Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 2691
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`CYBERFONE SYSTEMS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, et al.,
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`Defendants.
`
`CYBERFONE SYSTEMS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`CNN INTERACTIVE GROUP, INC.,
`et al.,
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`Defendants.
`
`CYBERFONE SYSTEMS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`V.
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., et al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`)
`)
`)
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`) Civ. No. 11-827-SLR
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`)
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`) Civ. No. 11-829-SLR
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`) Civ. No. 11-831-SLR
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`Richard D. Kirk, Esquire, Stephen B. Brauerman, Esquire and Vanessa R. Tiradentes,
`Esquire of Bayard, PA, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Plaintiff. Of Counsel: Marc
`A. Fenster, Esquire, Bruce D. Kuyper, Esquire, Eric J. Carsten, Esquire and Fredricka
`Ung, Esquire of Russ, August & Kabat.
`
`Jack B. Blumenfeld, Esquire, Karen Jacobs Louden, Esquire and Paul Saindon,
`Esquire of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for
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`CRS EXHIBIT 1009
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`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 2692
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`Moving Defendants. 1
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`Dated: August 16, 2012
`Wilmington, Delaware
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`1 Because the parties have authorized and stipulated to having Morris, Nichols,
`Arsht & Tunnell LLP file this motion (D. I. 267 in 11-827), and because other counsel
`have not been identified in the associated briefs, the court does not list them here.
`
`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: 2693
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`R~
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff CyberFone Systems, LLC ("CyberFone" or "plaintiff'), previously named
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`LVL Patent Group, LLC, is the assignee of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,044,382, 7,334,024 and
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`8,019,060 ("the '060 patent") relating to telecommunications technologies. CyberFone
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`asserted infringement of combinations of these patents against a total of 175
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`defendants and 970 accused products across a span of 21 related cases. The '060
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`patent is asserted in all but five cases and is, in some instances, the only patent at
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`issue.
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`On April 30, 2012, the court denied certain motions: (1) to sever and/or dismiss
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`under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20; (2) to stay claims; (3) to dismiss direct
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`infringement claims on the merits or based on the sufficiency of the pleadings; (4) to
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`dismiss induced infringement claims based on the lack of pleading pre-suit knowledge.
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`The court commensurately granted several motions to dismiss claims of contributory
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`infringement. 2 (0.1. 183)3
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`Discovery is underway and will conclude in April 2013. (D. I. 154) A status
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`conference was held on May 15, 2012, at which time the court granted defendants
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`permission to file an early summary judgment motion related to their contention that the
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`'060 patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (0.1. 199) That motion is presently before
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`2 There were 21 motions in total; based on the volume of motions, the court
`does not describe in detail their contents here (nor whether each was denied, denied in
`part, denied as moot, granted in part and denied in part, etcetera) and, instead, refers
`back to its priororderforthe relevant details. (Civ. No. 11-827,0.1. 183)
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`3 Unless provided otherwise, the court hereinafter references docket item
`numbers in Civ. No. 11-827.
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`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 2694
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`the court. (0.1. 227 in 11-827; 0.1. 147 in 11-829; 0.1. 127 in 11-831)4
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`II. BACKGROUND
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`The '060 patent, entitled "Telephone/transaction entry device and system for
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`entering transaction data into databases," was filed September 4, 2007 at U.S. Patent
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`Application No. 11/849,952; it claims priority through a chain of continuation, divisional
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`and continuation in part applications to May 19, 1995. The '060 patent issued
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`September 13, 2011 and lists Rocco L. Martino as its sole inventor.
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`The invention of the '060 patent is described as a system for automatically
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`capturing data at a point of transaction (e.g., a telephone in "transaction entry mode")
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`and transmitting the data to one or more databases for processing and storage. ('060
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`patent, col. 1 :27 -42) A transaction entry device formats input data from a user into a
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`data transaction, which is then transferred to an external (local or remote) database
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`server. (!d., col. 2:44-48; col. 3: 12-15) The server "explodes" the data transaction into
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`its component parts "on a system-specific basis so that each component part has a
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`one-to-one correspondence with a file." (/d., col. 2:47-51, col. 3:49-55) The
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`specification states that "[t]he telephone/transaction entry device and the associated
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`system for storing transaction data in accordance with the invention is unique in that it
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`separates the user from the database and provides a simple, user friendly way to enter
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`transaction data without requiring a local operating system to run various application
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`programs." (/d., col. 4:29-34) Further, "[s]ince all data is entered as data transactions
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`determined by templates tailored to particular applications, the user applications may
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`4 Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a sur-reply is granted. (0.1. 262 in 11-827; 0.1.
`188 in 11-829; 0.1. 160 in 11-831)
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`2
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`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 2695
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`be generalized so that no unique user application programs need be written when a
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`new application is added." (/d., col. 4:34-38) The "system for entering data
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`transactions into databases in accordance with the invention" is described in figure 1 of
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`the '060 patent, reproduced below.
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`16~fl
`y,.-12
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`FIG.1
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`User
`Input
`Devices
`
`,
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`20----....l Dis;lay I
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`\
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`10__}
`
`Transactions
`:
`I
`Data~ 1
`~ormlfield
`Data
`
`First Tier
`
`Third Tier
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`Figure 3 of the '060 patent, reproduced below, illustrates a data transaction being
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`"exploded" into its different subparts for storage "in a database-specific and file-specific
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`location." (/d., col. 5: 18-20)
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`3
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`

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`FIG.3
`
`data
`stream
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`The '060 patent contains three independent claims: method claims 1 and 13,
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`and system claim 18. These claims are reproduced below:
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`1. A method, comprising:
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`obtaining data transaction information entered on a telephone from a single
`transmission from said telephone;
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`forming a plurality of different exploded data transactions for the single
`transmission, said plurality of different exploded data transaction[s] indicative
`of a single data transaction, each of said exploded data transactions having
`different data that is intended for a different destination that is included as
`part of the exploded data transactions, and each of said exploded data
`transactions formed based on said data transaction information from said
`single transmission, so that different data from the single data transmission
`is separated and sent to different destinations; and
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`sending said different exploded data transactions over a channel to said
`different destinations, all based on said data transaction information entered
`in said single transmission.
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`13. A method, comprising:
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`obtaining data transaction information;
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`based on said data transaction information,
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`forming a plurality of different, exploded data transactions, said plurality of
`different exploded data transactions indicative of a single data transaction
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`4
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`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: 2697
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`represented by said data transaction information, each of the exploded
`transactions having different data and having a different destination, where
`destination information indicative of multiple destinations for said exploded
`data transactions is included as part of the single data transaction, and each
`data transaction formed based on said data transaction information;
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`sending said different exploded data transactions over a channel to
`respective destinations, each respective destination represented by different
`destination information; and
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`receiving data from at least one of said destinations, which data is used as
`part of the data transaction, and is sent to a second of said destinations
`different than said one of said destinations, and where said second of said
`destination[s] is represented by second destination information in said single
`data transaction.
`
`18. A data transaction system comprising:
`
`a first transaction tier, operating to capture a data transaction from a user,
`said data transaction including at least one request for information from at
`least one remote server;
`
`a second transaction tier, operating to convert the data transaction into
`multiple different requests, based on said requestfor information, where said
`second tier converts, from a single data transaction from the user, a plurality
`of different exploded data transaction[s] indic ative of said single data
`transaction each of said exploded data transactions having different data and
`a different destination that is included as part of the exploded data
`transactions, and each of said exploded data transaction[s] formed based on
`said data transaction information from said single transmission and
`representing said different data in the single transmission that is intended for
`different servers; and
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`a third tier, further exploding at least plural of requests from said second
`transaction tier into third tier transaction requests for specific information
`from specific remote servers, where each of the third tier transaction
`requests is specific to a specified application.
`
`Ill. STANDARD
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`A court shall grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions,
`
`answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
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`5
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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 2698
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`show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
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`entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). The moving party bears
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`the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita
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`Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.10 (1986). "Facts that
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`could alter the outcome are 'material,' and disputes are 'genuine' if evidence exists from
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`which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden
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`of proof on the disputed issue is correct." Horowitz v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co.,
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`57 F.3d 300, 302 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). If the moving party has
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`demonstrated an absence of material fact, the nonmoving party then "must come
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`forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Matsushita,
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`475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court will "view the underlying facts
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`and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
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`opposing the motion." Pa. Coal Ass'n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). The
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`mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmoving party, however, will not
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`be sufficient for denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough
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`evidence to enable a jury reasonably to find for the nonmoving party on that issue. See
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`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails
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`to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it
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`has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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`See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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`IV. DISCUSSION
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`A. § 101 Case law
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`6
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`Section 101 provides that patentable subject matter extends to "new and useful
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`process[es], machine[s], manufacture, or composition[s] of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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`In 2008, the Federal Circuit issued its en bane decision in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943
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`(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Bilski/"), in which the majority held that the "machine-or-
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`transformation test" ("MOTT") is the definitive inquiry governing patentability of a
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`process claim. /d. at 954-55, 959-60. As articulated by the Supreme Court, the MOTT
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`provides that a process is patent-eligible under§ 101 if:
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`(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
`particular article into a different state or thing. A claimed process involving
`a fundamental principle [such as an equation] that uses a particular machine
`or apparatus would not preempt uses of the principle that do not also use the
`specified machine or apparatus in the manner claimed. And a claimed
`process that transforms a particular article to a specified different state or
`thing by applying a fundamental principle would not pre-empt the use of the
`principle to transform any other article, to transform the same article but in
`a manner not covered by the claim, or to do anything other than transform
`the specified article.
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`/d. at 954 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)). In so holding, the
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`Bilski I Court rejected the applicability of several other articulations of§ 101 tests: (1)
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`the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, which consisted of determining both whether the claim
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`recites an algorithm, and whether that algorithm is applied to a physical element or
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`process step; and (2) the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test, which focused on
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`preventing patents on mathematical or other principles. /d. at 958-60.
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`On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the MOTT is not the exclusive test for
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`determining the patent eligibility of a process. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226-
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`27 (201 0) ("Bilski//"). However, the MOTT remains "a useful and important clue, an
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`investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes
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`7
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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 2700
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`under§ 1 01." /d. at 3227. While the Supreme Court declined to further define what
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`constitutes a patentable process, id. at 3231, it noted that its precedents "provide three
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`specific exceptions to§ 1 01's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature,
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`physical phenomena, and abstract ideas."' /d. at 3225 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
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`303, 308 (1980)). Whether the asserted claims are invalid for failure to claim statutory
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`subject matter is a question of law that may be informed by subsidiary factual issues.
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`See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
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`B. Claim Construction
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`The court first addresses the issue of whether claim construction is required
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`before undertaking a § 1 01 analysis. In Bancorp Services, L. L. C. v. Sun Life
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`Assurance Co. of Canada, No. 2011-1467, 2012 WL 3037176, at *5 (Fed. Cir. July 26,
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`2012), the Federal Circuit was recently confronted with this same issue. While noting
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`that it will "ordinarily be desirable-and often necessary-to resolve claim construction
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`disputes prior to a § 101 analysis" since "the determination of patent eligibility requires a
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`full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter," the Federal
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`Circuit "perceive[ d) no flaw in the notion that claim construction is not an inviolable
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`prerequisite to a validity determination under§ 1 01." /d.
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`The court notes that, while plaintiff in this case did argue that claim construction
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`should occur prior to a§ 101 analysis (D.I. 250 at 5), plaintiff did not explain how claim
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`construction might alter such analysis. At oral argument, plaintiff also failed to articulate
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`a compelling reason why the court would lack a full understanding of the claimed
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`subject matter if it did not first construe the claims. In light of this and the foregoing
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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: 2701
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`case law, the court concludes that it may proceed without the benefit of claim
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`construction.
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`C. The Machine or Transformation Test
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`1. The parties' positions
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`Defendants argue, in support of their motion, that:
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`The '060 patent merely claims the abstract concept of gathering, organizing
`and forwarding data. The '060 claims are not tied to any specific machine
`... and do not involve the transformation of any article.
`. . .
`Instead,
`according to CyberFone, the claims encompass collecting, organizing and
`forwarding data regarding virtually any transaction in any field of commercial
`endeavor. Accordingly,[§ 1 01] precludes CyberFonefrom preventing others
`from practicing this undeniably abstract concept of collecting, organizing and
`forwarding information about a transaction.
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`(D. I. 228 at 3)
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`Plaintiff responds by arguing that claim 1 meets both the transformation and
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`machine prongs of the MOTT. According to plaintiff, the transformation prong is met
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`because claim 1 requires that a data transaction be "transformed into multiple data
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`transactions and sent over a channel to different destinations. The sending of these
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`exploded data transactions effects a transformation in the devices that receive them."
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`(D.I. 250 at 13) In other words, plaintiff appears to argue that: 1) the data is
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`transformed by being converted into data subsets; and 2) a storage device is changed
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`when it incorporates new data. The machine test, plaintiff asserts, is met because "the
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`telephone is a specific machine that plays a significant part in permitting claim 1 of the
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`'060 patent to be performed." (D. I. 250 at 10) Specifically, plaintiff notes that the
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`telephone is responsible for obtaining data transactions. (/d. at 11-12) Plaintiff also
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`argues that "the sending of exploded data transactions over a channel ... also requires
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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 12 of 18 PageID #: 2702
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`a machine."5 (!d. at 13)
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`2. Claim 1 's component parts
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`As plaintiff notes, and the Federal Circuit emphasized in CLS Bank International
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`v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., No. 2011-1301, 2012 WL 2708400, at *9 (Fed Cir. July 9,
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`2012), '"all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
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`nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.' Any claim can be stripped down, or
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`simplified, removing all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something that could
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`be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed." /d. (citing Mayo Collaborative
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`Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)). However,
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`nothing in the Supreme Court's precedent, nor in [the Federal Circuit's],
`allows a court to go hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete,
`palpable, tangible, and otherwise not abstract invention the patentee actually
`claims.
`It is fundamentally improper to paraphrase a claim in overly
`simplistic generalities in assessing whether the claim falls under the limited
`'abstract ideas' exception to patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Patent
`eligibility must be evaluated based on what the claims recite, not merely on
`the ideas upon which they are premised.
`
`/d.
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`Cognizant of this admonition, the court turns to claim 1. 6 Claim 1 recites a three
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`step process. The first entails "obtaining data transaction information entered on a
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`5 Because plaintiff only summarily makes this argument and does not indicate
`what type of machine is required, the court addresses this argument no further. See
`Bilski I, 545 F.3d at 961 ("[T]he use of a specific machine or transformation of an
`article must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart patent-eligibility")
`(emphasis added).
`
`6 In its brief, plaintiff focuses solely on how claim 1 is patent-eligible under§
`101. (See D.l. 250 at 10-14 in 11-827) No argument is made with respect to claims 13
`or 18 despite defendants raising the ineligibility of those claims. Given plaintiffs focus,
`the court deals only with claim 1.
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`10
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`telephone from a single transmission." In other words, the first step involves obtaining
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`or capturing data. The second step entails "forming a plurality of different exploded
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`transactions" from the single transmission. In other words, the second step involves the
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`sorting or organizing of data into data subsets. The third and final step entails "sending
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`said different exploded data transactions over a channel to different destinations." In
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`other words, the last step involves sending data to a storage location. Analyzing and
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`interpreting a claim by breaking it down into its relevant steps, as the court has done
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`here, is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, see e.g. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at
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`1297-98, and consistent with the Federal Circuit's guidance in CLS, 2012 WL 2708400,
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`at *9.
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`3. The transformation prong
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`Plaintiff's argument that the data and/or data storage devices are transformed is
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`unpersuasive. As the Federal Circuit explained in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
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`Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (a case dealing with a method of
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`detecting credit card fraud perpetrated over the internet), the "mere collection and
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`organization of data regarding credit card numbers and Internet addresses is
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`insufficient to meet the transformation prong of the [MOTT]." Likewise, no
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`transformation can be said to have occurred in claim 1 via the second step where the
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`data is organized into data subsets. See also Bancorp, 2012 WL 3037176, at *5
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`(affirming the district court's finding that "the claims do not effect a transformation, as
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`they 'do not transform the raw data into anything other than more data and are not
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`representations of any physically existing objects'"). The court also rejects plaintiff's
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`claim that the storage device is transformed when it receives the transmitted data. The
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`storage device is not transformed into a "different state or thing" by the mere receipt of
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`additional electronic data.
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`4. The machine prong
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`"[A] machine is a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and
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`combination of devices. This includes every mechanical device or combination of
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`mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect
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`or result." In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir 2009) (citations and
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`quotations omitted). Generally speaking, for a machine to make an otherwise
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`unpatentable process patent eligible, it must place a meaningful limit on the scope of
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`the claim and be integral to the process. The court finds Bancorp and SiRF
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`Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
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`2010) instructive in this regard.
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`In Bancorp, where the asserted patents disclosed "specific formulae for
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`determining the values required to manage a stable value protected life insurance
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`policy," the district court granted summary judgment of invalidity under§ 101. Bancorp,
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`2012 WL 3037176, at *4. Under the machine prong of the MOTT, the district court
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`found that "the specified computer components are no more than objects on which the
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`claimed methods operate, and that the central processor is nothing more than a general
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`purpose computer programmed in an unspecified manner." /d.
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`In affirming the district
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`court's findings, the Federal Circuit explained that
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`the use of a computer in an otherwise patent ineligible process for no more
`than its most basic function-making calculations or computations-fails to
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`circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental
`processes. As we have explained, "[s]imply adding a 'computer aided'
`limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient
`to render the claim patent eligible." Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d
`1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible
`process, a computer must be integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the
`process in a way that a person making calculations or computations could
`not.
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`/d. at *9-1 0. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that "[t]he computer required by
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`some of Bancorp's claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance
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`of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope
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`of those claims." /d. at *1 0.
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`In contrast to Bancorp, the Federal Circuit in SiRF found that a GPS receiver
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`was "integral" to the claims at issue and, therefore, the MOTT was met. SiRF, 601 F.3d
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`at 1332. As in Bancorp, the SiRF Court also emphasized that a machine will only
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`"impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim [when it plays] a significant part in
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`permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an
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`obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through
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`the utilization of a computer for performing calculations." /d. at 1333. After noting how
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`the GPS receiver was specifically involved in each step of the method, the Court
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`concluded that "the use of the GPS receiver is essential to the operation of the claimed
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`methods." /d.
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`It is apparent, when comparing Bancorp and SiRF, that a spectrum exists with
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`respect to computer-based implementation limitations. At one end of the spectrum is
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`Bancorp and a general purpose computer that is generically performing calculations; at
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`the other end is SiRF and a GPS receiver that performs specific operations essential to
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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 2706
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`the claimed methods. In CLS, the Federal Circuit was again confronted with where a
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`claim fell on this spectrum. CLS, 2012 WL 2708400, at *1 ("This case presents, once
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`again, the question of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of an invention
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`implemented by computers."). The patents at issue in CLS described "a computerized
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`trading platform for exchanging obligations in which a trusted third party settles
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`obligations between a first and second party so as to eliminate 'settlement risk[,]"
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`"settlement risk [being] the risk that only one party's obligation will be paid, leaving the
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`other party without its principal." /d. After specifically highlighting the relevant case law
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`on the issue of computer usage and the MOTT, the Court summarized the spectrum in
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`this way: "It can, thus, be appreciated that a claim that is drawn to a specific way of
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`doing something with a computer is likely to be patent eligible whereas a claim to
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`nothing more than the idea of doing that thing on a computer may not." /d. at *9.
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`In the present case, the telephone is the only machine plainly referenced in claim
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`1; it is also the only machine that plaintiff identifies with respect to its MOTT analysis. 7
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`Plaintiff argues that the telephone is involved in step one, i.e., the data capturing step.
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`Inasmuch as this is plaintiff's argument, the telephone is not an integral part of the
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`claim; it simply functions as a means for collecting data whereas the real focus of the
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`claim is the sorting and storing. As the Cybersource Court explained, "mere [data(cid:173)
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`gathering] step[s] cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory."
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`Cybersource, 654 F.3d at 1370 (quotations and citations omitted). In other words, the
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`use of a telephone to capture data does not make the abstract concepts of sorting and
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`7 See supra, pg. 10, note 4.
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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: 2707
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`storing data somehow patent-eligible.
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`To the extent that a machine is also involved in the sorting or organizing step
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`(step two), 8 that machine exists on the Bancorp end of the spectrum. The machine is
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`just a general purpose computing device being asked to do some unspecified sorting
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`function. Claiming a generic "computer-aided" sorting process is insufficient under the
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`machine prong of the MOTT. See Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333. Essentially plaintiff
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`has claimed nothing more than the idea of sorting via machine.
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`D. Abstract Idea
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`Because the Supreme Court has found that the MOTT is not dispositive in a§
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`101 inquiry, the court more generally examines the abstract nature of claim 1. See
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`Cybersource, 654 F.3d at 1371; CLS, 2012 WL 2708400, at *8. As the Federal Circuit
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`has aptly noted, "the dividing line between patent ineligible abstract ideas and those
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`that are not, remains elusive." CLS, 2012 WL 2708400, at *7. Nevertheless, the Court
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`has provided some guidance, explaining as follows:
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`[A]bstract ideas constitute disembodied concepts or truths which are not
`useful from a practical standpoint standing alone, i.e., they are not useful
`until reduced to some practical application. More recently, this court
`explained that the disqualifying characteristic of abstractness must exhibit
`itself manifestly to override the broad statutory categories of patent eligible
`subject matter.
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`8 Presumably, plaintiff does not argue that the phone is involved at step two
`because the specification (unlike claim 1) makes it clear that a data transaction is
`"transferred to a local or remote database server which 'explodes' [i.e., sorts] each data
`transaction into component parts." ('060 patent, col. 2:47-49; 3:32-37) In other words,
`the telephone is not performing a sorting function, it is a database server which does
`that, and since the server is not specifically named in claim 1, plaintiff focused on how
`the telephone is a machine integral to the claimed process. As discussed above,
`regardless of whether the claim is construed such that the telephone is involved at step
`two or a "database server" is, the court still finds that the MOTT is not met.
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`Case 1:11-cv-00827-SLR Document 274 Filed 08/16/12 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: 2708
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`/d. With this guidance in mind, the court finds that the abstract nature of plaintiff's
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`patent is plainly apparent. The patent, broken down into its component parts, recites
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`steps by which data is obtained, sorted and stored. These steps represent nothing
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`more than a disembodied concept of data sorting and storage and, therefore, the court
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`finds the abstract nature of this patented process to be manifestly apparent.
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`V. CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons discussed above, the court finds the '060 patent ineligible under
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`35 U.S.C. § 101 and, therefore, grants defendants' motion for summary judgment. An
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`appropriate order shall issue.
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