throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_______________
`
`CRS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`Patent of FRONTLINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`_______________
`
`PETITIONER CRS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S REPLY
`TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.220
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 2 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
`
`“Website” .............................................................................................. 2 
`
`“One or More Computers” .................................................................... 3 
`
`“Receiving,” “Generating,” “Posting,” and “Providing” ...................... 4 
`
`“Information” ........................................................................................ 4 
`
`III.  THE ASSERTED CLAIMS COVER PATENT-INELIGIBLE
`SUBJECT MATTER ....................................................................................... 4 
`
`A. 
`
`CLS Bank Did Not Change the Law of Patent Eligibility under
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ..................................................................................... 4 
`
`B.  Method Claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 Only Recite an Abstract Idea ........... 5 
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
`
`E. 
`
`F. 
`
`System Claims 6 and 7 Only Recite an Abstract Idea .......................... 7 
`
`Frontline’s Attempts to Distinguish Bancorp Are Unavailing ........... 11 
`
`The PTO Has Consistently Found Claims such as Those at
`Issue Ineligible for Patent Protection .................................................. 12 
`
`The Claims Are Not Patent-Eligible Even Considering Them in
`Their Entirety as Frontline Urges ........................................................ 13 
`
`IV.  ADDITIONAL FACTS BEARING ON THE JURISDICTIONAL
`RECORD ....................................................................................................... 14 
`
`V. 
`
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 15 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`FEDERAL CASES
`Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (US),
`687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 11
`
`Page(s)
`
`In re Bilski,
`545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) .............................................................. 6
`
`Bilski v. Kappos,
`130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) .................................................................................. 11, 14
`
`Ex Parte Caccavale,
`No. 2009-006026, 2010 WL 2901727 (B.P.A.I. July 23, 2010) ........................ 12
`
`CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., Appeal No. 2011-1301
`(Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) .................................................................................. 4-5
`
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) ............................................................................................ 11
`
`Ex Parte Edelson,
`No. 2011-004285, 2012 WL 417467 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 7, 2012) ............................ 12
`
`Fuzzysharp Technologies Inc. v. 3dLabs Inc.,
`447 F. Appx. 182 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4,2011) ......................................................... 10
`
`Ex Parte Guetta,
`No. 2008-4366, 2009 WL 2563524 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 10, 2009) ........................... 12
`
`Ex Parte Kelkar,
`No. 2009-004635, 2010 WL 3768175 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010) ....................... 12
`
`In re Nuijten,
`500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................................. 7
`
`Ex Parte Ramanujam,
`No. 2009-002483, 2010 WL 3214559 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) ................. 10, 13
`
`Ex Parte Russo,
`No. 2009-001876, 2010 WL 3441058 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 30, 2010) ....................... 13
`ii
`
`
`
`

`

`Ex Parte Starkey,
`No. 2010-007809, 2011 WL 4434501 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 20, 2011) ....................... 12
`
`Ex Parte Venkata,
`No. 2009-007302, 2010 WL 3934573 ................................................................ 13
`
`Ex Parte Webb,
`No. 2010-008274, 2012 WL 417450 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 7, 2012) ............................ 13
`
`
`
`FEDERAL STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 .................................................................................................passim
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`Frontline concedes that “[a] claim that does nothing more than recite an ab-
`
`stract idea and then state that the idea should be implemented on a computer is not
`
`patent-eligible; it is akin to simply taking a law of nature and saying ‘apply it.’”
`
`Frontline Response at 24. Frontline, however, never explains why its claims do
`
`more than recite an abstract idea—automated substitute fulfillment—implemented
`
`on a computer.
`
`Frontline relies heavily on the declaration of its expert, Edward Yourdon
`
`(Frontline Ex. 2003), but Mr. Yourdon never reviewed the Board’s decision insti-
`
`tuting this proceeding and he disclaimed any intention to address the scope of any
`
`claim. CRS Ex. 1013 at 4-5, 43-44. The thrust of his testimony was that comput-
`
`ers, web sites, and databases had to be “intentionally programmed,” but he conced-
`
`ed that the elements recited in the claims were not “specially” programmed or for-
`
`matted in the sense of requiring anything out of the ordinary or even requiring any
`
`particular types of computers, web sites, or databases programmed or formatted in
`
`any particular way. CRS Ex. 1013 at 8-14, 19-20, 23-27, 33-42.
`
`The ‘151 patent neither claims nor discloses anything other than a generic
`
`system and method for automated substitute fulfillment. This is not eligible for pa-
`
`tent protection.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`Frontline declined to challenge Petitioner’s claim construction in its Initial
`
`Response. See Paper No. 16. Although Frontline addresses this issue in its re-
`
`sponse, none of Frontline’s constructions materially affects the section 101 analysis.1
`
`“Website”2
`
`A.
`Frontline relies on a computer dictionary to define “web site” as “a file or re-
`
`lated group of files available on the World Wide Web” instead of the Board’s con-
`
`struction (“one or more related HTML-coded webpages on the World Wide
`
`Web”). Frontline Response at 13. This is a difference without distinction because
`
`the “World Wide Web” is “a system of extensively interlinked hypertext docu-
`
`ments,” and HTML (hypertext markup language) is the standard protocol for for-
`
`matting and displaying documents on the World Wide Web. CRS Ex. 1014.
`
`Frontline’s proposed construction is so broad in that it would permit a ZIP
`
`
`1 These comments are designed to complete the record for Frontline’s constructions that are most
`
`incorrect.
`
` Frontline does not challenge the Board’s adoption of CRS’s construction of the terms “Internet
`
` 2
`
`communication link,” “communication link,” or “database,” or even address the Court’s
`
`construction of “organization worksite” or “posting.”
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`file3 downloaded from a webpage to qualify as the claimed “website.” A ZIP file,
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`however, would not necessarily need to be programmed and would not provide the
`
`website interface envisioned by the ’151 specification. See CRS Ex. 1 at col. 7, ll.
`
`31-40. Although a collection of files comprising a website can be stored in a .ZIP
`
`file and then transferred over the Internet, such files, while stored in a ZIP file,
`
`cannot be accessed by an absent worker or a substitute worker through the Internet
`
`unless and until the Zip file is unzipped and made accessible by a web server.
`
`Thus, one skilled in the art would not interpret the claim language to include a ZIP
`
`file in the definition of “website.”
`
`“One or More Computers”
`
`B.
`Frontline contends that “one or more computers” means “one or more ma-
`
`chines capable of executing instructions on data,” not “one or more general-
`
`purpose computational devices.” Frontline Response at 14. Frontline chooses to
`
`define “computer” by its capabilities rather than what it actually is, even though
`
`the Federal Circuit s recently affirmed the invalidity of system claims that “re-
`
`cite[d] a handful of computer components in generic, functional terms that would
`
`
`3 ZIP files (also often referred to as “compressed files”) are one or more files on a computer disk
`
`that have been combined into a single file in a space-efficient manner to reduce their total file
`
`size, and would thus be included within Patent Owner’s proposed construction. CRS Ex. 1017.
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`encompass any device capable of performing the same ubiquitous calculation, stor-
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`age, and connectivity functions.” CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.,
`
`Appeal No. 2011-1301, slip op. at 34 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (Lourie, J. concur-
`
`ring).
`
`“Receiving,” “Generating,” “Posting,” and “Providing”
`
`C.
`Frontline’s proposed constructions of these terms are not the broadest rea-
`
`sonable constructions in the context of the specific claims at issue. In addition, Pe-
`
`titioner’s constructions, which the Board adopted in whole or in part, also reflect
`
`dictionary definitions. See, e.g., CRS Ex. 1014 (“receive” (“to get or be informed
`
`of: to receive instructions . . .”), “post” (“to place text on a Web site”), and “pro-
`
`vide” (“to make available)”). “Create” is likewise a recognized synonym for “gen-
`
`erate.” CRS Ex. 1014.
`
`“Information”
`
`D.
`Frontline contends “information” means “data,” not “any type of data that
`
`may be stored or recorded.” Frontline Response at 18. Frontline’s construction
`
`just makes its claims broader and less likely to be eligible for patent protection.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III. THE ASSERTED CLAIMS COVER
`
`PATENT-INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
`A. CLS Bank Did Not Change the Law of
`Patent Eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
`CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., Appeal No. 2011-1301
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`(Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (per curiam), did not alter the outcome of that case or any
`
`Federal Circuit precedent. A majority of the Court affirmed the district court’s
`
`holding that the method and computer-readable media claims were not directed to
`
`eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and the court’s deadlock affirmed
`
`the district court’s holding that the system claims also failed to recite eligible sub-
`
`ject matter. Moreover, “eight judges, a majority, have concluded that the particular
`
`method, medium, and system claims at issue in this case should rise or fall together
`
`in the § 101 analysis.” Id. at 2 n.1 (Lourie, J., concurring).
`
`B. Method Claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 Only Recite an Abstract Idea
`Frontline misunderstands the reasoning of the various courts. It maintains
`
`that “‘the one or more computers,’ ‘the website,’ the ‘one or more communication
`
`link,’ and the Internet communication link’ are integral to the claimed operations.”
`
`Frontline Response at 26. In doing so, it mistakenly assumes that its claims are
`
`valid under section 101 because the claimed operations “only work, as intended,
`
`when carried out using the recited ‘computers,’ ‘website,” and ‘communication
`
`link[s]’” and, indeed, that “it is not possible” for it to accomplish a “computer-
`
`based way of providing substitute fulfillment” without them. Id. at 26-27. That
`
`uncontroverted point is irrelevant.
`
`To avoid preempting the abstract concept of automated substitute fulfill-
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`ment,4 Frontline needed to include in its claims limitations of substance that mate-
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`rially narrowed the claims relative to that abstract idea. The method claims, how-
`
`ever, only recite generic computers, a website, and communication links. This is
`
`not enough to satisfy section 101.5
`
`In his declaration, Mr. Yourdon asserts that the claims do not recite “generic
`
`technology” (Frontline Ex. 2003 at ¶ 12), but he appears to limit “generic technol-
`
`ogy” to unprogrammed computers. With respect to claim 3, he asserted the “one
`
`or more computers” must be “specially programmed and configured to cooperate
`
`with a specially programmed ‘website,’ and interface with the ‘communication
`
`links,’ in order to provide the specific series of operations that are recited in the
`
`claim.” Id.; see also id. at ¶¶ 11, 14, 18. At his deposition, however, Mr. Your-
`
`don admitted that, by “specially” programmed, he merely meant “specifically or
`
`deliberately or consciously.” CRS Ex. 1013 at 9-10, 14, 36-37.
`
`All computers and websites require programming and require interfaces and
`
`communication links to communicate with each other, and programming occurs
`
`
`4 According to Frontline’s expert, the claims recite a “website” that need not be accessible via
`
`the Internet. CRS Ex. 1013 at 14.
`
`5 Frontline could have amended its claims during reexamination, which occurred after In re Bil-
`
`ski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), but declined to do so.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`deliberately, not “unconsciously.” Mr. Yourdon himself admitted that he could not
`
`think of an example of programming that was not a conscious, deliberate act. CRS
`
`Ex. 1013 at 9-10. He also admitted that he was not suggesting the claims required
`
`a specific type of programming or certain types of computers that could be used
`
`when he used the term “specially programmed” in his declaration. CRS Ex. 1013
`
`at 12-13.
`
`Thus, the method claims are the epitome of an abstract idea employing ge-
`
`neric hardware to accomplish a goal (automatic substitute fulfillment) without lim-
`
`iting the hardware or software can to achieve such a result.
`
`System Claims 6 and 7 Only Recite an Abstract Idea
`
`C.
`Frontline also contends that “[a] ‘machine’ comprising a ‘database’ and ‘one
`
`or more computers comprising a server’ such as is recited in claims 6 [and 7] is ‘a
`
`concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devic-
`
`es” and therefore is not merely an abstract idea. Frontline Response at 22-23
`
`(quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). However, whether
`
`claims 6 and 7 recite a physical machine does not end the analysis. Claims 6 and 7
`
`are indistinguishable from and mirror Frontline’s method claims, and are just an al-
`
`ternative format for claiming the same underlying patent-ineligible subject matter.
`
`With respect to claim 6, Mr. Yourdon again alleges “the ‘one or more com-
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`puters’ must be specially programmed and configured to cooperate with a specially
`
`programmed ‘website,’ and interface with the ‘communication links,’ in order to
`
`provide the specific series of operations that are recited in the claim.” Frontline
`
`Ex. 2003 at ¶ 12. The computers and website in claim 6, however, are the same
`
`“specifically programmed” (i.e., deliberately programmed) computers and website
`
`he discussed in connection with method claim 3. CRS Ex. 1013 at 33-34. He also
`
`conceded that he did not know the details of any special programming and config-
`
`uring required for the computers to interface with the communication links, that the
`
`claim was not limited to a particular kind of communication link, and that there
`
`were different ways in which computers could be programmed to communicate
`
`with them. CRS Ex. 1013 at 38-41.
`
`As with the method claims, these system claims recite nothing more than
`
`conventional computers, communication links, and websites. The only difference
`
`is the explicit recitation of a database of worker and substitute records. Again, Mr.
`
`Yourdon asserts in his declaration that the claimed database of claim 6 “has been
`
`specifically formatted to contain the data as recited in the claim.” Frontline Ex.
`
`2003 at ¶ 12. At his deposition, however, Mr. Yourdon explained, as he did with
`
`regard to “computer,” that, by “specially formatted” database, he merely meant
`
`that it was “consciously and deliberately” formatted. CRS Ex. 1013 at 33.
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Mr. Yourdon also testified that he did not base his understanding that claim
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`6 required a specially-formatted database on the language of claim 6, but instead
`
`on some unspecified language in the specification that referred to an “Oracle or
`
`Oracle-like database.” CRS Ex. 1013 at 17-18. Mr. Yourdon also asserted that the
`
`specification included other limitations to the database as “to the specific data ele-
`
`ments or fields that must be contained within the database and the relationships
`
`that must exist between groups of those fields and other groups of fields.” CRS
`
`Ex. 1013 at 18; see also CRS Ex. 1013 at 19, 27-31. Neither he nor Frontline in
`
`their Response identified these limitations.
`
`Frontline misplaces reliance on the presence of a database limitation in its
`
`system claims to try to salvage patent validity. Frontline Response at 34. The
`
`claimed database in this case is entirely generic.
`
`Although claim 6 identifies the type of data in the database (worker records
`
`having information associated with workers for each of the organizations and sub-
`
`stitute records having information associated with at least one substitute worker), it
`
`does not explain how to format the database or store the data. Mr. Yourdon admit-
`
`ted the claims did not spell out any detailed components of the database. CRS Ex.
`
`1013 at 19-20. He likewise conceded that claim 6 did not require anything other
`
`than worker records and substitute records. CRS Ex. 1013 at 23-24. He also could
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`not identify anything in claim 6 that further specifies the information associated
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`with the workers, or what information associated with substitutes had to be other
`
`than the position a given substitute eventually accepts. CRS Ex. 1013 at 24-26.
`
`Rather, the claim only recites only generic computer storage and, as such,
`
`does not impart patentability to the abstract concept claimed. Fuzzysharp Tech-
`
`nologies Inc. v. 3dLabs Inc., 447 F. Appx. 182, 185 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4,2011) (find-
`
`ing that the recitation of general-purpose computer storage did not impart “‘mean-
`
`ingful limits’ on the claim’s scope”); see also Ex Parte Ramanujam, No. 2009-
`
`002483, 2010 WL 3214559, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) (nominal recitations of
`
`structure held insufficient to bring an apparatus claim comprising a destination
`
`storage unit within the scope of statutory subject matter).
`
`Even the specification’s references to an “Oracle or Oracle-like database”
`
`only define conventional databases and do not limit the scope of the claims. Like-
`
`wise, discussion in the specification concerning data record fields in one embodi-
`
`ment does not make the database specific rather than generic. None of the dis-
`
`closed data record fields is required by the claims. Moreover, the content of the
`
`data places no limitations on the manner in which the database is to be structured
`
`or formatted for the storage and retrieval of such data.
`
`System claims 6 and 7 are not meaningfully different from the method
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`claims at issue and should fall for the same reason. They merely recite an abstract
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`idea of automated substitute fulfillment, and none of the recited hardware offers a
`
`meaningful limitation beyond generically linking “the use of the [method] to a par-
`
`ticular technological environment,” that is, implementation via one or more com-
`
`puters that communicate with a website over the Internet. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
`
`Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)).
`
`D.
`Frontline’s Attempts to Distinguish Bancorp Are Unavailing
`Frontline attempts to distinguish Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assur.
`
`Co. of Canada (US), 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) on the ground that the claims
`
`in that case used a computer to accelerate the mental process of performing math-
`
`ematical calculations, as opposed to using a computing structure “specially pro-
`
`grammed to perform interactive operations that result in securing a substitute.”
`
`Frontline Response at 30. This is not a meaningful distinction because the asserted
`
`claims use a computer to accelerate the process of securing substitutes, which is
`
`also an abstract idea. In fact, as its Response explains, Frontline has replaced the
`
`special machines of the prior art with use of the Internet. Frontline Response at 6,
`
`37-38. That limitation, however, does not save the claims, which cannot be made
`
`patent eligible “by limiting an abstract idea to one field of use,” namely, substitute
`
`fulfillment by Internet. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct at 3231.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`The PTO Has Consistently Found Claims such as
`Those at Issue Ineligible for Patent Protection
`
`E.
`
`This tribunal has rejected attempts like Frontline’s to rely on generic hard-
`
`ware to save claims. For example, in Ex Parte Guetta, No. 2008-4366, 2009 WL
`
`2563524 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 10, 2009), the Board found claims that “on their face”
`
`were directed to machines were “nonetheless nonstatutory.” Id. at *1. This in-
`
`cluded claims to a “system” comprising a “memory,” and a “processor” configured
`
`to determine the best way to minimize variance. Id. at *2. While the recited
`
`“memory and processor clearly introduced structure into the claim,” the broad
`
`claims placed no meaningful limitations on the generic memory or the generic
`
`computer recited, and thus fell into the “abstract idea” exception. Id. at *10. Ac-
`
`cordingly, the Board has consistently found ineligible for patent protection both
`
`computer-implemented method6 and system7 claims under section 101 that were
`
`6 See, e.g., Ex Parte Caccavale, No. 2009-006026, 2010 WL 2901727, at *6 (B.P.A.I. July 23,
`
`2010) (rejecting a claim to a method of analysis of performance of a data processing system that
`
`included an “industry standard database”); Ex Parte Kelkar, No. 2009-004635, 2010 WL
`
`3768175, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010) (rejecting method for determining similarity between
`
`portions of gene expression profiles requiring use of a computer that was “not limited to a
`
`particular machine”); Ex Parte Starkey, No. 2010-007809, 2011 WL 4434501, at *3 (B.P.A.I.
`
`Sept. 20, 2011) (finding that “[a]t most, a ‘computer-implemented method’ ties the process to
`
`any general-purpose computer”); Ex Parte Edelson, No. 2011-004285, 2012 WL 417467, at *4
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`not tied to a specific machine.
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`F.
`
`The Claims Are Not Patent-Eligible Even Considering
`Them in Their Entirety as Frontline Urges
`
`Frontline contends that Petitioner has dissected the invention into old and
`
`new parts and failed to consider the invention as a whole (Frontline Response at
`
`31-35), but that is not accurate. Petitioner has explained that the invention as a
`
`whole is the abstract idea of automated substitute fulfillment using generic com-
`
`
`(B.P.A.I. Feb. 7, 2012) (rejecting claims to a “computer implemented method” for creating asset-
`
`backed derivatives that did not recite any particular link to a particular machine “even if some
`
`physical steps are required to obtain information from the database”); Ex Parte Webb, No. 2010-
`
`008274, 2012 WL 417450, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 7, 2012) (rejecting method claims because patent
`
`would “cover both known and unknown uses of the concept and be performed through any exist-
`
`ing or future-devised machinery.”).
`
`7 See, e.g., Ex Parte Russo, No. 2009-001876, 2010 WL 3441058, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 30, 2010)
`
`(rejecting claims for a system of grouping a community of users within a directory structure re-
`
`citing “tools” and “resources,” a “directory,” and a “mapping”); Ex Parte Ramanujam, No. 2009-
`
`002483, 2010 WL 3214559, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) (rejecting claims to an apparatus
`
`comprising, inter alia, a “destination storage location,” an “architectural register,” a “functional
`
`unit” that processes packed format values, and a “decoder”); Ex Parte Venkata, No. 2009-
`
`007302, 2010 WL 3934573, at *1 (rejecting a claim directed to a “service discovery system,” a
`
`“service discovery agent,” and “service discovery protocols”).
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`puter equipment. Because Frontline’s claims, as a whole, do not recite improved
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`computer technology, they must be tied to specific computers, databases, commu-
`
`nication links, and websites to avoid preempting the field of automated substitution
`
`fulfillment, and lying outside the ambit of patent protection.
`
`Frontline notes that it amended its claims to avoid prior art, requiring that
`
`the computers generate and post a list of positions that a prequalified substitute
`
`could accept and secure, as opposed to an approach where the computing system
`
`electronically receives applications from substitutes and awards a vacant position
`
`to a qualified applicant. Frontline Response at 40-41. The presence of such limita-
`
`tions is irrelevant for section 101 purposes. The sequence of the offer and ac-
`
`ceptance steps does not add any specificity to the generic computers, database,
`
`communication links, or website in the claims, so the claim as a whole remains a
`
`patent-ineligible, abstract idea under Bilski.
`
`IV. ADDITIONAL FACTS BEARING ON
`THE JURISDICTIONAL RECORD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Frontline maintained in its Preliminary Response that the claims were not di-
`
`rected to systems or methods for performing data processing or other operations
`
`used in the practice, administration or management of a financial product or ser-
`
`vice. See, e.g., Paper No. 16 at 1. It went on to argue “[t]he possibility of the
`
`claimed invention being used in the management of financial products or services
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`is not enough to satisfy the requirements for review.” Paper No. 16 at 14.
`
`Case CBM2012-00005
`Patent 6,675,151C1
`Attorney Docket No.: 09461-0004
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`. Because Frontline has indicated it intends to challenge the Board’s jurisdic-
`
`tion on appeal, these exhibits provides evidentiary support for the Board’s decision
`
`that the ‘151 patent is within its jurisdiction under the AIA.
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 fail to recite patent
`
`eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and should be invalidated.
`
`
`
`Dated: May 20, 2013
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`By: /s/ E. Robert Yoches
`E. Robert Yoches, Reg. No. 30,120
`Darrel C. Karl, pro hac vice
`Aaron J. Capron, Reg. No. 56,170
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`901 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20001-4413
`Phone: (202) 408-4000
`Fax: (202) 408-4400
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`CRS Advanced Technologies, Inc.
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on this 20th day of May, 2013, a true and correct copy
`
`of the foregoing PETITIONER CRS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’s
`
`REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.220 was served via electronic mail upon the following counsel of record for Pa-
`
`tent Owner Frontline Technologies, Inc.:
`
`John P. Donohue, Jr., Lead Counsel
`Woodcock Washburn, LLP
`Cira Centre – 12th Floor
`2929 Arch Street
`Philadelphia, PA 19103
`Phone: 215.568.3100
`Fax: 215.568.3439
`Email: donohue@woodcock.com
`
`John E. McGlynn, Back-up Counsel
`Woodcock Washburn, LLP
`Cira Centre – 12th Floor
`2929 Arch Street
`Philadelphia, PA 19104
`Phone: 215.564.8382
`Fax: 215.568.3439
`Email: mcglynn@woodcock.com
`
`R. Scott Tewes
`Tewes Law Group LLC
`Sugarloaf Corporate Center
`2180 Satellite Blvd., Suite 400
`Duluth, GA 30097
`STewes@TewesLaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`/s/ Jacob Mersing
`Jacob Mersing
`Legal Assistant
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`
`2
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket