Case 1:21-cv-03459-LTS Document 7 Filed 06/03/21 Page 1 of 6
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`KENT A. ALLEN,
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`Plaintiff,
`-against-
`ANTWAN PATTON (BIG BOI); ANTONIO
`RIED (HITCO ENTERTAINMENT);
`SUNDAR PICHAI (GOOGLE),
`Defendants.
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`21-CV-3459 (LTS)
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`ORDER OF DISMISSAL
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`LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
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`Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, asserts claims for appropriation of his ideas for Google
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`and Instagram, and for developing domain names including Postmates, Kangaroo, and Amazon.
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`He invokes the diversity of citizenship statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as the basis for this Court’s
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`jurisdiction. By order dated April 29, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed
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`without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below,
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`the Court dismisses the complaint.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is
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`frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
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`relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see
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`Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also
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`dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`12(h)(3).
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`While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to
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`construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret
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`Case 1:21-cv-03459-LTS Document 7 Filed 06/03/21 Page 2 of 6
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`them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
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`F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in
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`original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –
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`to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the
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`pleader is entitled to relief.
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`The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to
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`state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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`570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the
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`Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing
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`the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v.
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`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals
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`of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550
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`U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court
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`must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is
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`entitled to relief. Id.
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`BACKGROUND
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`In prior actions assigned to this Court, Plaintiff Kent Allen raised the same claims raised
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`here but named different defendants. See Allen v. Patton, ECF 1:21-CV-3434, 2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
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`30, 2021); Allen v. Cole, ECF 1:21-CV-3450, 2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2021). Plaintiff attached the
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`same statement of facts to the complaints in this action and the prior actions. (See ECF 2, at 7;
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`ECF 1:21-CV-3434, 2, at 6; ECF 1:21-CV-3450, 2, at 7.) Here, Plaintiff adds Sundar Pichai
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`(Google), but the complaint alleges no facts regarding Pichai. Otherwise, Plaintiff alleges
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`identical facts in all three complaints. The Court therefore assumes familiarity with the
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`complaints in 21-CV-3434 and 21-CV-3450 for the purposes of this order.
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`A.
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`Failure to State a Claim
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`DISCUSSION
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`The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations that he had the idea for the Instagram platform
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`and Google’s search engine and map software, but was not credited or compensated for these
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`ideas as seeking relief for copyright or patent infringement. The Court also construes Plaintiff’s
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`allegations that he was deprived of the ability to profit from registration of various well-known
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`domain names, including the domain names Google, Amazon, and Postmates, as seeking relief
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`for “cybersquatting.”1
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`The Court dismisses each of these claims for the same reasons it dismissed Plaintiff’s
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`claims in ECF 1:21-CV-3434, 6 and ECF 1:21-CV-3450, 6. That is, because Plaintiff does not
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`allege that at any point he created any software or other tangible expression of his ideas or that
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`he holds any copyright, he alleges nothing more than that he had an uncopyrightable idea, and he
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`therefore fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under the Copyright Act. And
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`because Plaintiff alleges only that he had the idea for something like Google or Instagram – not
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`1 The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) amends the Trademark Act
`of 1946 to create a federal remedy for cybersquatting – that is, for warehousing and trafficking in
`domain names. The ACPA provides, at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), that:
`A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a
`personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard
`to the goods or services of the parties, that person—(i) has a bad faith intent to
`profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark
`under this section; and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that—(I) in
`the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain
`name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark; (II) in the case of a famous
`mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or
`confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; . . . .
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`Case 1:21-cv-03459-LTS Document 7 Filed 06/03/21 Page 4 of 6
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`that he actually developed the technology or was issued a patent, Plaintiff fails to state a claim
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`for patent infringement. Finally, because the complaint gives no indication that Plaintiff has a
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`registered trademark for any word, name, slogan, logo, or symbol, that Defendants have
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`infringed any trademark he holds, or that Defendants were involved in preventing Plaintiff from
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`renewing any domain registration, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant for
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`interfering with his domain registration.
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`B.
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`Frivolousness
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`Under the IFP statute, a court must dismiss a case if it determines that the action is
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`frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A claim is “frivolous when either: (1) the
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`factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or
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`fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston, 141 F.3d
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`at 437 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, a court has “no obligation to
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`entertain pure speculation and conjecture.” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011)
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`(finding as frivolous and baseless allegations that set forth a fantastical alternative history of the
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`September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
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`The Court, after reviewing Plaintiff’s complaint, finds that it lacks any arguable basis in
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`law or in fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Plaintiff’s claim that, as an
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`eight or nine-year-old child, he had the ideas for Google and Instagram is baseless, particularly
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`in light of claims Plaintiff has advanced in his numerous other complaints described below. Thus,
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`the Court also dismisses the complaint as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
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`In deference to Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court would normally direct Plaintiff to
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`amend his complaint, but the Court finds that the complaint cannot be cured with an amendment.
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`Where an amendment would be futile, leave to amend is not required. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d
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`116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (court may
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`dismiss complaint sua sponte and without providing leave to amend “where the substance of the
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`claim pleaded is frivolous on its face”).
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`C.
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`Litigation History
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`Since April 19, 2021, Plaintiff has filed fifteen similar actions in this Court. See, e.g.,
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`Allen v. Payton, ECF 1:21-CV-4698, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 25, 2021) (complaint alleging that
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`Plaintiff came up with the idea of Dasani water); Allen v. Zuckerberg, ECF 1:21-CV-4699, 2
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`(S.D.N.Y. filed May 25, 2021) (complaint alleging Plaintiff had the idea for Facebook); Allen v.
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`EK, ECF 1:21-CV-4696, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 25, 2021) (complaint alleging Plaintiff had the
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`idea for Spotify); Allen v. Klein, ECF 1:21-CV-3839, 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021) (dismissing the
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`complaint for failure to state a claim); Allen v. Almanazar, ECF 1:21-CV-3838, 4 (S.D.N.Y. May
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`17, 2021) (dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim and as frivolous and directing
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`Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be barred from filing future actions IFP without first
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`receiving permission from the Court); Allen v. Trimble, ECF 1:21-CV-4299, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed
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`May 11, 2021) (complaint alleging that Plaintiff developed singer Dej Loaf and invented Twitter
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`and Instagram); Allen v. Tenev, ECF 1:21-CV-4119, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 7, 2021) (complaint
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`alleging that, as a child, Plaintiff “thought about how Robin Hood the cartoon show should also
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`be used for stock trading”); Allen v. Cole, ECF 1:21-CV-3450, 6 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2021)
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`(dismissing the complaint and warning Plaintiff that vexatious or frivolous litigation may result
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`in an order barring him from filing new actions IFP); Allen v. Patton, ECF 1:21-CV-3434, 6
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`(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2021) (same); Allen v. Finley, ECF 1:21-CV-3840, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed April
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`29, 2021) (complaint alleging that Plaintiff invented the business name “Aquafina”); Allen v.
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`Thomas, ECF 1:21-CV-3841, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed April 29, 2021) (complaint describing Plaintiff’s
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`alleged creation of the name “GameStop”); Allen v. Cole, ECF 1:21-CV-3844, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed
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`Apr. 29, 2021) (complaint alleging Plaintiff developed singer Keyshia Cole and invented the
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`Case 1:21-cv-03459-LTS Document 7 Filed 06/03/21 Page 6 of 6
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`business name “Sunrun”); and Allen v. Patton, ECF 1:21-CV-3468, 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed April 19,
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`2021) (complaint naming Amazon founder Jeff Bezos).
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`Based on this litigation history, by order dated May 17, 2021, the Court directed Plaintiff
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`to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any further actions in this Court IFP
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`without first obtaining permission from this Court to file his complaint. Allen v. Almanazar, ECF
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`1:21-CV-3838, 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021). As of the date of this order, Plaintiff has not
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`submitted a declaration. Thus, the Court again warns Plaintiff that continued vexatious or
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`frivolous litigation in this Court may result in imposition of additional filing restrictions. See 28
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`U.S.C. § 1651.
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`CONCLUSION
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`Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for failure to
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`state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), and as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
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`Plaintiff has consented to receive electronic service of notices and documents in this
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`action. (ECF 6.)
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`The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
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`not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
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`Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
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`SO ORDERED.
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`Dated:
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`June 3, 2021
`New York, New York
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`/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
`LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
`Chief United States District Judge
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`6
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