`
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_______________
`
`CRS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`Patent of FRONTLINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`_______________
`
`PETITIONER CRS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S REPLY
`TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.220
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`“Website” .............................................................................................. 2
`
`“One or More Computers” .................................................................... 3
`
`“Receiving,” “Generating,” “Posting,” and “Providing” ...................... 4
`
`“Information” ........................................................................................ 4
`
`III. THE ASSERTED CLAIMS COVER PATENT-INELIGIBLE
`SUBJECT MATTER ....................................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`CLS Bank Did Not Change the Law of Patent Eligibility under
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ..................................................................................... 4
`
`B. Method Claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 Only Recite an Abstract Idea ........... 5
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`System Claims 6 and 7 Only Recite an Abstract Idea .......................... 7
`
`Frontline’s Attempts to Distinguish Bancorp Are Unavailing ........... 11
`
`The PTO Has Consistently Found Claims such as Those at
`Issue Ineligible for Patent Protection .................................................. 12
`
`The Claims Are Not Patent-Eligible Even Considering Them in
`Their Entirety as Frontline Urges ........................................................ 13
`
`IV. ADDITIONAL FACTS BEARING ON THE JURISDICTIONAL
`RECORD ....................................................................................................... 14
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`FEDERAL CASES
`Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (US),
`687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 11
`
`Page(s)
`
`In re Bilski,
`545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) .............................................................. 6
`
`Bilski v. Kappos,
`130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) .................................................................................. 11, 14
`
`Ex Parte Caccavale,
`No. 2009-006026, 2010 WL 2901727 (B.P.A.I. July 23, 2010) ........................ 12
`
`CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., Appeal No. 2011-1301
`(Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) .................................................................................. 4-5
`
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) ............................................................................................ 11
`
`Ex Parte Edelson,
`No. 2011-004285, 2012 WL 417467 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 7, 2012) ............................ 12
`
`Fuzzysharp Technologies Inc. v. 3dLabs Inc.,
`447 F. Appx. 182 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4,2011) ......................................................... 10
`
`Ex Parte Guetta,
`No. 2008-4366, 2009 WL 2563524 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 10, 2009) ........................... 12
`
`Ex Parte Kelkar,
`No. 2009-004635, 2010 WL 3768175 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010) ....................... 12
`
`In re Nuijten,
`500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................................. 7
`
`Ex Parte Ramanujam,
`No. 2009-002483, 2010 WL 3214559 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) ................. 10, 13
`
`Ex Parte Russo,
`No. 2009-001876, 2010 WL 3441058 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 30, 2010) ....................... 13
`ii
`
`
`
`
`
`Ex Parte Starkey,
`No. 2010-007809, 2011 WL 4434501 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 20, 2011) ....................... 12
`
`Ex Parte Venkata,
`No. 2009-007302, 2010 WL 3934573 ................................................................ 13
`
`Ex Parte Webb,
`No. 2010-008274, 2012 WL 417450 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 7, 2012) ............................ 13
`
`
`
`FEDERAL STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 .................................................................................................passim
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`Frontline concedes that “[a] claim that does nothing more than recite an ab-
`
`stract idea and then state that the idea should be implemented on a computer is not
`
`patent-eligible; it is akin to simply taking a law of nature and saying ‘apply it.’”
`
`Frontline Response at 24. Frontline, however, never explains why its claims do
`
`more than recite an abstract idea—automated substitute fulfillment—implemented
`
`on a computer.
`
`Frontline relies heavily on the declaration of its expert, Edward Yourdon
`
`(Frontline Ex. 2003), but Mr. Yourdon never reviewed the Board’s decision insti-
`
`tuting this proceeding and he disclaimed any intention to address the scope of any
`
`claim. CRS Ex. 1013 at 4-5, 43-44. The thrust of his testimony was that comput-
`
`ers, web sites, and databases had to be “intentionally programmed,” but he conced-
`
`ed that the elements recited in the claims were not “specially” programmed or for-
`
`matted in the sense of requiring anything out of the ordinary or even requiring any
`
`particular types of computers, web sites, or databases programmed or formatted in
`
`any particular way. CRS Ex. 1013 at 8-14, 19-20, 23-27, 33-42.
`
`The ‘151 patent neither claims nor discloses anything other than a generic
`
`system and method for automated substitute fulfillment. This is not eligible for pa-
`
`tent protection.
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`Frontline declined to challenge Petitioner’s claim construction in its Initial
`
`Response. See Paper No. 16. Although Frontline addresses this issue in its re-
`
`sponse, none of Frontline’s constructions materially affects the section 101 analysis.1
`
`“Website”2
`
`A.
`Frontline relies on a computer dictionary to define “web site” as “a file or re-
`
`lated group of files available on the World Wide Web” instead of the Board’s con-
`
`struction (“one or more related HTML-coded webpages on the World Wide
`
`Web”). Frontline Response at 13. This is a difference without distinction because
`
`the “World Wide Web” is “a system of extensively interlinked hypertext docu-
`
`ments,” and HTML (hypertext markup language) is the standard protocol for for-
`
`matting and displaying documents on the World Wide Web. CRS Ex. 1014.
`
`Frontline’s proposed construction is so broad in that it would permit a ZIP
`
`
`1 These comments are designed to complete the record for Frontline’s constructions that are most
`
`incorrect.
`
` Frontline does not challenge the Board’s adoption of CRS’s construction of the terms “Internet
`
` 2
`
`communication link,” “communication link,” or “database,” or even address the Court’s
`
`construction of “organization worksite” or “posting.”
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`file3 downloaded from a webpage to qualify as the claimed “website.” A ZIP file,
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`however, would not necessarily need to be programmed and would not provide the
`
`website interface envisioned by the ’151 specification. See CRS Ex. 1 at col. 7, ll.
`
`31-40. Although a collection of files comprising a website can be stored in a .ZIP
`
`file and then transferred over the Internet, such files, while stored in a ZIP file,
`
`cannot be accessed by an absent worker or a substitute worker through the Internet
`
`unless and until the Zip file is unzipped and made accessible by a web server.
`
`Thus, one skilled in the art would not interpret the claim language to include a ZIP
`
`file in the definition of “website.”
`
`“One or More Computers”
`
`B.
`Frontline contends that “one or more computers” means “one or more ma-
`
`chines capable of executing instructions on data,” not “one or more general-
`
`purpose computational devices.” Frontline Response at 14. Frontline chooses to
`
`define “computer” by its capabilities rather than what it actually is, even though
`
`the Federal Circuit s recently affirmed the invalidity of system claims that “re-
`
`cite[d] a handful of computer components in generic, functional terms that would
`
`
`3 ZIP files (also often referred to as “compressed files”) are one or more files on a computer disk
`
`that have been combined into a single file in a space-efficient manner to reduce their total file
`
`size, and would thus be included within Patent Owner’s proposed construction. CRS Ex. 1017.
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`encompass any device capable of performing the same ubiquitous calculation, stor-
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`age, and connectivity functions.” CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.,
`
`Appeal No. 2011-1301, slip op. at 34 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (Lourie, J. concur-
`
`ring).
`
`“Receiving,” “Generating,” “Posting,” and “Providing”
`
`C.
`Frontline’s proposed constructions of these terms are not the broadest rea-
`
`sonable constructions in the context of the specific claims at issue. In addition, Pe-
`
`titioner’s constructions, which the Board adopted in whole or in part, also reflect
`
`dictionary definitions. See, e.g., CRS Ex. 1014 (“receive” (“to get or be informed
`
`of: to receive instructions . . .”), “post” (“to place text on a Web site”), and “pro-
`
`vide” (“to make available)”). “Create” is likewise a recognized synonym for “gen-
`
`erate.” CRS Ex. 1014.
`
`“Information”
`
`D.
`Frontline contends “information” means “data,” not “any type of data that
`
`may be stored or recorded.” Frontline Response at 18. Frontline’s construction
`
`just makes its claims broader and less likely to be eligible for patent protection.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III. THE ASSERTED CLAIMS COVER
`
`PATENT-INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
`A. CLS Bank Did Not Change the Law of
`Patent Eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
`CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., Appeal No. 2011-1301
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`(Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (per curiam), did not alter the outcome of that case or any
`
`Federal Circuit precedent. A majority of the Court affirmed the district court’s
`
`holding that the method and computer-readable media claims were not directed to
`
`eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and the court’s deadlock affirmed
`
`the district court’s holding that the system claims also failed to recite eligible sub-
`
`ject matter. Moreover, “eight judges, a majority, have concluded that the particular
`
`method, medium, and system claims at issue in this case should rise or fall together
`
`in the § 101 analysis.” Id. at 2 n.1 (Lourie, J., concurring).
`
`B. Method Claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 Only Recite an Abstract Idea
`Frontline misunderstands the reasoning of the various courts. It maintains
`
`that “‘the one or more computers,’ ‘the website,’ the ‘one or more communication
`
`link,’ and the Internet communication link’ are integral to the claimed operations.”
`
`Frontline Response at 26. In doing so, it mistakenly assumes that its claims are
`
`valid under section 101 because the claimed operations “only work, as intended,
`
`when carried out using the recited ‘computers,’ ‘website,” and ‘communication
`
`link[s]’” and, indeed, that “it is not possible” for it to accomplish a “computer-
`
`based way of providing substitute fulfillment” without them. Id. at 26-27. That
`
`uncontroverted point is irrelevant.
`
`To avoid preempting the abstract concept of automated substitute fulfill-
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`ment,4 Frontline needed to include in its claims limitations of substance that mate-
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`rially narrowed the claims relative to that abstract idea. The method claims, how-
`
`ever, only recite generic computers, a website, and communication links. This is
`
`not enough to satisfy section 101.5
`
`In his declaration, Mr. Yourdon asserts that the claims do not recite “generic
`
`technology” (Frontline Ex. 2003 at ¶ 12), but he appears to limit “generic technol-
`
`ogy” to unprogrammed computers. With respect to claim 3, he asserted the “one
`
`or more computers” must be “specially programmed and configured to cooperate
`
`with a specially programmed ‘website,’ and interface with the ‘communication
`
`links,’ in order to provide the specific series of operations that are recited in the
`
`claim.” Id.; see also id. at ¶¶ 11, 14, 18. At his deposition, however, Mr. Your-
`
`don admitted that, by “specially” programmed, he merely meant “specifically or
`
`deliberately or consciously.” CRS Ex. 1013 at 9-10, 14, 36-37.
`
`All computers and websites require programming and require interfaces and
`
`communication links to communicate with each other, and programming occurs
`
`
`4 According to Frontline’s expert, the claims recite a “website” that need not be accessible via
`
`the Internet. CRS Ex. 1013 at 14.
`
`5 Frontline could have amended its claims during reexamination, which occurred after In re Bil-
`
`ski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), but declined to do so.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`deliberately, not “unconsciously.” Mr. Yourdon himself admitted that he could not
`
`think of an example of programming that was not a conscious, deliberate act. CRS
`
`Ex. 1013 at 9-10. He also admitted that he was not suggesting the claims required
`
`a specific type of programming or certain types of computers that could be used
`
`when he used the term “specially programmed” in his declaration. CRS Ex. 1013
`
`at 12-13.
`
`Thus, the method claims are the epitome of an abstract idea employing ge-
`
`neric hardware to accomplish a goal (automatic substitute fulfillment) without lim-
`
`iting the hardware or software can to achieve such a result.
`
`System Claims 6 and 7 Only Recite an Abstract Idea
`
`C.
`Frontline also contends that “[a] ‘machine’ comprising a ‘database’ and ‘one
`
`or more computers comprising a server’ such as is recited in claims 6 [and 7] is ‘a
`
`concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devic-
`
`es” and therefore is not merely an abstract idea. Frontline Response at 22-23
`
`(quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). However, whether
`
`claims 6 and 7 recite a physical machine does not end the analysis. Claims 6 and 7
`
`are indistinguishable from and mirror Frontline’s method claims, and are just an al-
`
`ternative format for claiming the same underlying patent-ineligible subject matter.
`
`With respect to claim 6, Mr. Yourdon again alleges “the ‘one or more com-
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`puters’ must be specially programmed and configured to cooperate with a specially
`
`programmed ‘website,’ and interface with the ‘communication links,’ in order to
`
`provide the specific series of operations that are recited in the claim.” Frontline
`
`Ex. 2003 at ¶ 12. The computers and website in claim 6, however, are the same
`
`“specifically programmed” (i.e., deliberately programmed) computers and website
`
`he discussed in connection with method claim 3. CRS Ex. 1013 at 33-34. He also
`
`conceded that he did not know the details of any special programming and config-
`
`uring required for the computers to interface with the communication links, that the
`
`claim was not limited to a particular kind of communication link, and that there
`
`were different ways in which computers could be programmed to communicate
`
`with them. CRS Ex. 1013 at 38-41.
`
`As with the method claims, these system claims recite nothing more than
`
`conventional computers, communication links, and websites. The only difference
`
`is the explicit recitation of a database of worker and substitute records. Again, Mr.
`
`Yourdon asserts in his declaration that the claimed database of claim 6 “has been
`
`specifically formatted to contain the data as recited in the claim.” Frontline Ex.
`
`2003 at ¶ 12. At his deposition, however, Mr. Yourdon explained, as he did with
`
`regard to “computer,” that, by “specially formatted” database, he merely meant
`
`that it was “consciously and deliberately” formatted. CRS Ex. 1013 at 33.
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`Mr. Yourdon also testified that he did not base his understanding that claim
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`6 required a specially-formatted database on the language of claim 6, but instead
`
`on some unspecified language in the specification that referred to an “Oracle or
`
`Oracle-like database.” CRS Ex. 1013 at 17-18. Mr. Yourdon also asserted that the
`
`specification included other limitations to the database as “to the specific data ele-
`
`ments or fields that must be contained within the database and the relationships
`
`that must exist between groups of those fields and other groups of fields.” CRS
`
`Ex. 1013 at 18; see also CRS Ex. 1013 at 19, 27-31. Neither he nor Frontline in
`
`their Response identified these limitations.
`
`Frontline misplaces reliance on the presence of a database limitation in its
`
`system claims to try to salvage patent validity. Frontline Response at 34. The
`
`claimed database in this case is entirely generic.
`
`Although claim 6 identifies the type of data in the database (worker records
`
`having information associated with workers for each of the organizations and sub-
`
`stitute records having information associated with at least one substitute worker), it
`
`does not explain how to format the database or store the data. Mr. Yourdon admit-
`
`ted the claims did not spell out any detailed components of the database. CRS Ex.
`
`1013 at 19-20. He likewise conceded that claim 6 did not require anything other
`
`than worker records and substitute records. CRS Ex. 1013 at 23-24. He also could
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`not identify anything in claim 6 that further specifies the information associated
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`with the workers, or what information associated with substitutes had to be other
`
`than the position a given substitute eventually accepts. CRS Ex. 1013 at 24-26.
`
`Rather, the claim only recites only generic computer storage and, as such,
`
`does not impart patentability to the abstract concept claimed. Fuzzysharp Tech-
`
`nologies Inc. v. 3dLabs Inc., 447 F. Appx. 182, 185 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4,2011) (find-
`
`ing that the recitation of general-purpose computer storage did not impart “‘mean-
`
`ingful limits’ on the claim’s scope”); see also Ex Parte Ramanujam, No. 2009-
`
`002483, 2010 WL 3214559, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) (nominal recitations of
`
`structure held insufficient to bring an apparatus claim comprising a destination
`
`storage unit within the scope of statutory subject matter).
`
`Even the specification’s references to an “Oracle or Oracle-like database”
`
`only define conventional databases and do not limit the scope of the claims. Like-
`
`wise, discussion in the specification concerning data record fields in one embodi-
`
`ment does not make the database specific rather than generic. None of the dis-
`
`closed data record fields is required by the claims. Moreover, the content of the
`
`data places no limitations on the manner in which the database is to be structured
`
`or formatted for the storage and retrieval of such data.
`
`System claims 6 and 7 are not meaningfully different from the method
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`claims at issue and should fall for the same reason. They merely recite an abstract
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`idea of automated substitute fulfillment, and none of the recited hardware offers a
`
`meaningful limitation beyond generically linking “the use of the [method] to a par-
`
`ticular technological environment,” that is, implementation via one or more com-
`
`puters that communicate with a website over the Internet. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
`
`Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)).
`
`D.
`Frontline’s Attempts to Distinguish Bancorp Are Unavailing
`Frontline attempts to distinguish Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assur.
`
`Co. of Canada (US), 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) on the ground that the claims
`
`in that case used a computer to accelerate the mental process of performing math-
`
`ematical calculations, as opposed to using a computing structure “specially pro-
`
`grammed to perform interactive operations that result in securing a substitute.”
`
`Frontline Response at 30. This is not a meaningful distinction because the asserted
`
`claims use a computer to accelerate the process of securing substitutes, which is
`
`also an abstract idea. In fact, as its Response explains, Frontline has replaced the
`
`special machines of the prior art with use of the Internet. Frontline Response at 6,
`
`37-38. That limitation, however, does not save the claims, which cannot be made
`
`patent eligible “by limiting an abstract idea to one field of use,” namely, substitute
`
`fulfillment by Internet. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct at 3231.
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`The PTO Has Consistently Found Claims such as
`Those at Issue Ineligible for Patent Protection
`
`E.
`
`This tribunal has rejected attempts like Frontline’s to rely on generic hard-
`
`ware to save claims. For example, in Ex Parte Guetta, No. 2008-4366, 2009 WL
`
`2563524 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 10, 2009), the Board found claims that “on their face”
`
`were directed to machines were “nonetheless nonstatutory.” Id. at *1. This in-
`
`cluded claims to a “system” comprising a “memory,” and a “processor” configured
`
`to determine the best way to minimize variance. Id. at *2. While the recited
`
`“memory and processor clearly introduced structure into the claim,” the broad
`
`claims placed no meaningful limitations on the generic memory or the generic
`
`computer recited, and thus fell into the “abstract idea” exception. Id. at *10. Ac-
`
`cordingly, the Board has consistently found ineligible for patent protection both
`
`computer-implemented method6 and system7 claims under section 101 that were
`
`6 See, e.g., Ex Parte Caccavale, No. 2009-006026, 2010 WL 2901727, at *6 (B.P.A.I. July 23,
`
`2010) (rejecting a claim to a method of analysis of performance of a data processing system that
`
`included an “industry standard database”); Ex Parte Kelkar, No. 2009-004635, 2010 WL
`
`3768175, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010) (rejecting method for determining similarity between
`
`portions of gene expression profiles requiring use of a computer that was “not limited to a
`
`particular machine”); Ex Parte Starkey, No. 2010-007809, 2011 WL 4434501, at *3 (B.P.A.I.
`
`Sept. 20, 2011) (finding that “[a]t most, a ‘computer-implemented method’ ties the process to
`
`any general-purpose computer”); Ex Parte Edelson, No. 2011-004285, 2012 WL 417467, at *4
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`not tied to a specific machine.
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`F.
`
`The Claims Are Not Patent-Eligible Even Considering
`Them in Their Entirety as Frontline Urges
`
`Frontline contends that Petitioner has dissected the invention into old and
`
`new parts and failed to consider the invention as a whole (Frontline Response at
`
`31-35), but that is not accurate. Petitioner has explained that the invention as a
`
`whole is the abstract idea of automated substitute fulfillment using generic com-
`
`
`(B.P.A.I. Feb. 7, 2012) (rejecting claims to a “computer implemented method” for creating asset-
`
`backed derivatives that did not recite any particular link to a particular machine “even if some
`
`physical steps are required to obtain information from the database”); Ex Parte Webb, No. 2010-
`
`008274, 2012 WL 417450, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 7, 2012) (rejecting method claims because patent
`
`would “cover both known and unknown uses of the concept and be performed through any exist-
`
`ing or future-devised machinery.”).
`
`7 See, e.g., Ex Parte Russo, No. 2009-001876, 2010 WL 3441058, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 30, 2010)
`
`(rejecting claims for a system of grouping a community of users within a directory structure re-
`
`citing “tools” and “resources,” a “directory,” and a “mapping”); Ex Parte Ramanujam, No. 2009-
`
`002483, 2010 WL 3214559, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) (rejecting claims to an apparatus
`
`comprising, inter alia, a “destination storage location,” an “architectural register,” a “functional
`
`unit” that processes packed format values, and a “decoder”); Ex Parte Venkata, No. 2009-
`
`007302, 2010 WL 3934573, at *1 (rejecting a claim directed to a “service discovery system,” a
`
`“service discovery agent,” and “service discovery protocols”).
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`puter equipment. Because Frontline’s claims, as a whole, do not recite improved
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`computer technology, they must be tied to specific computers, databases, commu-
`
`nication links, and websites to avoid preempting the field of automated substitution
`
`fulfillment, and lying outside the ambit of patent protection.
`
`Frontline notes that it amended its claims to avoid prior art, requiring that
`
`the computers generate and post a list of positions that a prequalified substitute
`
`could accept and secure, as opposed to an approach where the computing system
`
`electronically receives applications from substitutes and awards a vacant position
`
`to a qualified applicant. Frontline Response at 40-41. The presence of such limita-
`
`tions is irrelevant for section 101 purposes. The sequence of the offer and ac-
`
`ceptance steps does not add any specificity to the generic computers, database,
`
`communication links, or website in the claims, so the claim as a whole remains a
`
`patent-ineligible, abstract idea under Bilski.
`
`IV. ADDITIONAL FACTS BEARING ON
`THE JURISDICTIONAL RECORD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Frontline maintained in its Preliminary Response that the claims were not di-
`
`rected to systems or methods for performing data processing or other operations
`
`used in the practice, administration or management of a financial product or ser-
`
`vice. See, e.g., Paper No. 16 at 1. It went on to argue “[t]he possibility of the
`
`claimed invention being used in the management of financial products or services
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`is not enough to satisfy the requirements for review.” Paper No. 16 at 14.
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`. Because Frontline has indicated it intends to challenge the Board’s jurisdic-
`
`tion on appeal, these exhibits provides evidentiary support for the Board’s decision
`
`that the ‘151 patent is within its jurisdiction under the AIA.
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 fail to recite patent
`
`eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and should be invalidated.
`
`
`
`Dated: May 20, 2013
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`By: /s/ E. Robert Yoches
`E. Robert Yoches, Reg. No. 30,120
`Darrel C. Karl, pro hac vice
`Aaron J. Capron, Reg. No. 56,170
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`901 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20001-4413
`Phone: (202) 408-4000
`Fax: (202) 408-4400
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`CRS Advanced Technologies, Inc.
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on this 20th day of May, 2013, a true and correct copy
`
`of the foregoing PETITIONER CRS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’s
`
`REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.220 was served via electronic mail upon the following counsel of record for Pa-
`
`tent Owner Frontline Technologies, Inc.:
`
`John P. Donohue, Jr., Lead Counsel
`Woodcock Washburn, LLP
`Cira Centre – 12th Floor
`2929 Arch Street
`Philadelphia, PA 19103
`Phone: 215.568.3100
`Fax: 215.568.3439
`Email: donohue@woodcock.com
`
`John E. McGlynn, Back-up Counsel
`Woodcock Washburn, LLP
`Cira Centre – 12th Floor
`2929 Arch Street
`Philadelphia, PA 19104
`Phone: 215.564.8382
`Fax: 215.568.3439
`Email: mcglynn@woodcock.com
`
`R. Scott Tewes
`Tewes Law Group LLC
`Sugarloaf Corporate Center
`2180 Satellite Blvd., Suite 400
`Duluth, GA 30097
`STewes@TewesLaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Jacob Mersing
`Jacob Mersing
`Legal Assistant
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`
`2
`
`