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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`...................................................................
`AMIDAX TRADING GROUP, on behalf of itself and
`all others similarly situated,
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`X
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`ELECTRONICALLY FILED
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`DATE FILED: Y'a3 -*?
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`Plaintiff,
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`08 Civ. 5689 (PKC)
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`MEMORANDUM
`AND ORDER
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`-against-
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`S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, S.W.I.F.T. PAN-AMERICAS, INC.,
`S.W.I.F.T., INC., JOHN SNOW, in his personal
`capacity, STUART LEVEY, in his personal and
`professional capacities, UNITED STATES
`DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GEORGE W.
`BUSH, in his personal capacity, BARACK H.
`OBAMA, in his professional capacity, CENTRAL
`INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, RICHARD CHENEY, in
`his personal capacity, JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his
`professional capacity, GEORGE TENET, in his
`personal capacity, MICHAEL HAYDEN, in his
`personal capacity, LEON E. PANElTA, in his
`professional capacity, HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., in
`his personal capacity, and TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
`in his professional capacity,
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`Defendants.
`...................................................................
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`X
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`P. KEVIN CASTEL, District Judge:
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`In a Memorandum and Order dated February 13,2009, the Court dismissed
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`plaintiffs complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l), Fed. R. Civ. P., for lack of subject matter
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`jurisdiction, holding that plaintiff had failed to establish its standing to bring the action. Amidax
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`Tradine. Group v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 08 Civ. 5689(PKC), 2009 WL 361949 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
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`2009) ("Feb. 13 order").' Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration pursuant to Local Civ. R. 6.3;
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`to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), Fed. R. Civ. P.; and for relief from
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`judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. SWIFT moves for sanctions against plaintiffs
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`I Familiarity with the facts described in the Feb. 13 Order is presumed. All capitalized terms and abbreviations have
`the same meaning here as they had there.
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`Case 1:08-cv-05689-PKC Document 54 Filed 04/23/09 Page 2 of 6
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`counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. For the reasons explained below, these motions are
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`denied.
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`I. Reconsideration
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`A. Legal Standard
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`DISCUSSION
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`The standards for relief under Local Rule 6.3 and Rule 59(e) are "identical."
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`Griffin Indus.. Inc. v. Petroiam. Ltd., 72 F.Supp.2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). And where, as
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`here, a Rule 60(b) motion is filed within ten days of the entry ofjudgment, it is treated as a
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`motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). See United States v. Clark, 984
`F.2d 3 1, 32 (2d Cir. 1993); cf. Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58,61 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule 60(b)
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`"allows extraordinary judicial relief' and requires a "showing of exceptional circumstances").
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`"Local Civil Rule 6.3 elaborates on Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and provides a vehicle
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`for a party to call the court's attention to facts or controlling decisions it believes the court
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`overlooked in reaching its prior decision." Truong v. Charles Schwab & Co., 07 Civ.
`8085(SHS), 2009 WL 464452, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24,2009) (quotation and footnote omitted).
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`"Generally, motions for reconsideration are not granted unless the moving party can point to
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`controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked -- matters, in other words, that might
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`reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." In re BDC 56 LLC, 330
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`F.3d 11 1, 123 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). While a court may grant a motion for
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`reconsideration "to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice," Munafo v. Metro.
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`Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted), "a motion to reconsider
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`should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided,"
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`Case 1:08-cv-05689-PKC Document 54 Filed 04/23/09 Page 3 of 6
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`Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255,257 (2d Cir. 1995). The decision to grant or deny a
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`motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the district court.
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`Devlin v.
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`Transp. Commc'ns Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 13 1-32 (2d Cir. 1999).
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`B. Analysis
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`Plaintiffs principal argument for reconsideration is that "the Court has apparently
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`overlooked three crucial exhibits to Plaintiffs' complaint" because "a series of administrative and
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`technological problems apparently left the Court without these exhibits." (PI. 6.3 Mem. at 2.)
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`To the contrary, the Court thoroughly reviewed a complete copy of plaintiffs complaint,
`including the three exhibits -- E, F, and G -- that plaintiff believes were overlooked. (& Doc.
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`#1 (Complaint with Exhibits A - G attached).) The Court did not refer to these exhibits in the
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`Feb. 13 Order because they were immaterial to a determination of whether plaintiff had standing
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`under Article 111 of the Constitution. These three exhibits consist of reports or opinions of
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`commissions outside the United States. (f& Compl. ex. E (internet article from
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`www.privacyinternational.org translating into English the legal analysis of the Data Protection
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`Commission for the German Lander of ScNeswig-Holstein); id. ex. F (opinion of the Swiss
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`Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner); id. ex. G (opinion of the European
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`Commission Article 29 Data Protection Working Party).) The conclusions reached by these
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`commissions are based mainly on the same kind of media reports that the Court reviewed in the
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`Feb. 13 Order. Most importantly, these exhibits do not provide a concrete basis for plaintiffs
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`speculative allegation that SWIFT turned over to the U.S. government either its entire database
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`or specifically plaintiffs records. (f& Compl. ex. E at 2 (referring to "[tlhe turn over of all
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`records or parts of SWIFT customer data") (emphasis added); id. at 11 (referring to "a complete
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`Case 1:08-cv-05689-PKC Document 54 Filed 04/23/09 Page 4 of 6
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`or partial turnover . . . of all information available to SWIFT on transfers orders") (emphasis
`added); id. ex. G at 15 (referring to "massive data transfers . . . from SWIFT to the [U.S.
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`Treasury Department]").) Thus, plaintiff is not entitled to reconsideration on the basis that the
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`Court overlooked exhibits attached to the complaint.
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`Plaintiff also contends that "the Commercial Invoice [attached to the certification
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`of Marcello Schor] proves conclusively that [Amidax] has standing to sue." (Pl. Rep. Mem. at
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`4.) It does not. At most, it provides evidence that plaintiff used the SWIFT network.
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`Nonetheless, the Court assumed for the purposes of the motion to dismiss that plaintiff had
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`adequately alleged that its financial information was contained in the SWIFT database. See Feb.
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`13 Order at 10. Plaintiff cannot point to anything in Mr. Schor's certification that the Court
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`overlooked, which would establish that plaintiffs financial information was among the data
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`disclosed by SWIFT to the U.S. government. Accordingly, neither Mr. Schor's certification nor
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`the exhibits attached to it provides a basis for reconsideration.
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`Plaintiff next argues that reconsideration should be granted because the Court
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`engaged in "a fact finding function not appropriate or permitted on a motion to dismiss." (Pl. 6.3
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`Mem. at 4.) The Court did no such thing. As the Feb. 13 Order makes clear, the Court only
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`reviewed the complaint as a whole to determine whether plaintiff had adequately alleged an
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`injury-in-fact sufficient to establish its standing to sue. See Feb. 13 Order at 12-14. The Court
`did not find, as a factual matter, that SWIFT did or did not disclose its entire database -- or
`specifically plaintiffs records -- to the U.S. government. Rather, the Court held that the
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`complaint's allegations of such disclosure were speculative and conjectural, and thus insufficient
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`to establish standing. Id. at 14.
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`Case 1:08-cv-05689-PKC Document 54 Filed 04/23/09 Page 5 of 6
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`Finally, plaintiff argues that reconsideration should be granted because the Court
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`erroneously declined to permit jurisdictional discovery. (PI. 6.3 Mem. at 5; PI. 59(e) and 60(b)
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`Mem. at 2.) Plaintiff argues that defendants' contention that plaintiffs "information was not
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`disclosed by SWIFT to the government" is a "defense" supported by facts that "lie within the
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`exclusive control of the defendants." (PI. 6.3 Mem. at 5.) However, the contention that plaintiff
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`lacks standing is not an affirmative defense. Rather, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing its
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`own standing.
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`Cent. States SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco
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`Managed Care. L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has pointed to no controlling
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`authority establishing that plaintiffs mere speculation that it might have suffered a constitutional
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`injury entitles it to obtain sensitive discovery from SWIFT or the government.
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`Plaintiff has failed to identify any facts or controlling decisions overlooked by the
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`Court. Nor has plaintiff shown that reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law or
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`to prevent manifest injustice. Thus, plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Local Civil Rule 6.3,
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`Rule 59(e), or Rule 60(b).
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`11. Sanctions
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`A sanction under 28 U.S.C. 5 1927 is appropriate against "[alny attorney or other
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`person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who
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`so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously." 28 U.S.C. 5 1927;
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`also Wechsler v. Hunt Health Svs., Ltd., 216 F.Supp2d 347,356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("A pleading,
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`motion, or paper violates Rule 11 if it is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or factually without
`foundation. . . .") (citing Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. The Richard E. Jacobs Group. Inc.,
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`186 F.3d 157,167 (2d Cir. 1999)). "Section 1927 authorizes the imposition of sanctions only
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`Case 1:08-cv-05689-PKC Document 54 Filed 04/23/09 Page 6 of 6
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`when there is a finding of conduct constituting or akin to bad faith. . . . [A]n award under
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`[section] 1927 is proper when the attorney's actions are so completely without merit as to require
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`the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay."
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`State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 180 (2d Cir. 2004)
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`(citations and quotations omitted).
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`The filing of the complaint by plaintiffs counsel, and the arguments advanced by
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`counsel in opposing defendants' motions to dismiss, were not objectively unreasonable. The
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`Court is unable to conclude that counsel's actions must have been undertaken in bad faith for an
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`improper purpose. Thus, no sanction is warranted.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motions for reconsideration, to alter or
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`amend the judgment, and for relief from judgment are denied. SWIFT'S motion for sanctions is
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`denied.
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`SO ORDERED.
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`, ,,
`V P. Kevin Caste1
`United States District Judge
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`Dated: New York, New York
`April 22,2009