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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`EBAY INC. AND GSI COMMERCE SOLUTIONS, INC.
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`LANDMARK TECHNOLOGIES LLC
`Patent Owner
`____________________
`
`Case CBM2014-00026
`U.S. Patent No. 5,576,951
`____________________
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`
`LANDMARK’S PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
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`

`

`
`
`
`i
`
`Table of Contents
`
`CBM2014-00026
`
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`2.
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`Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iv
`I.
`The Board should not institute covered business methods review of
`the 5,576,951 Patent. ...................................................................................... 1
`Overview of the ’951 Patent ........................................................................... 6
`II.
`III. The Petitioners lack standing to petition for CBM review. ............................ 9
`A.
`The Petition provided no evidence that GSI is obligated to
`indemnify iRobot. .................................................................................. 9
`Landmark’s letter requesting a dialog with eBay did not
`create declaratory judgment standing. ................................................. 14
`Proper consideration of the state-of-the-art in the early
`1980s shows that the ’951 Patent falls into the technological
`invention exception. ............................................................................ 15
`IV. The Petition failed to show that the applied references qualify as
`prior art. ........................................................................................................ 19
`A.
`The effective filing date of the claims is May 24, 1984, and
`Mr. Lockwood’s § 131 evidence and declaration establish a
`date of invention as early as the Summer of 1982. ............................. 20
`1.
`The Petition ignored the evidence Mr. Lockwood
`provided during original prosecution that established
`benefit to May 24, 1984. .......................................................... 20
`The Petition ignored Mr. Lockwood’s § 131 evidence
`and declaration that establish a date of invention as
`early as the Summer of 1982. .................................................. 23
`The Reed and Johnson references have been antedated. .................... 24
`Even if Reed qualified under §102(e), it is not eligible under
`the CBM rules. .................................................................................... 24
`The Petition did not establish that Shortliffe, Johnson,
`Gordon, and EMYCIN are prior art references. .................................. 26
`The Petition failed to present proper claim construction as
`statutorily required. ....................................................................................... 31
`A.
`The Petition failed to properly define a person having
`ordinary skill at the time of the invention (POSA). ............................ 32
`
`B.
`C.
`
`D.
`
`V.
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`

`

`
`
`
`B.
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`C.
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`CBM2014-00026
`
`
`ii
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`The Petition incorrectly construed the claims under BRI
`even though the ’951 Patent expired two weeks after the
`Petition was filed. ................................................................................ 38
`The Petition did not provide any evidence of how a POSA
`would have understood the claim terms, resulting in an
`unsupported and improper claim construction. ................................... 39
`The Petition failed to perform the required two-step analysis
`to construe means-plus-function elements and to consider
`the ’951 Patent’s algorithms to construe computer-
`implemented functions, resulting in an improper claim
`construction. ........................................................................................ 40
`VI. The claims of the ’951 Patent satisfy the definiteness requirement
`and are nonobvious. ...................................................................................... 44
`A.
`The Petition failed to meet the minimal showing required to
`institute trial of the challenged claims for indefiniteness
`under the “more likely than not” standard. ......................................... 45
`1.
`The ’951 Patent provides a POSA extensive support
`for “means for interrelating said textual and graphical
`information,” which is not “insolubly ambiguous.” ................ 46
`The ’951 Patent provided a POSA extensive support
`for “indicating means for indicating a pathway that
`accesses information related in one of said entry path
`means to information accessible in another one of said
`entry path means,” which is not “insolubly
`ambiguous.” ............................................................................. 49
`The Petition failed to provide the threshold showing that the
`claims are “more likely than not” obvious. ......................................... 51
`1.
`The Petition failed to provide a showing that it
`satisfied the four Graham factors. ........................................... 52
`(a)
`The Petition failed to consider the scope of the
`claims before applying the alleged prior art,
`failing to satisfy the first and second Graham
`factors. ........................................................................... 53
`The Petition failed to define a POSA, failing to
`satisfy the third Graham factor. ..................................... 54
`The Petition failed to consider the objective
`indicia of nonobviousness, failing to satisfy the
`fourth Graham factor. .................................................... 54
`
`D.
`
`B.
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`2.
`
`(b)
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`(c)
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`

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`(d)
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`(b)
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`(c)
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`CBM2014-00026
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`
`iii
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`The Petition failed to provide a showing that
`the references are obvious to combine, resulting
`in a fatally flawed obviousness analysis under
`Graham. ......................................................................... 56
`The Petition failed to provide a showing that it
`satisfied the analysis outlined in KSR. ..................................... 59
`(a)
`The Petition failed to provide a showing that
`the references are analogous. ......................................... 60
`The Petition failed to provide a showing that
`the disparate and non-analogous references
`would be combined absent impermissible
`hindsight. ....................................................................... 63
`The Petition failed to provide a showing that
`the disparate and non-analogous references
`would be combined without changing the
`principle of operation of at least one reference. ............ 64
`The Petition’s five rationales for combining the
`references are fatally flawed. ................................................... 65
`VII. The additional shortcomings of the Petition should provide no
`incentive for the Board to cure such deficiencies. ........................................ 67
`A.
`The Petition failed to provide adequate notice to the Board
`how certain claims are unpatentable as required by 37
`C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(4). ......................................................................... 68
`The Petition failed to identify all related matters, including
`matters Petitioners themselves filed violating 37 C.F.R. §
`42.8(b)(2). ............................................................................................ 69
`VIII. Conclusion and Relief Requested ................................................................. 71
`
`
`2.
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`3.
`
`B.
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`

`

`
`
`
`iv
`
`Table of Authorities
`
`CBM2014-00026
`
`
`Cases
`ABB Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC.,
`635 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011)............................................................................ 12
`AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2007).................................................................... passim
`Already v. Nike,
`133 S.Ct. 721 (2013) ............................................................................................ 14
`Arris Group, Inc. v. British Telecommunications,
`639 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011)............................................................... 11, 12, 13
`Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.,
`846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).............................................................................. 12
`ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc.,
`159 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1998).............................................................................. 63
`Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus Inc.,
`715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013).............................................................................. 45
`Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse,
`170 U.S. 537 (1898) ........................................................................................ 6, 17
`CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc.,
`584 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ................................................................. 30
`Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods.,
`291 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2002)............................................................................ 28
`Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffery-Allan Industries, Inc.,
`807 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1986).............................................................................. 34
`DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,
`567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009)............................................................................ 64
`Enzo Biochem. Inc. v. Applera Corp.,
`599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010)............................................................................ 53
`Finisar Crop. v. DirecTV Grp.,
`523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................... 41, 42
`Function Media v. Google,
`708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013)............................................................................ 45
`Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`355 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................ 40
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .............................................................................. 32, 37, 52, 62
`Honeywell Int’l. Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`341 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003)............................................................................ 53
`In re Aoyama,
`656 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................... 40, 41, 42
`In re Clay,
`966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992).............................................................................. 61
`
`

`

`v
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`CBM2014-00026
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`
`
`In re De Blauwe,
`736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)......................................................................... 9, 29
`In re Geisler,
`116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997).............................................................................. 1
`In re Gorman,
`933 F.2d 982 (Fed. Cir. 1991).............................................................................. 63
`In re GPAC Inc.,
`57 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).............................................................................. 34
`In re Huang,
`100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996)......................................................................... 9, 29
`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006).............................................................................. 52
`In re Klein,
`647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................... 60, 61
`In re Lister,
`583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................... 28, 30
`In Re Ratti,
`270 F.2d 810 (C.C.P.A. 1959) ............................................................................. 64
`In re Schulze,
`346 F.2d 600 (C.C.P.A. 1965) ............................................................................... 1
`In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,
`603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................... 32, 39
`In re Wyer,
`655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ............................................................................. 30
`In re Yamamoto,
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984)............................................................................ 38
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) .......................................................................... 52, 59, 62, 64
`Leo Pharmaceutical v. Rea,
`726 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..................................................................... 54, 63
`Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co., Inc.,
`605 F.Supp. 1362 (D. Del. 1985) ......................................................................... 29
`Medimmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc.,
`549 U.S. 118 (2007) ................................................................................ 10, 14, 15
`Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Johnson & Johnson,
`976 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1992)............................................................................ 55
`Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co.,
`332 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1964) ................................................................................. 62
`Neutrino Dev’t Corp. v. Sonosite Inc.,
`337 F.Supp.2d 942 (S.D. Tex. 2004) ................................................................... 29
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................... 32, 33, 37, 39
`
`

`

`CBM2014-00026
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`
`vi
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`
`
`Power MOSFET Techs., LLC v. Siemens AG,
`378 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................ 53
`Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,
`234 F.3d 654 (Fed. Cir. 2000).............................................................................. 34
`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc.,
`127 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997)............................................................................ 15
`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc.,
`511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................... 28, 29
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ........................................................................................................ 27
`35 U.S.C. § 102(a) ................................................................................................... 25
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................................................................................................... 25
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) ................................................................................................... 25
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ........................................................................................ 4, 30, 51
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ............................................................................................. 4, 36, 56
`35 U.S.C. § 322 ................................................................................................... 4, 39
`35 U.S.C. § 324(a) .............................................................................................. 4, 31
`35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(2) .......................................................................................... 4, 31
`35 U.S.C. § 326(b) ................................................................................................... 32
`AIA §18(a)(1)(B) ...................................................................................................4, 9
`AIA §18(a)(1)(C) .............................................................................................. 25, 26
`AIA §18(a)(1)(C)(i) ................................................................................................. 25
`AIA §18(a)(1)(C)(ii) ................................................................................................ 25
`Other Authorities
`157 Cong. Rec. S1379.............................................................................................. 25
`77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48763 (Aug. 14, 2012) .......................................... 1, 17, 26, 39
`Rules
`Fed.R.Evid. 901 ......................................................................................................... 4
`Fed.R.Evid. 902 ....................................................................................................... 27
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) ......................................................................................... 5, 68
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22 ..................................................................................................... 30
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) ............................................................................................ 37
`37 C.F.R. § 42.62 ................................................................................................ 4, 27
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) ...................................................................................... 4, 33, 39
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) .............................................................................................. 38
`37 C.F.R. § 42.208(c) ................................................................................................. 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.223(c) ........................................................................................ 10, 27
`37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b) ......................................................................................... 4, 38
`37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) ............................................................................................... 15
`37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) ................................................................................. 16, 17, 19
`
`

`

`Vii
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`CBM2014-00026
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`CBM2014-00026
`vii
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`
`
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) .............................................................................................4, 9
`37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) .............................................................................................4, 9
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) ............................................................................................... 16
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) ............................................................................................... 16
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(2) ............................................................................... 4, 24, 26
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(2) ............................................................................... 4, 24, 26
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(3) ......................................................................... 4, 31, 40, 42
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(3) ......................................................................... 4, 31, 40, 42
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(4) ..................................................................................... 4, 46
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(4) ..................................................................................... 4, 46
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(5) ............................................................................... 4, 37, 39
`37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(5) ............................................................................... 4, 37, 39
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`I.
`
`CBM2014-00026
`1
`
`
`The Board should not institute covered business methods review of the
`5,576,951 Patent.
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`The Petition fails to meet the basic threshold required to institute covered
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`business methods review, such that the Petition “demonstrate[s] that it is more
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`likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is
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`unpatentable.”1 Assertions made in the Petition must be factually supported.
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`Otherwise, they have no probative value and should be disregarded. As the Office
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`Trial Practice Guide explains: “[t]he Board expects that most petitions and motions
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`will rely upon affidavits of experts.”2 Arguments of counsel cannot take the place
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`of evidence in the record.3
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`The Petition fails to provide any evidence supporting its assertion that there
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`is standing to file this Petition. Aside from the fact that all of the claims of the ’951
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`Patent fall into the technological invention exception because the claims recite
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`novel technical features, Petitioners were not threatened or sued by Landmark. Yet,
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`Petitioners attempt to assert standing based on two flawed theories: (1) an alleged
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`indemnification clause from an iRobot license that GSI failed to submit into
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`evidence and (2) an informative letter from Landmark that allegedly established
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`1 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(c).
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`2 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48763 (Aug. 14, 2012).
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`3 See In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Geisler, 116
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`F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An assertion of what seems to follow from
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`common experience is just attorney argument and not … factual evidence . . . .”).
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`

`

`
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`declaratory judgment jurisdiction against eBay. Both theories fail since (1) GSI
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`CBM2014-00026
`
`2
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`provided the Board absolutely no evidence of the alleged indemnification clause
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`and (2) the informative letter tracks the language of the letter in SRI which the
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`Federal Circuit found insufficient to establish a threat allowing for declaratory
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`judgment action. These deficiencies are not remediable.
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`Even if standing is found, institution should be denied for least two reasons.
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`First, Reed and Johnson are not available as prior art. Reed is ineligible in a CBM
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`as a §102(e) reference, and the §131 declarations and evidence from prior
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`proceedings antedate Johnson. Second, the Petition has not provided any evidence
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`indicating when Johnson, Shortliffe, Gordon, and EMYCIN were publicly
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`available.
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`In addition, the Petition includes many statutory deficiencies resulting in
`
`irreparable defects. For example, the Petition failed to properly define a POSA,
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`which is the objective baseline for claim construction, definiteness, and
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`obviousness analysis. Also, the Petition includes at least three claim construction
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`deficiencies: it failed to use the correct claim construction standard; it failed to
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`provide any evidence to support its claim construction; and it failed to properly
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`construe the means-plus-function claim elements of the ’951 Patent.
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`Moreover, all claimed features are definite and nonobvious. The Lockwood
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`’631 Patent directed to automated sales and services systems for data processing
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`cannot be combined with disparate and experimental expert systems. As discussed
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`

`

`
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`in prior reexamination proceedings, the applied references teach away from any
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`CBM2014-00026
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`3
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`combination with the Lockwood ’631 Patent. But even if combined, they would
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`result in an inoperable system or change in the principle of operation of the
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`systems. And such a combination would not teach bi-directional communication to
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`provide data during forward- and backward-chaining described in the ’951 Patent.
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`Finally, the Petition disregards many of the rules defining these proceedings.
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`For example, the Petition failed to give notice why certain claims were
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`unpatentable. And the Petition failed to inform the Board of other related
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`proceedings, including proceedings filed by Petitioners themselves.
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`As the Board has previously stated in denying 196 grounds of
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`unpatentability for similar statutory deficiencies and evidentiary gaps in a petition:
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`[W]e resolve all vagueness and ambiguity in Petitioner’s
`arguments against the Petitioner. . . . it is the responsibility of the
`Petitioner to clearly articulate it. It would be unfair to expect the
`Patent Owner to conjure up arguments against its own patent and just
`as inappropriate for the Board to take the side of the Petitioner to
`salvage an inadequately expressed ground proposing an alternative
`rationale. We recommend that all petitioners clearly express and
`explain their positions, especially on precisely how the teachings of
`multiple references are used in combination to meet a claim feature.
`We also recommend that all petitioners clearly state what the
`differences are between the subject matter claimed in a claim alleged
`as obvious over prior art, and the prior art.4
`
`4 CBM2012-00003, Paper 8, pp. 14-15 (emphasis added.)
`
`

`

`
`
`
`4
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`CBM2014-00026
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`In summary, the Board should not institute CBM review because the Petition
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`suffers from at least the following violations and deficiencies:
`
`Deficiency in Petition
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`Statute or Regulation Violated
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`1. The Petition failed to provide evidence
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` AIA, § 18(a)(1)(B)
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`the Petitioners were “charged with
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` 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a)
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`infringement.”
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`2. The Petition relied on references outside
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` 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(2)
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`of the scope of CBM.
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`3. The Petition failed to provide evidence
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` Fed.R.Evid. 901
`
`that the references are prior art.
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` 37 C.F.R. § 42.62
`
`4. The Petition failed to provide a complete
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` 35 U.S.C. §§ 324(a), 326(a)(2)
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`claim construction.
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` 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(3)
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`5. The Petition failed to correctly define a
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` 35 U.S.C. §§ 103 and 112
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`“POSA.”
`
`6. The Petition failed to provide evidence
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` 35 U.S.C. § 322
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`supporting its claim construction and
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` 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.65(a),
`
`definiteness analysis.
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`42.304(b)(5)
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`7. The Petition failed to use the proper
`
` 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b)
`
`claim construction standard.
`
`8. The Petition failed to give proper notice
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` 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(4)
`
`about how the claims are unpatentable.
`
`

`

`
`
`Deficiency in Petition
`
`5
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`CBM2014-00026
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`Statute or Regulation Violated
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`9. The Petition failed to identify all related
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` 37 C.F.R. § 42.8.(b)(2)
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`matters.
`
`

`

`
`
`II. Overview of the ’951 Patent
`The Lockwood Family of Patents are pioneering patents protecting novel
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`6
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`CBM2014-00026
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`automated sales and services technology Mr. Lockwood diligently developed
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`beginning in the 1970s.5 The Supreme Court has recognized that the “term
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`‘pioneer patent’ signifies that the invention has been followed by others. A pioneer
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`patent does not slow down, but opens, the door for subsequent invention.”6 Since
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`the issuance of the ’951 Patent, it has appeared as a prior art citation on the face of
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`more than 350 subsequently issued patents7–more citations against future
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`applications than over 90% of all other issued U.S. patents. Such a high number of
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`citations demonstrates that U.S. Patent No. 5,576,951 (“the ’951 Patent”) has
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`achieved pioneering status in the field of automated sales and services systems.
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`During original prosecution of the ’951 and ’508 Patents8 almost no non-
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`Lockwood prior art was cited against the claims, further demonstrating their
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`pioneering status. Rather, the Office relied primarily on either Mr. Lockwood’s
`
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`5 Pioneer is defined by Webster as “a person or group that originates or helps
`
`open up a new line of thought or activity or a new method or technical
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`development.” Ex. 2015.
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`6 Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 574 (1898).
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`7 Ex. 2017.
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`8 U.S. Patent 7,070,508 is a sibling patent of the ’951 Patent. See Patent
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`Owner’s Mandatory Notices, p. 2.
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`

`

`
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`’631 Patent and §112 to reject the claims. These rejections were overcome, and
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`CBM2014-00026
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`7
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`more importantly the claims of the ’508 Patent passed the Board’s scrutiny twice
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`during prosecution.
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`The Petition followed several attempts to invalidate Mr. Lockwood’s patents
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`that included similar grounds.9 The Petition also contained statements and
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`innuendo about the candor of the Patent Owner in dealings with the Office in
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`prosecution his patent applications and defending the reexaminations. Patent
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`Owner will not respond in this document because to do so would be
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`counterproductive and would deviate from the express language and spirit of the
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`rules surrounding the POPR.
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`As with the previous attempts, the Petition relied on the Lockwood ’631
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`Patent as the primary basis for unpatentability. It attempted to combine the
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`automated sales and services technology of the Lockwood ’631 Patent with niche
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`technologies within the esoteric field of artificial intelligence known as “expert
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`systems.” Closed and static, expert systems were considered “experimental”
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`technologies in the early 1980s. Doctorate-level researchers in artificial
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`intelligence were developing expert systems at places like Stanford University and
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`General Electric’s Corporate R&D department. These systems were designed to
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`solve discrete problems in discrete subject areas, e.g., locomotive repair, auditing,
`
`
`9 90/012,641, 90/012,685, and 90/012,671 all filed by eBay in 2012. In all,
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`13 reexaminations have been filed against the Lockwood Family of Patents.
`
`

`

`
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`medical diagnosis, etc. These researchers were experts in the fields of artificial
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`CBM2014-00026
`
`8
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`intelligence and expert systems.
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`Expert systems used specialized software to capture the knowledge of a
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`human expert. Expert systems were used to solve domain-specific, complex
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`problems using the captured knowledge. For example, the knowledge of a
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`dermatologist could be implemented in an expert system to analyze symptoms to
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`diagnose skin conditions. Capturing and representing the knowledge in software
`
`were essential activities for building expert systems.
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`Lockwood’s ’951 Patent is directed to automated sales and services systems,
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`not expert systems. The Patent uses forward and backward chaining to drive
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`interactions with a user seeking to interact with a service provider, such as a
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`customer seeking an insurance quote. The Patent accesses dynamic data, such as
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`credit scores, from a remote system over a network connection. In contrast to
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`expert systems, the ’951 Patent: (1) has no need to capture and represent an
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`expert’s knowledge; (2) is not limited to complex problems in a complex domain;
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`(3) is not intended solely for use by experts; and (4) is not an experimental research
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`tool.
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`In sum, Mr. Lockwood pioneered technology that allowed consumers to
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`apply for and receive products and services using a network of remote terminals,
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`which was far removed from the field of expert systems.
`
`

`

`
`
`III. The Petitioners lack standing to petition for CBM review.
`The Petitioners lack standing for CBM review. Neither eBay nor GSI has
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`9
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`CBM2014-00026
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`been sued or charged with infringement. 10 And, the ’951 Patent falls into the
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`technological invention exception. For at least these reasons, the Board should
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`deny institution.
`
`A. The Petition provided no evidence that GSI is obligated to
`indemnify iRobot.
`
`The Petition stated that GSI’s alleged obligation to indemnify its customer
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`iRobot provided standing to file a CBM petition. (Pet. 3.) But the Petition failed to
`
`provide evidence11 of an indemnification contract or any connection between the
`
`iRobot litigation and GSI’s systems and software. Without more, the Petition has
`
`provided nothing that indicates a substantial controversy exists between GSI and
`
`
`10 “A person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect
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`to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in
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`interest or privy . . . has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA,
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`Sec. 18(a)(1)(B). “Charged with infringement means a real and substantial
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`controversy regarding infringement of a covered business method patent exists
`
`such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action
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`in Federal court.” 37 C.F.R. §42.302(a).
`
`11 See, e.g., In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139–40 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re De
`
`Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
`
`

`

`
`
`Landmark.12 If such evidence exists, it should have been submitted with the
`
`10
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`CBM2014-00026
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`Petition.13
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`No evidence was provided to the Board of either an explicit indemnification
`
`agreement or the basis for an implicit indemnification obligation. Yet the Petition
`
`stated, “GSI is obligated to indemnify iRobot Corporation for accusation(s) of
`
`patent infringement related to iRobot’s use of GSI’s products” (Pet. 3), without
`
`citing a single piece of evidence illustrating this obligation.14 The Petition was
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`silent regarding the basis for the alleged “obligation to indemnify.”(Pet. 3.) If
`
`jurisdiction was based on a contractual obligation to indemnify iRobot, GSI didn’t
`
`provide any evidence establishing the existence of the contract. If jurisdiction was
`
`based on an inferred obligation, GSI didn’t provide any evidence to indicate that its
`
`