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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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`
`
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`IN RE: APPLE INC. SMARTPHONE
`ANTITRUST LITIGATION
`
`This Document Relates to:
`All Direct Purchaser Plaintiff Actions
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`Case No. 24-MD-3113 (JXN-LDW)
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`HAUSFELD LLP’S & SUSMAN GODFREY LLP’S RESPONSE
`TO THE “MAJORITY PLAINTIFFS” GROUP’S PROPOSED
`LEADERSHIP SLATE FOR THE DIRECT PURCHASER CLASS
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. THE MP PROPOSAL IS INEFFICIENT AND UNWIELDY ........................... 2
`III. THE MP PROPOSAL IGNORES JUDICIAL ADVICE GIVEN TO COURTS
`ON CLASS LEADERSHIP APPOINTMENTS ................................................. 6
`IV. THE MP PROPOSAL RELIES ON INAPPOSITE CASES INVOLVING
`VERY DIFFERENT CLAIMS AND IGNORES RECENT ANTITRUST
`LEADERSHIP PRECEDENTS .......................................................................... 9
`V. THE MPS’ JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR PROPOSED STRUCTURE ARE
`UNAVAILING ..................................................................................................17
`VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................26
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
`
`City of Providence, Rhode Island v. AbbVie Inc.,
`No. 20-CV-5538 (LJL), 2020 WL 6049139 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2020) ............... 19
`Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) .................. 5
`Four in One Co. v. SK Foods L.P.,
`No. 2:08-cv-03107, 2009 WL 747160 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2009) ...................... 13
`In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig.,
`240 F.R.D. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ........................................................................... 18
`In re Am. Med. Collection Agency, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
`2:19-md-02904 (D.N.J.) ....................................................................................... 10
`In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig.,
`2018 WL 11360203 (N.D. Cal. May. 15, 2018) ............................................ 11, 12
`In re Bystolic Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 20-cv-5735 (LJL), 2020 WL 6700830 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2020) ............... 15
`In re California Gasoline Spot Mkt. Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 3:20-cv-03131-JSC (N.D. Cal.) .................................................................... 16
`In re Capital One Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
`No. 1:19-MD-2915-AJT (E.D. Va.) ..................................................................... 11
`In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 07-5944 SC, 2008 WL 2024957 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2008) ........................... 13
`In re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litig.,
`2012 WL 569195 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012) .................................................. 15, 16
`In re Deva Concepts Prod. Liab. Litig.,
`No. 1:20-cv-01234-GHW, 2020 WL 4368362 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2020) ........... 12
`In re Enzo Biochem Data Sec. Litig.,
`No. CV-23-4282 (GRB)(AYS), 2023 WL 6385387 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) 11
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`In re Gerber Prod. Co. Heavy Metals Baby Food Litig.,
`No. 1:21-cv-269 (MSN/JFA), 2022 WL 1494378 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2023)...... 12
`In re Google Play Dev. Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 3:20-cv-05792 (N.D. Cal.) ............................................................................ 16
`In re European Gov’t Bonds,
`19-cv-02601 (S.D.N.Y.) ....................................................................................... 17
`In re Int. Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 16-MD-2704, 2016 WL 4131846 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016) ......................... 15
`In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 11 MD 2262 (NRB), 2011 WL 5980198 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) ........... 16
`In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig.,
`307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ..................................................................... 3, 4, 5
`In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
`No. 1:17-md-2804 (N.D. Ohio) ....................................................................... 9, 10
`In re Nelnet Servicing, Inc.,
`No. 4:22CV3181, 2023 WL 1108253 (D. Neb. Jan. 20, 2023) ........................... 11
`In re Parking Heaters Antitrust Litig.,
`310 F.R.D. 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ........................................................................... 14
`In re RealPage, Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 3:23-md-3071 (M.D. Tenn.) .................................................................... 16, 17
`In re Shop-Vac Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
`No. 4:12-md-2380, 2013 WL 183855 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2013) ......................... 18
`In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 16 CIV. 3711 (ER), 2016 WL 7439365 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016) ........ 14, 15
`In re Transpacific Passenger Air Transp. Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 3:07-cv-05634-CRB (N.D. Cal.) ................................................................... 18
`In re Warner Music Grp. Data Breach,
`No. 20 CIV. 7473 (PGG), 2021 WL 725728 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) ............. 11
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`Kjessler v. Zaappaaz, Inc.,
`No. 4:17-CV-3064, 2018 WL 8755737 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018) ................ 8, 12
`Kamakahi v. Am. Soc. for Reprod. Med.,
`No. C 11-01781 SBA, 2012 WL 892163 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2012) .................. 12
`United States, et al. v. Apple, Inc.,
`No. 2:24-cv-04055 (D.N.J.) ........................................................................... 22, 25
`
`
`Rules
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ............................................................................................. passim
`
`Other Authorities
`MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 ...................................... 8, 9
`The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency
`in the Large Class Action,
`54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1987) ............................................................................... 6
`Third Circuit Task Force Report, Selection of Class Counsel,
`208 F.R.D. 340 (2002) ................................................................................... 6, 7, 8
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiffs Shoshi Goldfus and Ira Polly, who have moved for the appointment
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`of Hausfeld LLP (“Hausfeld”) and Susman Godfrey LLP (“Susman”) as Interim Co-
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`Lead Counsel for the proposed Direct Purchaser Plaintiff (“DPP”) Class (together,
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`the “Proposed Co-Leads”), hereby respond to the motion for leadership presented
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`by the so-called “Majority Plaintiffs” (“MP”).
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`The choice between the Hausfeld-Susman leadership proposal and the MP
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`proposal could not be starker, and the conclusion that the Hausfeld-Susman proposal
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`will best serve the interests of the proposed DPP Class could hardly be clearer.
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`Hausfeld and Susman have proposed a lean, efficient leadership structure helmed by
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`the country’s two most elite antitrust firms who, both separately and together, have
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`a demonstrated track record of shepherding the country’s highest-stakes cases
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`through trial. The MPs, by contrast, have proposed a top-heavy leadership structure
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`that is unmoored from the needs of the case, that lacks any coherent justification for
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`the sheer number of firms involved or the vaguely defined roles they would play,
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`and that inherently invites inefficiency, duplication of work, and inflation of
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`attorneys’ fees.
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`The MPs’ leadership proposal is not in the best interest of the proposed DPP
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`Class and their prosecution of the case, nor is it justified by any of the supposed
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`rationales proffered by the MPs. The proposal—comprised of 16 separate firms,
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`arranged into vaguely defined committees, without clear lines of responsibility or
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`accountability—is unnecessary, inefficient, and runs contrary to virtually every
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`authority on the appointment of class counsel. It conflicts with the guidance given
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`by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Federal Judicial
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`Center (“FJC”) on how lead counsel for class actions ought to be appointed. It
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`conflicts with the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 2003 amendments
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`to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that added Rule 23(g), which deals with
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`appointment of interim class counsel. And it is inconsistent with how contested
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`leadership has been decided by numerous courts in recent antitrust class actions. A
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`responsible general counsel of a private corporation or public entity would find the
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`MP proposal ill-advised at best and, respectfully, this Court should not impose such
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`an ill-advised structure on the proposed DPP Class.
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`Asking which of the competing proposals best serves the interests of the class
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`—the lean and efficient Hausfeld-Susman proposal, or the sprawling, inefficient, and
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`labyrinthine MP proposal—is a question that virtually answers itself. This Court
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`should grant Hausfeld’s and Susman’s motion to serve as Interim Co-Lead Class
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`Counsel for the proposed DPP Class.
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`II. THE MP PROPOSAL IS INEFFICIENT AND UNWIELDY
`The MPs have proposed one of the most convoluted leadership structures in
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`the recent history of antitrust class actions. It consists of: (a) four co-lead counsel;
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`(b) an “Executive Committee” of seven more firms; and (c) a “Steering Committee”
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`of yet another five firms, for a total of 16 law firms. MP Brief at 3. It is unclear what
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`the division of tasks, if any, between the “Executive” and “Steering” committees
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`would be. The proposed MP co-leads say no more than that they will “assign tasks
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`ranging from briefing to depositions, to document review, to the development of
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`expert testimony to members of the proposed Executive Committee and Steering
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`Committee.” Id. In their respective complaints, the 16 firms proposed for leadership
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`have identified a total of nearly 60 attorneys who are expected to work on this case,
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`though there undoubtedly would be even more attorneys and staff from these firms
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`who would be billing time behind the scenes—ranging from other lawyers to
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`paralegals, secretaries, IT professionals, etc.
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`The MPs’ proposed structure has appeared before in a case in this Circuit—a
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`mass tort case involving one of the proposed MP co-leads here: In re Nat’l Football
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`League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-MD-2323-AB (E.D. Pa.)
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`(“Concussion”). See MP Brief at 18. In that case, there was a leadership structure of:
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`(a) two (rather than four) co-leads; (b) a six-firm executive committee (rather than
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`seven, and including the two co-leads among those six firms) comprised of twelve
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`people; and (c) a nine-person steering committee. See Concussion ECF Nos. 64, 70.
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`The Concussion case was originally brought in 2011 as a mass tort suit against
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`the National Football League (“NFL”) and NFL Properties (collectively, the “NFL
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`parties”) by 73 former professional football players who alleged that the NFL parties
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`failed to protect them from the chronic risks created by concussive and
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`subconcussive head injuries. By April of 2015, nearly 5,000 players had filed a total
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`of over 300 similar suits against not only the NFL parties, but also, in many
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`instances, five separate Riddell parties who manufactured and sold football helmets.
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`Concussion, 307 F.R.D. 351, 361 & n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir.
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`2016), cert. denied sub nom. Gilchrist v. NFL, 580 U.S. 1030 (2016).
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`Only years later was a proposed class settlement with the NFL parties initially
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`submitted for approval, first in June of 2014 and as amended in early 2015. After
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`many months of negotiation, a settlement was reached that included funding for
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`individual medical examinations and compensation for individual player injuries. Id.
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`at 364–65. Two settlement classes were created: one of retired players who had a
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`qualifying diagnosis at the time of preliminary approval of the settlement, and
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`another of retired players who had no such diagnosis at that time. Id. at 365. To
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`obtain treatment and monitoring, each class member had to register with the claims
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`administrator and submit a claim package within a specified time period. Id. at 367.
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`The court ultimately approved the class settlements and carried forward the
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`leadership structure created in the prior mass tort actions. Id. at 373.
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`As this summary reflects, the Concussion case contrasts starkly with this one.
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`Unlike here, no one contested the Concussion leadership class counsel structure
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`(decided four years previously, when it was a mass action). Moreover, such an action
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`on behalf of individual NFL players with multiple defendants is markedly different
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`from the present antitrust class action against one defendant: Apple, Inc. (“Apple”).
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`See In re: Apple Inc. Smartphone Antitrust Litig., No. 24-MD-3113 (JXN-LDW)
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`(D.N.J.) (“Apple Smartphone Litig.”). As explained in Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr.
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`Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (N.D.
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`Cal. Sept. 22, 2017):
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`In a mass tort action, . . . each plaintiff was a real party in interest to the
`complaints, meaning that they were named as plaintiffs in the
`complaints. . . . In a putative class action, like the one before the Court,
`one or more plaintiffs seek to represent the rest of the similarly situated
`plaintiffs, and the “named plaintiffs” are the only plaintiffs actually
`named in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
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`Unlike Concussion, the representative plaintiffs here assert claims typical of
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`the class: that a single monopolist—Apple—engaged in unilateral conduct in
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`violation of the Sherman Act by precluding competition with respect to certain
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`markets where it has a dominant share, thereby injuring class members. Apple is an
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`integrated company and sole defendant; it is not being accused of any conspiracy
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`with others to further its monopoly. And the various class actions here are not being
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`brought on a clean slate: They were initiated in the wake of a lawsuit by the United
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`States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and multiple states that was filed on March
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`21, 2024. While the Proposed Co-Leads’ pleadings go beyond the DOJ allegations—
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`reflecting their own reasoned and independent research—the private lawsuits
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`depend to a significant degree on the allegations in the governmental complaint, and
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`the private plaintiffs indisputably will benefit from any discovery obtained by the
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`governmental regulators.
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`In light of all of the foregoing, a leadership structure involving 16 law firms
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`and at least 60 counsel representing the DPP Class is excessive, unnecessary, and
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`unsupported by any legal precedent.1
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`III. THE MP PROPOSAL IGNORES JUDICIAL ADVICE GIVEN TO
`COURTS ON CLASS LEADERSHIP APPOINTMENTS
`The MPs cite Third Circuit Task Force Report, Selection of Class Counsel,
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`208 F.R.D. 340 (2002) (“Task Force Report”) in support of their application. MP
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`Brief at 9. That Task Force Report warns, however, that top-heavy leadership
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`structures can be inherently suspect:
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`[V]oluntary agreements among lawyers may create cartel-like
`groupings that favor some lawyers and disfavor others on the basis of
`factors that have little to do with ability or fees, and such agreements
`may also result in overstaffing and padded hours. In order to reach a
`“deal”, lead counsel may have to “cut in” so many lawyers that the
`representation of the class becomes inefficient and the ultimate fee
`request becomes inflated[2].
`
`
`1 To be clear, the Hausfeld and Susman firms have worked well with many of the
`MP firms in the past and, indeed, are working with some of them now in other
`ongoing cases. Our alternative leadership proposal simply reflects a legitimate
`disagreement with respect to how this case should be managed to best serve the
`interests of the proposed DPP Class.
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` In support of this determination, the Task Force Report cited with approval, at
`footnote 24, the following article: John C. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
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` 2
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` .
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` . .
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`The court has an obligation to determine whether counsel chosen
`through private ordering is indeed qualified and capable of providing
`effective representation to the class. The court should reject the
`counsel arrangement if the best interests of the class will not be
`served. Moreover, the court should rightly be concerned if private
`ordering has resulted in excessive staffing of the case by various law
`firms who have cut a deal. The court at the outset should scrutinize the
`staffing arrangement and should not hesitate to intervene by removing
`counsel if it appears that lawyers are simply in the case as part of a
`negotiating process for everyone to get a piece of the pie.
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`Task Force Report, 208 F.R.D. at 348, 416 (footnotes omitted; emphases added).
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`Here, it is no coincidence that the MPs’ leadership proposal would result in a
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`leadership position being awarded to every single firm supporting that MP
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`leadership slate.
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`And the Task Force Report continues, emphasizing the importance of
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`efficiency in leadership structuring:
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`In passing on the propriety of multiple counsel, the court should not be
`content with conclusory assertions that multiple counsel is necessary to
`assure input from more class members or to avoid disputes among
`counsel for various plaintiffs. As the [Securities & Exchange
`Commission] has put it, “lead counsel should be able to explain to the
`court why and how the use of additional law firms promotes the
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`Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI.
`L. REV. 877, 908 (1987) (observing that under private ordering, competing groups
`have sometimes invited other attorneys into the action in order to secure their vote
`for lead counsel, and that the result of some private ordering is a “political
`compromise,” the price of which is “often both overstaffing and an acceptance of
`the free-riding or marginally competent attorney, whose vote gave him leverage that
`his ability did not”).
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`effective, efficient prosecution of the litigation, rather than serving
`the interests of the law firms.”
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`Id. at 417 (footnote omitted; emphases added).
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`The Third Circuit is not alone in expressing these concerns. The Advisory
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`Committee Notes to the 2003 amendment that created Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) warned
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`that “the court should be alert to the need for adequate staffing of the case, but also
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`to the risk of overstaffing or an ungainly counsel structure.”3
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`The FJC’s MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2020 printing)
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`likewise has this to say on committees of counsel in class actions: “Often called
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`steering committees, coordinating committees, management committees, executive
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`committees, discovery committees, or trial teams. Committees are most commonly
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`needed when group members’ interests and positions are sufficiently dissimilar to
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`justify giving them representation in decision making.” § 10.221 (emphases
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`added); see also Kjessler v. Zaappaaz, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-3064, 2018 WL 8755737,
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`at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018) (“Kjessler”) (holding that appointment of an
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`executive or steering committee is not appropriate where there are no “cognizable
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`dissimilarities among the current Plaintiffs . . . in terms of their ‘interests and
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`positions’”). The FJC further warned that such committees “can lead to
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`3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), Advisory Committee’s Note to 2018 Amendment (emphases
`added).
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`substantially increased costs . . . .” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §
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`10.221 (emphases added).
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`Here, there has been no attempt by the MPs to show in this single-defendant
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`case that the individual firms who seek to represent the DPP Class in the MP
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`leadership proposal have such differing interests as to justify a 16-firm leadership
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`structure. This creates the definite prospect of an inefficiently handled case and
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`duplicative billing—exactly what the Third Circuit and FJC say should be
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`discouraged.
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`IV. THE MP PROPOSAL RELIES ON INAPPOSITE CASES
`INVOLVING VERY DIFFERENT CLAIMS AND IGNORES
`RECENT ANTITRUST LEADERSHIP PRECEDENTS
`In support of their proposed leadership structure, the MPs point to mass tort
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`cases, as well as product liability cases, data breach cases, or other class actions
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`outside the antitrust context. MP Brief at 37–38. These citations are inapposite. They
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`are not helpful to evaluating leadership in this antitrust case.
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`The Opioids Case. The MPs rely most heavily on the 22-firm leadership
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`structure adopted in In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-2804 (N.D.
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`Ohio) (“Opioids”), and cite it throughout their brief. See MP Brief at 1, 2, 3, 18, 19,
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`36, 37. But they fail to note the numerous distinctions between that case and this
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`one. In Opioids, various types of governmental entities brought claims for both
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`economic and non-economic damages, and there were also claims raised by
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`disparate groups of other entities (e.g., Native American tribes, third-party payers,
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`hospitals, and classes of similarly-situated individuals). Additionally, there were
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`dozens of different types of defendants, including various manufacturing and
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`marketing defendants (e.g., Purdue Pharma, Mallinckrodt, Janssen, Endo, and
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`Allergan), and various distributor and diversion defendants (e.g., McKesson,
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`Amerisource Bergen, Cardinal Health, chain stores, and independent distributors).
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`See Opioids, ECF No. 34 at 5–6. Nothing like that exists in this case with respect to
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`Apple, where the primary claims are for aggregate economic damages to the DPP
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`Class as a whole and involve a single antitrust defendant.
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`Data Breach Cases. The principal data breach case that the MPs cite in
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`support of their applications is In re Am. Med. Collection Agency, Inc. Customer
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`Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2:19-md-02904 (D.N.J.) (“AMCA”). MP Brief at 37 (citing
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`AMCA, ECF No. 115). But there, five different class complaints were on file: one
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`against Quest Diagnostics Inc. and Optus 360, LLC; a second against Laboratory
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`Corporation of America Holdings; a third against CareCentrix; a fourth against
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`Sonic Healthcare U.S.A., Inc.; and a fifth against Inform Diagnostics, Inc. See
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`AMCA, ECF Nos. 104–07, 193. The order cited by the MPs appointed one overall
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`lead counsel and separate co-lead counsel and committees for each group of
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`defendants then being sued, as well as with respect to bankruptcy proceedings. That
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`situation is dramatically different from this case.
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`More typically, recent data breach decisions have rejected oversized
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`leadership structures. E.g., In re Enzo Biochem Data Sec. Litig., No. CV-23-4282
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`(GRB) (AYS), 2023 WL 6385387, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (appointing
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`two co-lead counsel—including Hausfeld—and refusing to appoint an executive
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`committee); In re Nelnet Servicing, Inc., No. 4:22CV3181, 2023 WL 1108253, at *6
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`(D. Neb. Jan. 20, 2023) (appointing two co-lead counsel rather than three, saying
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`“the court must balance desire to create a ‘dream team’ with several co-lead firms
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`against the competing considerations of efficiency and economy”) (cleaned up); In
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`re Warner Music Grp. Data Breach, No. 20 CIV. 7473 (PGG), 2021 WL 725728, at
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`*3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (“Warner Music”) (appointing two lead counsel and
`
`refusing to appoint a five-firm executive committee); In re Capital One Consumer
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`Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1:19-MD-2915-AJT (E.D. Va.), ECF No. 210
`
`(appointing three co-leads and declining to appoint a requested steering committee).
`
`Product Liability Litigation. The product liability cases cited by the MPs
`
`are also distinguishable. The MPs’ principal example is the decision in In re Apple
`
`Inc. Device Performance Litig., No. 5:18-md-02827-EJD, 2018 WL 11360203
`
`(N.D. Cal. May. 15, 2018) (ECF No. 99), see MP Brief at 37, as if to imply that any
`
`lawsuits against Apple require complex webs of counsel. There, however, the
`
`plaintiffs filed a 305-page complaint containing: (a) claims involving ten different
`
`Apple iPhones as well as 13 different Apple iPads; (b) one federal law claim; (c)
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`five California law claims; (d) 12 common law claims; (c) two claims under the laws
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`of the United Kingdom; and (e) 57 claims under various state or territorial laws. See
`
`In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., ECF No. 145. The claims here, which
`
`turn largely on a unified body of federal antitrust law, are far more straightforward.
`
`Moreover, other product liability or consumer class leadership rulings have
`
`dispensed with large committee structures. See, e.g., In re Gerber Prod. Co. Heavy
`
`Metals Baby Food Litig., No. 1:21-cv-269 (MSN/JFA), 2022 WL 1494378, at *3
`
`(E.D. Va. May 10, 2023) (“Gerber”) (the court refused to create an executive
`
`committee, citing five recent product liability class leadership decisions to show that
`
`“[c]ourts routinely deny requests for appointment of executive committees where
`
`plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that such appointment is necessary[,]” and observing
`
`that “[t]his action . . . is comprised of lawsuits with substantially identical common
`
`law and state consumer law claims . . . that are not so complex as to warrant a multi-
`
`firm counsel structure”); In re Deva Concepts Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1:20-cv-01234-
`
`GHW, 2020 WL 4368362, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2020) (commending counsel for
`
`eliminating formal executive committee); Kjessler, 2018 WL 8755737, at *5
`
`(rejecting need for a three-firm steering committee where “each Plaintiff in this
`
`consolidated action has asserted similar, if not identical wrongful conduct”);
`
`Kamakahi v. Am. Soc. for Reprod. Med., No. C 11-01781 SBA, 2012 WL 892163,
`
`at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2012) (declining to appoint a three-firm executive
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`committee where plaintiff did not “identif[y] any diverse interest among the
`
`parties”).
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`Antitrust Cases. What is most relevant here is what was done in recent
`
`analogous antitrust class actions. Courts faced with contested leadership structures
`
`in antitrust class action cases have favored more streamlined approaches with fewer
`
`lead counsel and often no subordinate committees whatsoever. For example, in Four
`
`in One Co. v. SK Foods L.P., No. 2:08-cv-03107, 2009 WL 747160 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
`
`20, 2009), the court chose a two-firm leadership structure (including Hausfeld),
`
`saying that it “believes that the appointment of more than two co-lead counsel, and
`
`anything other than a single liaison counsel, would engender duplication of effort
`
`not in the best interest of either a focused or efficient class representation.” Id. at
`
`*3 (emphases added).
`
`Likewise, in In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-5944 SC,
`
`2008 WL 2024957 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2008), the court chose a single lead counsel
`
`saying:
`
`The Court is convinced, however, that a single firm will usually provide
`more effective and efficient representation than a group of two or more
`firms. A single firm is already organized with internal levels of
`communication and management structure. A group of firms, on the
`other hand, must create these structures. This will tend to increase
`the risk that items may fall through the cracks. Moreover, as the
`Advisory Committee Note [to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)] states, “the court
`should be alert to . . . the risk of overstaffing” and the possibility of
`“an ungainly counsel structure.”
`
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`Id. at 1 (emphases added).
`
`Similarly, in In re Parking Heaters Antitrust Litig., 310 F.R.D. 54 (E.D.N.Y.
`
`2015), the court appointed Hausfeld and the Roberts Law Firm (which supports the
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`Hausfeld-Susman effort here) as co-leads for direct purchasers. In so ruling, the court
`
`said:
`
`The parties themselves were unable to reach a consensus about how to
`make such a leadership structure work, and I doubt that judicial fiat will
`succeed in creating a workable committee where the parties themselves
`did not. Moreover, particularly in light of the extent to which prior
`proceedings may have clarified some of the issues in dispute in these
`consolidated cases,
`there seems no need for
`the
`inevitable
`redundancies and inefficiencies attendant to a four-firm leadership
`structure.
`
`
`310 F.R.D. at 57–58 (emphases added; footnote omitted).
`
`In that same case, one of the proposed MP co-lead counsel here sought to be
`
`appointed sole lead for indirect purchasers over a competing two-firm proposal. That
`
`firm contended there that “only one lead counsel is necessary and that a joint
`
`leadership structure would be ‘overkill, inefficient and promote attorney lodestar
`
`over maximizing class member recovery.’” Id. at 58.
`
`Likewise, in In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 16 CIV. 3711 (ER), 2016
`
`WL 7439365 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016), the court found that although all leadership
`
`applicants were adequate, it would only choose two and rejected a proposed
`
`executive committee, saying:
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`[T]he Court finds that appointing a formal committee of plaintiffs’
`counsel is neither necessary nor beneficial to the interests of the class
`in this case. The creation of a formal committee is “most commonly
`needed when group members’ interests and positions are sufficiently
`dissimilar to justify giving them representation in decision making.”
`MCL § 10.221. None of the parties advocating for an executive
`committee in this case take the position that putative class members
`have divergent interests. Rather, those supporting the establishment
`of a committee seem to do so solely out of a desire to assist lead
`counsel with resources . . . . Taking into consideration that committees
`can lead to substantially increased costs and duplication of efforts, see
`MCL § 10.221, the Court finds that appointing only Quinn Emanuel
`and Robbins Geller will be “sufficient to address the various
`complexities that arise, while keeping unnecessary costs to a
`minimum.”
`
`2016 WL 7439365, at *3 (emphases added) (quoting In re Crude Oil Commodity
`
`Futures Litig., No. 11 CIV. 3600 WHP, 2012 WL 569195, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
`
`2012), and citing In re Int. Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 16-MD-2704 (PAE),
`
`2016 WL 4131846, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016) (appointing only two co-leads
`
`and “further find[ing] that appointing two interim co-lead counsel is most likely to
`
`produce efficient and effective representation” and determining that the creation of
`
`a formal committee “would lead to unnecessary duplication of work and hinder
`
`efficient decision making”)).
`
`Similarly, in In re Bystolic Antitrust Litig., No. 20-cv-5735 (LJL), 2020 WL
`
`6700830