Case 1:16-cr-00091-PKC Document 213 Filed 09/04/17 Page 1 of 2
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`U.S. Department of Justice
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`United States Attorney
`Southern District of New York
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`The Silvio J. Mollo Building
`One Saint Andrew=s Plaza
`New York, New York 10007
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`September 4, 2017
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`BY ECF
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`Honorable P. Kevin Castel
`United States District Judge
`Southern District of New York
`Daniel Patrick Moynihan U.S. Courthouse
`500 Pearl Street
`New York, New York 10007
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`Re: United States v. Scott Tucker and Timothy Muir, 16 Cr. 91 (PKC)
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`Dear Judge Castel:
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`The Government respectfully submits this letter to supplement its motions in limine opposing
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`the admission of evidence, argument, and cross-examination concerning the desirability of payday
`lending and its legality under facts other than those presented in this case.
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` Counsel for defendant Timothy Muir has recently disclosed several potential defense exhibits
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`bearing on these subjects. Many of these disclosures—such as dueling congressional committee
`reports on the merits of payday lending, and law review articles debating the pros and cons of tribal
`lending—are squarely addressed by the Government’s already-filed motions. See Dkt. 129, at 37-
`40. Several of Muir’s disclosures, however, do not concern payday lending, but rather other
`businesses in which Indian tribes may be involved, principally gambling. Evidence, argument, and
`cross-examination on these subjects should also be excluded for reasons stated elsewhere in the
`Government’s motions.
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`That tribes lawfully do business in other areas, such as gambling, that state and federal
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`governments heavily regulate has no bearing here. To start, introducing legal evidence outside an
`advice of counsel defense—as Muir proposes to do—is improper for reasons stated elsewhere.
`See, e.g., Dkt 207. Indeed, many of Muir’s potential defense exhibits are dated after the crimes
`charged in the Indictment occurred, meaning that they could not conceivably be relevant to any
`advice of counsel received by the defendants. Moreover, the legal regime governing tribal
`gambling is entirely different from the laws relevant here, because of, among other things, the Indian
`Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et sec. Under that federal statute, tribes can, in certain
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`Case 1:16-cr-00091-PKC Document 213 Filed 09/04/17 Page 2 of 2
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`circumstances, lawfully conduct gaming activities that states would prohibit. Thus even if evidence
`about the law were proper in general, any attempt to use tribal gambling to argue about payday
`lending would be irrelevant, and would require further evidence—or further instruction from the
`Court—to explain that to the jury. Nor can Muir claim that his awareness of legalized tribal
`gambling operations informed his state of mind as to the legality of his payday lending. Because
`gambling differs from payday lending factually as much as it does legally, it has no conceivable
`relevance to Muir’s beliefs about the latter; a heroin dealer cannot offer in his defense evidence that
`a pharmacy legally sells opiates. Cf. United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 1999)
`(evidence of defendant’s other legal conduct not relevant to jury’s analysis of separate criminal
`conduct).1 This evidence should thus be excluded even if a mistake of law defense were
`permissible here—which it is not—and the evidence did not prove Muir’s involvement with tribes
`was a sham—which it will.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`JOON H. KIM
`Acting United States Attorney
`Southern District of New York
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`By:
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`_____________________________________
`Niketh Velamoor/Hagan Scotten/Sagar Ravi
` Assistant United States Attorneys
`Tel.: (212) 637-1076 / 2410 / 2195
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`1
`For the same reasons, evidence that payday lenders other than the defendants arguably
`engaged in legal lending with tribes is also irrelevant. A pharmacist on trial for selling opiate drugs
`without a prescription could not introduce evidence that other pharmacists sold the same drugs
`lawfully under different circumstances.
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`2
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