Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2015)
`2015 WL 4603820
`
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`(cid:10)(cid:26)(cid:52)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:34)(cid:46)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:19)(cid:26)(cid:35)(cid:35)(cid:22)(cid:53)(cid:41)(cid:36)(cid:36)(cid:21)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:21)(cid:22)
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`(cid:7)(cid:47)(cid:6)(cid:47)(cid:32)
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
`District of Texas in Nos. 6:13–cv–00447–JRG, 6:13–cv–
`00448–JRG–KNM, Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap.
`
`Attorneys and Law Firms
`
`Bradley Wayne Caldwell, Caldwell Cassady & Curry, Dallas,
`TX, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented by Jason
`Dodd Cassady, John Austin Curry, John Franklin Summers.
`
`Mark Andrew Perry, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
`Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant Apple Inc.
`Also represented by Blaine H. Evanson, Los Angeles, CA;
`Douglas Hallward–Driemeier, Kevin John Post, Ropes &
`Gray LLP, Washington, DC; James Richard Batchelder, East
`Palo Alto, CA; Ching–Lee Fukuda, New York, NY.
`
`Charles Kramer Verhoeven, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
`Sullivan LLP, San Francisco, CA, argued for defendants-
`appellants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung
`Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Telecommunications
`America, LLC, HTC Corporation, HTC America, Inc.,
`
`Exedea, Inc. Also represented by Melissa J. Baily, Kevin
`Alexander Smith.
`
`Before NEWMAN, LINN, and O'MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
`
`Opinion
`
`Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge O'MALLEY.
`
`Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by
`Circuit Judge NEWMAN.
`
`O'MALLEY, Circuit Judge.
`
`*1 Appellants, Apple Inc. (“Apple”) and Samsung
`Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America,
`Inc., Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC, HTC
`Corporation, HTC America,
`Inc., and Exedea,
`Inc.
`(collectively, “Samsung”), appeal from the district court's
`order denying their motions to stay patent infringement
`litigation pending covered business method (“CBM”) review
`of the asserted claims. For the reasons set forth below, we
`affirm the district court's order as to Apple, but reverse as to
`Samsung.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Smartflash LLC and Smartflash Technologies Ltd.
`(collectively, “Smartflash”), patent licensing companies,
`filed separate suits against Apple and Samsung on May 29,
`2013, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,334,720
`(the “#720Patent”); 8,033,458 (the “#458 Patent”); 8,061,598
`(the “#598 Patent”); 8,118,221 (the “#221 Patent”); 8,336,772
`(the “#772 Patent”); and 7,942,317 (the “#317 Patent”).
`Subsequently, Smartflash sued Google, Inc. (“Google”)
`on May 7, 2014 and Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) on
`December 23, 2014 for patent infringement, asserting the
`same six patents as those asserted against Apple and
`Samsung, as well as an additional patent that issued on August
`5, 2014, U.S. Patent No. 8,794,516. All of the asserted patents
`relate to managing access to data via payment information.
`
`Throughout the course of these cases, both Apple and
`Samsung filed multiple CBM petitions with the Patent
`Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”).See America Invents Act,
`Pub.L. No. 112–29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011)
`(“AIA”). Between March 28 and April 3, 2014, Apple filed 12
`separate petitions for CBM review on 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
`103 grounds. And, on April 3, 2014, Apple moved to stay the
`
` © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
`
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`(cid:34)(cid:81)(cid:81)(cid:77)(cid:70)(cid:1)(cid:87)(cid:15)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:78)(cid:66)(cid:83)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:77)(cid:66)(cid:84)(cid:73)(cid:1)
`(cid:36)(cid:35)(cid:46)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:23)
`
`

`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2015)
`2015 WL 4603820
`
`district court action pending CBM review. See Defendants'
`Motion to Stay Litigation, SmartFlash LLC v. Apple Inc .,
`No. 6:13–cv–447 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 4, 2014), ECF No. 120.
`On May 15, 2014, Samsung filed a motion to stay based on
`Apple's CBM petitions, explaining that, if the court were to
`grant its motion, it “would stipulate to be bound to the same
`extent as Apple is under § 18(a)(1)(D) of the America Invents
`Act.”Defendants' Motion to Stay Litigation, SmartFlash LLC
`v. Samsung Elecs., Co., No. 6:13–cv–448 at 3 n. 4 (E.D.Tex.
`May 15, 2014), ECF No. 149. Because the PTAB had not
`yet decided whether to grant these petitions, the district court
`denied both motions without prejudice to refiling if any of
`the petitions were granted.SmartFlash LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 6:13–cv–447 (E.D.Tex. July 8, 2014), ECF No. 175;
`SmartFlash LLC v. Samsung Elecs., Co., No. 6:13–cv–448
`(E.D.Tex. Dec. 30, 2014), ECF No. 424. On September 30,
`2014, the PTAB granted Apple's petitions for CBM review
`on several claims, but denied review for the majority of the
`challenged claims, including those asserted at trial. Neither
`Apple nor Samsung renewed their motions to stay.
`
`On September 26, 2014, Samsung filed ten petitions for CBM
`review of all the patents-in-suit on §§ 101, 102, and 103
`grounds. Apple also filed six more petitions for CBM review
`between October 30 and November 24, 2014, this time only
`asserting that the patents covered patent ineligible subject
`matter. Neither party filed a motion to stay with the district
`court at this time.
`
`*2 While the parties awaited the PTAB's decisions regarding
`the most recent petitions, both the Apple and Samsung
`cases proceeded towards trial. Because the cases raised
`similar issues, the district court held joint hearings on claim
`construction, dispositive motions, and the parties' Daubert
`challenges during 2014, conducted a joint pretrial conference
`in January 2015, and denied both defendants' motions for
`summary judgment of invalidity under § 101. It also set a
`February 2015 trial date for Apple—postponing Samsung's
`trial until after the conclusion of Apple's trial. Thereafter,
`the district court held two additional pretrial conferences for
`the Apple case and the case went to trial. After a six day
`trial in the Apple case, the jury returned a verdict in favor
`of Smartflash on February 24, 2015. See Smartflash LLC v.
`Apple Inc., No. 6:13–cv–447 (E.D.Tex. Feb. 24, 2015), ECF
`No. 503. Briefing on post-trial motions then began, and the
`court scheduled a hearing on those motions for July 1, 2015.
`
`In late March and early April 2015, the PTAB instituted CBM
`review in seven proceedings filed by Apple and Samsung
`
`on all asserted claims of the ′221, ′ 720, ′458, ′598, and
`′317 Patents on § 101 grounds. On May 28, 2015, the PTAB
`also instituted CBM review on the asserted claims of the
`′772 Patent on § 101 grounds. In light of these decisions, on
`April 10, 2015, Samsung filed a “renewed” motion to stay
`all proceedings pending CBM review, and on April 23, 2015,
`Apple filed a motion to stay post-trial activity in its case, or, in
`the alternative to stay entry of final judgment, pending CBM
`review.
`
`The district court denied both of these stay requests. The
`court did, however, sua sponte stay the actions against Google
`and Amazon. 1 Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., Nos. 6:13–
`cv–447, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70259 (E.D.Tex. May 29,
`2015) (“Stay Op.”). The district court wrote a lengthy opinion
`analyzing the stay requests and explaining his ruling with
`respect to the four pending related actions. With respect to
`Apple, the district court's analysis focused on the timing of
`Apple's motion to stay, which was two months after the jury
`trial, and the fact that only the resolution of the parties' post-
`trial motions remained before the case could be appealed
`to this Court. Because “seeing the case to its conclusion
`maximizes judicial and party resources and discourages
`gamesmanship in filing CBM petitions,” the district court
`concluded that a stay of the Apple litigation was unwarranted.
`Id. at *89 (quotation omitted). Similarly, the district court
`considered the significant resources already expended in the
`Samsung case and Samsung's decision to wait until sixteen
`months into the litigation to file a CBM petition asserting §
`101. Because the case was on the eve of trial and an appeal to
`the Federal Circuit of both Samsung and Apple's district court
`cases would be resolved before an appeal from a final PTAB
`decision, the district court concluded that the cases should
`proceed as scheduled. Because the actions against Google and
`Amazon remained in the early stages of litigation, the court
`found a stay of those actions to be appropriate even though
`there necessarily would be an overlap with respect to many
`of the issues to be decided.
`
`*3 Appellants timely filed interlocutory appeals to this
`Court. Apple further filed a motion to stay entry of final
`judgment and/or expedite appeal and Samsung filed a motion
`to stay district court proceedings pending appeal and to
`expedite briefing. Two days before oral argument, the district
`court vacated the jury's damage award and ordered a new trial
`on damages to begin on September 14, 2015. See Smartflash
`LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13–cv–447 (E.D.Tex. July 7, 2015),
`ECF No. 581. After oral argument this Court, sua sponte,
`
` © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
`
`2
`
`

`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2015)
`2015 WL 4603820
`
`granted both parties motions for temporary stays pending
`disposition of these appeals.
`
`We have jurisdiction pursuant to § 18(b) of the AIA.
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`On appeal, both Apple and Samsung challenge the district
`court's decision not to stay their cases. In light of the PTAB's
`decision to institute CBM review on all asserted claims under
`35 U.S.C. § 101, both argue that the district court should
`have stayed the litigation pending the PTAB's eligibility
`determinations because those decisions could end both cases
`without any further proceedings, either at the district court or
`in this one. Apple goes so far as to ask this Court to create
`a bright line rule mandating stays whenever CBM review
`is granted on all relevant patent claims, without regard to
`the state of the litigation. Oral Arg. at 9:14–55, available at
`http:// oralarguments.cafc.uscourts .gov/default.aspx?fl=20
`15–1701.mp3.
`
`Under the AIA, parties may request a stay of district court
`litigation pending CBM review, but a stay is not obligatory.
`Rather, under § 18(b)(1), the district court is required to weigh
`four factors to determine whether to stay the case:
`
`(A) whether a stay, or denial thereof,
`will simplify the issues in question
`and streamline the trial; (B) whether
`discovery is complete and whether a
`trial date has been set; (C) whether
`a stay, or the denial thereof, would
`unduly prejudice the moving party or
`present a clear tactical advantage for
`the moving party; and (D) whether a
`stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce
`the burden of litigation on the parties
`and on the court.
`
`AIA § 18(b)(1). These factors include the three factors courts
`traditionally have considered when deciding whether a stay
`of litigation is appropriate pending administrative review in
`the PTO (prejudice to the non-moving party, the state of the
`litigation, and simplification of the issues) and a fourth—
`a consideration of the burdens of litigation. Though these
`factors are statutory, consideration of them in a particular
`case remains committed to the district court's discretion. See
`Benefit Funding Sys. LLC v. Advance Am. Cash Advance
`Ctrs., Inc., 767 F.3d 1383, 1385–86 (Fed.Cir.2014); see also
`
`NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 2:13–CV–1058, 2015
`WL 1069111, at *1 (E.D.Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (“A district
`court has the inherent power to control its own docket,
`including the power to stay proceedings before it.”(citing
`Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997))). We, thus, review
`a district court's stay decision for abuse of discretion except
`to the extent necessary “[t]o ensure consistent application of
`established precedent.”Benefit Funding, 767 F.3d at 1385. As
`discussed below, based on this record and the district court's
`thorough analysis, we see no reason “to conduct [a] more
`searching review.”Id.
`
`A. Apple's Motion to Stay
`
`Factor (A): Simplification of the issues in
`question and potential to streamline the trial
`
`*4 The district court concluded that the first factor in § 18(b)
`(1) weighed against a stay because there was “nothing left
`to simplify” as the district court and the jury had already
`decided nearly every potential issue, including the § 101
`issue. Stay Op. at *71. Thus, the district court determined that
`the simplest way for the § 101 dispute to be resolved now was
`to allow the district court litigation to reach this Court. Id. at
`*72. We agree that this factor does not favor a stay.
`
`Apple does not dispute that “[g]enerally, the time of the
`motion is the relevant time to measure the stage of litigation.
`See VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307,
`1317 (Fed.Cir.2014). Nor can Apple dispute that it filed its
`motion post-trial, a point in time when the possibility that
`the issues will be simplified is greatly diminished. Id. at
`1314. Apply argues, however, that there is a good chance
`that it will prevail on one or more post-trial motions or
`prevail on one or more issues on appeal that could result in
`a remand. Either way, Apple argues that the litigation could
`remain ongoing. And, Apple asserts that, because a CBM
`review that results in invalidation of the patents at issue would
`dispose of the entire litigation, the litigation issues necessarily
`would be simplified. That is, Apple points out, “The ultimate
`simplification of the issues.”Id.
`
`But the first factor relates to the simplification of the issues
`before the trial court. In its entirety, the focus of this factor
`is on streamlining or obviating the trial by providing the
`district court with the benefit of the PTO's consideration
`of the validity of the patents before either the court or the
`jury is tasked with undertaking that same analysis. See NFC
`
` © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
`
`3
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`

`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2015)
`2015 WL 4603820
`
`Tech., 2015 WL 1069111, at *4–5. When the motion to stay
`is made post-trial, many of the advantages flowing from
`the agency's consideration of the issues-such as resolving
`discovery problems, using pre-trial rulings to limit defenses
`or evidence at trial, limiting the complexity of the trial, etc.
`—cannot be realized. The simplification contemplated by
`the first factor is far less likely to occur once all the legal,
`procedural, and evidentiary issues involved in a trial have
`already been resolved.
`
`Apple attempts to mitigate these realities by noting that, since
`the beginning of this appeal, the district court vacated the
`jury's damage award and ordered a new trial on damages
`to begin on September 14, 2015. In light of this new
`development, Apple argues that this case is no longer
`only a single post-trial order away from final appellate
`review, and that significant work remains. As this Court has
`recognized, a court may “take[ ] judicial notice of post-appeal
`developments ... when assessing the propriety of a trial court's
`ruling on a motion to stay premised on the existence of a
`pending CBM[ ] proceeding,” so long as it only considers the
`fact that such an event occurred and not the propriety of such
`developments. Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. JPMorgan
`Chase & Co ., 781 F.3d 1372, 1374 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.2015) (citing
`VirtualAgility, Inc., 759 F.3d at 1312–13). But taking judicial
`notice of this fact does not change our conclusion that this
`factor does not favor a stay.
`
`*5 The district court and a jury have already addressed
`infringement and invalidity issues, which are the only
`questions common to the two proceedings which could be
`“simplified” by agency review. The new trial is limited solely
`to a consideration of the appropriate measure of damages—
`an issue with which the PTO is not concerned. Although we
`may take judicial notice of the fact of the trial court's post-trial
`order, we may not, in the first instance, conduct an analysis
`of what the new trial may entail, how long it may take, or
`the complexity of the issues therein. Moreover, the trial court
`did not revisit the request for a stay after ordering a new trial,
`indicating that it did not believe the new trial impacted its
`reasoning.
`
`Ultimately, the existence of a new damages trial does not alter
`our finding that the district court did not err when assessing
`this factor. 2
`
`Factor (B): Whether Discovery is Complete
`and Whether a Trial Date has been Set
`
`Turning to the second factor, the district court determined
`that the status of the case weighed heavily against granting a
`stay. Stay Op. at *75–79. Specifically, it noted that, not only
`was discovery complete and a trial date set, but a jury had
`already rendered a verdict on February 24, 2015. The district
`court also considered Apple's lack of diligence in filing its
`petitions for CBM review on § 101 grounds. The district court
`concluded that this delayover seventeen months from start
`of the case-negated the intent of the CBM review process,
`which was designed to provide a cost-effective alternative to
`litigation and to reduce the burden on the courts. Id. at *78
`(citing 157 Cong. Rec. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of
`Sen. Kyl)). The district court further explained that granting
`Apple's motion to stay “at the latest conceivable stage of
`district court litigation” would “encourage parties to misuse
`CBM review.”Id. at *77–78.
`
`Apple disagrees that this factor weighs heavily against a stay,
`contending that the stage of this litigation does not preclude
`the issuance of a stay because even a stay post-trial would
`avoid wasting judicial resources to resolve post-trial motions
`and any resulting appeal. Apple also argues that it was
`improper for the district court to consider the timeliness of
`Apple's CBM petitions because there is no statutory deadline
`to file such a petition.
`
`We agree with the district court that this factor weighs against
`a stay. At the time of Apple's motion to stay on April 23,
`2015, discovery had been complete since September 2014,
`and there had been a six day jury trial. Apple downplays these
`facts, arguing that the work yet to be done in the case is still
`significant, but Apple's argument addresses whether a stay
`would reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on
`the court—a different and separate factor in the analysis—
`and does not alter the finding that discovery is complete and
`there has been a jury trial. See VirtualAgility, Inc., 759 F.3d
`at 1313 (“We cannot, as VA requests, collapse the four-factor
`test expressly adopted by Congress into a three-factor test.”).
`While there may be circumstances where a stay is appropriate
`post-trial, on this record, where Apple filed its motion to stay
`well until after the jury had rendered its verdict, the stage of
`litigation factor clearly favors a stay. And the existence of
`a new damages trial does not modify this conclusion, both
`for the reasons previously noted and because a trial date has
`already been set for September 14, 2015.
`
` © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
`
`4
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`

`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2015)
`2015 WL 4603820
`
`*6 We also find Apple's argument regarding its diligence in
`filing unpersuasive. The district court considered the timing
`of these petitions in order to assess the state of the proceeding
`when Apple actually filed its petitions and when it could have
`filed its petitions. Stay Op. at *75–78. Finding Apple could
`have reasonably raised § 101 issues in petitions well before
`three months prior to trial, the district court concluded that,
`but for Apple's own decision to delay filing its petitions, the
`stage of the litigation had progressed to a point that no longer
`justified a stay. We see no error in this analysis. It was not
`an abuse of discretion for the district court to consider why
`the litigation was so advanced. And, although Apple argues
`its delay in filing its CBM petitions on § 101 grounds was
`justified in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Alice
`Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014), which issued
`in June 2014, Alice did not create a new§ 101 defense, but
`rather clarified § 101 jurisprudence. A party cannot wait to
`assert an available defense as litigation marches on and then
`argue that the stage of litigation facing the court is irrelevant
`to its right to a stay. In any event, the Supreme Court issued
`Alice in June 2014 but Apple did not file its petition until
`late October 2014, four months later. Without any explanation
`for this additional delay, we find no special circumstances
`that would justify an extended grace period for filing a CBM
`petition. Accordingly, we find that the timing factor, although
`not of significant weight, mitigates against a stay. 3
`
`Factor (C): Undue Prejudice or Tactical Advantage
`
`The district court concluded that the undue prejudice factor
`also weighed against a stay. By waiting until the eve of trial
`to pursue CBM proceedings on § 101 grounds, the district
`court determined that Apple had multiple opportunities to
`challenge the eligibility of the asserted patents in two separate
`forums, which gave Apple a clear tactical advantage over
`Smartflash. Stay Op. at *83. Thus, even though there was no
`undue prejudice to Smartflash because Smartflash does not
`compete with Apple, the district court found that this factor
`disfavored a stay. Id. at *82–83.
`
`Apple disputes these findings, arguing that the district court
`erred when it determined that Apple improperly gained the
`opportunity to challenge the validity of Smartflash's asserted
`patents in multiple forums. According to Apple, the entire
`purpose of CBM review is to create an alternative avenue
`to challenge the validity of a claim, thus, the district court's
`decision to weigh this fact against it is illogical. Additionally,
`
`Apple argues against any finding of tactical advantage,
`asserting that it is actually at a disadvantage now because it
`must continue to litigate its case, whereas the cases against its
`competitors, Google and Amazon, have been stayed. We find
`these arguments unpersuasive.
`
`*7 Congress enacted the AIA, in part, to address concerns
`about business method patents. With this Court's decision
`in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
`Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.Cir.1998), the test for
`patent eligibility greatly expanded until the Supreme Court's
`decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), which
`significantly curtailed the patentability of business methods.
`As a result of “[t]his judicial expansion and subsequent
`judicial retraction of U.S. patentability standards ... a large
`number of business-method patents” issued that may not
`be valid. 157 Cong. Rec. S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)
`(statement of Sen. Kyl). Through the enactment of Section
`18 of the AIA, Congress sought to clarify this confusion by
`providing “a relatively inexpensive administrative alternative
`to litigation for addressing disputes concerning the validity
`of [CBM] patents.”157 Cong. Rec. S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
`2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also157 Cong. Rec. S1364
`(daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (noting
`that the fundamental purpose of the CBM review process is
`“to provide a cost-efficient alternative to litigation”).
`
`But in order to realize Congress's intent to establish an
`alternative to district court litigation for CBM issues, parties
`must file CBM petitions in a manner that facilitates this goal.
`We recognize that there is no statutory deadline to file a
`CBM petition, unlike other post-grant proceedings, but we
`nevertheless conclude the timing of the petitions in this case
`created a tactical advantage for Apple. See VirtualAgility,
`Inc., 759 F.3d 1319–20 (considering the timing of a CBM
`petition to assess whether a party sought to gain a tactical
`advantage or had a “dilatory motive”). By waiting to submit
`its petitions until almost the eve of trial and well after it filed
`its motion for summary judgment on the § 101 issue, Apple
`was able to first pursue its § 101 defense at the district court
`and then at the PTAB. As the district court correctly found,
`this strategy thus afforded Apple multiple opportunities to
`pursue a single defense—a clear tactical advantage. See Segin
`Sys ., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 30 F.Supp.3d 476, 484
`(E.D.Va.2014) (“[T]wo separate opportunities in two separate
`forums to challenge the validity of Plaintiffs' patent does raise
`a concern of an unfair tactical advantage, giving them two
`bites of the apple as to a central defense.”).
`
` © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
`
`5
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`

`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2015)
`2015 WL 4603820
`
`This finding is not negated by the alleged prejudice now
`suffered by Apple. The district court did not arbitrarily decide
`to stay Google and Amazon, but not Apple. Rather, the district
`court carefully considered the statutory factors for each party,
`taking into account the stage of each litigation. Because the
`cases involving Google and Amazon were still in their relative
`infancy, the factors weighed in favor of a stay, while in
`Apple's case, they did not. Thus, Apple's arguments related to
`its prejudice are unpersuasive, especially considering that its
`suffering is largely self-inflicted. Therefore, we find that this
`factor does not weigh in favor of a stay.
`
`Factor (D): Burden of litigation
`on the parties and on the court
`
`*8 Finally, the district court found that the fourth factor
`weighed against a stay. Stay Op. at *89. Recognizing the
`potential benefits of a CBM review in reducing litigation
`costs, the district court nevertheless found that those benefits
`did not exist here. Specifically, because Apple waited to file
`its petitions, the district court found that it and the parties had
`already spent substantial time and resources on the litigation,
`as evidenced by the six day jury trial, the hundreds of pages
`of court-issued orders and opinions, and the thousands of
`pages of briefing and exhibits submitted by the parties. The
`district court also explained that, under the current post-trial
`schedule, the parties could appeal the entire litigation to this
`Court prior to any appeal from a PTAB final determination.
`Thus, the district court determined that it was more efficient
`not to stay the case. The district court found this to be true
`even if it were to ultimately order a new trial on damages. 4
`
`Apple alleges that the district court erred in its decision,
`because it improperly focused on the resources already
`expended in litigation (i.e., sunk costs) and failed to properly
`consider the reduction in the burden of remaining litigation.
`This burden is significant, according to Apple, especially
`considering that the district court did actually order a new
`damages trial. If this Court were to reweigh the evidence,
`Apple argues that this factor would favor a stay.
`
`spent