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`Case 1:04-cv-05312· Document 963
`
`Filed 09/1212007 Page 1 of 3
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICf COURT
`FOR THE NORmERN DISTRICf OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DMSION
`
`TRAiliNG TECHNOLOGIES
`INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff;
`
`vs.
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`eSPEED, INC., eSPEED, INTERNATIONAL,)
`LTD., and ECCO WARE, LTD.,
`)
`)
`)
`
`No. 04 C 5312
`
`Defendaats.
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`TT brings this motion in limine to preclude eSpeed from contradicting the court's
`
`"single actloa" coastn•ction, requesting that we preclude expert testimony, arg\ling tbat the
`
`term "single action" can cover (I) any number of aser actions so loag aa they are performed
`
`in a "short period of time"; (ii) the order entJy process of the alleged Tokyo Stock Exchange
`
`("TSE") prior art; and (iii) a screen which requires that a u1er click on a screen and move a
`
`cursor to dick on a button in a pop-up window to send an order. Essentially, TT argues that
`
`a product requiring (1) clicking or double clickioe on au order entry screen; (2) typing a
`
`quantity in an order ticket that pops up; and (3) clicking on a send button within the order
`
`ticket to send the order cannot come within our construction of "single action order entry
`
`region." Therefore, TT coo tends, eSpeed sbould not be able to introduce its arpment at trial.
`
`eSpeed fails to respond to the substance ofTT's motion. Rather, eSpeed focuses on the
`
`process underlying a patent infringement suit. That process, eSpeed points out, Involves two
`
`separate and distinct steps: (1) claim construction (Le., what do the claims mean?); and (2)
`
`.. pplying the construed claims to the prior art. eSpeed i1 perfectly right - there are two
`
`elements of a patent case, con.stming the pateat and determining whether infringement
`
`occurred. Mamman v. Westview ln!!truments, lp£,, 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). In fact. the
`
`i
`' ..
`·!.
`
`TRADING TECH EXHIBIT 2004
`TD Ameritrade v. Trading Technologies
`CBM2014-00131
`
`Page 1 of 4
`
`

`

`·;.: .·: .·:-· ... .
`
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`.
`.
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`
`~~
`
`..
`~
`~ .·.
`
`Case 1:04-cv-05312 Document 963
`
`Filed 09/12/2007 Page 2 of 3
`
`No.04 C 5312
`
`Pagtl
`
`Supreme Court supports eSpeed's argument that the first inquiry is a question of law to be
`
`determined by the court and the second inquiry is a question of fad to be submitted to a jury.
`
`ld. In f•ct, the Federal Cir~uit has guided us. to "provide the jury in a patent case with
`
`instrudlons adequate to ensure that the jury fully understands the court's daim construction
`
`nllings and what the patentee covered by the claims." Sulzer Textil A. G. v. f.ict~nol N.y., 358
`
`F.3d 1356.1366 (Fed.Cir.l004).
`
`Although eSpeed torrectly states the pro~ess of a patent infringement trial, we think
`
`this presents a spedal circumstance. ln our claim construction ruling, we construed "single
`
`action of a user input device" to be "an action by a user within a short period of time that may
`
`comprise one or more eUcla of a mouse button or other input device." Tradine Tecbnolodes
`
`Int'l. Inc. y. eSpeed. lgc .• 2006 WL 3147697, *8 (N.D.ID.l006) (''Claim Construction"). We
`
`went on to explain:" As we have continually noted, however, plaintitl's patents aenerally were
`
`written from tbe perspective of the user. Therefore, tbis claim refers to the user~s sinale action,
`
`not the adion(s) tbe computer performs to ex~ute the user's command." ld. We made it very
`
`clear that, from the perspeetive of the user, a single action had to be just that - a single action.
`
`We think it is very elear that a double click, foUowed by entry of a quantity, followed by an
`
`' 4enter'' (as described by eSpeed's attorney Mr. Perkins) is not a single action under our
`
`construction.
`
`While such is generally a decision left to the jury, we pause to recognize the c:ompleDty
`
`of this case and the dimculty the jurors will encounter in attempting to keep track of all of the
`
`different features and arguments. The parties have no lack of theories, especially when it
`
`comes to invalidity and prior art. Therefore, as we are convinced that it would be impossible
`
`for a reasonable jury to fmd that the three steps described by eSpeed's attorney could fit into
`
`Page 2 of 4
`
`

`

`Case 1 :04-cv-05312 Document 963
`
`Filed 09/12/2007 Page 3 of 3
`
`Nu.04CS31l
`
`Pegt3
`
`our definition of single action, we grant TI's motion to exc:lude evidence that it does.' Rather
`
`than throw a non-starter at the jury or deal with this issue during post-trial motion practi.ee,
`
`we exclude the evidence from the start. Althoup our decision is nearly akin to a partial
`
`summary judgment nallng, we are convinced that it is correct, it will save preeiOU$ judiClial
`
`resourees, and simplify the case for the jury. See C91usi v. C,ybex lnt'l .. lpc., 2007 WL
`
`490969, *3 (Fed.Cir.2007) (unpubHshed Federal Circuit opinion finding that district court did
`
`not abuse its discretion in grantin& plaintiff's motion In limine to preclude competitor from
`
`arguing non-infringement under the reverse dodrine of equ~alents even though it was a "de
`
`facto summary judgment"). TT's motion is granted in part.
`
`~, lr· . 1001.
`
`JAMESiMORAN
`Senior Judge, U.S. District Court
`
`1 We limit our ruling to exclusion of evidence of a prior art "single action" feature that
`requires a double click. entry of a quantity, and an enter by the user. Because of the unusual
`nature of our detennination, we reject IT's request that we go any further. Specifically, we
`reject IT's request that we exclude expert testimony that "single action" can cover a screen
`whlch requires that a user click on a screen and move a cursor to click on a button in a pop-up
`window to send an order. 'IT can argue its case to the jury and we will, per the guidance of the
`Federal Circuit, submit detailed claim construction instructions to the jury.
`
`Page 3 of 4
`
`

`

`Orp Fonn (OlllOOS)
`
`Filed 09/12/2007 Page 1 of 1
`Case 1 :04-cv-05312 Document 962
`United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
`
`N•mt of MJ11:1cd .hadJ:t
`or Mallm'lte Jad~
`
`CASE NUMBER
`
`James B. Moran
`04 c 5312
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC. Vs. ESPEED, INC., et al
`
`DATE
`
`9/12/2007
`
`Sln:l111 Judce If Other
`tblll AISIJbM Jo.
`
`CASE
`TITLE
`
`..
`
`...
`
`. . .
`...
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`Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. TT's motion in limine to preclude eSpeed from contradicting the
`court's "single action" construction, requesting that we preclude expert testimony, arguing that the tenn
`"single action" can cover (I) any nwnber of user actions so long as they are perfonned in a "short period of
`time" [943) is granted in part.
`
`• [For further de1ailsee separate ordcr(s).]
`
`Docketint tu mail noticca.
`
`.· 1
`
`Courtroom Deputy I
`
`lnitiak:
`
`LG
`
`•.. , .... ''J -, , ......... , .~a z
`C... c; .. .) LltU
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`
`04C53 I 2 TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC. Vs. BSPEED, INC., et al
`
`Page 1 of I
`
`Page 4 of 4
`
`

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