, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
`
`Aug. 24, 2015)(nonprecedential)). The Board further supports its decision with
`
`prior Board decisions “issuing final written decisions in cases in which no
`
`petitioner remained as a result of settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317.” Id. (citing
`
`BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013-00016, (PTAB Dec.
`
`11, 2013) (Paper 31) and InterThinx Inc.v. CoreLogic Solutions, LLC ̧ Case
`
`CBM2012-00007 (PTAB Nov. 12, 2013) (Paper 47)).
`
`With all due respect to the Board, the Board (i) misapprehends Progressive
`
`and (ii) overlooks the substantive statutory differences between proceedings in
`
`which no petitioner remains due to settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 3272 and
`
`proceedings where the petitioner is estopped from maintaining an action under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1).
`
`2 § 317, § 318(a) and § 315(e)(1) are the inter partes review analogs to, and
`
`substantively identical to, the post-grant review statutes § 327, § 328(a) and
`
`§ 325(e)(1).
`
`6
`
`

`
`1.
`The Board Misapprehends Progressive
`The Federal Circuit’s decision in Progressive is inapposite. In that case,
`
`unlike here, the Patent Owner was arguing for the instantaneous application of
`
`§ 325(e)(1) such that it “bar[red] the Board’s entry of its CBM 2013-9 decision
`
`because the Board posted that decision to its electronic docketing system just over
`
`an hour after, but the same day as, it posted the CBM 2012-3 decision.” 2015 WL
`
`5004949, at *2. In other words, Patent Owner was arguing that “the Board was
`
`estopped from entering its CBM 2013-9 decision.” Id. at *1. It was in that context
`
`that the Federal Circuit noted Ҥ 325(e)(1) by its terms does not prohibit the Board
`
`from reaching decisions. It limits only certain (requesting or maintaining) actions
`
`by a petitioner.” Id. at *2.
`
`Also unlike here, in Progressive
`
`[T]he Board stated in its two decisions that they were
`being entered “concurrently.” The Board previously
`agreed to the parties’ joint request to “synchronize the
`timelines in both trials” because the reviews involved the
`same parties, the same patent, and overlapping prior-art
`references. We see nothing in the statute (or any
`regulation or other source) that forecloses the Board’s
`treatment of the two same-day decisions as simultaneous
`and therefore outside § 325(e)(1)’s scope, regardless of
`the precise times of posting on an electronic docketing
`system.
`
`2015 WL 5004949, at *2 (internal citations omitted). Here, there was no
`
`synchronization of the timelines of the trials; they were 5 months apart. Here,
`
`there could be no concurrent entry of final written decisions because the
`
`7
`
`

`
`CBM2014-00102, -00106, and -00112 final written decisions were issued on
`
`September 25, 2015 long before the November 9, 2015 CBM2015-00015, -00016,
`
`and -00018 hearings. Here, it is not a case of two same day decisions in
`
`synchronized trials. Instead, the situation here is exactly in line with what
`
`§ 325(e)(1) contemplates – entry of a final written decision under § 328(a) where
`
`the petitioner has a separate proceeding before the Office with respect to that same
`
`claim on a separate ground that the petitioner reasonably could have raised in the
`
`petition yielding the final written decision. In that circumstance, § 325(e)(1)
`
`estops the petitioner from maintaining the separate proceeding. Only the Board
`
`can effectuate § 325(e)(1). Rather than trying to find a way to justify continuation
`
`of the CBM2015-00015, -00016 (claim 1), and -00018 proceedings based on an
`
`inapposite case like Progressive, the Board should effectuate the estoppel
`
`mandated by § 325(e)(1).
`
`Indeed, in denying Smartflash LLC’s request, the Board’s November 4,
`
`2015 Order here ruled completely the opposite of the Board’s November 6, 2015
`
`decision on identical facts in International Business Machines Corp. v. Intellectual
`
`Ventures II, LLC, IPR2014-01465, Paper 32 (“IBM”). In IBM, the Patent Owner
`
`sought termination of the -01465 proceeding because on September 23, 2015, a
`
`final written decision, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), was issued in an earlier
`
`proceeding on the same claim of the same patent in International Business
`
`8
`
`

`
`Machines Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLC, IPR2014-00587. IBM, Paper 32
`
`at 1-2. The issue before the Board there was “whether Petitioner is estopped
`
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) because Petitioner reasonably could have raised
`
`[a certain prior art reference] during the earlier proceeding and, if so, whether this
`
`proceeding should be terminated.” In IBM, like here, Patent Owner argued that the
`
`AIA estoppel provisions “‘should be interpreted to mean that once estoppel
`
`attaches, the proceeding should normally be terminated’ because Congress
`
`intended to limit serial attacks on patents” and “that continuing the proceeding
`
`when no petitioner remains would frustrate Congress’ intent.” IBM, Paper 32 at 7.
`
`The Patent Owner in IBM also argued that “continuing this proceeding requires the
`
`Board to ‘carry the petitioner’s case(s) the rest of the way’” and that such an
`
`outcome “creates perceived inequities.” Id. at 8. Smartflash made similar
`
`arguments at the November 9, 2015 hearing, noting that to proceed through to a
`
`final written decision required the Board to step into the shoes of Petitioner Apple,
`
`and noting that the Board should recuse itself due to the conflict of being both the
`
`petitioner and adjudicator in the same case. November 9, 2015 Oral Hearing
`
`Transcript at __ (transcript not yet available).
`
`In IBM, the Board noted that “[t]he rules are construed to ‘secure the just,
`
`speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.’” IBM, Paper 32 at 9
`
`(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) and 36 U.S.C. § 316(b)). In IBM, the Board concluded
`
`9
`
`

`
`that “[u]pon consideration of the totality of the circumstances,” including that “an
`
`oral hearing … has not yet been held and a decision on the merits has not yet been
`
`reached” – both circumstances that are also true here – “we determine that the best
`
`means of securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of this proceeding is
`
`to terminate this proceeding.” The same is true in the CBM2015-00015, -00016
`
`(claim 1), and -00018.
`
`2.
`
`The Board Overlooks the Substantive Statutory Differences
`Between § 327 and § 325(e)(1)
`The Board’s reliance in this § 325(e)(1) estoppel situation on prior Board
`
`precedent in which final written decisions were issued in cases in which no
`
`petitioner remained as a result of settlement under § 327 ignores substantive
`
`statutory differences between § 327 and § 325(e)(1). In particular, the plain
`
`language § 327 contemplates the Board issuing a final written decision even where
`
`a settling Petitioner and Patent Owner jointly seek termination. Section 327 states:
`
`(a) In General. - A post-grant review instituted under this
`chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner
`upon the joint request of the petitioner and the patent
`owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the
`proceeding before the request for termination is filed.
`If the post-grant review is terminated with respect to a
`petitioner under this section, no estoppel under section
`325 (e) shall attach to the petitioner, or to the real party in
`interest or privy of the petitioner, on the basis of that
`petitioner’s institution of that post-grant review. If no
`petitioner remains in the post-grant review, the Office
`may terminate the post-grant review or proceed to a final
`written decision under section 328 (a).
`
`10
`
`

`
`35 U.S.C. § 327(a) (emphasis added). In contrast, § 325(e)(1) contains no
`
`language giving the Board authority to issue a final written decision when a
`
`petitioner is estopped from maintaining its proceeding. There is no exception for
`
`cases in which the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the
`
`request for termination is filed like in § 327(a), nor is there an exception for cases
`
`where “proceedings are in the late stages of Covered Business Method patent
`
`reviews with a fully developed record” (CBM2015-00015, Paper 49 at 6;
`
`CBM2015-00016, Paper 50 at 6) as the Board posits.
`
`Again, only the Board can effectuate § 325(e)(1) estoppel. That estoppel
`
`provision was intended by Congress to protect Patent Owners from the harassment
`
`of repetitive piecemeal challenges to the same patent claim on the basis of
`
`information that was known or reasonably could have been known at the time the
`
`patent challenger brings its action. The legislative history of the AIA emphasizes
`
`the importance of the estoppel provisions to protect patent owners:
`
`In addition, the bill would improve the current inter
`partes administrative process for challenging the validity
`of a patent. It would establish an adversarial inter partes
`review, with a higher threshold for initiating a proceeding
`and procedural safeguards to prevent a challenger from
`using the process to harass patent owners. It also would
`include a strengthened estoppel standard to prevent
`petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the
`same patent issues that were raised or reasonably could
`have been raised in a prior challenge. The bill would
`significantly reduce the ability to use post-grant
`procedures for abusive serial challenges to patents.
`
`11
`
`

`
`These new procedures would also provide faster, less
`costly alternatives to civil litigation to challenge patents.
`
`Ex. 2104, 157 Cong. Rec. S936-S953 at S952 (Senate Debate, February 28, 2011;
`
`Senator Grassely) (emphasis added). By allowing the proceedings to continue
`
`through to final written decision despite finding that the Petitioner is estopped
`
`under § 325(e)(1), the Board is perpetuating the harassment of the Patent Owner
`
`that Congress intended to prevent by including § 325(e)(1) in the AIA. Rather than
`
`trying to find a way to justify continuation of the CBM2015-00015, -00016 (claim
`
`1), and -00018 proceedings based on an inapt application of the substantively
`
`different § 327, the Board should effectuate the estoppel mandated by § 325(e)(1)
`
`as intended by Congress.
`
`B.
`
`Smartflash Should Be Granted Leave to File a Motion to
`Terminate
`
`Patent Owner Smartflash LLC sought leave to file a Motion to Terminate in
`
`light of Petitioner Apple’s 325(e)(1) estoppel, but the Board denied that request.
`
`CBM2015-00015, Paper 49 at 5-6; CBM2015-00016, Paper 50 at 5-6; CBM2015-
`
`00018, paper 37 at 5-6. As noted above, in IBM, the Board concluded that “[u]pon
`
`consideration of the totality of the circumstances,” including that “an oral hearing
`
`… has not yet been held and a decision on the merits has not yet been reached” –
`
`both circumstances that are true here – “we determine that the best means of
`
`securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of this proceeding is to
`
`12
`
`

`
`terminate this proceeding.” The same is true in the CBM2015-00015, -00016
`
`(claim 1), and -00018 proceedings, and Smartflash should be granted leave to file a
`
`Motion to Terminate.
`
`C.
`
`If the Board Insists on Proceeding, Smartflash is Statutorily
`Entitled to a Hearing
`
`The Board dismissed Apple as a Petitioner from CBM2015-00015, from
`
`CBM2015-00016 with respect to claim 1 of the ’458 patent, and from CBM2015-
`
`00018. CBM2015-00015, Paper 49 at 8; CBM2015-00016, Paper 50 at 8;
`
`CBM2015-00018, Paper 37 at 8. The Board further ruled “we will not hear any
`
`argument with respect to CBM2015-00015 at the hearing on November 9, 2015”
`
`(id. at 5, n.3); and “we will not hear any argument with respect to CBM2015-
`
`00018 at the hearing on November 9, 2015.” Id. at 7-8, n.6. At the November 9,
`
`2015 hearing, Patent Owner raised the propriety of continuing through to a final
`
`written decision in light of the circumstances. Although the Board offered at the
`
`last minute to hear Patent Owner on those cases at the November 9, 2015 hearing,
`
`Patent Owner noted that was not possible in light of the Board’s Order already
`
`ruling that no argument would be heard. In the event that the Board insists on
`
`maintaining CBM2015-00015, -00016 (as to claim 1) and -00018 through to a final
`
`written decision, Patent Owner is entitled to an Oral Hearing pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 326(a)(10). Patent Owner hereby requests such a hearing should the Board deny
`
`Patent Owner’s request to file a Motion to Terminate these proceedings.
`
`13
`
`

`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`For the forgoing reasons, Patent Owner Smartflash LLC respectfully
`
`requests rehearing pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) of the Board’s November 4,
`
`2015 Order – Conduct of the Proceedings 37 C.F.R. § 42.5 in which it concludes
`
`that it can issue a final written decision in CBM2015-00016 as to claim 1 despite
`
`finding that Petitioner Apple is estopped from maintaining the proceeding on that
`
`claim. Patent Owner further seeks leave to file a Motion to Terminate CBM2015-
`
`00016 as to claim 1. In the alternative, Patent Owner requests an oral hearing in
`
` /
`
` Michael R. Casey /
`
`
`Michael R. Casey
`Registration No. 40,294
`Davidson Berquist Jackson & Gowdey, LLP
`8300 Greensboro Drive
`Suite 500
`McLean, VA 22102
`Telephone: (571) 765-7705
`Fax: (571) 765-7200
`Email: mcasey@dbjg.com
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`
`CBM2015-00016 as to claim 1.
`
`Dated: November 16, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that this PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST
`
`FOR REHEARING, RENEWED REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION
`
`TO TERMINATE, AND CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR ORAL HEARING in
`
`CBM2015-00016 was served today, as a courtesy to the dismissed party, by
`
`emailing a copy to counsel for the Petitioner as follows:
`
`
`
`
`J. Steven Baughman (steven.baughman@ropesgray.com)
`Ching-Lee Fukuda (ching-lee.fukuda@ropesgray.com)
`Megan Raymond (megan.raymond@ropesgray.com)
`ApplePTABService-SmartFlash@ropesgray.com
`
`
` /
`
` Michael R. Casey /
`
`
`Michael R. Casey
`Registration No. 40,294
`Davidson Berquist Jackson & Gowdey, LLP
`8300 Greensboro Drive
`Suite 500
`McLean, VA 22102
`Telephone: (571) 765-7705
`Fax: (571) 765-7200
`Email: mcasey@dbjg.com
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: November 16, 2015
`
`
`
`15