Paper No. ______
`Filed: June 23, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORPORATION, TD AMERITRADE, INC., and
`TD AMERITRADE ONLINE HOLDINGS CORP.
`Petitioners
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`v.
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`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`Patent Owner
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`Case CBM2014-00135
`Patent 6,772,132
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`Patent Owner’s Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude
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`Filed: June 23, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORPORATION, TD AMERITRADE, INC., and
`TD AMERITRADE ONLINE HOLDINGS CORP.
`Petitioners
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`v.
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`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`Patent Owner
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`Case CBM2014-00135
`Patent 6,772,132
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`Patent Owner’s Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude
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`Case No. CBM2014-00135
`Patent 6,772,132
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`Standard ......................................................................................................... 1
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`II. Exhibit 2007 was Properly Cited in TT’s Preliminary Response
`and is not Hearsay ......................................................................................... 2
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`III. Exhibit 2202 Was Not Offered for the Truth of the Matter
`Asserted........................................................................................................... 3
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`IV. The First Thomas Report (Ex. 2010) was Properly Cited in TT’s
`Preliminary Response and is not Hearsay................................................... 4
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`V.
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`The Second Thomas Report (Ex. 2201) is an Expert Opinion
`Relying on Proper Evidence ......................................................................... 6
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`VI. TT’s Video Animations (Exs. 2012, 2014, 2048, 2049, 2203) Are
`Not Offered for the Truth of the Matter Asserted ..................................... 8
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`VII. The X_Trader Website (Ex. 2015) was Properly Cited in TT’s
`Preliminary Response and is not Hearsay................................................... 9
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`VIII. TT’s Reliance on the Thirty-One Litigation Declarations (Exs.
`2016-2046) is Proper is Both Responses .................................................... 10
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`IX. The HCI Printouts (Exs. 2053-2061) Are Admissible .............................. 12
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`A.
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`The HCI Printouts are Exceptions to the Prohibition on Hearsay
`or are Not Hearsay at All ..................................................................... 12
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`B.
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`The HCI Printouts Are Properly Authenticated .................................. 13
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`X.
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`The Prior Litigation Contentions (Ex. 2084) Do Not Make
`Representations on the Content of the Prior Art ..................................... 15
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`XI. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 15
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`i
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`Case No. CBM2014-00135
`Patent 6,772,132
`In its motion to exclude, Petitioners TD Ameritrade et al. (“TD”) repeatedly
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`ask the Board to ignore the nature of the evidence submitted by Trading
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`Technologies (“TT”), as well as the timing and circumstances of the evidence’s
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`submission.
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`TD criticizes TT’s reliance on exhibits, not declarations, in Patent Owner’s
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`Preliminary Response (“POPR”)—when, by rule, no declarations could be
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`submitted with that paper. Next, TD challenges as hearsay exhibits not submitted
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`for the truth of the matter asserted, distorting the exhibits’ use to further TD’s
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`exclusionary goals. Ignoring the rules governing the bases for expert opinions
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`under FRE 703, TD calls for the exclusion of opinions formed using litigation-
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`tested declarations. And TD argues that government websites and published
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`articles—which remain available to this day—are somehow inauthentic or
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`unreliable.
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`As these examples demonstrate, TD’s attacks are motivated not by a fair
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`reading of the rules of evidence, but rather by a litigation-driven desire to exclude
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`relevant, probative evidence. TT respectfully requests denial of TD’s motion.
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`I.
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`Standard
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`The Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) govern the admissibility of evidence
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`in this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a); Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756,
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`48,758 (Aug. 14, 2012). As the party moving to exclude evidence, TD bears the
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`1
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`Patent 6,772,132
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`burden of proving inadmissibility. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).
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`II. Exhibit 2007 was Properly Cited in TT’s Preliminary Response and is
`not Hearsay
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`TD seeks to exclude Exhibit 2007, a set of demonstrative slides submitted to
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`a court in parallel litigation, because TT cited it in its Patent Owner’s Preliminary
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`Response. Motion (Paper 48) at 2. TT cited this exhibit as general background
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`regarding TT’s formation, company size, and the success of its MD Trader
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`product. See POPR (Paper 17) at 1, 16. TT’s reliance on these demonstratives was
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`proper under the Rules.
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`Under Rule 42.207(c) and the Board’s Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”), a
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`Patent Owner cannot submit new supporting declarations with its Preliminary
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`Response and must rely on evidence from other proceedings. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(c)
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`(“The preliminary response shall not present new testimony evidence beyond that
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`already of record . . . .”); TPG at 48,764 (“The preliminary response may present
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`evidence other than new testimonial evidence to demonstrate that no review should
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`be instituted.”) (emphasis added). TD’s criticism of TT’s citation of Exhibit 2007,
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`not repeated in the Patent Owner’s Response (“POR”), is misplaced.
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`As discussed, for example, at pages 8-9 and 47-48 of the POPR, Exhibit
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`2007 is demonstrative in nature and illustrates exemplary differences between TT’s
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`technology and the prior art. To narrow the issues before the Board, TT agrees to
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`rely on Exhibit 2007 as a demonstrative only, not to establish the truth of the
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`Patent 6,772,132
`matters for which it is cited on pages 1 and 16 of the POPR. As such, TD’s hearsay
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`objections are unfounded. TD’s objections under FRE 602, 702, and 703 fail for
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`the same reason.
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`TD’s reliance on the best evidence rule (FRE 1002 et seq.) is similarly
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`misplaced. First, TT has not offered Ex. 2007 “in order to prove its content” or as a
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`“summary . . . of voluminous writings.” FRE 1002; FRE 1006. TT never alleged
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`any passage or figure of these exhibits served as a “summary” of a prior litigation.
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`Nor has TD pointed to any discrepancy between Ex. 2007 and any underlying
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`document. The “contents” of Ex. 2007 are therefore not at issue, and these rules are
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`inapplicable. Second, TD’s arguments go to the sufficiency of the evidence, not its
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`admissibility. TD’s motion questions whether the passages of Ex. 2007 are “proper
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`summaries” of the root proceedings. Motion at 5. This argument is improper in a
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`motion to exclude. See TPG at 48,767 (“A motion to exclude . . . may not be used
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`to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular fact.”).
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`III. Exhibit 2202 Was Not Offered for the Truth of the Matter Asserted
`TD asks the Board to exclude another demonstrative exhibit, Ex. 2202, on
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`the basis of hearsay, lacking personal knowledge, and the rules governing expert
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`testimony. Motion at 2-5. Due to the demonstrative nature of the exhibit, as well as
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`its intended use, TD’s arguments fail.
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`TT relied on Ex. 2202 to show how purported experts of TD’s co-defendants
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`had characterized the field of the ’132 patent as technological. See POR at 17. TT
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`also cited Ex. 2202 as a general demonstrative, illustrating features detailed in the
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`text of the response. Id. at 6. In other words, Ex. 2202 was not offered to establish
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`the truth of these characterizations. Id. at 6, 17.
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`Because TT did not present Ex. 2202 to establish the truth of the matters
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`asserted, it is not hearsay under FRE 801(c)(2). Anderson v. U.S., 417 U.S. 211,
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`219-220 (1974); Abrams v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir.
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`2014). And because TT offered to show what prior tribunals considered or as
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`general demonstratives, the personal knowledge (FRE 602) and opinion testimony
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`requirements (FRE 701, 702) are immaterial. Such evidence is not witness
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`testimony. Finally, TD’s attacks along the lines of the best evidence rule fail for
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`the same reasons above. Namely, the content of the exhibit is not at issue, so these
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`rules do not apply. FRE 1002, 1006.
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`IV. The First Thomas Report (Ex. 2010) was Properly Cited in TT’s
`Preliminary Response and is not Hearsay
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`TD next challenges Exhibit 2010, an expert report from Mr. Thomas in a
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`parallel litigation and cited only in its Preliminary Response, on three grounds,
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`each of them improper. Motion at 5-8.
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`First, TD accuses TT of relying on Ex. 2010 as hearsay in its Preliminary
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`Response. Id. at 6-7. TD’s criticism is misplaced for the same reasons explained
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`above. A Patent Owner cannot submit new testimonial evidence with its
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`Preliminary Response and therefore must rely on evidence from other proceedings.
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.207(c); TPG at 48,764. Here, TT cited Ex. 2010 to explain industry
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`conventions, generic inefficiencies prior to TT’s products, and general statements
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`about TT’s business. E.g., POPR at 5, 8, 9, 12, 14. Similar statements were also
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`explained in TT’s Patent Owner’s Response and supported by expert testimony,
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`although TT does not directly cite Ex. 2010. Accordingly, TD’s claims are
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`unfounded.
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`Second, TD challenges paragraphs 31, 33, and 34 of Ex. 2010 as allegedly
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`acting as “conduit[s] for the expunged Brumfield testimony.” Motion at 7. But
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`TD’s attacks are again baseless. By Rule, TT could not submit new testimonial
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`evidence in its Preliminary Response. And TT never cited Ex. 2010 in its Patent
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`Owner’s Response. TD’s accusations therefore do not survive scrutiny.
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`Third, TD challenges paragraphs 32-34 of Ex. 2010 as hearsay. Motion at 8.
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`Given that Exhibit 2010 is an expert report prepared for use in a Federal District
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`Court, reliance on facts and data beyond the expert’s personal knowledge, even if
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`otherwise inadmissible, is proper under FRE 703. Because the declarations relied
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`upon by Mr. Thomas are proper bases for an expert opinion, paragraphs 32-34 and
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`the declarations should not be excluded. Further, the declarations demonstrate the
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`mental impressions of those in the industry, falling within FRE 803(3)’s exception
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`to the hearsay rule.
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`V. The Second Thomas Report (Ex. 2201) is an Expert Opinion Relying on
`Proper Evidence
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`TD attacks the second Thomas Report (Ex. 2201) on the same grounds as
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`the first (Ex. 2010). Motion 5-8. TD’s arguments are equally unfounded.
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`First, Mr. Thomas adopted paragraphs 15, 19-31, and 33 of Ex. 2201 as his
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`testimony in the instant proceeding. Ex. 1036, ¶ 5. TT relied on these same
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`paragraphs in its Patent Owner’s Response. See POR at 2, 3, 11, 12, 40. TD took
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`the opportunity to depose Mr. Thomas after TT filed its Patent Owner’s response.
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`Thus, TD’s claims of hearsay are both irrelevant and incorrect.
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`Second, TD asks the Board to exclude paragraphs 31, 33, and 34 of Ex. 2201
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`as hearsay. Motion at 7. In TD’s view, these passages act as “conduit[s] for the
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`expunged Brumfield” testimony. Id. Not so. As an expert, Mr. Thomas may rely on
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`inadmissible evidence “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on
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`those kinds of facts.” FRE 703. Here, Mr. Thomas cites Brumfield’s transcript
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`within a broader discourse of the benefits of the claimed system and the state of the
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`art. Ex. 2010, ¶¶ 29, 30 (describing Mr. Thomas’s expert opinion on the impact of
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`the patented system for these proceedings). It is self-evident that an expert trader
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`would “reasonably rely” on the endorsements and voiced approval of other traders
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`in forming and substantiating his opinion on the influence of the claimed systems.
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`Such sworn evidence is particularly pertinent where, as here, it comes from early
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`adopters of the product within the expert’s realm of expertise. See id., ¶ 33.
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`Third, TD contends that paragraphs 32-34 of Ex. 2201 contain inadmissible
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`hearsay. Motion at 8. Similar to the arguments above, TD claims that Mr. Thomas
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`has “acted as a conduit for hearsay statements” from traders who signed
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`declarations—under the penalty of perjury—describing the importance of the
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`patented invention to electronic trading. Motion at 8; Ex. 2201, ¶¶ 32-33. TD’s
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`allegations fail to account for the context as a whole. Mr. Thomas considered these
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`statements in forming his expert opinion regarding public perception of the
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`claimed system. Ex. 1030 at 55:7-18. Mr. Thomas was ready and willing to answer
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`questions regarding how these declarations, as well as his conversation with one of
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`the declarants, factored into the preparation of his declaration. Id. at 52:17-55:18.
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`TD opted not to pursue this discovery. Nonetheless, under FRE 703, it was proper
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`for Mr. Thomas to employ the views of the claimed product’s early adopters to
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`inform and substantiate his general opinion of the claims and art. See Ex. 2201,
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`¶¶ 29, 30. TD offers no argument to the contrary.
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`Nothing in TD’s reliance on United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.
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`2003), runs to the contrary. In Dukagjini, an expert “repeatedly deviated from his
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`expertise” to opine on tangential evidentiary matters far outside the scope of his
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`prowess. See id. at 58-59. Rather than use this evidence to inform or substantiate
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`his opinion, the expert used it to generate over seventy pages of transcripts with
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`evidence irrelevant to his expertise. Id. at 59. Here, however, Mr. Thomas has an
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`expertise in field of the engineering, design, and development of trading interfaces.
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`And—unlike the out-of-his-depth expert in Dukagjini—Mr. Thomas considered
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`the sworn statements of these thirty prominent members of the industry in forming,
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`and confirming, his opinions.
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`VI. TT’s Video Animations (Exs. 2012, 2014, 2048, 2049, 2203) Are Not
`Offered for the Truth of the Matter Asserted
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`TD seeks exclusion of TT’s video animations (Exs. 2012, 2014, 2048, 2049,
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`2203) as hearsay, lacking personal knowledge, improper opinion testimony,
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`lacking authenticity, and improper summaries. Motion at 9-11. Trying to support
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`these contentions, TD theorizes that TT is “using these animations as evidence of
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`how TT’s product and some prior art actually operates.” Id. at 9. This argument
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`misstates the purpose of the video animations, and their demonstrative nature.
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`As is clear from page 21 of the Patent Owner’s Response, TT offered these
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`materials as demonstratives—examples of problems generally present in the
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`technical field, the recognition of these problems in the specification of the ’132
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`patent, TT’s novel, non-obvious solution to these problems, and how the claimed
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`invention improved over the prior art. POR at 21 n.5 (describing 2049 and 2203 as
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`“examples”). Citations to Exhibits 2012, 2014, 2048, and 2049 in TT’s Preliminary
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`Response also show their demonstrative nature. See POPR at 8-10 (Ex. 2012
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`demonstrates col. 2:60-67), 12 (Ex. 2014 demonstrates col. 2:60-67 and 7:47-53),
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`17-24 (Ex. 2048 demonstrates differences from prior art), and 13 (Ex. 2049
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`Patent 6,772,132
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`demonstrates col. 7:15-46).
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`Because these exhibits are demonstrative in nature, they are not hearsay
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`under FRE 801(c)(2). Nor are they the summary of expert testimony subject to
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`FRE 701 or 702. Finally, TD never articulates any way in which these exhibits lack
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`authenticity (FRE 901) or are improper summaries (FRE 1006). Thus, TD has
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`waived any such arguments.
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`VII. The X_Trader Website (Ex. 2015) was Properly Cited in TT’s
`Preliminary Response and is not Hearsay
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`TD calls for excluding a printout of the X_Trader website (Ex. 2015).
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`Motion at 11. TD alleges that Ex. 2015 is hearsay and unauthenticated. Id. Both
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`contentions are incorrect.
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`TT cited Ex. 2015 only in its Preliminary Response for the proposition that
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`TT’s MD Trader tool remains “TT’s flagship product.” POPR at 14. By rule, TT
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`could not have submitted new testimonial evidence in its Preliminary Response. 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.207(c); TPG at 48,764. Further, because the exhibit was not cited to
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`prove the truth of any statement it asserts, it is not hearsay under FRE 801(c)(2).
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`TD’s concern for the authenticity of the website is similarly unfounded.
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`According to TD, “there is no evidence in the record that this printout is what it
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`purports to be.” Motion at 11. This is untrue. Ex. 2015 includes an active link at
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`the top of each page, directing traffic to a live website. See Ex. 2015 at 1-5.
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`Following that link confirms Ex. 2015 is unchanged and is exactly what it purports
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`to be. Indeed, TD identifies no alleged inaccuracies in the exhibit.
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`FRE 901(a) does not require a proponent to authenticate a document to the
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`exclusion of all possible alternatives. It instead requires evidence merely
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`“sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
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`FRE 901(a). Here, Ex. 2015 includes several indicia of authenticity such as TT’s
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`logo and insignia, pertinent information regarding MD Trader, icons, active links,
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`and the like. Ex. 2015. This type of information is sufficient to authenticate the
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`X_Trader website. See FRE 901(b)(4); see also QSC Audio Prods., LLC v. Crest
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`Audio, Inc., IPR2014-00127, Paper 43 at 11-12 (Apr. 29, 2015). Any dispute as to
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`the sufficiency of this evidence goes to its weight and not admissibility. Such
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`disputes are improper in a motion to exclude. TPG at 48,767 (“A motion to
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`exclude . . . may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a
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`particular fact.”).
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`VIII. TT’s Reliance on the Thirty-One Litigation Declarations (Exs. 2016-
`2046) is Proper is Both Responses
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`Repeating similar challenges to Mr. Thomas’s report, TD criticizes TT for
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`citing to thirty-one declarations (Exs. 2016-2046) describing industry praise of
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`TT’s innovations. Motion at 12. These hearsay and authenticity challenges fail.
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`As explained above, TT cited this evidence in its Preliminary Response due
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`to prohibitions on new testimony under 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(c). The declarations
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`were cited to demonstrate the mental impressions of those in the industry, falling
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`within the well-establish exception to the hearsay rule set forth in FRE 803(3).
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`Further, because these declarations are a proper basis for an expert declaration,
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`they should not be excluded. FRE 703; HTI Holdings, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins.
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`Co., No. 10-cv-06021, 2011 WL 4595799, at *3 (D. Ore. Aug. 24, 2011) (“hearsay
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`is admissible as a type of fact or data reasonably relied upon by an expert”). Mr.
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`Thomas considered these sworn statements—made under penalty of perjury—in
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`forming his opinion regarding public perception of the claimed system. It is
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`reasonable for him to employ the views of the claimed product’s early adopters to
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`inform and substantiate his general opinion of the claims and art. See Ex.2201,
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`¶¶ 29, 30, 32, 33.
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`TD’s authentication challenge also fails. TT included these declarations in
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`the litigation materials provided to TD. See POPR at 16 n.5; Ex. 2047. Record
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`evidence sets forth the style of these proceedings and the Bates ranges of the
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`declarations. Ex. 2047. TD has ready access to these documents to confirm their
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`authenticity. FRE 901(a). Yet TD did not seek to depose any of the signatories to
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`Exs. 2016-2046 and has not alleged any inaccuracy in the declarations. TD’s
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`dispute implicates the weight of these documents, not their admissibility.
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`FRE 104(e). Such claims are improper in a motion to exclude. TPG at 48,767.
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`Further, TT need not authenticate these documents to Mr. Thomas to adduce
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`his expert opinion. FRE 703. In other words, for the same reasons described above,
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`Mr. Thomas has properly relied on these exhibits in forming his expert opinions.
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`And TT’s citation of the Thomas Report remains proper.
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`IX. The HCI Printouts (Exs. 2053-2061) Are Admissible
`TD requests exclusion of the HCI printouts (Exs. 2053-2061) as hearsay and
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`lacking authentication. Motion at 13-14. Neither assertion is correct.
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`A. The HCI Printouts are Exceptions to the Prohibition on Hearsay
`or are Not Hearsay at All
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`TT does not rely on Exhibits 2053-2061 for the truth of the matter asserted,
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`as TD suggests. These exhibits do not state that TT’s GUI “is technological and
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`solves a technical problem.” Motion at 9. Rather, TT provides these exhibits to
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`corroborate that GUIs are technology. See POR at 17, 51. Exhibits 2053-2061
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`corroborate this fact regardless of whether TT’s GUIs are “technological and
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`solve[] a technical problem.” Motion at 13. Accordingly, these exhibits are not
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`hearsay.
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`Even if TT did need to prove the truth of the matter in these exhibits, they
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`fall within hearsay exceptions. Exs. 2053 and 2054 are separately admissible
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`because they are statements from a public office setting out its activities. FRE
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`803(8)(A)(i). NASA, a federal agency, is a public office. And its statements on the
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`division of its technical areas and their “research activities” set out its “activities.”
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`Exhibits 2055-2061 are also admissible under FRE 807. These printouts
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`from websites maintained by colleges and universities reflect the courses offered at
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`Patent 6,772,132
`those educational institutions. There would be no reason for these institutions to
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`misrepresent the courses they offer or their descriptions thereof. Each website
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`remains available to the public at the addresses provided. See infra. Thus, these
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`statements have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. FRE 807(a)(1).
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`The exhibits also evidence a material fact and are highly probative.
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`FRE 807(a)(2)-(3), demonstrating that third party institutions consistently classify
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`subject matter relevant to this proceeding as technological. Finally, admitting these
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`exhibits best serves the interest of justice. FRE 807(a)(4). It would have been cost
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`prohibitive (and pedantic) for both TT and TD to depose an agent from each and
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`every one of these schools for the sole purpose of confirming their course offerings
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`match their online listings. To request this stresses form to the literal exclusion of
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`substance.
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`TT also notes that its Preliminary Response serves as proper notice on the
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`intent to use these exhibits. FRE 807(b). And each of the exhibits lists names and
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`addresses of the institutions, or such information is readily available. Id.
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`The HCI Printouts Are Properly Authenticated
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`B.
`The Board should dismiss TD’s argument that Exhibits 2053-2061 are
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`somehow inauthentic. Exhibits 2055-2061 include direct links to their sources at
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`the top of each page. See Exs. 2055-2061. All of these sources remain available to
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`this day and are accessible by either typing in a URL or querying public search
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`engines. TD can immediately confirm their content. TD cannot genuinely question
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`that these documents are what they purport to be. These exhibits also include
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`additional indicia of authenticity such as school or government logos, familiar
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`colors and formats, dates, addresses, contact information, etc., sufficient to
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`determine their authenticity. FRE 901(b)(4); see QSC Audio, Paper 43 at 11-12.
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`Exhibits 2053 and 2054 are self-authenticating. “[P]ublication[s] purporting
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`to be issued by a public authority” “require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity.”
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`FRE 902(5). Exhibits. 2053 and 2054 are websites published by NASA, a federal
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`agency (i.e., a public authority). Documents on government websites are thus self-
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`authenticating. See, e.g., Hispanic Broad. Corp. v. Educ. Media Found., 2003 WL
`
`22867633, at *5, n.5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2003); Langbord v. U.S. Dept. of
`
`Treasury, 2011 WL 2623315, at *14 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2011) (finding printouts of
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`National Archives website are “prima facie authentic under FRE 902(5), which
`
`provides that ‘publications purporting to be issued by public authority’ are self-
`
`authenticating”). These documents also include sufficient indicia of authenticity—
`
`such as NASA logos, the familiar website layout, proper names of research groups
`
`and related officials, etc.—confirming they are genuine. FRE 901(b)(4); see also
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`QSC Audio Prods., Paper 43 at 11-12. These documents remain available to this
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`day. Any disagreement as to their authenticity should thus go to their weight, not
`
`their admissibility.
`
`
`
`14
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`
`
`Case No. CBM2014-00135
`Patent 6,772,132
`X. The Prior Litigation Contentions (Ex. 2084) Do Not Make
`Representations on the Content of the Prior Art
`
`TD concludes by requesting the Board to exclude TT’s invalidity
`
`contentions stemming from the CQG litigation as hearsay. Motion at 15.
`
`According to TD, TT relies on these contentions to offer representations on “the
`
`content of the prior art and the scope of the claims.” Id. Not so.
`
`Ex. 2084 was cited only the TT’s Preliminary Response. TT did not cite it in
`
`its Patent Owner’s Response. TD’s challenges are therefore improper. 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.207(c).
`
`Ex. 2084 is not hearsay because TT did not offer Ex. 2084 for the truth of
`
`the matter asserted. FRE 801(c)(2). Rather, TT cited the contentions to establish
`
`what the Examiner considered relevant art during prosecution, as well as TT’s
`
`consistency between its positions in this case and parallel litigation. See POPR at
`
`25 & n.4 (describing prosecution events). Indeed, unsurprisingly, TT cross-cited
`
`the Examiner’s Notice of Allowance (Ex. 2083) both times it mentioned Ex. 2084.
`
`See POPR at 25, 65. Due to the reason it is offered, Exhibit 2084 is not hearsay.
`
`XI. Conclusion
`For at least these reasons, TT respectfully requests denial of TD’s motion.
`
`Dated: June 23, 2015
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /Erika H. Arner/
`Erika H. Arner, Lead Counsel
`Registration No. 57,540
`
`
`
`15
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`
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`CBM2014-00135
`Patent 6,772,132
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Patent
`
`
`
`
`
`Owner’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude was served on June 23,
`
`2015, via email directed to counsel of record for the Petitioners at the following:
`
`
`
`Lori A. Gordon
`lgordon-ptab@skgf.com
`
`Jonathan M. Strang
`jstrang-ptab@skgf.com
`
`Robert E. Sokohl
`rsokohl-ptab@skgf.com
`
`
`
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005-3934
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Ashley F. Cheung/
`Ashley F. Cheung
`Case Manager
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
`GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`
`16
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