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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`----------------------------------------X
`CBS BROADCASTING INC., et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
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`10 Civ. 7532 (NRB)
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` - against -
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`FILMON.COM, INC.,
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`Defendant.
`----------------------------------------X
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`NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`
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`On October 1, 2010, plaintiffs -- which include CBS
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`Broadcasting Inc., NBC Studios LLC, Fox Television Stations,
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`Inc., and ABC Holding Company Inc. -- brought this action
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`against defendant FilmOn.com, Inc., alleging infringement of
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`their copyrights in various programs exhibited over their
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`broadcast television stations. The case was closed by entry of
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`the Consent Order of Judgment and Permanent Injunction dated
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`August 8, 2012 (the “Injunction”).
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`On July 3, 2014, plaintiffs moved this Court by order to
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`show cause to hold FilmOn.com, Inc. and its Chief Executive
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`Officer, Alkiviades David (collectively, “FilmOn”) in civil
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`contempt. Plaintiffs assert that FilmOn violated the Injunction
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`by using mini-antenna technology (1) to broadcast the networks’
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`copyrighted content within the Second Circuit in violation of
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`the Supreme Court’s decision in American Broadcasting Companies,
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 2 of 19
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`Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (“Aereo”); and (2)
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`to transmit this programming to regions outside the Second
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`Circuit through use of defendant’s “Teleporter” system. For the
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`reasons herein, we agree with plaintiffs and grant their motion.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Nearly
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`four
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`years
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`ago,
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`plaintiffs
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`initiated
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`the
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`aforementioned action, alleging that FilmOn was streaming their
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`broadcast programming without their authorization, thereby
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`infringing their exclusive copyrights in the programming under
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`Sections 106(1)-(5) of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
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`101 et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 1–5. Plaintiffs sought monetary damages
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`and a permanent injunction against FilmOn’s retransmission
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`service. Id. In July 2012, after the completion of discovery,
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`the parties reached an agreement to resolve the action, the full
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`terms and conditions of which were set forth in a settlement
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`agreement dated July 31, 2012 (the “Settlement Agreement”). The
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`Settlement Agreement was conditioned upon this Court’s entry of
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`a stipulated consent judgment and permanent injunction
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`prohibiting
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`FilmOn
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`from
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`further
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`infringing
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`plaintiffs’
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`copyrights. Settlement Agreement § 4.1.
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`Accordingly, on August 8, 2012, we entered the parties’
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`Stipulated Consent Judgment and Permanent Injunction, which
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`permanently enjoined:
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`-2-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 3 of 19
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`[FilmOn,] its affiliated companies, and all of its
`officers, directors, agents, servants, and employees,
`and all natural and corporate persons in active
`concert or participation or in privity with any of
`them . . . from infringing, by any means, directly or
`indirectly, any of plaintiffs’ exclusive rights under
`Section 106(1)-(5) of the Copyright Act, including but
`not limited to through the streaming over mobile
`telephone systems and/or the Internet of any of the
`broadcast television programming in which any
`Plaintiff owns a copyright.
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`Injunction ¶ 1. The Injunction further provided that violation
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`of its provisions would expose FilmOn and all other persons
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`bound by the Injunction to “all applicable penalties, including
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`contempt of Court.” Id. ¶ 2. Finally, it provided that “[t]his
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`Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the Parties and
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`the action for purposes of enforcing th[e] [Injunction and
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`Settlement Agreement].” Id. ¶ 4.
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`After the issuance of the Injunction, FilmOn launched a
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`video on demand (“VOD”) service, which provided subscribers with
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`access to an archive of previously televised programs for
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`streaming “on demand.” On July 2, 2013, plaintiffs moved for an
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`order to show cause why FilmOn should not be found in civil
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`contempt for violating the Injunction based on the VOD service.
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`In a Memorandum and Order dated September 10, 2013, we found
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`that because “FilmOn has offered no evidence whatsoever that
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`they have validly acquired the right to stream plaintiffs’
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`copyrighted programming,” FilmOn was in contempt of the
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`-3-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 4 of 19
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`Injunction. CBS Broad. Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
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`7532(NRB), 2013 WL 4828592, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013).
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`Accordingly, we required defendant to (1) remove all broadcast
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`programming identified by plaintiffs, (2) agree not to stream
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`any of plaintiffs’ copyrighted programming using the VOD
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`service, and (3) pay a penalty of $10,000 per day of
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`noncompliance. Judgment, Oct. 3, 2013 (the “Judgment”) ¶ 3. We
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`also compelled FilmOn to pay $115,046.10 in attorneys’ fees.
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`Id. ¶ 4.
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`On June 25, 2014, while the Injunction remained in place,
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`the Supreme Court decided Aereo. Aereo operated a system “made
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`up of servers, transcoders, and thousands of dime-sized antennas
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`housed in a central warehouse.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. A
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`key feature of the Aereo system was that each subscriber had one
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`of these dime-sized antennas dedicated to his personal use. Id.
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`An Aereo subscriber could visit the Aereo website, select a
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`program for viewing, and stream it to his device with a delay of
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`only a few seconds. Id. Petitioners in the Aereo action, which
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`included the broadcast networks who are plaintiffs in the
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`instant case, argued that Aereo infringed their right to
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`“perform” their works “publicly,” within the meaning of the
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`Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act. Id. at 2504 (quoting 17
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`U.S.C. § 106(4)).
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`-4-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 5 of 19
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`The Supreme Court found in favor of the broadcast networks,
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`holding “that Aereo ‘perform[s]’ petitioners’ copyrighted works
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`‘publicly,’ as those terms are defined by the Transmit Clause”
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`of the Copyright Act. Id. at 2511. In so finding, the Court
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`relied on “Aereo’s overwhelming likeness to the cable companies
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`targeted by the 1976 amendments” to the Copyright Act and noted
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`that the “sole technological difference between Aereo and
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`traditional cable companies [did] not make a critical
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`difference” in the Court’s analysis. Id. at 2507. Ultimately,
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`the Supreme Court concluded that “Aereo is not just an equipment
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`supplier” and that its use of the antenna system constituted
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`public performance of the petitioners’ protected programming.
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`Id. This decision overruled the Second Circuit’s determination
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`in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013),
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`that Aereo’s retransmission system did not infringe on the
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`networks’ copyrights; therefore, the use of Aereo’s technology,
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`which had previously been permissible within the Second Circuit,
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`was henceforth barred. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504, 2511.
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`Aereo did not mention, let alone abrogate, WPIX, Inc. v. ivi,
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`Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (“ivi”). That case
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`established the law in the Second Circuit that “Internet
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`-5-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 6 of 19
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`retransmission services do not constitute cable systems under §
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`111” of the Copyright Act.1 Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
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`Shortly after the Aereo decision, on July 3, 2014,
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`plaintiffs again applied for an order to show cause why the
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`Court should not hold FilmOn in contempt for violating the
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`Injunction. In this instance, plaintiffs’ application was based
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`on defendant’s “operation[] of its ‘Teleporter’ service and any
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`other device or process by which it publicly performs
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`plaintiffs’ copyrighted programming.” Order to Show Cause Re
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`Contempt of Inj. ¶ 2 (July 7, 2014). FilmOn’s Teleporter
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`service relies on mini-antennas, much like those used by Aereo,
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`to “allow[] users to virtually view broadcast content from a
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`distant location that is not necessarily within the local
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`broadcast geographic area.” Def.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to
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`Order to Show Cause Re Contempt of Inj. (“Def.’s Opp’n”) at 10.
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`Plaintiffs have requested (1) that FilmOn be ordered immediately
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`to cease offering plaintiffs’ copyrighted programming to
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`subscribers and (2) that the Court impose coercive penalties for
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`defendant’s violation of the Injunction. Mem. of Pls. in Supp.
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`of Order to Show Cause at 5.
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`1 Section 111 of the Copyright Act creates a licensing regime and “permit[s]
`cable systems to publicly perform and retransmit signals of copyrighted
`television programming to its subscribers, provided they pay royalties at
`government-regulated rates and abide by the statute's procedures.” ivi, 691
`F.3d at 278 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 111).
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`-6-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 7 of 19
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`Plaintiffs’ motion for an order to show cause was fully
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`briefed by July 17, 2014, and we held oral argument on the
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`pending motion on July 22, 2014.
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`DISCUSSION
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`“[T]he district courts have the inherent power to find a
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`party in contempt for bad faith conduct violating the court’s
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`orders.” S. New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d
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`123, 144 (2d Cir. 2010). “A party may be held in civil contempt
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`for failure to comply with a court order if ‘(1) the order the
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`contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2)
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`the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the
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`contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable
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`manner.’” Utica Coll. v. Gordon, 389 Fed. App’x 71, 72 (2d Cir.
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`2010) (quoting Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda v. GE
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`Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 655 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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`Upon finding that a party is in civil contempt, this Court
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`retains “broad discretion to fashion an appropriate coercive
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`remedy . . . based on the nature of the harm and the probable
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`effect of alternative sanctions.” City of New York v.
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`Venkataram, No. 06 Civ. 6578(NRB), 2012 WL 2921876, at *3
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`(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Local 28 of Sheet
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`Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 247 F.3d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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`The purposes of civil contempt sanctions are twofold: to coerce
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`-7-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 8 of 19
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`a defendant into compliance with a court order and to compensate
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`a plaintiff for losses incurred. Local 28 of Sheet Metal
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`Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 443 (1986).
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`With regard to the first prong of the test for contempt, an
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`injunction is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to warrant a
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`finding of contempt against a violating party if it leaves “no
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`doubt in the minds of those to whom it was addressed . . .
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`precisely what acts are forbidden.” Drywall Tapers & Pointers
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`v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 395 (2d Cir. 1989). Defendant
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`advances two primary arguments in support of its assertion that
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`the Injunction is not clear and unambiguous. First, FilmOn
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`argues that because “the Injunction does not expressly mention
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`or prohibit the mini-antenna/DVR technology and the related
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`Teleporter service,” it cannot be said to clearly and
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`unambiguously prohibit its use. Def.’s Opp’n at 15. Second,
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`defendant maintains that “in light of the Supreme Court’s
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`findings in Aereo, FilmOn qualifies as a cable system and is
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`entitled to the benefits and responsibilities of the compulsory
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`license scheme under Section 111 of the Copyright Act.” Id. at
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`18. As a result, FilmOn asserts that Aereo generated some doubt
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`regarding whether the retransmissions enabled by the mini-
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`antenna system constitute infringement under the Injunction.
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`Neither of these arguments is persuasive.
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`-8-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 9 of 19
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`First, defendant’s suggestion that the Injunction must list
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`every potential transmission mechanism that it bars in order to
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`be “clear and unambiguous” is simply untenable. As the Supreme
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`Court has noted, “[t]he technology of the Internet evolves at a
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`rapid pace,” and an injunction of the sort issued in this case
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`would quickly become obsolete -- and lose its force as a
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`permanent remedy -- if we were forced to name each and every
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`infringing technology. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 671
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`(2004). Recognizing the speed of technological advances, the
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`Injunction prohibited FilmOn from infringing, “by any means,”
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`plaintiffs’ exclusive rights to broadcast its copyrighted
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`programming. Injunction ¶ 1 (emphasis added); see also CBS
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`Broad., 2013 WL 4828592, at *6 (noting that the “scope [of the
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`Injunction] is in no way limited to the precise form of
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`infringement that precipitated” the filing of the initial
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`lawsuit). The fact that the Injunction did not explicitly
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`mention the mini-antenna technology does not render it unclear,
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`and defendant’s argument to the contrary is baseless.
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`FilmOn’s second argument is also unavailing because it
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`hinges on a mischaracterization of the holding in Aereo.
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`Defendant is correct that, throughout the Aereo opinion, the
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`Court likened Aereo to a cable company. See, e.g., Aereo, 134
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`S. Ct. at 2506 (“Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to
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`-9-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 10 of 19
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`those of the CATV companies2 that Congress amended the
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`[Copyright] Act to reach.”); id. at 2507 (recognizing “the many
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`similarities between Aereo and cable companies”). But defendant
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`attaches far too much importance to the Court’s analogizing. A
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`series of statements that Aereo (and, by extension, FilmOn,
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`“which uses technology identical” to Aereo, Def.’s Opp’n at 16)
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`is very similar to a cable system is not the same as a judicial
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`finding that Aereo and its technological peers are, in fact,
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`cable companies entitled to retransmission licenses under § 111
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`of the Copyright Act. Defendant may argue that the Supreme
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`Court’s language in Aereo implies that FilmOn may be entitled to
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`a license under § 111, but an implication is not a holding.
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`In fact, the governing law in the Second Circuit is that
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`services like FilmOn that retransmit broadcast programming are
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`not entitled to compulsory licenses under § 111 of the Copyright
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`Act. See ivi, 691 F.3d at 284. Unlike Aereo, which answered
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`the question of whether Aereo “performed” petitioners’
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`copyrighted works “publicly” under the Copyright Act, ivi
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`focused squarely on the issue of whether internet services like
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`FilmOn are cable systems under § 111. And the ivi Court found
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`that the Copyright Act’s “legislative history, development, and
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`2 The Supreme Court described CATV companies as “the precursors of modern
`cable systems.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
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`-10-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 11 of 19
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`purpose indicate that Congress did not intend for § 111 licenses
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`to extend to Internet retransmissions.” Id. The detailed
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`analysis and ultimate decision of the Second Circuit is not
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`rendered moot by the Supreme Court’s use of an analogy in
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`answering an entirely different question. Moreover, given that
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`Aereo never mentioned ivi, let alone purported to overrule it,
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`ivi remains controlling precedent here. See United States v.
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`Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 395 (1973) (stating that when the Supreme
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`Court “did not so much as mention” a decision, it cannot be said
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`to have questioned or overruled that decision). Thus, based on
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`the law in this Circuit, FilmOn is not entitled to a license
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`under § 111, and its retransmissions clearly and unambiguously
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`fall under the scope of conduct barred by the Injunction.
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`Having determined that the Injunction unquestionably
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`disallows the use of mini-antenna technology to broadcast
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`plaintiffs’ content, the proof of FilmOn’s noncompliance is
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`clear and convincing. The exhibits submitted by plaintiffs more
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`than adequately demonstrate that FilmOn streamed the networks’
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`copyrighted programming to multiple cities in violation of the
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`Injunction. See Morrow Decl. Exs. 1–2. Although FilmOn implied
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`in its opposition brief that any noncompliance with the
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`Injunction was unintentional, see Def.’s Opp’n at 20, the
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`company’s press release of June 30, 2014 belies this assertion.
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`-11-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 12 of 19
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`The press release, issued before FilmOn learned of the instant
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`order to show cause but after Aereo, boasts that defendant’s
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`mini-antenna technology continued to make available to FilmOn
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`subscribers across the country the local broadcasts of eighteen
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`major American cities, including New York. See Press Release,
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`FilmOn, FilmOn Networks Continue Offering Broadcast Signals
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`Under Copyright Act of 1976 (June 30, 2014). Thus, defendant’s
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`own statements to the public indicate that it purposefully and
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`willfully streamed plaintiffs’ copyrighted content in violation
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`of the Injunction.
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`Moreover, if we were to give credence to defendant’s claim
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`that New York content was made available outside the Second
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`Circuit only accidentally, it does not excuse defendant’s
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`decision to continue to broadcast plaintiffs’ programming within
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`the Second Circuit after the Aereo decision. FilmOn has
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`advanced a number of theories about the implications of Aereo,
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`but the holding of that decision could not have been clearer:
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`the use of the mini-antenna technology to retransmit broadcast
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`networks’ content without a license violated the Copyright Act.
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`See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2505–11. Thus, while the Second
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`Circuit may have previously been a haven for companies like
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`Aereo and FilmOn to employ the mini-antenna technology, after
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`Aereo, that haven no longer existed. Aereo understood this: in
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`-12-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 13 of 19
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`the wake of the Aereo decision, it stopped its operations in the
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`Second Circuit. Press Release, Aereo, A Letter to Our
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`Consumers: Standing Together for Innovation, Progress and
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`Technology (June 28, 2014). By contrast, FilmOn did not stop
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`broadcasting plaintiffs’ content until it learned of the instant
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`order to show cause, twelve days after Aereo. Def.’s Opp’n at
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`10. For nearly two weeks, FilmOn was aware that its operations,
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`based on the Supreme Court’s determination, infringed
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`plaintiffs’ copyrights, yet defendant continued to purposefully
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`broadcast content within the Second Circuit until it got caught.
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`Therefore, regardless of whether New York programming leaked out
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`of the Second Circuit for reasons beyond defendant’s control,
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`the retransmissions within the Second Circuit after Aereo
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`constitute a clear violation of the Injunction.
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`In addition, assuming that FilmOn believed in good faith
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`that the Aereo decision rendered it qualified to become a cable
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`company under § 111, it would nevertheless have needed to obtain
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`a license from the Copyright Office in order to have been
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`eligible to retransmit plaintiffs’ content; judicial opining on
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`the definition of a cable system is no substitute for the
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`mandatory
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`administrative
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`process
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`required
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`for
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`content
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`retransmitters. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506 (“Section 111
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`creates a complex, highly detailed compulsory licensing scheme
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`-13-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 14 of 19
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`that sets out the conditions, including the payment of
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`compulsory fees, under which cable systems may retransmit
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`broadcasts.”); ivi, 691 F.3d at 283 (“The Copyright Office is
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`the administrative agency charged with overseeing § 111’s
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`compulsory licensing scheme.”). FilmOn does not have, and has
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`never had, a license from the Copyright Office. Indeed,
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`defendant admits that it did not even apply for a cable license
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`until July 10, 2014, after plaintiff submitted this order to
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`show cause -- a fact that undermines any claim by defendant that
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`it was truly committed to complying with the letter of the law.
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`Def.’s Opp’n at 9; see also id. at 11 (stating that defendant
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`“has undertaken various diligent efforts to ensure ongoing
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`compliance” with the law). Fundamentally, FilmOn cannot choose
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`to ignore the Injunction merely because it anticipated someday
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`being able to retransmit plaintiffs’ content legally.
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`Not only is hope no defense to the violation of an
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`injunction, but defendant’s faith that the Copyright Office
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`would grant it a cable license was misplaced. On July 23, 2014,
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`the Copyright Office, citing ivi, expressed its view that
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`FilmOn, as an internet retransmission service, “falls outside
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`the scope of the Section 111 license,” and that the Office did
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`not “see anything in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
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`[Aereo] that would alter this conclusion.” Boccanfuso
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`-14-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 15 of 19
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`Supplemental Reply Decl. Ex. 10. Thus, not only was FilmOn’s
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`expectation of a license irrelevant, but it was erroneous as
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`well. Moreover, even if the Copyright Office had granted a
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`license to FilmOn, this development would not have excused
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`defendant’s decision to preemptively stream content in violation
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`of the Injunction. The Copyright Office’s decision does,
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`however, provide additional support for our conclusion that
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`FilmOn’s use of the mini-antenna technology clearly falls within
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`the ambit of the Injunction, and defendant should be held in
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`contempt for willfully violating its terms.
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`We also find Mr. David in contempt of the Injunction. The
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`Injunction bound “all of [FilmOn.com’s] officers, directors . .
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`. and employees.” Injunction ¶ 1. These categories clearly
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`encompass Mr. David, who is identified in the company’s own
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`press releases as FilmOn.com’s “founder and CEO.” Boccanfuso
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`Reply Decl. Ex. 8; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (providing
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`that those bound by an injunction include the officers and
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`employees of all parties who receive actual notice of the court
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`order). To find otherwise would allow defendant to “nullify a
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`decree by carrying out prohibited acts through [non-parties],” a
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`clearly untenable outcome. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Reinert &
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`Duree, P.C., 191 F.3d 297, 302 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal
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`quotation marks omitted).
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`-15-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 16 of 19
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`Finally, defendant argues that this contempt should be
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`resolved in the federal courts of California and the District of
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`Columbia, which have also issued injunctions against defendant
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`regarding internet retransmissions of plaintiffs’ programming.
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`See Def.’s Opp’n at 18–19. We may easily dispose of this
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`argument, as plaintiff’s contempt application is directed to
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`this Court’s injunction.
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`Any remedy must be determined in context. Here, the
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`context includes the fact that this Court has found FilmOn in
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`contempt of the Injunction before, see CBS Broad., 2013 WL
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`4828592, at *9, and the fact that FilmOn has also been held in
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`contempt in the District Court for the District of Columbia, see
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`Order, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, Civil
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`Action No. 13-758 (RMC), at 3 (Nov. 26, 2013). In such a
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`context, it would be reasonable to presume that FilmOn would
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`have proceeded cautiously. However, instead of seeking a
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`modification of the Injunction or any other form of relief from
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`this Court, defendant made the unilateral decision to stream
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`plaintiffs’ programming across the country. The consequence of
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`that choice is this decision.
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`The sanctions we impose are not punitive, but civil in
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`nature, as they “serve the purpose of coercing future
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`compliance” with the Injunction. NLRB v. Local 3, Int’l Bhd. Of
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`-16-
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 17 of 19
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`Elec. Workers, 471 F.3d 399, 405 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
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`quotation marks omitted). FilmOn has demonstrated a repeated
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`willingness to flout the authority of the federal judiciary, and
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`it is essential for this Court to make clear the obvious: the
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`Injunction and the Judgment are not mere suggestions, but are
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`orders that demand compliance.
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`CONCLUSION
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` Based on the foregoing, we find FilmOn in civil contempt
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`
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`of court for its violation of the Injunction. Pursuant to
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`paragraph 3 the Judgment, FilmOn must pay $10,000 for each of
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`the nine days of its noncompliance.3 Therefore, we impose a
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`sanction of $90,000. We also reiterate that while it appears
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`that defendant has ceased streaming plaintiffs’ programming,
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`such conduct is covered by the Injunction and future
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`retransmission of plaintiffs’ copyrighted content without a
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`license will subject defendant to significant penalties per day
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`of noncompliance.
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`3 FilmOn’s rights and responsibilities in this Circuit are tethered to those
`of Aereo, as both companies employed the same mini-antenna technology to
`broadcast the networks’ programming. Consequently, it is reasonable to
`assume that FilmOn would follow Aereo’s lead in responding to the Aereo
`decision. Aereo did not suspend its operations until June 28, 2014, and we
`believe it would be unfair to hold FilmOn in contempt for continuing to
`stream content when Aereo, the company explicitly bound by the Supreme
`Court’s decision, continued to do so itself. Therefore, we find that
`FilmOn’s noncompliance began on June 29, 2014, the day after Aereo stopped
`retransmitting content in the wake of Aereo, and ended on July 7, 2014, the
`day FilmOn deactivated its mini-antenna service.
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`
`-17-
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`
`
`-~-------------------
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 18 of 19
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`Plaintiffs are also entitled
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`to attorneys'
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`fees
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`in an
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`amount to be determined.
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`Plaintiffs' counsel shall submit on
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`notice a proposed form of
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`judgment, supported by an affidavit
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`detailing their attorneys'
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`fee request,
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`to this Court on or
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`before July 30, 2014.
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`FilmOn's counter proposal, if any, shall
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`be filed no later than August 5, 2014.
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`SO ORDERED.
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`Dated:
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`New York, New York
`July tt-.L/, 2 014
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`/ (-L~: ~~~
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`NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`-18-
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`
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`Case 1:10-cv-07532-NRB Document 102 Filed 07/24/14 Page 19 of 19
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`foregoing Memorandum and Order have been
`the
`Copies of
`mailed on this date to the following:
`
`Counsel for Plaintiffs
`Peter L. Zimroth, Esq.
`Arnold & Porter, LLP
`399 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10022
`
`Robert Alan Garrett, Esq.
`Hadrian R. Katz, Esq.
`C. Scott Morrow, Esq.
`Arnold & Porter, LLP
`555 Twelfth Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`
`Paul M. Smith, Esq.
`Jenner & Block LLP
`1099 New York Avenue, Suite 900
`Washington, DC 20001-4412
`
`Counsel for Defendant
`Ryan G. Baker, Esq.
`Baker Marquart LLP
`10990 Wilshire Blvd., Fourth Fl.
`Los Angeles, CA 90024
`
`-19-