throbber

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` Paper No. ______
`Filed: June 23, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`
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`
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORPORATION, TD AMERITRADE, INC., and
`TD AMERITRADE ONLINE HOLDINGS CORP.
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`TRADING TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude
`
`
`
`

`

`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Preliminary Statement .................................................................................. 1
`
`Standard ......................................................................................................... 1
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III. Exhibit 2007, a Set of Demonstrative Exhibits, was Properly Cited
`in TT’s Preliminary Response and is not Hearsay ..................................... 2
`
`IV. Exhibit 2202, a District Court Demonstrative, Was Not Offered
`for the Truth of the Matter Asserted ........................................................... 3
`
`V.
`
`The HCI Printouts (Exs. 2008-2016) Are Admissible ................................ 5
`
`A.
`
`The HCI Printouts are Exceptions to the Hearsay Prohibition or
`are Not Hearsay at All ........................................................................... 5
`
`B.
`
`The HCI Printouts Are Properly Authenticated .................................... 6
`
`VI. The Thomas Report (Ex. 2201) is an Expert Opinion Relying on
`Proper Evidence ............................................................................................. 8
`
`VII. The Pletz Article (Ex. 2020) is Admissible ................................................ 11
`
`VIII. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 13
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`I.
`
`Preliminary Statement
`
`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
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`In its motion to exclude, Petitioners TD Ameritrade et al. (“TD”) repeatedly
`
`ask the Board to ignore the nature of the evidence submitted by Trading
`
`Technologies (“TT”), as well as the timing and circumstances of the evidence’s
`
`submission.
`
`TD criticizes TT’s reliance on exhibits, not declarations, in Patent Owner’s
`
`Preliminary Response (“POPR”)—when, by rule, no declarations can be submitted
`
`with that paper. Next, TD challenges as hearsay exhibits not submitted for the truth
`
`of the matter asserted, distorting the exhibits’ use to further TD’s exclusionary
`
`goals. Ignoring the rules governing the bases for expert opinions under FRE 703,
`
`TD calls for the exclusion of opinions formed using litigation-tested declarations.
`
`And TD argues that government websites and published articles—which remain
`
`unavailable to this day— are somehow inauthentic or unreliable.
`
`As these examples demonstrate, TD’s attacks are motivated not by a fair
`
`reading of the rules of evidence, but rather by a litigation-driven desire to exclude
`
`relevant, probative evidence. TT respectfully requests denial of TD’s motion.
`
`II.
`
`Standard
`
`The Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) govern the admissibility of evidence
`
`in this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a); Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756,
`
`48,758 (Aug. 14, 2012). As the party moving to exclude evidence, TD bears the
`
`
`
`1
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`

`

`burden of proof on inadmissibility. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).
`
`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`III. Exhibit 2007, a Set of Demonstrative Exhibits, was Properly Cited in
`TT’s Preliminary Response and is not Hearsay
`
`TD criticizes TT for citing Exhibit 2007, a set of demonstrative slides
`
`submitted to a court in parallel litigation, in its Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`
`Response. Motion (Paper 55) at 2. TT cited this exhibit as general background
`
`regarding TT’s formation, company size, and success of its MD Trader product.
`
`POPR (Paper 17) at 1. TT’s reliance on these demonstratives was proper under the
`
`Rules.
`
`Under Rule 42.207(c) and the Board’s Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”), a
`
`Patent Owner cannot submit new supporting declarations with its Preliminary
`
`Response and must accordingly rely on evidence from other proceedings. 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.207(c) (“The preliminary response shall not present new testimony
`
`evidence beyond that already of record . . . .”); TPG at 48,764 (“The preliminary
`
`response may present evidence other than new testimonial evidence to demonstrate
`
`that no review should be instituted.”) (emphasis added). As such, TD’s criticism of
`
`TT’s citation of Exhibit 2007, not repeated in the Patent Owner’s Response
`
`(“POR”), is misplaced.
`
`Exhibit 2007 is demonstrative in nature and illustrates exemplary differences
`
`between TT’s technology and the prior art. To narrow the issues before the Board,
`
`
`
`2
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`

`

`TT agrees to rely on Exhibit 2007 as a demonstrative only, not to establish the
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`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
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`truth of the matters for which it is cited on page 1 of the POPR. As such, TD’s
`
`hearsay objections are unfounded. TD’s objections under FRE 602, 702, and 703
`
`fail for the same reason.
`
`TD’s reliance on the best evidence rule (FRE 1002 et seq.) is similarly
`
`misplaced. First, TT has not offered Ex. 2007 “in order to prove its content” or as a
`
`“summary . . . of voluminous writings.” FRE 1002; FRE 1006. TT never alleged
`
`any passage or figure of these exhibits served as a “summary” of a prior litigation.
`
`Nor has TD pointed to any discrepancy between Ex. 2007 and any underlying
`
`document. The “contents” of Ex. 2007 are therefore not at issue, and these rules are
`
`inapplicable. Second, TD’s arguments go to the sufficiency of the evidence, not its
`
`admissibility. TD’s motion questions whether the passages of Ex. 2007 are “proper
`
`summaries” of the root proceedings. Motion at 5. This argument is improper in a
`
`motion to exclude. See TPG at 48,767 (“A motion to exclude . . . may not be used
`
`to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular fact.”).
`
`IV. Exhibit 2202, a District Court Demonstrative, Was Not Offered for the
`Truth of the Matter Asserted
`
`TD similarly asks the Board to exclude another demonstrative exhibit,
`
`Ex. 2202, on the basis of hearsay, lacking personal knowledge, and the rules
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`governing expert testimony. Motion at 1-5. Due to the demonstrative nature of the
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`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
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`exhibit, as well as its intended use, TD’s arguments fail.
`
`TT relied on Ex. 2202 (once) to show how purported experts of TD’s co-
`
`defendants had characterized the field of the ’056 patent as technological. POR
`
`at 10. But contrary to TD’s insistence, Ex. 2202 was not offered to establish the
`
`truth of these characterizations. Id. (explaining what “TD’s co-defendants in the
`
`district court” said about the field of the ’056 patent).
`
`Because TT did not present this exhibit to establish the truth of the matters
`
`asserted, it is not hearsay under FRE 801(c)(2). See Anderson v. United States, 417
`
`U.S. 211, 219-220 (1974); Abrams v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 252 (2d
`
`Cir. 2014). And because TT offered these exhibits to show what statements were
`
`made, the personal knowledge (FRE 602) and opinion testimony requirements
`
`(FRE 701, 702) are immaterial. Such evidence is not witness testimony. Finally,
`
`TD’s attacks along the lines of the best evidence rule fail for the same reasons
`
`above. Namely, the content of the exhibit is not at issue, so these rules do not
`
`apply. FRE 1002, 1006.
`
`Finally, TD asserts that Exhibit 2202 is somehow irrelevant (FRE 401) or a
`
`waste of time (FRE 403). Not so. The exhibit contains materials considered in
`
`litigation as to the nature of the patent in dispute here. This material provides
`
`factual background helpful for patent eligibility and nonobvious assessments.
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`V. The HCI Printouts (Exs. 2008-2016) Are Admissible
`TD requests exclusion of the HCI printouts (Exs. 2008-2016) for purportedly
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`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
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`being hearsay and lacking authentication. Motion at 6-7. Neither assertion is
`
`correct.
`
`A. The HCI Printouts are Exceptions to the Hearsay Prohibition or
`are Not Hearsay at All
`
`TT does not rely on Exhibits 2008-2016 for the truth of the matter asserted,
`
`as TD suggests. These exhibits do not state that TT’s GUI “is technological and
`
`solves a technical problem.” Motion at 6. Rather, TT provides these exhibits to
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`corroborate that GUIs are technology. See POR at 10. Exhibits 2008-2016
`
`corroborate this fact regardless of whether TT’s GUIs are “technological and
`
`solve[] a technical problem.” Motion at 6. Accordingly, these exhibits are not
`
`hearsay.
`
`Even if TT did need to prove the truth of the matter in these exhibits, they
`
`fall within hearsay exceptions. Exhibits. 2008 and 2009 are separately admissible
`
`because they are statements from a public office setting out its activities. FRE
`
`803(8)(A)(i). NASA, a federal agency, is a public office. And its statements on the
`
`division of its technical areas and their “research activities” set out its “activities.”
`
`Id.
`
`
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`5
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`

`

`Exhibits 2010-2016 are also admissible under FRE 807. These printouts
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`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`from websites maintained by colleges and universities reflect the courses offered at
`
`those educational institutions. There would be no reason for these institutions to
`
`misrepresent the courses they offer or their descriptions thereof. Each website
`
`remains available to the public at the addresses provided. See infra. Thus, these
`
`statements have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. FRE 807(a)(1).
`
`The exhibits also evidence a material fact and are highly probative,
`
`FRE 807(a)(2)-(3), demonstrating that third party institutions consistently classify
`
`subject matter relevant to this proceeding as technological. Finally, admitting these
`
`exhibits best serves the interest of justice. FRE 807(a)(4). The websites are
`
`accurate. It would have been cost prohibitive (and pedantic) for both TT and TD to
`
`depose an agent from each and every one of these schools for the sole purpose of
`
`confirming their course offerings match their online listings. To request this
`
`stresses form to the literal exclusion of substance.
`
`TT also notes that its Preliminary Response serves as proper notice on the
`
`intent to use these exhibits. FRE 807(b). And each of the exhibits lists names and
`
`addresses of the institutions, or such information is readily available. Id.
`
`The HCI Printouts Are Properly Authenticated
`
`B.
`TD’s argument that Exhibits 2008-2016 are somehow inauthentic should
`
`also be dismissed. Exhibits 2010-2016 include direct links to their sources at the
`
`
`
`6
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`

`

`top of each page. See Exs. 2010-2016. All of these sources remain available to this
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`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
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`day and are accessible by either typing in a URL or querying public search
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`engines. TD can immediately confirm their content. TD cannot genuinely question
`
`that these documents are what they purport to be. Moreover, these exhibits also
`
`include additional indicia of authenticity such as school or government logos,
`
`familiar colors and formats, dates, addresses, contact information, etc., sufficient to
`
`determine their authenticity. FRE 901(b)(4); see also QSC Audio Prods., LLC v.
`
`Crest Audio, Inc., IPR2014-00127, Paper 43 at 11-12 (Apr. 29, 2015).
`
`Exhibits 2008 and 2009 are self-authenticating. “[P]ublication[s] purporting
`
`to be issued by a public authority” “require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity.”
`
`FRE 902(5). Exs. 2008 and 2009 are websites published by NASA, a federal
`
`agency (i.e., a public authority). Documents on government websites are thus self-
`
`authenticating. See, e.g., Hispanic Broad. Corp. v. Educ. Media Found., 2003 WL
`
`22867633, at *5, n.5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2003); Langbord v. U.S. Dept. of
`
`Treasury, 2011 WL 2623315, at *14 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2011) (finding printouts of
`
`National Archives website are “prima facie authentic under FRE 902(5), which
`
`provides that ‘publications purporting to be issued by public authority’ are self-
`
`authenticating”). These documents also include indicia of authenticity—such as
`
`NASA logos, the familiar website layout, proper names of research groups and
`
`related officials, etc.—confirming they are genuine. FRE 901(b)(4); see also QSC
`
`
`
`7
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`

`

`Audio., Paper 43 at 11-12. These documents remain available to this day. Any
`
`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`disagreement regarding the authenticity of these documents should thus go to their
`
`weight, not their admissibility.
`
`VI. The Thomas Report (Ex. 2201) is an Expert Opinion Relying on Proper
`Evidence
`
`TD’s motion also attempts to exclude portions of Ex. 2201 as hearsay.
`
`Motion at 7-11. TD raises four principal arguments, each unfounded.
`
`First, TD avers that Mr. Thomas did not adopt portions of Ex. 2201 as his
`
`testimony in the instant proceeding. Motion at 8. According to TD, this renders the
`
`unadopted portions of Ex. 2201 as hearsay. Id. TD’s allegations are irrelevant.
`
`TT’s relied on the adopted portions of the Thomas Report in its Response. See
`
`POR at 23 (citing Ex. 2201, ¶¶ 19-31). TD acknowledges Mr. Thomas adopted
`
`these passages as his testimony in this proceeding. Motion at 8; see also Ex. 1057,
`
`¶ 5. Thus, TD’s argument does not touch on any portion of the Thomas Report
`
`used in these proceedings. The allegation is immaterial.
`
`Second, TD asks the Board to exclude paragraphs 31, 33, and 34 of Ex. 2201
`
`as hearsay. Motion at 8-9. In TD’s view, these passages act as “conduit[s] for the
`
`expunged Brumfield” testimony. Id. Not so. As an expert, Mr. Thomas may rely on
`
`inadmissible evidence “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on
`
`those kinds of facts.” FRE 703. Here, Mr. Thomas cites Brumfield’s transcript
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`within a broader discourse of the benefits of the claimed system and the state of the
`
`art. See, e.g., Ex. 2201, ¶¶ 29, 30 (describing Mr. Thomas’s expert opinion on the
`
`impact of the patented system). It is self-evident that an expert trader would
`
`“reasonably rely” on the endorsements and voiced approval of other traders in
`
`forming and substantiating his opinion on the influence of the claimed systems.
`
`Such evidence is particularly pertinent where, as here, it comes from early adopters
`
`of the product within the expert’s realm of expertise. See id., ¶¶ 32, 33.
`
`Third, TD contends that paragraphs 32-34 of Ex. 2201 contain inadmissible
`
`hearsay. Motion at 10. Similar to the arguments above, TD claims that Mr. Thomas
`
`has “acted as a conduit for hearsay statements” from traders who signed
`
`declarations—under the penalty of perjury—describing the importance of the
`
`patented invention to electronic trading. Motion at 10; Ex. 2201, ¶ 33. TD’s
`
`allegations fail to account for the context as a whole. Mr. Thomas considered these
`
`statements in forming his opinion regarding public perception of the claimed
`
`system. CBM2013-00135, Ex. 1030 at 55:7-18. Mr. Thomas was ready and willing
`
`to answer questions regarding how these declarations, as well as his conversation
`
`with one of the declarants, factored into the preparation of his declaration. Id. at
`
`52:17-55:18. TD opted not to pursue this discovery. Nonetheless, under FRE 703,
`
`it was proper for Mr. Thomas to employ the views of the claimed product’s early
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`adopters to inform and substantiate his general opinion of the claims and art. See
`
`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`Ex. 2201, ¶¶ 29-30. TD offers no argument to the contrary.
`
`Nothing in TD’s reliance on United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.
`
`2003) runs to the contrary. In Dukagjini, an expert “repeatedly deviated from his
`
`expertise” to opine on tangential evidentiary matters far outside the scope of his
`
`prowess. See id. at 58-59. Rather than use this evidence to inform or substantiate
`
`his opinion, the expert used it to generate over seventy pages of transcripts with
`
`evidence irrelevant to his expertise. Id. at 59. Here, however, Mr. Thomas has an
`
`expertise in field of the engineering, design, and development of trading interfaces.
`
`And—unlike the out-of-his-depth expert in Dukagjini —Mr. Thomas considered
`
`the sworn statements of these thirty prominent members of the industry in forming,
`
`and confirming, his opinions.
`
`Finally, TD alleges that Ex. 2201 is irrelevant and a waste of time because
`
`he purportedly did not review the ’056 patent specifically. Motion at 10. This is
`
`incorrect. The Thomas Report details the impact of TT’s products had in the
`
`industry (¶¶ 19-31). These products implement features of the claimed systems.
`
`Moreover, Ex. 2201 contains materials considered in litigation as to the nature of
`
`the patent in dispute here. This material provides factual background helpful for
`
`patent eligibility and nonobvious assessments.
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`VII. The Pletz Article (Ex. 2020) is Admissible
`TD asks the Board to exclude the Pletz article (Ex. 2020) because it is
`
`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`purportedly hearsay and inauthentic. Motion at 11-12. TD is incorrect on both
`
`counts.
`
`TT cited Ex. 2020 only in its Preliminary Response. POPR at 1.
`
`Accordingly, TD’s hearsay accusations are unfounded by rule. 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.207(c).
`
`But TD’s arguments are not just irrelevant, they are also incorrect. TD
`
`attacks the Pletz article as hearsay by quarreling with its substance. TD argues, for
`
`instance, that Mr. Pletz “does not mention who at Crain’s counted the number of
`
`patents issued” to issue their rankings. Motion at 11. TD fundamentally confuses
`
`the purpose of Ex. 2020 and the law of hearsay. TT cited the Pletz article to show
`
`what others had said about the company. See POPR at 1. It did not rely on
`
`Ex. 2020 for any truth value as to its underlying content. Anderson, 417 U.S.
`
`at 220. In other words, the Pletz article shows that others viewed TT as innovative
`
`and highly-ranked regardless of whether TT is in fact innovate (it is) and
`
`regardless of any flaws of Crain’s methodology (or Pletz’s assessment thereof).
`
`Ex. 2020 at 2-3. Accordingly, the Pletz article is not hearsay under FRE 801(c)(2).
`
`TD’s qualms with the substance of the Pletz article go to, if anything, its weight
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`and not its admissibility. Such theories are improper in a motion to exclude. See
`
`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`TPG at 48,767.
`
`TD also questions Ex. 2020’s authenticity. Motion at 12. TD’s fears are
`
`misplaced. First, the article is self-authenticating. It is “printed material purporting
`
`to be a . . . periodical,” needing no other authentication. FRE 902(6). Such written
`
`material includes electrically stored information. FRE 101(b)(6). In this case,
`
`Crain’s Chicago Business purports to be a periodical. Its website includes written
`
`information. The information printed from the website is self-authenticating.
`
`Second, Ex. 2020 includes sufficient identifying information to authenticate
`
`it. FRE 901(b)(4). Ex. 2020 includes a web address at the bottom of each page.
`
`This address links to the live source webpage, available to this day. TD can
`
`immediately confirm that this document is exactly what it purports to be.
`
`FRE 901(a). Moreover, Ex. 2020 contains ample indicia of authenticity such as the
`
`Crain’s logo, distinctive website layout and color schemes, date, author, pictures,
`
`and graphics to conclude that it is genuine. See FRE 901(b)(4); see also QSC Audio
`
`Prods., IPR2014-00127, Paper 43 at 11-12. TT need not authenticate a document
`
`to the exclusion of every possible alternative. FRE 901(a). Any dispute as to the
`
`sufficiency of this evidence goes to its weight and not admissibility. See FRE
`
`104(e). As discussed above, such arguments are improper in a motion to exclude.
`
`Trial Practice Guide at 48,767.
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`VIII. Conclusion
`For at least these reasons, TT requests the Board to deny TD’s motion.
`
`Case No. CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`Dated: June 23, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /Erika H. Arner/
`Erika H. Arner, Lead Counsel
`Registration No. 57,540
`
`Joshua L. Goldberg, Backup Counsel
`Registration No. 59,369
`
`Steven F. Borsand, Backup Counsel
`Registration No. 36,752
`
`Attorneys for Patent Owner Trading
`Technologies International, Inc.
`
`13
`
`

`

`CBM2014-00131
`Patent 7,533,056
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Patent
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Owner’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude was served on June 23,
`
`2015, via email directed to counsel of record for the Petitioner at the following:
`
`Lori A. Gordon
`lgordon-ptab@skgf.com
`
`Jonathan M. Strang
`jstrang-ptab@skgf.com
`
`Robert E. Sokohl
`rsokohl-ptab@skgf.com
`
`
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005-3934
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Ashley F. Cheung/
`Ashley F. Cheung
`Case Manager
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
`GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`
`14
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`

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