UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________
`SAP AMERICA INC. AND SAP AG,
`Petitioners,
`v.
`VERSATA DEVELOPMENT GROUP INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_________________
`Case CBM2012-00001
`Patent 6,553,350
`_________________
`
`Before the honorable MICHAEL P. TIERNEY, SALLY C. MEDLEY and RAMA
`G. ELLURU.
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`B. 
`
`Statement of Relief Requested ........................................................................ 1 
`I. 
`Preliminary Statement ..................................................................................... 1 
`II. 
`III.  Statement Identifying Material Facts in Dispute ............................................. 2 
`IV.  Versata’s Arguments That Its Claims Are Not Abstract Rest On
`Unclaimed Limitations And Contradict The Patent ........................................ 3 
`The claims consist almost entirely of the abstract ideas of
`A. 
`arranging customer and product hierarchies and calculating a
`product price. ......................................................................................... 3 
`Claiming the abstract idea of calculating a price using several
`separate steps does not make the claims patentable under § 101. ........ 4 
`C.  Versata’s claim that the recited storing, retrieving, sorting,
`eliminating, and determining impart patentability because they
`are “specific, practical and advantageous” is belied by the
`patent. .................................................................................................... 5 
`V.  Versata’s Arguments Regarding Computer Involvement In The
`Claims Do Not Show Any Particular Machine Or Unconventional
`Subject Matter .................................................................................................. 7 
`A.  Versata’s arguments rely on limitations absent from the claims. ......... 7 
`B. 
`Claim 17 does not require any computer at all. .................................. 10 
`C. 
`The other claims add nothing but routine, conventional matter. ........ 12 
`VI.  The Board Properly Construed The Claims, And Versata’s Alternative
`Constructions Would Not Affect The § 101 Analysis .................................. 14 
`A. 
`The broadest reasonable interpretation is the proper standard. ........... 14 
`B. 
`The Board’s claim constructions are properly supported. .................. 16 
`C.  Versata’s constructions would not change the § 101 analysis. ........... 17 
`VII.  Dr. Siegel’s Expert Testimony Should Be Credited ...................................... 18 
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`VIII.  Mr. Liebich’s Testimony Should Be Given No Weight Because He Is
`Not Qualified to Opine About A Person Skilled In The Art ......................... 20 
`A.  Mr. Liebich lacks the undisputed requirements of a person
`skilled in the art. .................................................................................. 20 
`B.  Mr. Liebich’s non-expert opinions should be given no weight. ......... 21 
`C.  Mr. Liebich’s newly-added views are admitted to be irrelevant
`and are contradicted by Versata’s positions in litigation. ................... 22 
`IX.  Versata’s Arguments About SAP Prior Art Are Irrelevant To A Proper
`Section 101 Analysis ..................................................................................... 23 
`Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 24 
`
`X. 
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Cases 
`Arrythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053
`(Fed. Cir. 1992) .............................................................................................. 9, 10
`
`Page(s)
`
`Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266
`(Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................... 1, 8, 12, 13
`
`Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) ...............................................................5, 6
`
`CyberSource, Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366
`(Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................................ 12, 13
`
`Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .............................. 5, 12
`
`Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) ........................................................... 19, 23
`
`Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease L.L.C., 671 F.3d 1317
`(Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 12
`
`Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) ....................................................... passim
`
`In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................... 15
`
`In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ............................................................... 15
`
`In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) .................................................... 15
`
`Lyons v. Nike, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 986 (D. Or. 2012) .......................................... 22
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) ....................................................................... 4, 13, 19, 23
`
`Morpho Detection, Inc. v. Smiths Detection, Inc., No. 2:11cv498,
`2012 WL 6004085 (E.D. Va. Nov. 30 2012) ..................................................... 22
`
`Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) ................................................................ 4, 13
`
`Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .............. 9
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`
`SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ......... 8, 10
`
`Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ...... 22
`
`Williamson v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., No. 11 Civ. 4948, 2012 WL 5425033
`(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2012) ..................................................................................... 21
`
`Statutes 
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................................................ passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ................................................................................................... 15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326 ........................................................................................................ 15
`
`Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) § 18 ......................................................... 1
`
`Other Authorities 
`157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ................ 15
`
`Rules 
`37 C.F.R. § 42.221 ................................................................................................... 15
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b) .............................................................................................. 15
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) ................................................................................................. 22
`
`
`
`v
`
`
`
`

`
`Exhibit 1029:
`
`Exhibit 1030:
`
`Exhibit 1031:
`
`Exhibit 1032:
`
`Exhibit 1033:
`
`Exhibit 1034:
`
`Exhibit 1035:
`
`LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`Hand Drawn Liebich Depo. Exhibit
`
`Hand Drawn Liebich Depo. Exhibit
`
`Hand Drawn Liebich Depo. Exhibit
`
`Hand Drawn Liebich Depo. Exhibit
`
`Deposition Transcript of Matthias Liebich dated March
`22, 2013; Case CBM2012-00001
`
`Versata Reply Brief, Federal Circuit Appeals 2012-1029,
`-1049
`
`Excerpt of Scott Nettles Deposition Transcript (June 30,
`2009) Vol. 2
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`
`STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`
`
`I.
`
`Petitioner requests cancellation of claims 17 and 26-29 of U.S. Patent No.
`
`6,553,350 (“the ’350 patent,” SX1001) as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for
`
`the reasons set forth in its Petition (“Petition,” “Pet.,” Dkt. No. 1) and below.1
`
`II.
`
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
`
`Under both Supreme Court and Federal Circuit law, the abstract idea of
`
`arranging pricing information into customer and product hierarchies and using the
`
`hierarchies to determine product prices—as recited in claim 17 of the ’350
`
`patent—cannot be patented. And under that same body of law, simply adding
`
`generalized phrases such as “computer implemented” or “computer program
`
`instructions”—as Versata did in the other claims at issue—cannot transform those
`
`abstract ideas into a patentable invention.
`
`While Versata urges that claim 17 is not an abstract idea, its witness
`
`demonstrated otherwise, when he confirmed that the entire claimed method can be
`
`performed using nothing more than pen and paper. And while Versata urges that
`
`the other claims recite the use of a computer, it ignores controlling law (e.g.,
`
`Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
`
`
`1 Versata agreed that any issues not raised in its Response are waived (VX2098
`8:13-9:2), so SAP has not briefed issues raised in the Preliminary Response but
`absent from the Response, such as whether § 101 is proper under AIA § 18 or
`whether the ’350 patent is eligible for transitional post-grant review. See ID 32-36.
`SAP agrees, for the reasons set forth by the Board, that the answer to both
`questions is yes.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`
`
`
`Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) that the addition of such language
`
`cannot salvage the patentability of an otherwise invalid claim. In short, the claims
`
`at issue are plainly invalid, under Bilski and its progeny.
`
`Perhaps recognizing these fatal flaws in its primary arguments, Versata
`
`includes scattershot ancillary arguments that are either irrelevant or just plain
`
`wrong: attacking the Board’s claim construction standard, urging alternative
`
`constructions that would not change the outcome on § 101, arguing about prior art
`
`after these proceedings have been limited to exclude § 102, and presenting
`
`testimony from a purported expert who does not meet the undisputed requirements
`
`of one skilled in the art. None of this can change the four corners of the ’350
`
`patent, or the Board’s correct conclusion that claims 17 and 26-29 “do not
`
`incorporate sufficient meaningful limitations to ensure that the claims are more
`
`than just an abstract idea.” (Institution Decision (“ID,” Dkt. No. 36) 31).
`
`Accordingly, the claims should be cancelled for being unpatentable under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 101.
`
`III. STATEMENT IDENTIFYING MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE
`SAP’s identification of material facts in dispute is set forth in Appendix 1.
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`
`IV. VERSATA’S ARGUMENTS THAT ITS CLAIMS ARE NOT ABSTRACT REST ON
`UNCLAIMED LIMITATIONS AND CONTRADICT THE PATENT
`A. The claims consist almost entirely of the abstract ideas of
`arranging customer and product hierarchies and calculating a
`product price.
`
`Versata argues the Board improperly dissected the claims rather than
`
`considering them as a whole (Response (“POR,” Dkt No. 51) 14-17), faulting the
`
`Board for analyzing claim 17 as “[t]he concept of arranging customer and product
`
`data into hierarchies” and “the calculation of product prices using ‘abstracted’
`
`numbers,” id. at 16-18. But this analysis is proper because claim 17 recites nothing
`
`else. Much like the claims found unpatentable in Benson, Flook, and Bilski, see
`
`infra pp. 4-5, claim 17 recites two abstract ideas using a series of steps: (1)
`
`arranging customer and product data into hierarchies (SX1001 21:1-9 (arranging
`
`steps)) and (2) calculating a product price (id. at 21:10-29 (storing, retrieving,
`
`sorting, eliminating, and determining steps)). Claim 27 likewise recites two
`
`abstract ideas: (1) pricing information retrieved from product and customer
`
`hierarchies (id. at 21:66-22:7 (retrieving steps)) and (2) a product price determined
`
`using pricing information from the hierarchies (id. at 21:8-12 (receiving step)).2
`
`Contrary to Versata’s protests, the Board considered these claims as a whole; there
`
`is nothing more to consider.
`
`
`2 As for the addition of “computer implemented” in the preamble of claim 27, the
`addition of such language cannot make abstract ideas patentable. See infra p. 12.
`
`3
`
`

`
`
`
`For the remaining claims, which recite these two abstract ideas with the
`
`minor addition of routine, conventional subject matter, the Board—and SAP—
`
`properly concluded the claims do not contain “other elements or a combination of
`
`elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’” sufficient to cover
`
`“significantly more” than the underlying concept itself. Mayo Collaborative Servs.
`
`v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); see Pet. 16-22; ID 29-32.
`
`B. Claiming the abstract idea of calculating a price using several
`separate steps does not make the claims patentable under § 101.
`
`Versata argues that the storing, retrieving, sorting, eliminating, and
`
`determining of claims 17 and 26 are “separate and distinct steps that together
`
`define a particular way of determining product price” (POR 15 (emphasis added);
`
`see also id. at 32-34; VX2091 ¶¶ 56-57), and that the retrieving and receiving steps
`
`of claims 27-29 similarly recite a “specific and practical way of determining a
`
`product price,” (POR 37 (emphasis added); see also id. at 40, 43; VX2091 ¶¶ 85-
`
`90). But an abstract idea—here, determining a product price—is not patentable
`
`merely because it can be claimed as a series of steps. In Benson the Supreme Court
`
`considered a claim for converting binary coded decimals to binary through seven
`
`separate steps including storing, shifting, and adding. 409 U.S. at 73-74 (1972).
`
`Despite the many steps, the Court ruled the claimed method was an unpatentable
`
`abstract idea. Id. at 71-72; see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1978)
`
`(ruling claim to calculating alarm limits requiring four steps was nonetheless
`
`4
`
`

`
`
`
`unpatentable); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223-24, 3231 (2010) (ruling
`
`claim to managing risk in commodities transactions in three steps was nonetheless
`
`unpatentable). Versata may protest that the claims describe a “very specific,
`
`particular way” of pricing products using customer and product hierarchies, but the
`
`case law is clear that abstract ideas, even when described in detail, cannot be
`
`patented.
`
`C. Versata’s claim that the recited storing, retrieving, sorting,
`eliminating, and determining impart patentability because they
`are “specific, practical and advantageous” is belied by the patent.
`
`Versata argues claim 17’s storing, retrieving, sorting, eliminating, and
`
`determining steps are “meaningful” because they purportedly reduce the number of
`
`tables and queries needed to determine a product price when using hierarchies.
`
`POR 19-20, 47-48. Versata advances similar arguments for the retrieving and
`
`receiving steps in claim 27. POR 36-37, 47-48. Yet the challenged claims say
`
`nothing about a number of tables or a number of queries. SX1001 20:65-21:29,
`
`21:61-22:35. And unclaimed limitations cannot satisfy § 101. See, e.g.,
`
`Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Moreover,
`
`Versata’s reliance on supposed “technological benefits” for database tables and
`
`queries (e.g., POR 21) contradicts the specification’s clear statement that the
`
`claims don’t require a database: “although the invention is discussed in terms of a
`
`5
`
`

`
`
`
`‘database,’ the invention can be implemented using any data source that may be
`
`different from a conventional database.” SX1001 10:58-61.
`
`The other allegedly “specific, practical” features Versata cites are described
`
`in the patent as anything but. Versata argues its claims are not abstract because
`
`“the storing step requires pricing information to be stored in a data source, such as
`
`a database.” POR 19. But the patent explains there is nothing special about the data
`
`source. SX1001 10:58-61. Versata likewise stresses that the retrieving step lists
`
`“each product group above the product group in each branch of the hierarchy” and
`
`“each organizational group above the purchasing organization in each branch of
`
`the hierarchy,” and points to sorting “according to the pricing types, the product,
`
`the purchasing organization, the hierarchy of product groups, and the hierarchy of
`
`organizational groups.” POR 19. But these merely describe the abstract idea of
`
`customer (“organizational”) and product hierarchies, which are “wholly arbitrary”
`
`(SX1001 6:32-34, 7:65-67), and at best amount to mere field-of-use or data
`
`gathering limitations, which cannot impart patentability, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231
`
`(citing Flook).
`
`Versata suggests SAP admitted the claims are not abstract by stating they
`
`recite a “very specific way to determine a price of a product using a computer.”
`
`POR 1, 15, 21, and 45 (quoting VX2044 at 3). But Versata itself disputed this,
`
`arguing that “in fact they cover the ‘capability’ to execute a pricing procedure
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`
`using hierarchical accesses to hierarchical arrangements of customer . . . and
`
`product . . . data.” SX1011 at 11. Indeed, Versata described its invention on appeal
`
`as nothing more than arranging pricing data into hierarchies and calculating prices.
`
`See, e.g., id. at 24 (“[T]he claim does not require any extant data structures—it
`
`simply requires computer instructions to implement the relevant arranging,
`
`retrieving, and determining operations.”)
`
`V. VERSATA’S ARGUMENTS REGARDING COMPUTER INVOLVEMENT IN THE
`CLAIMS DO NOT SHOW ANY PARTICULAR MACHINE OR
`UNCONVENTIONAL SUBJECT MATTER
`A. Versata’s arguments rely on limitations absent from the claims.
`Versata argues that “run time” refers to “[r]unning on a computer” (POR 29-
`
`30), but as construed by the Board none of the challenged claims recites anything
`
`performed at runtime. Versata likewise argues that the “execution flow” and
`
`“computer screens” of the invention require a computer (POR 30-31), but neither
`
`of these terms appears in the claims. And Versata’s contention that even claim 17
`
`is tied to a particular machine because the “data source” requires a computer
`
`database (POR 27-28) is contradicted by the specification. SX1001 10:58-61.
`
`To argue a computer must be used, Versata offers a string of citations (POR
`
`28, 30), but closer inspection reveals that many discuss unclaimed features
`
`(SX1001 18:53-55, 19:7-17), several concern denormalized numbers, which the
`
`Board found are not required (SX1001 8:64-67, 10:55-61, 11:17-25; ID 12-17),
`
`7
`
`

`
`
`
`and the rest concern at most “any” conventional computer system or data source
`
`(SX1001 1:10-12, 3:16-23, 5:8-11, 5:55-58). None makes the claims patentable.
`
`See, e.g., Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278-79; VX2095 12 (“[C]laims that do no more
`
`than merely recite the use of a computer for its ordinary functions of performing
`
`repetitive calculations, storing data, or automating routine tasks are less likely to be
`
`patent eligible.”).
`
`Mr. Liebich contends the invention offers no “advantage” outside a
`
`computer (POR 28-29; VX2091 ¶¶ 68-69), but—even if true—this would not
`
`convey patentability. In Benson, the Supreme Court held unpatentable a process
`
`including a mathematical formula with “no substantial practical application except
`
`in connection with a digital computer, which means . . . the patent would wholly
`
`pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
`
`algorithm itself.” 409 U.S. at 71-72. Versata also offers no support for urging that a
`
`process with “no performance advantage outside the context of a computer” is tied
`
`to a particular machine. POR 28-29. In fact, a computer functioning “solely as an
`
`obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e.,
`
`through . . . performing calculations” does not impose meaningful limits to tie a
`
`claim to a particular machine. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d
`
`1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`Versata’s reliance on cases involving software with palpable applications is
`
`8
`
`

`
`
`
`misplaced in analyzing the ’350 patent’s pricing methods. Versata looks to RCT for
`
`support (see, e.g., POR 23, 37, 41, 44, and 48), but unlike claims that add a
`
`computer to the business method of pricing using customer and product
`
`hierarchies, the RCT patent related to “digital image halftoning,” or processing
`
`digital images consisting of “thousands of pixels,” and expressly claimed “utilizing
`
`a pixel-by-pixel comparison of the image,” which the Federal Circuit found
`
`represented “functional and palpable applications in the field of computer
`
`technology.” Research Corp. Techs. (RCT) v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 862,
`
`865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010). And while Versata carefully edits to suggest a
`
`“memory” in some claims was significant (POR 33-34), its excisions from the
`
`Court’s actual list of claimed features (“[t]he fact that some claims . . . require a
`
`‘high contrast film,’ ‘a film printer,’ ‘a memory,’ and ‘printer and display devices’
`
`also confirm this court's holding that the invention is not abstract”) is telling. RCT,
`
`627 F.3d at 869.
`
`Versata also likens its pricing process to the invention found patentable in
`
`Arrythmia Research (POR 34, 41), but the inapposite patent there involved
`
`“analyzing electrocardiographic signals in order to determine certain
`
`characteristics of the heart function” by “converting” signals into time segments
`
`and “applying” those segments to “high pass filter means.” Arrythmia Research
`
`Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1992). These “physical
`
`9
`
`

`
`
`
`process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into another” (id. at
`
`1059) imparted patentability, but are irrelevant to Versata’s pricing methods.3
`
`These cases, finding advancements in computer science and signal processing
`
`patentable under § 101, bear little resemblance to the ’350 patent, claiming product
`
`pricing using customer and product hierarchies in an unspecified “data source.”
`
`Versata hopes to distinguish CyberSource, Fort Properties, and Dealertrack
`
`by arguing its claims require a “data source” purportedly playing a “significant and
`
`integral part in permitting the claimed method to be performed.” POR 46-47. But
`
`the patent explains “any data source” will do. SX1001 10:58-61. Versata also
`
`argues its claims are different because they provide a “speed or performance
`
`advantage” from “the reduction of the number of tables, and thus the number of
`
`queries” needed to determine a product price when using hierarchies. POR 47-48.
`
`But these distinctions are not required by the claims. See infra pp. 22-23.
`
`Moreover, the fact that an unpatentable process might be speedier if computerized
`
`does not make it patentable. SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1332-33.
`
`B. Claim 17 does not require any computer at all.
`Versata’s argument that claim 17 is tied to a particular machine and cannot
`
`be performed using pencil and paper (POR 27-28) rests on the false assumption
`
`that the “data source” somehow requires a computer, which is contradicted by the
`
`3 Versata did not dispute that its claims fail the “transformation” test. See Pet. 21;
`ID 31.
`
`10
`
`

`
`
`
`specification itself. See supra pp. 5-6. Moreover, many of the claim elements are
`
`specifically described as being performed by a person. See Pet. 18-19.
`
`And Mr. Liebich’s testimony has twice shown that the entire process of
`
`claim 17 can be performed either on paper or mentally. First, in his direct
`
`testimony, Mr. Liebich performed substantially all of the steps of claim 17 either
`
`on paper or mentally when he described on paper how a product price can be
`
`determined from a final price discount (25%) for an exemplary product hierarchy
`
`(Figure 1) by eliminating least restrictive pricing information (10% and 15%).
`
`VX2091 ¶¶ 19, 35-39; SX1033 98:4-15, 156:1-157:22. Then, during cross-
`
`examination, Mr. Liebich and SAP’s counsel performed each step of claim 17 with
`
`pen and paper.4
`
`Like the method in Benson, claim 17 is unpatentable because it can be “done
`
`mentally” using the tables printed in the patent or drawn by hand. And even if “any
`
`type of computer system” could, as Versata urges (POR 28), be imported from the
`
`4 Mr. Liebich confirmed the mental process of arranging a hierarchy of
`organizational groups (SX1033 119:4-120:12; SX1029 (top right)), arranging a
`hierarchy of product groups (SX1033 120:13-121:4; SX1029 (bottom right)), and
`storing pricing information in a data source (SX1033 121:5-123:6, 131:10-14;
`SX1029 (“1st table”)). Mr. Liebich further confirmed, by pen and paper, retrieving
`pricing information from the data source (SX1033 131:15-138:16; SX1031),
`sorting the pricing information (SX1032 (arrows representing sorting)), and
`eliminating the less restrictive pricing information (SX1033 138:17-141:10;
`SX1032 (blue lines representing eliminating)). Mr. Liebich also performed the
`claimed determining of product price from the remaining sorted pricing
`information (SX1033 141:11-143:10; SX1032 (determining $65 price by applying
`remaining 20% and 15% discounts from sorted pricing information)).
`
`11
`
`

`
`
`
`specification into claim 17, this would add no more than a conventional computer
`
`to the recited abstract ideas, leaving it unpatentable.
`
`C. The other claims add nothing but routine, conventional matter.
`Claims do not become patentable under § 101 simply for reciting some
`
`computer element. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278-
`
`79; CyberSource, Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2011). Claim 27 recites a “computer implemented method” with two abstract ideas.
`
`See supra p. 3. But the Federal Circuit has repeatedly rejected Versata’s argument
`
`that a claim to an abstract idea becomes patent-eligible if it recites a “computer-
`
`implemented method.” See POR 34-35. For example, in Fort Properties, Inc. v.
`
`American Master Lease L.L.C., the Court rejected claims to a business method
`
`claimed “using a computer” because the patentee “simply added a computer
`
`limitation to claims covering an abstract concept—that is, the computer limitation
`
`is simply insignificant post-solution activity.” 671 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir.
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`2012); see also Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333; Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278-79.
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`Indeed, Mr. Liebich confirmed that the pen and paper example discussed above
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`with regard to claim 17 also applied to the steps recited in claim 27. SX1033
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`147:1-151:3.
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`Claims 26 and 28 are identical to claims 17 and 27, respectively, with the
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`added words “[a] computer readable storage media comprising: computer
`
`12
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`

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`
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`instructions to implement the method of” their respective independent claims.
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`Versata argues the terms “computer readable storage media” and “computer
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`instructions” tie claims 26 and 28 to a particular machine (POR 32-33, 40-41), but
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`adding these bare recitations to unpatentable ideas does not make them patentable.
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`See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1374-75 (rejecting claim to “computer readable
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`medium containing program instructions” because “merely claiming a software
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`implementation of a purely mental process that could otherwise be performed
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`without the use of a computer does not satisfy the machine prong of the machine-
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`or-transformation test”).
`
`Versata also argues that claims 26 and 28 are patentable machines or
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`manufactures. POR 31-32, 39-40. But the § 101 analysis applies equally to product
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`and process claims, see Benson, 409 U.S. at 67-69, and patent-eligibility should not
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`“depend simply on the draftsman’s art,” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Flook,
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`437 U.S. at 593). See also Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1277 (“As the Supreme Court has
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`explained, the form of the claims should not trump basic issues of patentability.”);
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`VX2095 22-24.
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`Claim 29 recites the same abstract ideas as claim 27, but adds “an
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`apparatus,” “a processor,” “a memory coupled to the processor,” and “computer
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`program instructions.” Versata argues claim 29 is a patentable machine (POR 43),
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`but the form of the claim cannot trump § 101. See supra p. 12; see also VX2095 3
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`13
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`

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`
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`(“[B]ecause claims relating to computer-implemented inventions can easily be
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`recast in different formats, it should not matter whether the claims is recited as a
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`process, a machine, or an article of manufacture.”). And it is incorrect that any
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`connection to a computer ties a claim to a particular machine. POR 38, 42-45. See
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`Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. While Versata argues claim 29’s “apparatus” and
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`“processor” tie it to a particular machine, this is contradicted by the specification,
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`which explains the invention can be implemented in “any type of computer system
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`or programming or processing environment.” SX1001 5:8-9.
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`None of the recitations in claims 26-29 add anything particular or non-
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`conventional to the abstract ideas of pricing using customer and product
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`hierarchies, and the claims are thus unpatentable. See Pet. 16-21; ID 27-28, 31-32.
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`Merely requiring that a process be performed on a computer rather than by pen and
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`paper does not transform a concept from an abstract idea to a patentable invention.
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`VI. THE BOARD PROPERLY CONSTRUED THE CLAIMS, AND VERSATA’S
`ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE § 101
`ANALYSIS
`A. The broadest reasonable interpretation is the proper standard.
`While Versata complains the Board gave the claims the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation (BRI) in light of the specification, and thus “applied a different
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`construction than the district court” (POR 51, 65), this was proper under the statute
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`14
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`

`
`
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`and rules.5 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b) (mandating “broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation”); 35 U.S.C. § 326 (requiring Director to prescribe regulations); ID
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`6; see also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`Hoping to distance covered business method review (CBM) from historical
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`post-grant challenges, Versata argues the “trial” label requires a different result
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`(POR 62), but ignores that, just as in reexamination: patent owners may amend
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`claims in a CBM, 37 C.F.R. § 42.221, distinguishing Office proceedings from
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`litigation, Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1364; and unlike a court, the Office applies a
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`“preponderance of the evidence” (instead of “clear and convincing evidence”)
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`standard, 35 U.S.C. § 326(e), and no presumption of validity – differences
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`manifested in the different Office and litigation claim construction standards. In re
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`Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858-59 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Versata’s arguments against the BRI
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`standard—applied for three decades in reexamination and reissue, see, e.g., In re
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`Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1984)—would also thwart
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`Congress’s intent to enable CBMs to be consolidated with these proceedings where
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`BRI applies. See 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). In short, Versata’s arguments are both
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`illogical and unfounded.
`
`
`5 Indeed, Congress’ intent that the Office continue applying the BRI standard in
`proceedings added by AIA is apparent both from its decision not to require any
`variance from ongoing Office practice, and also from the legislative history
`confirming awareness and expectation that the BRI standard would be applied. See,
`e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
`
`15
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`

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`
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`The Board’s claim constructions are properly supported.
`
`B.
`Versata’s disagreements with the Board’s constructions are also unfounded.
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`Versata’s argument that “sorting” must be performed after “retrieving” in claim 17
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`(POR 52-61) rests solely on its false premise that the intrinsic record contains no
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`suggestion that sorting can come first. See, e.g., POR 56-57. To the contrary, as
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`both the Board and Dr. Siegel correctly concluded, this is precisely what the patent
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`shows by differently claiming “sorting the retrieved pricing information” in claim
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`1 and “sorting the pricing information” in claim 17. ID 9; SX1005 ¶ 98 (emphasis
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`added). Claim 17’s language does not impose the temporal limitation in claim 1,
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`which Versata now seeks to spread throughout the patent. ID 8-12; SX1005 ¶ 98;
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`Pet. 12-13. And despite Versata’s generalized arguments (POR 53-54), parroted
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`without further support by a person not of ordinary skill in the art, Mr. Liebich
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`(VX2091 ¶¶ 126-128), this sequence is not required for the claims to “make
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`sense,” as Dr. Siegel explained (see, e.g., SX1005 ¶ 98), as Versata’s own expert
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`acknow