`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`______________
`
`AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL
`RELATED SERVICES COMPANY, INC., EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM LP,
`HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, HOTWIRE, INC., ORBITZ WORLDWIDE, INC.,
`PRICELINE.COM, INC., TRAVELOCITY.COM LP, and YAHOO! INC.
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`METASEARCH SYSTEMS, LLC,
`Patent Owner
`______________
`
`Case CBM2014-00001
`Patent 8,326,924 B1
`______________
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`
`
`
`
`CBM2014-00001
`Patent 8,326,924
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`PATENT OWNER DEFENDS IMAGINED CLAIMS .................................. 1
`II.
`III. SECTION 101: ALICE CORP. SUPPORTS
`THE BOARD’S PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION ................................ 4
`IV. CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE UNDER SECTION 103 ......................... 7
`A.
`Imagined Limitations Cannot Distinguish Prior Art ............................. 7
`B. Knowledge Broker Discloses A Metasearch Engine ............................ 8
`C. Knowledge Broker And Mamma.com
`Are Similar In Technology And Application ......................................11
`Combining Advertising With Knowledge Broker Was Natural .........12
`D.
`THE BOARD NEED NOT CONSTRUE “METASEARCHING” ..............14
`V.
`VI. DR. ETZIONI’S TESTIMONY DOES NOT HELP THESE CLAIMS .......14
`VII. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................15
`
`i
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CBM2014-00001
`Patent 8,326,924
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`Page
`
`Cases
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)............................................................................... 4, 5, 6, 7
`Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
`133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)............................................................................................ 7
`buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
`No. 2013-1575, 2014 WL 4337771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 2014)................................ 7
`CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 7
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ......................................................................................................1, 4
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ......................................................................................................1, 7
`
`
`
`ii
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`
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`CBM2014-00001
`Patent 8,326,924
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Patent Owner’s Response does not overcome the prima facie case for
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`invalidity established by Petitioner. Patent Owner’s Response fails to address the
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`claims as written, mischaracterizes the prior art, and advances irrelevant
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`arguments. Accordingly, the Board should find the challenged claims unpatentable
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`under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 103.
`
`II.
`
`PATENT OWNER DEFENDS IMAGINED CLAIMS
`Patent Owner imagines patent claims with multiple limitations not actually
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`required by the challenged claims. Patent Owner does not seek a BRI requiring
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`these supposed limitations, or try to justify such a BRI. Instead, it merely presents
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`patentability arguments that assume such limitations are in the claims—and dreams
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`up advantages supposedly attributable to these imagined claim limitations. That
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`these imagined limitations are nowhere in the claims was confirmed in the cross
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`examination of Dr. Carbonell, Patent Owner’s expert. Time and again, Dr.
`
`Carbonell readily conceded that a feature Patent Owner assumes is in the claim, is
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`not required by the claim. Two examples illustrate. First, no challenged claim
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`requires purchasing or e-commerce, but Patent Owner’s Response (hereinafter
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`“PO’s Response” or “POR”) defends the claims by referring to purchasing more
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`than 30 times and e-commerce more than 40 times. Second, no claim requires
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`searching heterogeneous information sources, but PO’s Response more than 25
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`Patent 8,326,924
`times refers to this as a supposedly key element of the allegedly claimed invention.
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`Dr. Carbonell admitted that claim 2 did not require these two features or any
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`of the following features (and his conclusions apply equally to claims 6 and 8)—
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`each of which PO’s Response discusses as if required by the claims:
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`Specific Hardware: Contrary to PO’s Response (pp. 1 & 51), the claims do
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`not require the metasearch engine to be “specific hardware components” or a
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`“computer component.” On the contrary, the metasearch engine is information that
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`executes on a hardware device, and a computer does not execute on a hardware
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`device. (Ex. 1041 at 66:16-68:8.) The specification further explains the “hardware”
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`is not anything “specific,” and has no limits beyond whatever is “suitable.” (E.g.,
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`Ex. 2001 at 97:33-53; 98:7-27.)
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`Specific Host: Contrary to PO’s Response (pp. 11-13, 39, 43, 52 & 60), the
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`claims do not require any of the plural hosts to be a Web site, or a search engine, or
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`an e-commerce site, or a database, or “populated by a spidering process.” (Ex.
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`1041 at 81:13-83:25.) Rather, the claims require only that a host “provide access to
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`information to be searched.”
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`Specific Information: Contrary to PO’s Response (pp. 10-14, 37, 42, 44, 49,
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`51-53 & 62), the claims do not require that the “information” accessible at the
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`hosts be “structured,” “semistructured,” unstructured, or “heterogeneous” (Ex.
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`1041 at 83:20-84:18; 86:1-16), or “dynamic,” “current, up-to-date, and complete,”
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`or relate to “items in rapidly changing markets,” or contain “current product
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`availability and pricing information” (id. at 84:19-85:25). All the claims require is
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`that it is “information to be searched.”
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`Reformatting: Contrary to PO’s Response (pp. 45-49), the claims do not
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`require requests, queries or results to have any particular format (e.g., structured,
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`semistructured, or unstructured) or that they be reformatted into an “entirely
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`different syntax,” or otherwise, in the claimed method. (Ex. 1041 at 74:1-77:15;
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`88:24-89:14; 90:10-91:9.)
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`Purchasing: Contrary to PO’s Response (pp. 10-13, 16, 37-39, 42-44, 49, 55-
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`56, 59 & 63), the claims do not require a purchase, e-commerce, or the
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`“capabilities of an e-commerce site.” (See Ex. 1042 ¶ 36.) As Dr. Carbonell
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`conceded, it is possible to order a free item; the “item” could, for example, be a
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`free travel brochure. (Ex. 1041 at 87:7-23.)
`
`In sum, virtually nothing PO’s Response says or assumes about the
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`challenged claims is correct. They are not, for instance, “directed towards a
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`comprehensive process for accessing information from numerous heterogeneous
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`information sources with the most current pricing information in order to facilitate
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`the purchase of an item . . . .” (POR 37-38.) Nor do they “claim a novel
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`technological solution of metasearching heterogeneous information sources (e.g.,
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`unstructured, semistructured, and structured data) across webpages and e-
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`commerce sites to facilitate the purchase of an item . . . .” (Id. at 39.)
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`III. SECTION 101: ALICE CORP. SUPPORTS THE
`BOARD’S PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION
`The Board should declare these claims unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`because (1) Alice Corp. reaffirmed the legal analysis the Board applied in its initial
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`determination and (2) Patent Owner has failed to address the actual claims being
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`challenged or otherwise rebut the prima facie showing of unpatentability.
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`Claims 2, 6 and 8 are directed to the abstract idea of “marketing an item on a
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`metasearch Web site with keyword ads and some way to order the item.” (Corr’d
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`Pet. (Paper 20) 12-13, 23-25 & 43-45.) Patent Owner acknowledges Petitioner’s
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`following position but has no answer for it: “because the remaining limitations are
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`directed to metasearching, they cannot meaningfully limit an abstract idea in the
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`field of metasearching.” (POR 41.) As the Board concluded in its Institution
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`Decision, the scope of these claims is limited only by conventional, general
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`purpose computer functions (Paper 29 at 17-18), which cannot render the abstract
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`idea patent eligible. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352
`
`(2014) (“merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that
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`abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”).
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`Computer elements are “conventional” (or generic) if the function performed
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`is a basic function of the computer, such as electronic recordkeeping, obtaining
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`data, adjusting account balances, and issuing automated instructions, or, if “the
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`process could be ‘carried out in existing computers long in use.’” Id. at 2357. Here,
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`although the claims do not require a computer, the claim-recited steps use
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`functions basic to conventional computers in 1999. (Cf. Ex. 1041 at 93:13-94:16
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`(Dr. Carbonell testified a conventional Unix server in 1998 could have performed
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`the method of claim 2).) All of these claim-recited steps were just as conventional
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`as those “obtaining data,” etc. conventional-computer functions identified in Alice
`
`Corp.: receiving and sending requests for information, processing such requests,
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`and receiving and sending responses to such requests. Considering the steps “as an
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`ordered combination” here adds nothing to this analysis.
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`Patent Owner argues that a computer is required because a travel agent
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`working manually could not work fast enough to purchase at the current price an
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`item with a rapidly changing price. (POR 51-52.) There are at least two problems
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`with this argument. First, it imagines a fictional claim. Second, it would be
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`irrelevant even if true. The claims still would amount to nothing more than an
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`instruction on how to apply an abstract idea “using some unspecified, generic
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`computer.” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2360. In Alice Corp., “the claimed method
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`require[d] the use of a computer,” id. at 2359, but only for conventional computer
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`functions.
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`Patent Owner’s arguments that the claims are patent eligible rely on
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`imaginary claim limitations, made-up solutions, and disclosures in the patent
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`written description rather than the claims themselves. Patent Owner’s declaration
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`that the claims provide a “technical” or “technological solution” is exemplary,
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`(POR 43-47), and problematic for three reasons. First, PO’s Response conflates the
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`claims with the specification, and bases its “technical solution” argument on
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`(results-only) embodiments in the specification. Second, there is no plausible
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`argument that these claims recite an improvement in the functioning of a computer.
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`Cf. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (“The method claims do not, for example,
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`purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an
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`improvement in any other technology or technical field.” (citations omitted)).
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`Third, the claimed methods do not improve an existing technological process. Cf.
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`id. As explained by Mr. Liao, this patent is replete with science fiction but lacking
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`in even a single concrete embodiment. (Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 9-16 (patent provides no
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`working examples of any element of the alleged invention and repeatedly describes
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`these elements as having “unlimited” capabilities to be accomplished by any
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`“suitable means”).)
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`Similarly flawed is Patent Owner’s argument that the claims require
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`“transformative steps,” specifically “transforming” “data into an entirely different
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`syntax in order to enable communication of the search requests, results, or order.”
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`(POR 47.) The claims do not require any change into an “entirely different syntax.”
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`(Ex. 1041 at 77:6-15; 90:10-91:9.) Even if they did, “mere manipulation or
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`reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the transformation prong.” CyberSource
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`Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The claims
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`require no transformation of a particular article. Rather, these claims deal with
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`abstract data, as was true in Benson, Bilski and Alice. Further, PO’s Response does
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`not even try to apply the analysis set forth by the en banc Bilski court when
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`explaining the ruling in In re Abele, despite the Board’s reliance on that precedent
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`in its Institution Decision. (Paper 29 at 15.) The label “transformative steps” (POR
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`47-49) is not a magic wand turning data into a particular physical article.
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`Finally, Patent Owner suggests that the abstract idea (which it
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`mischaracterizes as requiring e-commerce) itself is novel and useful. (POR 41-43.)
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`Even were that so, it is immaterial. Patents cannot be used to preempt abstract
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`ideas, whether those ideas are new or old, or useful or useless. Cf. buySAFE, Inc.
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`v. Google, Inc., No. 2013-1575, 2014 WL 4337771, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 2014)
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`(abstract ideas are unpatentable no matter how “‘[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or
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`even brilliant’” (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
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`133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013))).
`
`IV. CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE UNDER SECTION 103
`Imagined Limitations Cannot Distinguish Prior Art
`A.
`Step (d): Patent Owner assumes an unduly narrow interpretation of step (d)
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`and “results list.” Contrary to Patent Owner’s assumption (POR 58), nothing in
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`these claims requires combining structured and unstructured data into the same
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`single list. On the contrary, Dr. Carbonell admitted that the returned results need
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`not be structured. (Ex. 1041 at 90:4-15.) Both Mamma.com and Knowledge Broker
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`disclose this element as construed by the Board. (Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 43-48.)
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`Steps (g) and (h): Patent Owner assumes an unduly narrow interpretation of
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`these steps. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assumption (POR 10-13, 16, 37-39, 42-44,
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`49, 55-56, 59 & 63), and notwithstanding Patent Owner’s 40 plus references to “e-
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`commerce” and 30 plus references to “purchase” or “purchasing,” nothing in these
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`claims requires that the order be a purchase. The patent describes purchase as
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`merely one example of an order. (E.g., Ex. 2001 at 2:67-3:4; 7:29-33; 45:51-54;
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`62:39-46.) And, Dr. Carbonell admitted that claim 2 allows for the ordered item to
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`be free. (Ex. 1041 at 87:7-23.) Both Mamma.com and Knowledge Broker disclose
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`these elements, under their BRI. (Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 32-42.) Patent Owner suggests that
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`the Mamma.com site does not process the orders it receives. That is not so. It must
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`process the order because it keeps track of each click on the “download now”
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`button and then it redirects the request to the download page of the software
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`provider. (Id. ¶¶ 33-36.)
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`B. Knowledge Broker Discloses A Metasearch Engine
`Patent Owner’s contention that Knowledge Broker does not send searches to
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`external data sources in response to user search queries, and thus is not a
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`metasearch engine (POR 60-61), is soundly refuted by multiple express statements
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`in the references themselves (Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 6-31), and by the cross-examination
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`testimony of its expert, Dr. Carbonell.
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`As Mr. Liao explains, each of Exhibits 1006 and 1007 expressly describes
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`querying external data archives in response to receiving a search query from a user.
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`(Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 6-17.) Knowledge Broker performs “metasearching” under both the
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`Board’s tentative BRI and also under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. (Id.
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`¶¶ 16-17.) In cross-examining Dr. Carbonell, Petitioner’s counsel read Patent
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`Owner’s proposed construction of “metasearch” (Ex. 1041 at 52:18-25; 56:7-11)—
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`without revealing that it was Patent Owner’s construction—and asked whether this
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`was disclosed in passages from Knowledge Broker Exhibits 1006 and 1007. Each
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`time Dr. Carbonell testified that it was, once with qualifications that do not conflict
`
`with Patent Owner’s proposed construction. (Id. at 52:18-53:14; 56:7-15.)
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`Specifically, Dr. Carbonell admitted on cross-examination that Figure 1 of
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`Exhibit 1006 depicts plural external hosts, labeled as “external archives,” that are
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`accessed by Knowledge Broker via HTTP and searched to answer the request from
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`the user. (Id. at 18:17-19:10; 20:1-23; 44:14-47:14.) Further, Exhibit 1007 (p. 12)
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`states:
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`This wrapper receives the description of the constraints corresponding
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`to the query, translates them into the query-string required by the
`search script, verifies that the indicated fields are accepted by the
`server and provides default values for required fields not specified by
`the user. It then queries the server and receives the results in html
`format. Finally it parses the results and translates them into the
`constraint format accepted by the CBKB system.
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`Dr. Carbonell agreed that this passage discloses sending search queries to
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`plural remote hosts and returning the results to the user (Ex. 1041 at 58:15-59:15;
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`see also id. at 41:20-43:14)—which is Patent Owner’s proposed construction of
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`“metasearch” (POR 25). Earlier, Dr. Carbonell defined a “query string” as what is
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`sent “from a metasearch engine into a search engine.” (Ex. 1041 at 11:18-12:3.)
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`(The above-quoted passage uses that term.) He also agreed that Figure 3 of Exhibit
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`1007 (p. 10) discloses sending at least one search query to plural hosts and
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`returning the results received from each host. (Ex. 1041 at 53:20-56:15.) Again,
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`that is Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “metasearch.” (POR 25.)
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`The apparent basis for Patent Owner’s contention that Knowledge Broker
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`was not a metasearch engine is Dr. Carbonell’s recollection of discussions he had
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`more than 15 years ago about Knowledge Broker generating and searching its own
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`internal index of the external data repositories. But he admitted that these
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`references “did not discuss” these features. (Ex. 1041 at 130:7-131:7.) On the
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`contrary, as explained above, Exhibits 1006 or 1007 expressly refute his
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`recollection. (Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 24-28.)
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`C. Knowledge Broker And Mamma.com
`Are Similar In Technology And Application
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`Patent Owner attacks the combination of references proposed by Petitioner
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`
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`by arguing “technical challenges” would teach away from “combining general-
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`purpose metasearch engines with special-purpose e-commerce sites searching
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`structured data.” (POR 59.) Patent Owner’s arguments again are based on
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`imagined claims. Neither the claims nor the proposed combination require e-
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`commerce or searching of any particular type of data. (For example, as Dr.
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`Carbonell conceded, the method’s travel related item might be a free travel
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`brochure. (Ex. 1041 at 87:7-23.).) Any “technical challenges” that might attach to
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`Patent Owner’s imagined combination are consequently irrelevant. Regardless,
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`Mamma.com and Knowledge Broker are not the “disparate technologies” Patent
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`Owner contends. (POR 62.) To the contrary, Mamma.com and Knowledge
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`Broker’s common features suggest their combinability. (Ex. 1042 ¶ 50.)
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`First, Knowledge Broker—as explained in detail above—and Mamma.com
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`both performed metasearching and were metasearch engines. Second, both
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`Knowledge Broker and Mamma.com received and processed orders. (Ex. 1042 ¶¶
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`32-42.) Third, both Knowledge Broker and Mamma.com searched
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`“heterogeneous” sources—although not required by the claims. As Patent Owner
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`points out, Mamma.com was not only a “general metasearch engine” (POR 61),
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`but also performed searches of structured databases (id. at 6). Likewise, Exhibits
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`1006 and 1007 disclose Knowledge Broker’s ability to meta-search a wide variety
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`of heterogeneous data repositories including Web search engines, aka Web
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`crawlers. (Ex. 1007 at 11 (Fig. 4) (Knowledge Broker’s Web search interface
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`included an option “Search also Webcrawlers.”).) A “Web crawler” is “software
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`that seeks out information from multiple sources, usually multiple hosts on the web
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`by following links, hyperlinks usually, and collects that information in one central
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`repository.” (Ex. 1041 at 6:21-7:1.) “Some of the web crawlers in existence [in
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`1999 include] Lycos, Excite, AltaVista and perhaps Infoseek.” (Id. at 7:18-21; see
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`also Ex. 1006 at 2 (reciting “Lycos, Alta Vista, Yahoo and other retrieval
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`engines”).) Thus, Knowledge Broker’s reach was not limited to repositories of
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`physics articles, but also accessed the same sources searched by general-purpose
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`metasearch engines such as Mamma.com.
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`Mamma.com and Knowledge Broker are not the “vastly different
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`technologies” Patent Owner contends. (POR 59; cf. Ex. 1042 ¶ 50.)
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`D. Combining Advertising With Knowledge Broker Was Natural
`The lead reference, Knowledge Broker, discloses each step of each
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`challenged claim except for the advertising step. It would have been obvious to a
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`skilled artisan in 1999-2000 to add that step to Knowledge Broker.
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`First, as Dr. Carbonell testified (Ex. 1041 at 91:11-93:11), the claims do not
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`specify an advertisement source. So, the advertisement could be provided by one
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`of the plural hosts separately from the search results, such as a keyword-triggered
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`advertisement provided by a search engine. As noted, Knowledge Broker expressly
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`described searching hosts that were Web crawlers and other search engines. It was
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`common for search engines to return keyword-triggered advertisements in addition
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`to their search results. (Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 20, 25 & 33.) As Mamma.com shows, there
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`would be no technical obstacle to returning those advertisements to the user with
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`the search results.
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`Second, contrary to Patent Owner’s charge that Knowledge Broker is limited
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`to libraries and physics papers (POR 21-23 & 57), Exhibits 1006 and 1007 disclose
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`a framework with broad relevance to a large variety of domains, and with both
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`commercial and non-commercial applications. Exhibit 1006 teaches that the
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`Knowledge Broker architecture can be exploited in “a large variety and number of
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`multiagent applications for knowledge management on the Web” including
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`“bargain finding [and] dynamic assemblage of virtual catalogs.” (Ex. 1006 at 2
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`(3rd full para.).) The terms “bargain finding” and “virtual catalog” refer to
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`comparison shopping engines. (Ex. 1041 at 8:6-17; Ex. 1042 ¶ 49.) Also, Dr.
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`Carbonell testified that comparison shopping sites sometimes included banner ads.
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`(Ex. 1041 at 9:6-15; see also Ex. 1042 ¶ 49.) A banner ad at least sometimes relates
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`to an item associated with the search request.
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`Third, Knowledge Broker expressly discloses the need for a commercial
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`model. (Ex. 1007 at 12-13.) That model need not be either transactions without
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`advertising or advertising without transactions. Instead, Patent Owner’s expert Dr.
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`Carbonell notes that “hybrid” revenue models were explored in this time period.
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`(Ex. 2006 ¶ 29; see also POR 64.) He noted that in 1999-2000, “[m]etasearch
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`relied on advertisement” (Ex. 2006 ¶ 29), and Knowledge Broker shows that a
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`metasearch service also can sell items. Indeed, advertising at the point of sale is an
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`ancient practice.
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`V. THE BOARD NEED NOT CONSTRUE “METASEARCHING”
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`The Board need not resolve the parties’ dispute over the meaning of
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`“metasearching” because neither party relies on any difference between their
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`competing constructions. Patent Owner seeks a broader construction of the term
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`“metasearch”: “sending at least one search query to plural hosts, and returning the
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`results received from each host.” (POR 25.) But, Patent Owner does not rely on
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`that broader construction to distinguish Knowledge Broker or for any other reason.
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`VI. DR. ETZIONI’S TESTIMONY DOES NOT HELP THESE CLAIMS
`Dr. Etzioni was not asked to read these claims or this patent. Instead, he
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`opined on background information concerning this field. Therefore, it is not
`
`accurate to say, as Patent Owner says, “Dr. Etzioni, who testified that the claimed
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`
` Page 14
`
`
`
`CBM2014-00001
`Patent 8,326,924
`invention reflected in Figure 9 of the ’924 Patent . . . .” (POR 41-42.) Dr. Etzioni
`
`did not read any text explaining that figure and did not compare that figure to any
`
`patent claim. Nor did Dr. Etzioni testify that “the e-commerce and metasearch
`
`aspects of the ’924 invention were different.” (POR 42).
`
`Patent Owner cites Dr. Etzioni’s testimony that designing more than a
`
`“rudimentary” metasearch engine in the late 1990s “was not a trivial task.” (POR
`
`7, 44, 53 & 62.) That’s true but does not help Patent Owner. These claims do not
`
`require more than a rudimentary metasearch engine. For example, they encompass
`
`within their scope a slow search of only two homogeneous Web sites in response
`
`to a single request from a single client.
`
`VII. CONCLUSION
`For the reasons in the Petition and above, claims 2, 6 and 8 of the ’924
`
`patent should be found to be unpatentable.
`
`Dated: September 11, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP
`
`
`By /John D. Vandenberg/
` John D. Vandenberg
` Registration No. 31,312
` Kristen L. Reichenbach, Ph.D.
` Registration No. 61,162
`
`
`
`One World Trade Center
`121 S.W. Salmon Street,
`Suite 1600
`Portland, Oregon 97204
`Telephone: (503) 595-5300
`Facsimile: (503) 595-5301
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`
` Page 15
`
`
`
`CBM2014-00001
`Patent 8,326,924
`
`Certificate of Service
`
`The undersigned certifies that on September 11, 2014 a true and correct copy
`
`of PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`
`was served along with associated Exhibits via electronic mail, per agreement of the
`
`parties, on the attorneys of record for the Patent Owner in this proceeding to the
`
`following:
`
`Cyrus A. Morton
`CAMorton@rkmc.com
`Ryan M. Schultz
`RMSchultz@rkmc.com
`Bryan J. Mechell
`BJMechell@rkmc.com
`Richard Martinez (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
`RMMartinez@rkmc.com
`mmtacheny@rkmc.com
`ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI LLP
`2800 LaSalle Plaza
`800 LaSalle Avenue
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`
`
`One World Trade Center
`121 S.W. Salmon Street,
`Suite 1600
`Portland, Oregon 97204
`Telephone: (503) 595-5300
`Facsimile: (503) 595-5301
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP
`
`
`By /Kristen L. Reichenbach/
` Kristen L. Reichenbach, Ph.D.
` Registration No. 61,162
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`
`Page 1
`
`
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