Case 1:21-cv-08528-LTS Document 47 Filed 03/31/23 Page 1 of 17
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`Plaintiffs,
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`No. 1:21-cv-08528-LTS
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`CHRISTOPHER GENTILE and JUAN A.
`CRAWFORD,
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`CASSI CREDEDIO and KEVIN DOYLE,
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`Defendants.
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`Plaintiffs Christopher Gentile (“Mr. Gentile” or “Gentile”) and Juan A. Crawford
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`(“Mr. Crawford” or “Crawford”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendants
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`Cassi Crededio (“Ms. Crededio” or “Crededio”) and Kevin Doyle (“Mr. Doyle” or “Doyle”),
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`alleging that Defendants applied for, and received, copyright registrations of a draft screenplay
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`without seeking authorization from Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that they are the sole owners and
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`authors of the draft screenplay at issue and assert claims for declaratory relief and copyright
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`infringement. (See docket entry no. 46 (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”).1) Before the
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`Court is Defendant Crededio’s motion to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim upon which
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`relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket entry no.
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`37.) The Court has jurisdiction of the dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1338(a).
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`1
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`The unredacted version of the First Amended Complaint was filed at docket entry no. 46
`pursuant to the Court’s March 16, 2023 Order (docket entry no. 45) denying Plaintiffs’
`motion to seal. The First Amended Complaint was originally filed at docket entry no. 32
`in redacted form.
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`The Court has reviewed carefully the submissions in connection with the instant
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`motion. For the following reasons, Defendant Crededio’s motion to dismiss the First Amended
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`Complaint is granted in its entirety.
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`BACKGROUND
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`The following facts, drawn from the First Amended Complaint, are taken as true
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`for the purposes of the instant motion practice. This case concerns ownership of a draft version
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`of a screenplay entitled “Untitled Wyoming Project” or “The Monarch” (the “Work” or the
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`“Untitled Wyoming Project”). Plaintiff Gentile first conceived of the idea for the Work
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`approximately fifteen years ago, inspired by the idea of a show “focused around a flawed female
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`heroine.” (FAC ¶¶ 17-18.) After learning that Wyoming was the “first state or territory in the
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`nation to grant suffrage to women, in 1869[,]” Mr. Gentile decided to create a show based upon
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`the women’s suffrage movement, led by a “madam[]” in the Wyoming area, who “ran a brothel”
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`and also “championed women’s rights.” (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Mr. Gentile shared this idea with his
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`long-time friend and colleague, Mr. Crawford, and together, they “conducted extensive research”
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`into the relevant historical period. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs then worked together to draft “the early
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`versions of” a television series “focused on the role that madams of brothers in [the] American
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`West played in bring[ing] suffrage rights to women.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Mr. Crawford submitted a short
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`draft of “the first few scenes of the Work” to the Writers Guild of America (the “WGA”). (Id. ¶
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`21; see also id. ¶ 42 (describing the version submitted to the WGA as the “first pages of the
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`Work”).)
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`Plaintiff Crawford met Defendant Crededio on a set for a different project in
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`which Plaintiff Crawford had an acting role and mentioned that “he and Mr. Gentile could
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`consider hiring [her]” to “assist with work on the Untitled Wyoming Project.” (FAC ¶¶ 22, 24.)
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`Ms. Crededio was subsequently hired and entered into a Confidentiality Agreement with Mr.
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`Gentile on October 22, 2019, agreeing to “treat all Confidential Information” including
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`“materials relating to Untitled Wyoming Project” with “the strictest confidence.” (Id. ¶ 25.)
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`Ms. Crededio collaborated with Plaintiffs over about a three-week span, from October 14, 2019,
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`to November 2, 2019, during which time she “helped draft the Work’s first three acts.” (Id. ¶¶
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`26-27; see also id. ¶ 39 (alleging Ms. Crededio “assisted with drafting the first version of the
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`Work”).)
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`Plaintiffs allege that they provided Ms. Crededio with “detailed verbal
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`instructions and/or physical outlines as well as rough drafts . . . demonstrating Plaintiffs’
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`conception of the Work[].” (FAC ¶ 27.) Ms. Crededio was given “firm deadlines” for
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`completion of “her drafts of each act” and was “paid a sum of $500 for each act she drafted” by
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`the requisite deadline. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30.) Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Crededio “used a screenwriting
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`software and a platform called ‘WritersDuet’” to draft the three acts of the screenplay, which
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`permits writers to “co-write in real time.” (Id. ¶ 37.) The program gave Plaintiffs “access to the
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`Untitled Wyoming script” where they “could see and comment on any changes Ms. Crededio
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`made to any individual scene” and either “approve[] Ms. Crededio’s words, suggest[] ways that
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`they could be re-written, or simply re-wr[i]te them themselves to ensure that what Ms. Crededio
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`was writing” conformed “with their directions.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that they “authored[,]”
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`“were responsible for[,]” and “dictated” aspects of the individual scenes within the first three
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`acts of the play, including characters, the settings, and “the action, description[,] and dialog” of
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`the scenes. (Id. ¶¶ 47-65.) Ms. Crededio’s role, they allege, was “primarily to reduce to writing
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`Plaintiffs’ detailed instructions.” (Id. ¶ 66.) To the extent Ms. Crededio made any independent
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`contributions to the Work, Plaintiffs allege that they were made “on a work-for-hire basis”
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`within the scope of her employment. (Id. ¶¶ 74-79.) Plaintiffs allege that the Work has
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`undergone further revision since Ms. Crededio’s three-week term ended, and was unfinished as
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`of the time the First Amended Complaint was filed. (Id. ¶ 39.)
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`After completing the draft of the first three acts of the screenplay, Ms. Crededio
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`“submitted an application to register” the Work with the U.S. Copyright Office on November 15,
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`2019, which was ultimately granted. (FAC ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs assert that this registration was
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`“unauthorized” and therefore “invalid” because Plaintiffs are “the exclusive authors of the
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`Work” who “never relinquished control over” its “direction, scope and words.” (Id. ¶¶ 2-7.)
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`Plaintiffs sent Ms. Crededio a cease-and-desist letter on November 25, 2020, asserting that her
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`copyright registration “was made under false pretenses as she was not the author of ‘Untitled
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`Wyoming Project.’” (Id. ¶ 136.) Two days later, “Plaintiffs applied for their own copyright
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`registration[,]” and the U.S. Copyright Office granted such copyright in January 2021 for the
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`“dramatic work and music ‘Untitled Wyoming Project’ a.k.a. Monarch.” (Id. ¶¶ 132-33.)
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` In this action, Plaintiffs seek declarations “that the copyright registration[] held
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`by Ms. Crededio” is “invalid[,]” that “their copyright registration is valid[,]” and that “Plaintiffs
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`are . . . the exclusive owners and authors of the Work.” (FAC ¶¶ 140-44.) Plaintiffs also assert a
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`claim for copyright infringement, alleging that they are the “owners of a valid copyright” in the
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`Untitled Wyoming Project and that Ms. Crededio not only unlawfully “copied Plaintiffs’ original
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`expression from the copyrighted work when she submitted her application for a copyright to the
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`U.S. Copyright Office” but also that her “continued refusal to cancel” her copyright registration
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`“infringes on Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights.” (Id. ¶¶ 145-49.)
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`In anticipation of the filing of the Amended Complaint, on July 1, 2022, Judge
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`Broderick, to whom this case was previously assigned, dismissed Defendant Crededio’s motion
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`to dismiss the original pleading as moot. (Docket entry no. 28.) In that order, Judge Broderick
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`expressed his “concerns about whether Plaintiffs [had] adequately plead[ed] their authorship of
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`the Work” because the “allegations seem[ed] to plead only that [Plaintiffs] provided Crededio
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`with ‘ideas,’ rather than that they provided any particular ‘manner[s] of expression’ that became
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`part of the Work.” (Id. at 4 (citation omitted).) Judge Broderick acknowledged that Plaintiffs
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`failed to “plead any ‘written instrument’ through which they and Crededio agreed that the Work
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`‘shall be considered a work made for hire[,]’” but rather the “Complaint appear[ed] to portray
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`Crededio as an ‘independent contractor when [s]he produced the’ Work.” (Id. at 4-5 (citations
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`omitted).) In directing Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint by July 28, 2022, Judge Broderick
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`instructed that the revised pleading “should include . . . some or all of the following: (1) a copy
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`of the Work; (2) copies of the ‘physical outlines,’ ‘rough drafts,’ or other work product ‘provided
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`by the Plaintiffs’ to Crededio demonstrating Plaintiffs’ alleged authorship of the Work . . . [;] (3)
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`allegations about which specific parts of the Work they believed they authored; and (4) if it
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`exists, any written employment agreement Plaintiffs entered into with Crededio[,]” in order to
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`meet their “burden to plead sufficient ‘factual content’” to render their claims plausible. (Id. at
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`5-6 (citations omitted).) In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the portions of the
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`scenes they claim to have “authored,” been “responsible for,” and “dictated.” (FAC ¶¶ 43-65.)
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`Plaintiffs also attached as Exhibit A to the First Amended Complaint “the version of the script as
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`it existed when they ceased to employ Ms. Crededio on or about November 2, 2019.” (Id.
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`¶ 40.) Plaintiffs allege that the version Ms. Crededio “submitted for copyright protection” is
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`“either identical to Exhibit A or is derivative thereof.” (Id.)
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`“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
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`DISCUSSION
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`matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
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`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A complaint cannot simply recite legal
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`conclusions or bare elements of a cause of action; it must plead factual content that “allows the
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`court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
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`Id. Under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the court accepts as true the non-conclusory factual
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`allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Roth v.
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`Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 2007).
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`Count One: Declaratory Judgment2
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`Plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, seeking
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`declarations “that the copyright registration[] held by Ms. Crededio” is “invalid[,]” that “their
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`copyright registration is valid,” and because “Plaintiffs are . . . the exclusive owners and authors
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`of the Work.” (FAC ¶¶ 140-44.) Ms. Crededio moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for
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`declaratory relief, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that they were authors of
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`the Work or that the Work constituted a work-made-for-hire.
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`The crux of this issue is a dispute over authorship of the version of the screenplay
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`that Ms. Crededio assisted in drafting and thereafter registered for copyright protection. “The
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`Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership ‘vests initially in the author or authors
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`of the work.’” Sorenson v. Wolfson, 96 F. Supp. 3d 347, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting 17
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`U.S.C. § 201(a)). “Long-established precedent designates ‘the author’ as the person who
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`‘actually creates the work—that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
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`2
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`Plaintiffs assert Count One for “declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 re
`Rights of ‘Untitled Wyoming Project.’” (FAC ¶¶ 140-44.) Declaratory judgment is a
`type of relief Plaintiffs may seek, not an independent cause of action. For this reason, the
`Court analyzes this cause of action as a claim seeking declaratory relief in the context of
`alleged copyright infringement.
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`expression,’ making the work copyrightable.” Horror Inc. v. Miller, 15 F.4th 232, 242 (2d Cir.
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`2021) (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989)).
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`“[B]oth tangibility and originality are necessary aspects of authorship.” Medforms, Inc. v.
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`Healthcare Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2002); see also 16 Casa Duse, LLC v.
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`Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 256 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works
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`of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a))).
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`“Ideas, refinements, and suggestions, standing alone, are not the subjects of copyrights.”
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`Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 84 F. Supp. 2d 455, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
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`citation omitted); see also Medforms, 290 F.3d at 107 (“Copyright protection does not, however,
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`extend to an idea just because it is original.”). Moreover, to reflect an original contribution, the
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`work must have been “independently created by the author and . . . possess at least a minimal
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`degree of creativity.” Maurizio, 84 F. Supp. at 466-67. The “requisite level of creativity is
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`extremely low” and, therefore, “[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
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`possess some creative spark, no matter how crude[,] humble[,] or obvious it might be.”
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`Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d 327, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation
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`marks and citations omitted).
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`Plaintiffs argue that they have plausibly alleged exclusive authorship of the Work
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`because the allegations, if accepted as true, demonstrate that Defendant Crededio did not
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`contribute any original components to the draft script. Plaintiffs allege that they “conceived of
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`the idea for the Work, conducted significant research into developing their idea, and committed
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`their early conceptions to writing in the form of outlines[,]” including the initial few-page draft
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`submitted to the WGA. (Docket entry no. 43 (“Pl. Opp.”) at 6-7 (citing FAC ¶¶ 19-21, 42).)
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`Plaintiffs further allege that they “dictated the details of scenes, characters, plot points and
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`dialog” to Ms. Crededio for the screenplay and “retained absolutely (sic) control over what
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`remained in the script.” (Id. (citing FAC ¶¶ 28, 75).) Therefore, the First Amended Complaint,
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`Plaintiffs argue, plausibly demonstrates that Ms. Crededio failed to contribute any portion of the
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`work that resulted from her “independent creation.” (Id.)
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`The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to render
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`their Declaratory Judgment Act claim—seeking a declaration of exclusive authorship over the
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`Work—plausible. Plaintiffs allege that they conceived of the idea for the Work, namely a
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`“period drama set in the late 1800’s American West” focused on the women’s rights movement
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`(FAC ¶ 19), and conducted extensive research to develop the conceptual framework for the
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`television series, but ideas are not eligible for copyright protection absent “fix[ation] in a
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`tangible medium of expression.” Medforms, 290 F.3d at 107; see also Sorenson, 96 F. Supp. 3d
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`at 362 (dismissing copyright claim where plaintiff “did not translate any idea into a fixed,
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`tangible expression”). Plaintiffs allege, in a conclusory manner, that they drafted the “first few
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`scenes” of the Work in a short draft submitted to the WGA (FAC ¶ 21) and also translated their
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`ideas to “written outlines, and rough drafts” (id. ¶ 5), but they fail to identify with any factual
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`specificity the elements of the screenplay that appeared in these preliminary versions and were
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`allegedly incorporated into the later version of the Work at issue here, which Plaintiffs claim to
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`have authored. (See docket entry no. 38 (“Def. Mem.”) at 5 (explaining that the “work at issue”
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`here is “the version of the script as it existed . . . on or about November 2, 2019” (citing FAC ¶
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`40).) Nor have Plaintiffs submitted, with their revised pleading, copies of the preliminary
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`versions of the Work that they allegedly drafted to enable the Court to compare the early drafts
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`with the work product that Ms. Crededio assisted in drafting. (See docket entry no. 28 (July 1,
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`2022 Order); cf. FAC (only attaching the versions of the Work with which Defendants were
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`involved, and not any preliminary outlines or drafts).)
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`In lieu of submitting the preliminary versions of the Work that Plaintiffs allegedly
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`wrote, Plaintiffs instead break down the three acts scene-by-scene in the FAC in an attempt to
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`describe the elements Plaintiffs claim to have “authored.” (FAC ¶¶ 47-65.) This section of the
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`FAC is replete with legal conclusions that the Court need not accept as true. See, e.g., Klauber
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`Brothers, Inc. v. URBN US Retail LLC, No. 21-CV-4526-GHW, 2023 WL 1818472 (S.D.N.Y.
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`Feb. 8, 2023) (“‘[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true’ a complaint’s factual allegations
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`does not apply ‘to legal conclusions.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). For example, Plaintiffs
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`repeatedly allege that they “authored” characters that appear in the Work, as well as the “overall
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`direction” and “action[s], description[s,] and dialog[s]” in given scenes, even though authorship
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`is the legal issue at stake in this case. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 49, 61.) Plaintiffs’ allegations as to the portions
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`of the Work they were “responsible for” are vague and devoid of factual detail about the scope of
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`their responsibility and how that responsibility relates to the language used in the actual written
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`work. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 53-56 (alleging that Plaintiffs “dictated” elements including “the overall
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`setting” and the “descriptions, actions, dialog and motivations of [certain] characters” throughout
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`certain scenes).) The Court’s review of the draft script attached as Exhibit A to the First
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`Amended Complaint reveals that many of the elements Plaintiffs claim to have “authored” or
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`“dictated” amounted to broad conceptions or ideas for the Work that are not copyrightable and
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`required substantial expansion to transform into a viable screenplay. In Act I, scene 1, for
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`instance, Plaintiffs refer to their authorship of the characters and the “overall direction” of the
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`scene, including the “acceptance of a package” that allegedly formed a “central plot point to the
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`pilot script.” (Id. ¶ 47.) The Court’s review of this scene in the Work, however, reveals that the
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`written script contains much more detail, describing, for example, the “dirt soaked into” a
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`character’s skin “as we see his breathing starting to race” and how the character was “matching
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`the gallops of the horses pulling the stagecoach spotted in the distance, timing his attack like a
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`lion does to the prey.” (Id., Ex. A.) In another example from Act I, scene 2, Plaintiffs allege to
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`have “created” one of the characters – Mining Man I – that appears in the scene (id. ¶ 48), but
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`several other miners also appear in the underlying Work, including “[m]any grunting MINERS”
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`“tired on their knees [who] continue to work in soot soaked suits” and one “MINER” in
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`particular who “walks out of the darkened mine chambers and wipes coal dust off his face” (id.,
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`Ex. A).
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`Plaintiffs attempt to portray Ms. Crededio’s role as that of a “scribe” who “merely
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`transformed instructions dictated by Plaintiffs into writing” (FAC ¶ 45) and added no original
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`contributions to the Work. Plaintiffs rely on the Second Circuit’s decision in Medforms, Inc. v.
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`Healthcare Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 290 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2002), which explained that, although an
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`author of a work is usually “the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
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`expression[,]” authorship may, in limited circumstances, also extend to the individual who
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`“authorize[s] another to ‘fix’ his original idea.” 290 F.3d at 107 (citations omitted). The Second
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`Circuit cited approvingly the decision in Andrien v. S. Ocean County Chamber of Commerce,
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`927 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1991), where the Third Circuit concluded that, “[w]hen one
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`authorizes embodiment” of an idea, they may claim ownership of the work where the
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`embodiment process involved “rote or mechanical transcription that [did] not require intellectual
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`modification or highly technical enhancement.” Id. (quoting Andrien, 927 F.3d at 135).
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`When accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs,
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`however, Plaintiffs’ allegations show that Ms. Crededio was the individual who fleshed out
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`Plaintiffs’ conceptual frameworks for the screenplay and committed them to the page, making
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`the Work copyrightable. See, e.g., New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. Intercontinental
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`Exchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that “ideas are too important to the
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`advancement of knowledge to permit them to be under private ownership” and therefore “ideas
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`cannot be copyrighted” and “only the manner of [an idea’s] expression is copyrightable”
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`(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Crededio “assist[ed]
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`in turning Plaintiffs’ written work into a product that would be ready to be sold as a screenplay”
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`(FAC ¶ 44); that Ms. Crededio drafted the screenplay on a platform called “WritersDuet[;]” and
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`that Plaintiffs accessed the screenplay on WritersDuet to “approve[] [her] words, suggest[] ways
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`that they could be re-written, or simply re-wrote them themselves to ensure that what Ms.
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`Crededio was writing in conformity with their directions” (id. ¶ 37; see also ¶ 79 (explaining that
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`the platform “allows multiple authors and collaborators to work together on the same project”)).
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`Once Ms. Crededio completed her drafts, Plaintiffs allege that they were involved in the editing
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`process, noting, for example, when “[g]rammar [had] to be cleaned up” and where the “story
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`need (sic) to tie together along with more dialogue and direction changes.” (Id. ¶ 68.) These
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`allegations, even construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, indicate that Ms. Crededio
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`played a significant role in transforming Plaintiffs’ ideas into the written, tangible screenplay and
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`exercised some degree of freedom throughout the drafting process, as she was the one who
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`drafted the sections of the script for Plaintiffs’ review and also worked to complete her drafts by
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`the deadlines Plaintiffs provided. The allegations of the FAC are not sufficient to support an
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`inference that Plaintiffs were the sole authors of the Work.
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`The Court “need not feel constrained to accept as truth conflicting pleadings that
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`make no sense . . . or that are contradicted either by statements in the complaint itself or by
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`documents upon which [the] pleadings rely.” Sander v. Enerco Grp., Inc., No. 21-CV-10684-
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`VB, 2023 WL 1779691, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023) (quoting Brown v. City Univ. of N.Y.,
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`No. 21-CV-854-PKC-MMH, 2022 WL 467818, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022)); see also
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`Hirsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1095 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of
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`Complaint where “attenuated allegations” were “contradicted both by more specific allegations
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`in the Complaint and by facts of which [the court] may take judicial notice”). Here, Plaintiffs’
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`allegations as to their sole authorship of the Work are conclusory, vague, and contradicted by
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`their more specific allegations as to Ms. Crededio’s role in the drafting process, and by the Work
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`itself. The plethora of additional creative elements in the Work, as compared to the vague
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`concepts Plaintiffs allege to have authored, render implausible their contention that Ms. Crededio
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`made no original contributions to the Work. See, e.g., Cnty. of Suffolk, New York v. First Am.
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`Real Estate Sols., 261 F.3d 179, 188 (“The level of creativity required to demonstrate that the
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`work is original is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” (internal quotation marks
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`and citation omitted)). Therefore, upon review of the entirety of the pleading, the Court
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`concludes that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to render plausible Plaintiffs’ claim as to
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`exclusive authorship of the Work.
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`Plaintiffs allege in the alternative that, to the extent Ms. Crededio contributed
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`original portions to the Work, her contributions amounted to a work-made-for-hire and,
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`therefore, Plaintiffs retain the authorship rights in the Work. Even though the author of a work is
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`usually the person who “actually creates the work—that is the person who translates an idea into
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`a fixed, tangible expression,” the Copyright Act “creates an exception to the general authorship
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`rule regarding ‘works made for hire.’” Horror Inc., 15 F.4th at 242 (internal quotation marks and
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`citations omitted). Section 101 of the Copyright Act specifies that a work is “for hire” under
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`Case 1:21-cv-08528-LTS Document 47 Filed 03/31/23 Page 13 of 17
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`“two sets of circumstances: ‘(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
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`employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned . . . if the parties expressly agree
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`in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.’”
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`Reid, 490 U.S. at 738 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). Here, only the first prong is even potentially
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`applicable because Plaintiffs do not allege that Ms. Crededio signed a written instrument
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`designating the draft script a work-made-for-hire. (See FAC ¶¶ 74-79).
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`The Supreme Court, in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
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`730 (1989), set forth the framework for determining whether a “hired party is an employee” for
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`the purposes of copyright ownership. 490 U.S. at 751-52. If the party “qualifies as an employee
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`‘under the general common law of agency,’ and the work is prepared within the scope of his
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`employment, then the work that [the party] prepares for [her] employer is a work for hire” and
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`authorship vests in the employer. Horror, Inc., 15 F.4th at 244 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 738,
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`740, 751). “If, however, the individual is merely an independent contractor ‘as understood by
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`common-law agency doctrine,’ then the work will not qualify as a work for hire” and the non-
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`employee will be considered the author of the Work. Id. (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 738, 740).
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`The Reid court identified thirteen non-exclusive factors to be considered in determining whether
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`the hired party is an employee, including: (1) “the hiring party’s right to control the manner and
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`means by which the product is accomplished[,]” (2) “the skill required[,]” (3) the source of the
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`instrumentalities and tools[,]” (4) the location of the work[,]” (5) “the duration of the relationship
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`between the parties[,]” (6) “whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
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`the hired party[,]” (7) “the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to
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`work[,]” (8) “the method of payment[,]” (9) “the hired party’s role in hiring and paying
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`assistants[,]” (10) “whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party[,]” (11)
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`“whether the hiring party is in business[,]” (12) the “provision of employee benefits[,]” and (13)
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`“the tax treatment of the hired party.” Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52. The Second Circuit has
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`“cautioned against applying the Reid factors ‘in a mechanistic fashion[,]’” Horror Inc., 15 F.4th
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`at 248 (quoting Aymes v. Boonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1992)), as the “Reid test can be
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`easily misapplied, since it consists merely of a list of possible considerations that may or may not
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`be relevant in a given case.” Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861. Instead, the Court should weigh the
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`factors based on their applicability and significance to the case. Id. The Second Circuit has also
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`explained that the factors “that will be significant in virtually every situation” and “should be
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`given more weight in the analysis” include “(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and
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`means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax
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`treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
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`projects to the hired party.” Id. at 861.
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`Based on its review of the allegations in the FAC in light of the Reid factors, the
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`Court concludes that the facts Plaintiffs proffer in the FAC, even when construed in the light
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`most favorable to them, are insufficient to support an inference that the Work was a work-made-
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`for-hire because Ms. Crededio was Plaintiffs’ employee. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
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`Crededio only worked with Plaintiffs for a three-week period on one project—the Untitled
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`Wyoming Project—and was paid a lump sum payment upon her completion of each act of the
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`script—rather than a fixed weekly or monthly salary. See, e.g., Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53
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`(finding two-month work period to weigh in favor of independent contractor status); Horror, Inc.,
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`15 F.4th at 255 (classifying defendant as independent contractor where he worked on screenplay
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`“for approximately two months” and was paid lump sum payments upon his completion of the
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`first and final drafts of the screenplay); cf. Mwangi v. Passbase, Inc., No. 21-CV-6728-ER, 2022
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`WL 2133734, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2022) (finding allegation regarding receipt of a “fixed
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`monthly salary” suggested “employee status” because “[i]ndependent contractors are often paid
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`using lump-sum payments”). Plaintiffs also allege that they used an application for one-off
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`money transfers, “Chase Quickpay,” as the method of payment for each of the three lump sums,
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`in lieu of regular pay checks. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 28, 32-34.)
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`The FAC contains no allegation that Defendant Crededio received any employee
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`benefits such as health insurance, vacation time, or a pension plan, nor that Defendants withheld
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`taxes from the lump sum payments she received. Horror Inc., 15 F.4th at 253; see also Aymes,
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`980 F.2d at 862-63 (collecting cases where courts have “found the hired party to be an
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`independent contractor where the hiring party failed to extend benefits or pay social security
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`taxes”). These last two factors weigh especially heavily in Ms. Crededio’s favor because, as the
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`Second Circuit has observed, it would be “inequitable” for Plaintiffs to “benefit from a worker’s
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`status as an independent contractor ‘in one context’ and then” subsequently deny Ms. Crededio
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`“that [independent contractor] status” in order to prevail in this copyright litigation. Horror Inc.,
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`15 F.4th at 253. Finally, although Plaintiffs allege that they maintained “control over the
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`composition of the Work” (FAC ¶¶ 75, 79), they fail to allege facts est