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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`—————————————
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`—————————————
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`LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.
`Patent Owner
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`—————————————
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`—————————————
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`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c)
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c) and Notice of Stipulation of Due Dates
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`
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`(Paper Nos. 30), Patent Owner Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. (“Progressive”)
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`hereby moves to exclude Exhibits 1027-1029, 1031, and 1034-1038 filed by
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`Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (“Liberty”) with its Reply (Paper No. 27.)
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`I.
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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`Liberty and its reply declarants have belatedly sought to introduce new prior
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`art references, new invalidity arguments and theories, and new declarations with
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`Liberty’s Reply in an effort to plug the holes in its original case. This is not proper
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`rebuttal evidence, and is without justification. Liberty’s belated new evidence not
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`only violates the Board’s rules, but it unfairly prejudices Progressive. Because
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`Liberty delayed in submitting this improper new evidence with its Reply,
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`Progressive has no opportunity to respond by surreply or with declarations of its
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`own expert witnesses. The Board should grant Progressive’s motion to exclude,
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`otherwise Liberty would be rewarded with an unfair procedural advantage
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`resulting from shifting its theories and evidence of unpatentability at the Reply
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`stage, in an effort to now make out a prima facie case that the Board’s rules
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`required them to establish with their Petition.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`A.
`Petition Must Identify All Supporting Evidence
`A petition to institute a Covered Business Method (“CBM”) Review must be
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`accompanied by all the evidence upon which the petitioner relies in challenging
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`Case CBM2013-00009
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`patentability. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(4),(5); 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,756-57
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`(Aug. 14, 2012) (petition must be “accompanied by the evidence the petitioner
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`seeks to rely upon” and “identif[y] all…supporting evidence on a claim-by-claim
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`basis.”) It must also “identify[] the specific portions of the evidence that support
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`the challenge,” including “specify[ing] where each element of the claim is found in
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`the prior art[.]” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(4),(5); see also 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,757.
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`The Board will not consider any basis for invalidity that is not specifically
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`identified in a petition and will “resolve all vagueness and ambiguity in
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`Petitioner’s arguments against the Petitioner.” (Ex. 2005 at 10.)
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`B. Reply Evidence Cannot Fix Deficiencies In Prima Facie Case
`A “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the…patent owner
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`response.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). A Petitioner is prohibited from using its reply to
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`submit (i) new evidence necessary to make out its prima facie case, or (ii) new
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`evidence that could have been presented in its petition. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,767.
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`The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide further explains this prohibition:
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`While replies can help crystallize issues for decision, a reply that raises a
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`new issue or belatedly presents evidence will not be considered and may be
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`returned….Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised in a
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`reply include new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`the patentability or unpatentability of an original or proposed substitute
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`claim, and new evidence that could have been presented in a prior filing.
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`77 Fed. Reg. at 48,767 (emphasis added). The Board has quoted and referenced
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`this language, explaining that “a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents
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`evidence will not be considered” and “a new issue is raised if the reply includes
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`new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the unpatentability of a
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`challenged claim.” BlackBerry Corp v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, No. IPR2013-
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`00036 (JYC), Paper 40, at 2. Further, such evidence would be both irrelevant and
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`unfairly prejudicial and therefore not admissible under F.R.E. 402 and 403.
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`C. Unreliable Testimony Improper Under F.R.E. 702
`Pursuant to Federal Evidence Rule 702, expert testimony can only be
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`admitted if it is reliable. Rule 702 requires the Board to act as a gatekeeper for
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`expert testimony and exclude such testimony if it is unreliable. See Daubert v.
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`Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.62
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`(Federal Rules of Evidence apply to proceedings before the Board).
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`D. Board May Exclude Or Not Consider Improper Evidence
`The Board has two options if a petitioner submits improper evidence with its
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`reply. CBS Interactive Inc. v. Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC, No. IPR2013-
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`00033 (JYC), Paper 79, at 3. It can exclude or decline to consider the evidence.
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`See id. (“Should there be improper…evidence presented with a reply, the Board,
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`exercising its discretion, may exclude the…related evidence in their entirety, or
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`alternatively, decline to consider the…related evidence.”).
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`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`Improper New Evidence As To Kosaka’s Deficient Disclosure
`Liberty’s Petition cited and relied exclusively on the fuzzy logic disclosure
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`of Kosaka (Exhibit 1003) in arguing that the ’358 patent is unpatentable over the
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`combination of RDSS (Exhibit 1004) and Kosaka. Moreover, Liberty offered no
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`evidence with its Petition that a POSITA would have experience with or any
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`knowledge of fuzzy logic as used in Kosaka. As discussed below, Liberty
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`submitted with its Reply new prior art references to combine with Kosaka, as well
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`as Declarations addressing this new prior art and asserting new invalidity
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`arguments based on Kosaka’s alleged disclosure of defuzzification, crisp values,
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`and non-fuzzy logic disclosure. This is improper new evidence that violates the
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`prohibition on raising new issues with a reply brief and is unreliable. Progressive
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`timely objected (Paper No. 28), and Liberty’s new evidence should be excluded.
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`Liberty’s Petition Based On Kosaka’s Fuzzy Logic Disclosure
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`1.
`Liberty based its invalidity argument in its Petition solely on Kosaka’s fuzzy
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`logic disclosure. Indeed, the phrase “fuzzy logic” appears 47 times in the Petition
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`and the supporting Andrews Petition Declaration (Exhibit 1014). And, Liberty
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`quoted Kosaka’s “fuzzy logic” disclosure as the basis for invalidating every claim
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`element in claim 1, with the term “fuzzy logic” appearing 26 times in Liberty’s
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`claim chart for claim 1. (See Petition at 32-43.) Furthermore, although Liberty
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`offered witness declarations with its Petition regarding the level of ordinary skill in
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`the art (Exhibit 1014 at ¶¶ 14-26), it offered no opinions that a POSITA would
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`have had training in, experience with, or exposure to fuzzy logic.
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`2.
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`Liberty’s Reply Introduced New Fuzzy Logic Evidence
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`With its Reply, Liberty submitted seven new references to combine with
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`Kosaka (Exhibits 1028-1029 and 1034-1038), along with supporting Reply
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`Declarations from Andrews (Exhibit 1027 at ¶¶ 5-8) and O’Neil (Exhibit 1031, at
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`¶¶ 35, 37, 39, and 42), in an effort to state a prima facie case based on Kosaka’s
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`deficient disclosure. As discussed below, this evidence should be excluded
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`because it improperly raises new issues in a reply and because it is unreliable under
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`F.R.E. 702.
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`Both O’Neil and Andrews opined on Liberty’s new references in their Reply
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`Declarations. O’Neil relied on Exhibits 1034-1038 in opining that a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art (a “POSITA”) would know how to apply Kosaka’s
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`disclosure because the fuzzy logic “methodology was well known and applications
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`to classification rating and underwriting were well-documented” by 1996. (O’Neil
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`Reply Declaration at ¶ 35.) She further opined based on these references that the
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`“process of using fuzzy logic has been well described,” “well demonstrated,” and
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`addressed in “significant literature on the subject of fuzzy logic prior to 1996.”
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`(Id. at ¶¶ 37, 39, and 42.) Andrews relied on Exhibits 1028-1029 and opined that
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`“[f]uzzy logic was well established and fairly common by 1996.” (Andrews Reply
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`Declaration at ¶ 6; see also id. at ¶ 8.)
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`Liberty attempts to characterize these new references as not being combined
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`with Kosaka but simply demonstrating what “would certainly have been within the
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`understanding of a POSITA[.]” (Reply at 15; see also id. at 14.) This is nothing
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`more than a smokescreen to cover Liberty’s improper introduction of new evidence
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`with its Reply. Indeed, Liberty also tries to blame Progressive, claiming that it had
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`“ignore[d]” “relevant prior art” and thus compelled Liberty to now introduce it.
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`(Reply at 14, emphasis added.) However, Progressive could not have “ignored”
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`these references because they were not submitted with the Petition. Under the
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`guise of its new argument as to the level of skill in the art, Liberty is combining the
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`alleged teachings reflected by the new references with Kosaka. These
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`combinations were not bases for unpatentability set forth in Liberty’s Petition, and
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`Liberty cannot now raise them.
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`Moreover, O’Neil and Andrews effectively admitted that the POSITA would
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`need other references to implement Kosaka. Andrews admitted that “someone
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`reading Kosaka would look at it and say…I’m going to go to a textbook [] and find
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`out the specific details of how to implement that.” (See Ex. 2029, Andrews Tr. at
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`6
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`204:20-205:9.) O’Neil similarly conceded that a POSITA “not totally familiar
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`with fuzzy logic” would need to “do their own research and education on [fuzzy
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`logic] in order to apply it and go forward.” (See Ex. 2028, O’Neil Tr. at 67:23-
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`68:7, emphasis added; see also id. at 82:19-20, 51:4-5, and 52:4-5.)
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`The standard for what a POSITA knows is not what a POSITA could know
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`if they did research and educated themselves. Rather, a POSITA is “a hypothetical
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`individual having [specific] qualities,” as Andrews admitted. (See Ex. 1014,
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`Andrews Petition Declaration at ¶ 16, emphasis added; see also id. at ¶ 17.)
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`Andrews and O’Neil opining that a POSITA could do research to understand fuzzy
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`logic is nothing more than restating the truism that an educated person can do
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`research to learn about a subject matter with which they are not familiar. If that
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`were the standard for the knowledge of a POSITA, then a POSITA could be argued
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`to know anything that they could research and understand, and that is plainly not
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`the law, as Andrews admits. (See id.) As such, the seven new references (Exhibits
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`1028-1029 and 1034-1038) and the supporting Declarations addressing them
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`(O’Neil Reply Declaration at ¶¶ 35, 37, 39, and 42 and Andrews Reply Declaration
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`at ¶¶ 6 and 8) should be excluded.
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`Andrews’ New Opinions As To A POSITA
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`3.
`In addition to opining on the new references, Andrews addressed the
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`knowledge of a POSITA in his Reply Declaration. (Andrews Reply Declaration at
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`7
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`¶¶ 6 and 8.) He opined that “a person of ordinary skill in the telematics aspects of
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`the ’358 patent would understand how to implement the fuzzy logic processing in
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`Kosaka’s Risk Evaluation Unit” and “would know enough about fuzzy logic to
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`understand Kosaka and the technology for implementing it.” (Andrews Reply
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`Declaration at ¶ 5.) Andrews also relied on Figures 10 and 11 from Kosaka in
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`opining that Kosaka “clearly illustrate[s] how fuzzy logic would be used to classify
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`these input values in a way that could be used by an insurance expert to determine
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`proper risk assignments.” (Id. at ¶ 7.)
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`These are new opinions which are improper to raise in a Reply Declaration.
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`Neither the Petition nor the Andrews Petition Declaration relied on Figures 10 and
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`11 from Kosaka. Andrews did address the “Level of Ordinary Skill for the ’358
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`Patent” and the “State of the Art in the Vehicle Telematics Industry by January
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`1996” in his Petition Declaration, but he made no reference to “fuzzy logic” or its
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`use by an “insurance expert.” (See Andrews Petition Declaration at ¶¶ 14-26.)
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`Indeed, to now claim that fuzzy logic is within the level of ordinary skill
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`contradicts his Petition Declaration. To the extent Liberty wanted to rely on
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`Figures 10 and 11 of Kosaka, and Andrews’ opinions as to a POSITA’s
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`understanding of fuzzy logic set forth at ¶¶ 5-8 of his Reply Declaration, Liberty
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`should have specifically identified this argument and evidence in its Petition. (See
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`supra at 1-2.) It is improper to now introduce them with the Reply, and they
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`should be excluded.
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`Moreover, the record demonstrates that Andrews’ opinions are unreliable
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`and should be excluded pursuant to F.R.E. 702. Andrews relied on an after-the-
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`fact disclosures from 1997 and 1999 as a basis for opining on the use of fuzzy
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`logic in 1996. (See Andrews Reply Declaration at ¶ 6, Exs. 1028-1029 dated
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`“November 1997” and “1999.”) Andrews also relied on the fact that Exhibit 1028
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`cites a treatise purportedly from 1994, but he never discussed the specific
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`substance of this treatise. (See id., noting that Ex. 1028 “referenc[es] Wang, L.”
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`treatise.) As such, ¶¶ 6 and 8 of the Andrews Reply Declaration should be
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`excluded pursuant to F.R.E. 702.
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`Andrews’ opinions are also unreliable as to how Kosaka’s disclosure “could
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`be used by an insurance expert to determine proper risk assignments” and how “a
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`person of ordinary skill in the telematics aspects of the ’358 patent would
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`understand how to implement the fuzzy logic processing in Kosaka’s Risk
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`Evaluation Unit.” (Andrews Reply Declaration at ¶¶ 5 and 7.) Andrews conceded
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`he is not “qualified” as “a person of ordinary skill in the insurance aspects of the
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`’358 patent.” (Id. at ¶ 7, emphasis added.) As such, his opinions on the insurance
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`aspects of Kosaka are unreliable, and ¶¶ 6 and 8 of the Andrews Reply Declaration
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`should be excluded or ignored pursuant to F.R.E. 702. See Sundance, Inc. v.
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`DeMonte Fabricating LTD, 550 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]here an
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`issue calls for consideration of evidence from the perspective of one of ordinary
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`skill in the art, it is contradictory to Rule 702 to allow a witness to testify on the
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`issue who is not qualified as a technical expert in that art.”).
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`Liberty’s New Kosaka Defuzzification Argument
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`4.
`In a further attempt to rescue Kosaka’s deficient fuzzy logic disclosure,
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`Liberty’s declarants opine that Kosaka discloses a “defuzzification” step and the
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`use of “crisp” values. (See, e.g., Andrews Reply Declaration, at ¶ 8.) Liberty’s
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`Reply declarants rely on portions of Kosaka that Liberty did not use or cite in its
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`Petition, and on two more new references (Exhibits 1029 and 1035). (See Andrews
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`Reply Declaration at ¶¶ 8-9; O’Neil Reply Declaration at ¶¶ 37, 40, 42, and 48.)
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`This evidence should be excluded because it improperly raises a new invalidity
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`argument in a reply and because the evidence is unreliable pursuant to F.R.E. 702,
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`as discussed below.
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`Liberty did not argue that Kosaka disclosed “crisp” values or
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`“defuzzification” as a basis for invalidity in the Petition, nor was it addressed in the
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`Andrews Petition Declaration. Rather, for the first time in his Reply Declaration,
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`Andrews opined that “Kosaka explicitly describes using defuzzification.”
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`(Andrews Reply Declaration at ¶ 8.) Andrews cited page 8 from Kosaka as
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`support for this disclosure (id.), but Liberty never cited that portion of Kosaka in
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`its Petition. Andrews also explained in his Reply Declaration that “Kosaka
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`discloses using fuzzy logic to process the data and arrive at a risk evaluation value”
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`and that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the risk evaluation
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`value to be a single, ‘crisp’ risk value.” (Id.) In addition, Andrews relied on a new
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`reference, Exhibit 1029, in concluding that “[a]fter the data is processed through
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`fuzzy logic, a POSITA would understand it must be converted into a crisp value
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`through a process called defuzzification – a standard part of basic fuzzy logic
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`implementation.” (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.)
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`O’Neil’s Reply Declaration mirrors Andrews’ opinions on this new
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`argument, as she opines that “[a] POSITA would understand that the Kosaka risk
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`evaluation values are single crisp numerical values,” and relies on a new reference,
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`Exhibit 1035, as disclosing “fuzzy processing” that “outputs a ‘crisp value[.]’”
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`(O’Neil Reply Declaration at ¶¶ 42 and 48; see also id. at ¶ 40.) In addition, she
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`relied on Figure 11 from Kosaka – not cited in the Petition – as disclosing that
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`“[t]he overall risk evaluation value is a single numerical value (based on fuzzy
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`inputs) that is indicative of risk and that Kosaka uses to adjust the premium.”
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`(O’Neil Reply Declaration at ¶ 37, citing Figure 11 from Kosaka.)
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`If Liberty wanted to argue invalidity based on “crisp” values and
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`“defuzzification” or rely on Exhibits 1029 and 1035 and Figure 11 and page 8 from
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`Kosaka, then it could have, and should have, done so in its Petition. As such,
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`Exhibits 1029 and 1035, ¶¶ 8-9 from Andrews Reply Declaration and ¶¶ 37, 40,
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`42, and 48 from O’Neil Reply Declaration should be excluded because they
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`improperly introduce new issues in a Reply.
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`In addition, the record demonstrates that O’Neil’s opinions are unreliable.
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`She admits that she is “not an expert in fuzzy logic” and has never even used fuzzy
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`logic. (See Ex. 2028, O’Neil Tr. at 82:19-20, 51:4-5, and 52:4-5, “I personally
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`have not utilized fuzzy logic.”) Yet, she nevertheless opines as to the fuzzy logic
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`disclosure of Kosaka. (See supra at 5-6, 11.)
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`O’Neil further opines that “[a] POSITA would understand that the Kosaka
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`risk evaluation values are single crisp numerical values” and not fuzzy values.
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`(See O’Neil Rebuttal Declaration at ¶ 48.) However, she contradicts this opinion
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`and admits that it “may be true” that the risk evaluation values are “fuzzy values.”
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`(See Ex. 2028, O’Neil Tr. at 83:16-21.)
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`In addition, O’Neil relies on Figure 11 from Kosaka in opining that the
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`“overall risk evaluation value is a single numerical value,” but then admits that she
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`never “studied any of the figures” in Kosaka, nor did she “match the figures up to
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`each part of the patent and determine exactly what they meant.” (See O’Neil Reply
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`Declaration at ¶ 37; Ex. 2028, O’Neil Tr. at 81:22-24, 83:7.) As such, her opinions
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`as to Kosaka’s fuzzy logic disclosure are unreliable and ¶¶ 37 and 48 of the O’Neil
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`Reply Declaration should be excluded or ignored pursuant to F.R.E. 702.
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`Liberty’s New Kosaka Non-Fuzzy Logic Argument
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`5.
`In a final attempt to resuscitate Kosaka’s deficient disclosure, Liberty offers
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`a new theory of unpatentability in its Reply that “fuzzy logic need not be used” at
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`all with Kosaka. (Reply at 14, emphasis added.) Andrews at ¶ 9 and O’Neil at
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`¶ 39 and ¶ 48 so opine in their Reply Declarations. O’Neil quotes from Kosaka
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`that a “determination may be carried out without using fuzzy logic” and the
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`“[c]alculation may also be carried out using a common insurance table.” (Id. at
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`¶ 39.) However, this language appears nowhere in the Petition or any Petition
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`Declaration. And, Andrews conceded that he did not know what the content of a
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`“common insurance table” would be and that Kosaka provided no disclosure of
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`how its functions would be carried out in crisp logic. (Ex. 2029, Andrews Tr. at
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`240:23-242:11.)
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`Liberty chose not to challenge patentability of the ’358 patent based on any
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`non-fuzzy disclosure of Kosaka. If Liberty wanted to so argue, then it could have,
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`and should have, done so in its Petition. Indeed, O’Neil admitted that if Liberty
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`had asked her, she “would have been able to provide a declaration on the ’358
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`patent back at the time of Liberty’s original petition.” (See Ex. 2028, O’Neil Tr. at
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`97:11-17, emphasis added.) As such, ¶ 9 from the Andrews Reply Declaration and
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`¶¶ 39, 40, and 48 from the O’Neil Reply Declaration should be excluded.
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`In addition, O’Neil’s opinions are unreliable at ¶ 40 of her Reply
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`Declaration and should be excluded pursuant to F.R.E. 702. She opines that “fuzzy
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`logic is not the key point in the Kosaka reference,” but then concedes that “all of
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`the embodiments that are actually disclosed and described in the Kosaka patent use
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`fuzzy logic,” the “patent is presented using fuzzy logic,” and “tout[s] the advantage
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`of using fuzzy logic[.]” (Ex. 2028, O’Neil Tr. at 90:3-7, 90:23-91:2.) She cannot
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`have it both ways. As such, ¶ 40 of her Reply Declaration should be excluded.
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`B. O’Neil’s Unreliable Attacks On Progressive’s Expert
`O’Neil’s unreliable opinions are further demonstrated based on her attempts
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`to attack Progressive’s expert, Michael Miller. O’Neil claims that Miller’s
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`Declaration is wrong based on his “repeated insistence on the use of actual claims
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`data” to generate actuarial classes. (See O’Neil Rebuttal Declaration at ¶ 19,
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`emphasis in original.) Yet the phrase “actual claims data” does not appear in the
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`narrative text of Miller’s Declaration, and O’Neil admits that the language in
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`Miller’s Declaration on which she relies “does not use that exact word.” (Ex.
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`2028, O’Neil Tr. at 31:11-13; see also Ex. 2013, at ¶ 17.) Further, when directed
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`to another portion of Miller’s declaration, O’Neil was forced to admit that Miller
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`was simply saying that using actual claims data is “one way” and that he also
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`suggests the use of information other than actual claims data. (Ex. 2028, O’Neil
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`Tr. at 39:8-9, 39:21-24, emphasis added; see also Ex. 2013 at ¶ 30.)
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`O’Neil further attempts to discredit Miller’s opinions as to the term “rating
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`factor” based on her belief that a “rating factor” is “something that’s purposely
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`calculated[.]” (Ex. 2028, O’Neil Tr. at 111:2; see also O’Neil Reply Declaration at
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`¶ 52.) Yet this opinion is contradicted by her own previous description of a “rating
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`factor.” That is, she wrote a chapter in a treatise titled, “Dealing with Automobile
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`Insurance in North America” (Ex. 2027), and included a calculation for “coming
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`up with a total rating factor,” which she characterized as a “ratio.” (Ex. 2028,
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`O’Neil Tr. at 103:9-104:6, 107:4, emphasis added.) She testified that this “rating
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`factor” is different than the “rating factor” defined by the Board because the later
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`was “purposely calculated.” (See id. at 109:9-110:3, 110:12-111:8.) However, she
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`conceded that a ratio – such as the rating factor set forth in her treatise – is also a
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`calculation: “It is mathematically – It’s true that one number divided by another is
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`a calculation.” (See id. at 111:9-13.) As such, her opinions attacking Miller are
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`unreliable and ¶¶ 19, 30, and 52 of the O’Neil Reply Declaration should be
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`excluded pursuant to F.R.E. 702.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
`For at least these reasons, Progressive’s Motion should be granted.
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`Case CBM2013-00009
`Patent 8,140,358
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`By:
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`JONES DAY
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`/s/Calvin P. Griffith
`Calvin P. Griffith
`Registration No. 34,831
`JONES DAY
`North Point
`901 Lakeside Avenue
`Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1190
`(216) 586-3939
`(216) 579-0212 (Fax)
`Attorney For Patent Owner
`Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.
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`September 30, 2013
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`CLI-2142082v10
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`16
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that a copy of the foregoing PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO
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`EXCLUDE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c) was served on
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`September 30, 2013 by causing them to be sent by email to counsel for Petitioner
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`at the following email addresses:
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`Steven.baughman@ropesgray.com
`Nicole.jantzi@ropesgray.com
`James.myers@ropesgray.com
`LibertyMutualPTABService@ropesgray.com
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`/s/ John V. Biernacki
`John V. Biernacki
`Registration No. 40,511
`JONES DAY
`North Point
`901 Lakeside Avenue
`Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1190
`Attorney For Patent Owner
`Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.
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