UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________________
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`________________________
`Case CBM2014-001021
`Patent 8,118,221 B2
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE UNDER 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.62 AND 42.64
`
`
`1 Case CBM2014-00103 has been consolidated with the instant proceeding.
`
`
`
`
`
`________________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________________
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SMARTFLASH LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`________________________
`Case CBM2014-001021
`Patent 8,118,221 B2
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE UNDER 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.62 AND 42.64
`
`
`1 Case CBM2014-00103 has been consolidated with the instant proceeding.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. Dr. Katz’s Declaration Should Not Be Excluded ................................................ 1
`A. Dr. Katz Qualifies as an Expert Whose Testimony is Admissible. ...... 1
`B.
`Petitioner’s Criticism of Dr. Katz is Unfair and Unfounded. ............... 4
`C. Dr. Katz Provides Relevant Testimony About Deficiencies in the
`Petition That Will Assist the Board in Understanding the Technical
`Evidence and Determining the Facts Regarding Patentability of the
`Claims at Issue. ...................................................................................... 9
`Patent Owner’s References to and Reliance on Dr. Katz’s Testimony
`in Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 26) Should Not be Excluded. .... 15
`III. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 15
`
`
`D.
`
`i
`
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Patent Owner Smartflash, LLC opposes Petitioner Apple Inc.’s Motion to
`
`Exclude, which seeks to exclude Exhibit 2028 (Declaration of Jonathan Katz,
`
`Ph.D. in Support of Patent Owner’s Response to Petition), and any reference to or
`
`reliance on Dr. Katz’s declaration in Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 26). Motion
`
`to Exclude, Paper 39, at 3.
`
`Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude should be denied because Dr. Katz qualifies
`
`as an expert and his declaration testimony meets the requisites of FRE 702.
`
`Petitioner’s attack on Dr. Katz’s qualifications as an expert is unwarranted.
`
`Petitioner’s attack relies on deposition excerpts in which Petitioner examined Dr.
`
`Katz with ambiguously broad questions and/or on subject matter that was unrelated
`
`to the specific opinions he rendered about the application of the prior art references
`
`to the patent claims under review in this proceeding. Trying to discredit Dr. Katz,
`
`Petitioner strings together a litany of things that Dr. Katz was “not sure” about at
`
`his deposition, but that does not change or undermine Dr. Katz’s declaration about
`
`instances in which the Petition incorrectly alleges the existence of claim elements
`
`in the prior art references upon which this review was instituted.
`
`II. Dr. Katz’s Declaration Should Not Be Excluded
`A. Dr. Katz Qualifies as an Expert Whose Testimony is Admissible.
`Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
`
`RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERT WITNESSES
`
`1
`
`
`
`A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
`skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
`form of an opinion or otherwise if:
`(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
`knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
`evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
`(b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
`(c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
`methods; and
`(d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and
`methods to the facts of the case.
`
`FRE 702.
`
`The technology at issue in this proceeding generally relates to data storage
`
`and access systems, including portable data carriers for storing and paying for data
`
`and to computer systems for providing access to that data. Ex. 1001 at 00020,
`
`1:20-25. Dr. Katz earned a Ph.D. (with distinction) in Computer Science from
`
`Columbia University, has been a professor at University of Maryland since 2002,
`
`and has been working in the cybersecurity field since at least May 1999 (Ex. 2028
`
`at 27-28). He is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
`
`and education. As is clear from Dr. Katz’s declaration, he has reviewed the state
`
`of the art at the time of patent application filing, the patent claims at issue, the prior
`
`art references on which this proceeding was instituted, and he analyzed how
`
`Petitioner applies the references to the elements of the claims at issue. Ex. 2028 ¶¶
`
`10-49. As such, Dr. Katz’s testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, is the
`
`product of reliable principles and methods, and Dr. Katz has reliably applied the
`
`2
`
`
`
`principles and methods to the facts of the case. Here, Dr. Katz’s declaration
`
`succinctly points out areas in which the Petition incorrectly alleges the existence of
`
`claim elements in the prior art references on which this covered business method
`
`review was instituted. As such, Dr. Katz’s declaration testimony will help the
`
`Board understand the technical evidence and determine the facts regarding
`
`patentability of the claims under review. Dr. Katz’s testimony is admissible under
`
`FRE 702.
`
`Dr. Katz is qualified to testify about what a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`(“POSITA”) would have known at the priority date, even if he did not meet the
`
`definition at the time. There is no requirement that Dr. Katz had to be a POSITA
`
`at the priority date. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289,
`
`1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(“Although [the expert] did not possess [the POSITA]
`
`qualifications in 1983 (the invention date of the … patent), this fact would not
`
`disqualify him from giving a competent opinion in 1995 as to what a hypothetical
`
`person of ordinary skill would have known in 1983”). Here, at the time Dr. Katz
`
`rendered his opinions, his qualifications met his POSITA definition. This is
`
`distinguishable from Extreme Networks, cited by Petitioner, in which the expert did
`
`not meet the POSITA definition at the time of rendering her opinion. Extreme
`
`Networks, Inc. v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 395 Fed. Appx. 709, 715 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2010)(expert opined that POSITA had Bachelor of Computer Science or computer
`
`3
`
`
`
`engineering degree, or equivalent experience, and 2-3 years experience in
`
`computer industry working on design or development of high speed switches,
`
`bridges, or routers for various networks, whereas expert had Associate of Applied
`
`Science degree in Computer Programming and “never seems to have worked on
`
`‘the design or development of high speed switches, bridges, or routers’”).
`
`Petitioner’s Criticism of Dr. Katz is Unfair and Unfounded.
`
`B.
`Petitioner’s criticism of Dr. Katz that he “was repeatedly unable to answer
`
`whether a POSITA would have known or understood various basic principles and
`
`technologies pertinent to the ’221 patent in the relevant time period” (Motion to
`
`Exclude at 5) is unfair and unfounded.
`
`At Dr. Katz’s deposition, Petitioner never established whose definition of a
`
`POSITA Dr. Katz was to use. Ex. 1031 at 180:2-6. Dr. Katz’s definition is “a
`
`bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent, or at least 5 years of
`
`experience in manufacturing or engineering, with significant exposure to the digital
`
`content distribution and/or e-commerce industries.” Ex. 2028 ¶ 9. Petitioner’s
`
`definition is “at least a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering,
`
`computer science or a telecommunications related field, and at least three years of
`
`industry experience that included client-server data/information distribution and
`
`management architectures.” Ex. 1021 ¶24. While there is obvious overlap, there
`
`exist some people who would qualify as a POSITA under one definition who
`
`4
`
`
`
`would not meet the other definition. At deposition, there were times Dr. Katz
`
`could not be sure what a POSITA would know without Petitioner defining a
`
`POSITA for deposition purposes. For example Dr. Katz had no problem opining
`
`that in the prior art time period a POSITA (by whatever definition) would know
`
`what a merchant server was (Ex. 1031 at 19:3-10), but he was “not sure” whether
`
`in the prior art time period a POSITA would have understood that digital content
`
`could be bought and sold over a network or over the internet (id. at 13:16-14:3).
`
`Certainly Dr. Katz’s POSITA with digital content distribution and/or e-commerce
`
`experience would have understood, but that is not clear for Petitioner’s POSITA.
`
`The Board should not fault Dr. Katz for answering the questions he was asked.
`
`Moreover, the principal examples that Petitioner uses – that “Dr. Katz
`
`testified he was ‘not sure’ whether in the prior art time period a POSITA would
`
`have ‘known how to carry out an electronic payment to sell digital content’ or
`
`‘known how to implement an electronic sale of digital content’ (Motion to Exclude
`
`at 5-6 (citing Ex. 1031 at 21:12-16, 23:2-15)) resulted from questions so broad and
`
`lacking context that an “I’m not sure” response was appropriate. For example, did
`
`Petitioner mean “carry out an electronic payment to sell digital content” and
`
`“implement an electronic sale of digital content” with the apparatus and methods
`
`described and claimed in the ‘221 Patent? If that was the question, then the answer
`
`would have been “no,” because the apparatus and methods were novel. Did
`
`5
`
`
`
`Petitioner mean “carry out an electronic payment to sell digital content” and
`
`“implement an electronic sale of digital content” in some other specific, but
`
`undefined, manner? That is not possible to answer without defining the specific
`
`manner the questioner had in mind. The Board should not fault Dr. Katz for doing
`
`his best to answer the questions he was asked. It was not Dr. Katz’s job at the
`
`deposition to constrain the breadth of the questions or to seek out the context of the
`
`question. He answered the questions he was asked. Here, the “I’m not sure”
`
`reflects the quality of the question, not the qualifications of the witness.
`
`Petitioner’s other criticisms are similarly unfair and unfounded. Petitioner
`
`asserts that “at his deposition, Dr. Katz was not sure if Ginter’s disclosures fit his
`
`characterization of ‘pre-purchase processing’ even after consulting all of his
`
`declarations” (Motion to Exclude at 7, citing Ex. 1031 at 124:10-128:11) and that
`
`“[w]hen questioned by his own counsel, Dr. Katz testified that he did not even
`
`know what was meant by the term ‘pre-purchase processing’—the very term that
`
`he himself uses in his declaration” (id., citing Ex. 1031 at 190:14-20). This is a
`
`mischaracterization of the record. At deposition, upon first use of the term at
`
`124:13, Petitioner’s counsel never established what he meant by “pre-purchase
`
`processing” and never framed the question in terms of Dr. Katz’s definition or
`
`prior use of the term. Dr. Katz did not testify “that he did not even know what was
`
`meant by the term ‘pre-purchase processing,’” he testified that he did not know
`
`6
`
`
`
`what Petitioner’s counsel meant by the phrase pre-purchase processing. Ex. 1031
`
`at 190:14-20. It is unfair to claim that Dr. Katz “was not sure if Ginter’s
`
`disclosures fit his characterization of ‘pre-purchase processing’” when he was
`
`never asked the questions in that context.
`
`Petitioner asserts that “at his deposition, Dr. Katz was not sure whether
`
`debit, debit transactions, or debit processing were in the prior art or if, even today,
`
`debit cards are used to pay for goods electronically.” Motion to Exclude at 8
`
`(citing Ex. 1031 at 31:14-17, 18:1-7, 18:15-20, 30:15-19, 32:5-14, 33:5-10.). But
`
`the record shows that the questions were electronic transaction related and were
`
`generally framed in terms of what a POSITA would have known “in the prior art
`
`time period in connection with the sale of electronic content.” As noted above,
`
`Petitioner’s counsel never established whose definition of a POSITA should be
`
`used (Ex. 1031 at 180:2-6) and one of the differences between Dr. Katz’s and
`
`Petitioner’s definition is digital content distribution and/or e-commerce experience.
`
`Dr. Katz’s POSITA with such experience may have understood these payment
`
`concepts where Petitioner’s POSITA may not. The point is, without Petitioner
`
`establishing the definition for deposition purposes, Dr. Katz’s “I’m not sure”
`
`answers were accurate and do not reflect a lack of qualifications.
`
`Petitioner’s criticisms of Dr. Katz regarding Ginter’s purported “disclosure
`
`of ‘payment data’” (Motion to Exclude at 8-9) similarly suffer from a lack of
`
`7
`
`
`
`definition by Petitioner at the deposition. Dr. Katz’s definition of “payment data”
`
`differs from Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2028 ¶ 11. Petitioner never established
`
`which definition to use and never asked about “payment data” in the context of the
`
`patent claims at issue. Ex. 1031 at 179:20-180:1. Moreover, the criticism that “Dr.
`
`Katz was not sure … whether a POSITA would have understood that the
`
`“prepayments,” “credits,” “debits,” and “currency token deposit accounts” referred
`
`to in Ginter could be used to pay for a VDE object” (Motion to Exclude at 9) is
`
`unfair given that Petitioner did not define a POSITA for deposition purposes, as
`
`detailed above. Petitioner’s criticism that “Dr. Katz was unable to answer whether
`
`a POSITA would have already known ‘what activating a credit account was’”
`
`(Motion to Exclude at 10) is unfair for the same reason.
`
`Petitioner’s criticisms of Dr. Katz’s testimony on Stefik ‘235, Figure 3 miss
`
`the point. Petitioner asserts that “Dr. Katz was not sure … whether Figure 3
`
`involves accessing a desired document and payment of fees for that desired
`
`document or digital work.” Motion to Exclude at 10. Dr. Katz has been clear
`
`about why Figure 3 does not show “payment of fees”: the step 303, “User Assigns
`
`Payment of Fees,” “does not mean that any payments are actually made” given that
`
`step 303 happens before the user selects the desired document or function and thus
`
`“no fee information is known in step 303.” Ex. 2028 ¶ 24. Petitioner asserts that
`
`“Dr. Katz was not sure … what role a credit account would have in Figure 3 as that
`
`8
`
`
`
`term is used in describing Figure 3” and “whether in prior art Stefik ’235 the credit
`
`card number used in connection with the transaction in Figure 3 could be ‘payment
`
`data.’” Motion to Exclude at 10. But the cited deposition testimony generally
`
`suffers from the one or both of the definitional problems referenced above.
`
`Petitioner did not establish for deposition purposes which definition of a POSITA
`
`or which definition of “payment data” Dr. Katz was to use, thus he was “not sure.”
`
`Finally, Petitioner’s example of Dr. Katz’s “confusion about whether or not
`
`the prior art discloses certain concepts, and … willingness to adjust his testimony
`
`in unsupported ways” (Motion to Exclude at 11) mischaracterizes the record.
`
`There is nothing inconsistent with Dr. Katz testifying that Poggio “discloses
`
`payment validation data,” as he does at Ex. 1031, 13:17, but that Poggio does not
`
`disclose “payment validation data as that term is used in the claims in the present
`
`case,” as he does at id., 178:4-179:1.
`
`C. Dr. Katz Provides Relevant Testimony About Deficiencies in the
`Petition That Will Assist the Board in Understanding the
`Technical Evidence and Determining the Facts Regarding
`Patentability of the Claims at Issue.
`
`Dr. Katz provides relevant testimony about instances where the Petition
`
`incorrectly alleges the existence of claim elements in the prior art references that
`
`will help the Board to understand the technical evidence and to determine the facts
`
`regarding patentability of the claims under review. For example Dr. Katz shows
`
`that:
`
`9
`
`
`
`•
`
`Stefik ‘235 and Stefik ‘980 do not disclose, with respect to Claims 1, 2, and
`
`11, “code to read payment data from the data carrier…” because “the 00102
`
`Petition is inconsistent with regard to those elements of Stefik that it alleges
`
`correspond to the ‘data carrier.’” Dr. Katz points out that the 00102 Petition
`
`variously points to 4 different and inconsistent elements in Stefik as the “data
`
`carrier”: a “repository such as a DocuCard” (Ex. 2028 ¶ 19); a “removable card”
`
`(id. ¶ 20); “other repository communicating through external interface 1206” (id. ¶
`
`21); and a “third repository” (id.).
`
`•
`
`Stefik ‘235 and Stefik ‘980 do not disclose, with respect to Claims 1, 2, and
`
`11, “code to read payment data from the data carrier and to forward the payment
`
`data to a payment validation system” because, (i) although the 00102 Petition
`
`“alleges ‘Stefik discloses that logging in and activating a credit account grants
`
`access to read (e.g., retrieve) payment data (e.g., bank and credit account
`
`information) that is stored on the data carrier (e.g., removable card) and assign fees
`
`against the account associated with the payment data’ … there is no disclosure of
`
`what it means to ‘activate credit accounts,’ and neither the 00102 Petition nor Mr.
`
`Wechselberger clearly define what this is supposed to mean, let alone show how
`
`‘logging in and activating a credit account grants access to read (e.g., retrieve)
`
`payment data (e.g., bank and credit account information) that is stored on the data
`
`carrier (e.g., removable card)’” (Ex. 2028 ¶ 19); (ii) in Stefik the purported
`
`10
`
`
`
`assignment of fees “does not mean that any payments are actually made” given that
`
`the cited step, 303, happens before the user selects the desired document or
`
`function and thus “no fee information is known in step 303” (id. ¶ 24); and (iii) the
`
`00102 Petition’s assertion the “bank account information is later transmitted along
`
`with fee charges to a payment system” does not support “payment data read from
`
`the data carrier,” given that the Petition “does not allege that such bank account
`
`information is read from the DocuCard.” Id.
`
`•
`
`Stefik ‘235 and Stefik ‘980 do not disclose, with respect to Claims 12, 13,
`
`and 14, “reading payment data from the data carrier” and “writing the retrieved
`
`data into the data carrier” because the Petition is inconsistent with regard to
`
`elements of Stefik that it alleges correspond to the “data carrier,” such that “the
`
`data carrier in the ‘reading’ and ‘writing’ steps are not alleged to be the same.” Ex.
`
`2028 ¶ 26.
`
`•
`
`Stefik ‘235, Stefik ‘980, and Poggio do not disclose, with respect to Claim 2,
`
`“code to transmit at least a portion of the payment validation data …” because the
`
`Petition is inconsistent as to elements of Stefik that it alleges correspond to
`
`“payment validation data;” citing both “billing information” and “”acceptance of
`
`assigned fees” but not stating “how ‘billing information’ corresponds to
`
`‘acceptance of fees’ or vice versa.” Ex. 2028 ¶ 28.
`
`11
`
`
`
`•
`
`Stefik ‘235, Stefik ‘980, and Poggio do not disclose, with respect to Claim 2,
`
`“code to transmit at least a portion of the payment validation data to the data
`
`supplier or to a destination received from the data supplier” because even though
`
`the Petition alleges “Stefik … discloses examples in which the credit server to
`
`which both repositories in a transaction report the validation data” and “repository
`
`1 and 2 each generate billing information for the access which is transmitted to a
`
`credit server,” Stefik actually shows that “each repository transmits billing
`
`information to a separate credit server.” Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 29-30.
`
`•
`
`Stefik ‘235, Stefik ‘980, and Poggio do not disclose, with respect to Claim 2,
`
`“code to transmit at least a portion of the payment validation data to the data
`
`supplier” because, although the Petition asserts that Poggio discloses “The data
`
`access terminal (e.g., virtual vending machine) transmits payment validation data
`
`(e.g., indication from the electronic banking network signifying successful
`
`completion of the payment transaction) received from the payment validation
`
`system (e.g., electronic banking network) to a data supplier (e.g., web server;
`
`vending information database),” the Petition “does not supply any analysis of how
`
`this is shown.” Ex. 2028 ¶ 31.
`
`•
`
`Stefik ‘235, Stefik ‘980, and Poggio do not disclose, with respect to Claims
`
`13 and 14, “transmitting at least a portion of the payment validation data to the
`
`data supplier” because the Petition relies on the same Stefik ‘980 and Poggio
`
`12
`
`
`
`citations as for the similar element in Claim 2, the deficiencies of which are
`
`discussed above. Ex. 2028 ¶ 34.
`
`•
`
`Ginter does not disclose, with respect to Claims 1, 2 and 11, “code to read
`
`payment data from the data carrier and to forward the payment data to a payment
`
`validation system” because the 00103 Petition cites to Ginter’s “audit information”
`
`as the claimed “payment data,” but it cannot be. Ginter states that “the
`
`clearinghouse may analyze the contained audit information to determine whether it
`
`indicates misuse of the applicable VDE object 300”, which indicates that “audit
`
`information is for tracking post-usage information, not current purchase
`
`information.” Ex. 2028 ¶ 35-36.
`
`•
`
`Ginter does not disclose, with respect to Claims 1, 2 and 11, “code to receive
`
`payment validation data from the payment validation system” because “an
`
`administrative response” cannot be the “payment validation data” as the Petition
`
`asserts and is contradicted elsewhere in the Petition. Ex. 2028 ¶ 37. The cited
`
`section “does not describe purchases, nor does the 00103 Petition explain why
`
`absent the disclosure of purchases an administrative reply itself would render a
`
`purchase obvious.” Ex. 2028 ¶ 38.
`
`•
`
`Ginter does not disclose, with respect to Claims 1, 2 and 11, “code
`
`responsive to the payment validation data to retrieve data from the data supplier
`
`and to write the retrieved data into the data carrier,” because “the cited section
`
`13
`
`
`
`(162:38-61) does not relate to audit information, as alleged, or disclose this
`
`limitation.” Ex. 2028 ¶ 39.
`
`•
`
`Ginter does not disclose, with respect to Claim 2, “code to transmit at least a
`
`portion of the payment validation data to the data supplier or to a destination
`
`received from the data supplier” because although the Petition points to “the
`
`administrative response” corresponding to “payment validation data,” the Petition
`
`“does not describe how the cited text [from Ginter] corresponds to ‘administrative
`
`responses’ or transmitting at least a portion of the administrative responses to the
`
`data supplier or to a destination received from the data supplier.” Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 41-
`
`42.
`
`•
`
`The Petition “changes the principle of operation of Ginter” and does so “in
`
`hindsight using the claims as a model” and does not show that it would have been
`
`obvious to do so. Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 37, 43, 44, 47.
`
`•
`
`Ginter does not disclose, with respect to Claim 12, “reading payment data
`
`from the data carrier” and “forwarding the payment data to a payment validation
`
`system” because the Petition alleges that the payment data corresponds to “audit
`
`information” in Ginter but the Petition has not shown that such post-usage “audit
`
`information” which is analyzed “to determine whether it indicates misuse of the
`
`applicable VDE object 300” corresponds to “payment data.” Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 46, 47.
`
`14
`
`
`
`•
`
`Ginter does not disclose, with respect to Claims 13 and 14, “transmitting at
`
`least a portion of the payment validation data to the data supplier” because the
`
`Petition relies on the same Ginter citations as for the similar element in Claim 2,
`
`the deficiencies of which are discussed above. Ex. 2028 ¶ 49.
`
`As can be seen from the above synopsis, Dr. Katz’s declaration testimony is
`
`relevant and will help the Board understand the technical evidence showing
`
`deficiencies in the Petition’s application of the subject prior art and determine the
`
`facts regarding patentability of the claims under review. It should not be excluded.
`
`D.
`
`Patent Owner’s References to and Reliance on Dr. Katz’s
`Testimony in Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 26) Should Not be
`Excluded.
`
`Because Dr. Katz is qualified and his declaration is admissible, the Board
`
`should not exclude any reference to, or reliance on, Dr. Katz’s declaration in Patent
`
`Owner’s Response (Paper 26).
`
`III. Conclusion
`For these reasons, Patent Owner Smartflash, LLC respectfully requests that
`
`the Board not exclude Exhibit 2028 (Declaration of Jonathan Katz, Ph.D. in
`
`Support of Patent Owner’s Response to Petition), or any reference to or reliance on
`
`Dr. Katz’s declaration in Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 26).
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: May 26, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/ Michael R. Casey /
`
`Michael R. Casey
`Registration No. 40,294
`Davidson Berquist Jackson & Gowdey, LLP
`8300 Greensboro Drive
`Suite 500
`McLean, VA 22102
`Telephone: (571) 765-7705
`Fax: (571) 765-7200
`Email: mcasey@dbjg.com
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that this PATENT OWNER’S
`
`OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.62 AND 42.64 in CBM2014-00102 was served today, by
`
`agreement of the parties by emailing a copy to counsel for the Petitioner as
`
`follows:
`
`
`
`J. Steven Baughman (steven.baughman@ropesgray.com)
`Ching-Lee Fukuda (ching-lee.fukuda@ropesgray.com)
`Megan Raymond (megan.raymond@ropesgray.com)
`ApplePTABService-SmartFlash@ropesgray.com
`Ropes & Gray LLP
`
`
` /
`
` Michael R. Casey /
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`Michael R. Casey
`Registration No. 40,294
`Davidson Berquist Jackson & Gowdey, LLP
`8300 Greensboro Drive
`Suite 500
`McLean, VA 22102
`Telephone: (571) 765-7705
`Fax: (571) 765-7200
`Email: mcasey@dbjg.com
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`
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`
`
`Dated: May 26, 2015
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`
`
`17
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