Case 2:24-md-03113-JXN-LDW Document 17 Filed 08/08/24 Page 1 of 46 PageID: 62
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`James E. Cecchi, Esq.
`CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI
`BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
`5 Becker Farm Road
`Roseland, New Jersey 07068
`Telephone: (973) 994-1700
`jcecchi@carellabyrne.com
`
`Attorneys for Forty-Nine Plaintiffs Aceto,
`Aguiar, Babb, Balogh, Bauman, Bove, Boykin,
`Brown, Chiuchiarelli, B. Collins, H. Collins,
`Cornejo Oraheta, Cross, Daines, De La Hoz,
`Deluca, Dwyer, Finkelstein, Filter, Freifeld,
`Good, Halim, M. Hernandez, Z. Hernandez,
`Hopper, Ishii, Kielbasa, Kouyate, Kurtz,
`Kyndberg, Mason, C. Miller, J. Miller,
`Michaelson, Moody, Morgan, Morales,
`Mukherjee, G. Philbrook, K. Philbrook, Rabadi,
`Rodgers, Siano, Stuck, Styron, Sutters, Walker,
`Webb, and Yamaichi
`
`[Additional counsel appear on signature page]
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`
`IN RE: APPLE INC. SMARTPHONE
`ANTITRUST LITIGATION
`
`This Document Relates to:
`
`DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS
`
`Civil Action No. 2:24-md-03113
`
`(JXN)(LDW) MDL 3113
`
`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPOINTMENT OF
`THE MAJORITY GROUP’S LEADERSHIP SLATE FOR
`DIRECT iPHONE PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS
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`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Title
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... iii
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`I.
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`II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................... 6
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`III. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 8
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`INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
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`A) Proposed Counsel Filed Detailed and Comprehensive Complaints ............... 10
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`B) Proposed Co-Lead Interim Counsel, Executive Committee Counsel and
`Steering Committee Counsel Are Highly Experienced In Class Action and
`Complex Litigation ......................................................................................... 11
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`Proposed Co-Lead Interim Counsel: ................................................................... 12
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`1. Steve W. Berman of Hagens Berman Sobel Shapiro, LLP ....................... 12
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`2. Dena Sharp of Girard Sharp LLP .............................................................. 14
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`3. Christopher A. Seeger of Seeger Weiss, LLP ........................................... 17
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`4. James E. Cecchi of Carella Byrne Cecchi Brody & Agnello, PC ............. 19
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`Proposed Executive Committee: ......................................................................... 21
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`1. Karin B. Swope of Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP .............................. 21
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`2. Linda P. Nussbaum of Nussbaum Law Group, PC ................................... 22
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`3. Joseph H. Meltzer of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP ................... 24
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`4. Hae Sung Nam of Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP ................................... 26
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`5. Peter A. Barile III of Lowey Dannenberg, PC .......................................... 27
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`6. Daniel J. Nordin of Gustafson Gluek PLLC ............................................. 29
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`7. Mark J. Dearman of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP ................... 29
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`Proposed Steering Committee: ............................................................................ 31
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`1. Alison E. Chase of Keller Rohrback LLP ................................................. 31
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`2. Jeff Ostrow of Kopelowitz Ostrow P.A. ................................................... 32
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`3. Michelle C. Clerkin of Spiro Harrison & Nelson LLC ............................. 33
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`4. Joseph M. Vanek of Sperling & Slater, LLC ............................................ 34
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`5. Roberta D. Liebenberg of Fine, Kaplan and Black, R.P.C. ...................... 35
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`The Majority Group is the Right Size for a Case of This Magnitude ................. 36
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`C) Proposed Counsel Will Commit The Necessary Resources
` To Vigorously Prosecute This Action ............................................................ 38
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`IV. THE MAJORITY GROUP WILL WORK EFFICIENTLY TO CONTROL COSTS
`AND COMMUNICATE WITH ALL COUNSEL .................................................. 38
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`V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 39
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
`In Re: Apple Inc. Smartphone Antitrust Litig.,
`2024 WL 2884408 (J.P.M.L. June 7, 2024) ......................................................... 7
`Bernhard v. TD Bank, N.A.,
`2009 WL 3233541 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009) ............................................................. 9
`Garbaccio v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. & Subsidiaries,
`2017 WL 1196458 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2017) .......................................................... 9
`In re Insulin Pricing Litig.,
`2017 WL 4122437 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2017) ...................................................... 8, 9
`In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.,
`768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 35
`Waudby v. Verizon Wireless Servs, Inc.,
`248 F.R.D. 173 (D.N.J. 2008) ............................................................................... 8
`Rules
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ..............................................................................................passim
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1) ......................................................................................... 8, 9
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2) ............................................................................................. 8
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3) ............................................................................................. 8
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4) ............................................................................................. 9
`Other Authorities
`MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) ............................................... 8, 9, 10
`Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Selection of Class Counsel
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`208 F.R.D. 340 (2002) ......................................................................................... 9
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`Pursuant to the Court’s Case Management Order Number 1 (“CMO-1” or
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`“Order”), ECF 7, at ¶ 5, Plaintiffs Barbara Aceto, Eraldo Aguiar, Sarah Babb, Connie
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`Balogh, George Bauman, Denise Bove, Angela Boykin, Jarell Brown, Jennifer B.
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`Chiuchiarelli, Deborah Collins, Bridget Collins, Hunter Collins, Patricia Yaneth Cornejo
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`Oraheta, Amy Cross, Tory Daines, Alfredo De La Hoz, Ana Deluca, Richard Dwyer,
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`Enrique Finkelstein, Marisa Filter, David Freifeld, Jack Townsend Good, Aimen Halim,
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`Mauricio Hernandez, Zaneth Hernandez, Richard K. Hopper, Kiyomi Ishii, Michele
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`Kielbasa, Moussa Kouyate, Stacy Kurtz, Kendra Kyndberg, Robert Mason, Christopher
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`Miller, John Miller, Robert Michaelson, Timothy Moody, Jerry Morgan, Henry Morales,
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`Ayan Mukherjee, Gene Philbrook, Kerry Philbrook, Sharon Rabadi, Brian Rodgers,
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`Deanna Siano, Tamara Stuck, Tahisha Styron, Milicient Sutters, Christopher Walker,
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`Dane Webb, and April H. Yamaichi respectfully submit this memorandum in support of
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`the appointment of their proposed leadership slate for the Direct iPhone Purchaser
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`Plaintiff (“DPP”) class.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`This is one of the largest and potentially most impactful Multidistrict Litigations
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`(“MDL”) since In re National Prescription Opiate Litig. (“Opioids”), MDL No. 2804,
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`No. 1:17-md-2804 (N.D. Ohio). If the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the private
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`class plaintiffs prevail, millions of U.S. consumers will benefit from billions of dollars
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`in savings from competition in the U.S. high performance smartphone market that Apple
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`1
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`currently suppresses and blocks. Just as the Opioids MDL brought transformative change
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`to the pharmaceutical industry, this MDL can revolutionize a billion dollar industry and
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`product—the high performance smartphone—that millions of Americans use every day.
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`The stakes are—admittedly—quite high. Apple will fund and litigate this MDL to
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`the hilt given the revenues and market power it stands to lose. The private class plaintiffs
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`should be represented by a team with enough experience, skill, manpower, and funding
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`to go toe-to-toe with Apple. The group of lawyers that have come together to submit this
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`application on behalf of the DPP class are such a team (the “Majority Group”).
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`As explained in detail below, the Majority Group’s proposed leadership slate
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`includes (1) Co-Lead Counsel with (collectively) decades of effective, efficient, and
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`successful leadership of the most complex and impactful antitrust, class, and MDL
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`matters, (2) a Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee with ample experience and judgment to
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`lead the briefing, discovery, and expert committees that will be needed in this case, and
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`(3) a Steering Committee, which will give the Majority Group additional manpower,
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`resources, and flexibility to prosecute this case.
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`The Majority Group is aware that another group of leadership applicants intends
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`to propose a smaller leadership structure that would place the fate of this ground-
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`breaking case in the hands of just a few law firms. Respectfully, we believe that approach
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`is unrealistic and will not best serve the class members. The Majority Group submits that
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`the complexity, size, and stakes of this case requires a multi-layered leadership structure
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`2
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`like the one we have proposed, which balances the need, on the one hand, for strong
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`leadership with the need, on the other, to draw on the skills, resources, and manpower of
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`multiple law firms so that the litigation team can be scaled up and down as needed. The
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`Majority Group’s structure has strong precedent. A similar, multi-layered approach has
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`been taken in other complex national litigations, including Opioids and In re Apple Inc.
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`Device Performance Litig. (“Apple Device Performance”), MDL 2837 (N.D. Cal.), to
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`name just two. Notably, although the quantum of work and the potential quantum of
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`damages at stake here is at least equal to what was involved in those cases, the Majority
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`Group’s proposed 16 firm structure is smaller than the 22 firm structure in Opioids and
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`the 23 firm structure in Apple Device Performance.
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`With these precedents in mind, we propose a leadership team consisting of four
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`Co-Lead Counsel, seven Executive Committee members, and five Steering Committee
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`members (collectively “Proposed Counsel”). The anticipated roles of these groups will
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`follow the normal parameters of Rule 23. To avoid duplication of effort and to control
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`costs, Co-Lead Counsel will direct and be in charge of all litigation decisions and will
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`assign tasks ranging from briefing to depositions, to document review, to the
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`development of expert testimony to members of the proposed Executive Committee and
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`Steering Committee. Only work assigned and approved by Co-Lead Counsel will be
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`eligible for a portion of class counsel fees, if Plaintiffs are successful. Finally, as is our
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`practice in all matters under Rule 23, Co-Lead Counsel will develop a billing and
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`3
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`timekeeping protocol that will be agreed to by all counsel. Contemporaneous time will
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`be collected and audited on a monthly basis by an auditor hired by Co-Lead Counsel.
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`Again, this is the most efficient and common procedure in cases of this magnitude.
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`The 16 lawyers comprising our proposed team are among the leading Plaintiffs’
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`lawyers in the United States. The lawyers who have agreed to work together here have
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`achieved overwhelming successes not only in the antitrust space, but in every type of
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`consumer protection case imaginable. Simply put, they have been architects of some of
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`the most impactful consumer lawsuits in history in the antitrust field, as well as other
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`consumer protection cases (e.g., emissions fraud, addictive consumer products, and
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`securities cases). One example that illustrates both the Majority Group’s achievements
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`and proven ability to work together is In re: Mercedes-Benz Emissions Litig., No. 16-
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`cv-881 (D.N.J.), where three members of the Majority Group (Steve Berman, James
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`Cecchi, and Christopher Seeger) served as co-lead counsel and secured one of the largest
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`class action settlements ($700 million) ever in this judicial District. The Special Master,
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`former District Court Judge, the Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh (Ret.), praised class counsel
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`for doing “an excellent job on behalf of their clients in this case,” noting that he had
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`“never worked with such professional, decent counsel.” Id., Dkt. No. 342 at 18-19. The
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`Majority Group’s other successes are many. See infra § III.B (attorney biographies). The
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`diversity of experience and resources this team brings to this case is unmatched. Our
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`4
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`proposed slate of lawyers is also diverse as to gender and ethnicity, and reflect the class
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`that we seek to represent.
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`The overwhelming support that the Majority Group has among the law firms that
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`filed claims in this MDL is the best indication of our ability to successfully and
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`professionally litigate this case. Put simply, the nationally recognized lawyers who
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`timely filed this antitrust case have voted by virtue of their overwhelming support for
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`the Majority Group’s leadership proposal. The Majority Group does not take that support
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`lightly and is honored that so many lawyers have expressed confidence in our collective
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`ability to lead this case.
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`One final note on inclusiveness and collegiality. The Court is aware that a group
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`of attorneys asserting claims only on behalf of Apple Watch purchasers have filed a
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`motion to serve as interim lead counsel on behalf of the Apple Watch class. The Majority
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`Group supports that motion. The Apple Watch claims raise sufficiently distinct issues
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`such that those claims deserve their own track and their own leadership team. We have
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`worked closely with the nationally recognized lawyers prosecuting those claims—
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`George Zelcs from Korein Tillery, David Frederick from Kellogg Hansen, and Steven
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`Molo from MoloLamken—to agree to coordinate our work to the fullest extent possible
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`while respecting the distinctions inherent in the Apple Watch case. The type of
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`leadership which enabled this cooperation is a hallmark of our team and a pivotal
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`5
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`characteristic needed to lead and control this massive MDL. It is one of the many
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`characteristics unique to our team.
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`II. BACKGROUND
`Private Plaintiffs, like the DOJ, assert that Apple unlawfully monopolizes the
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`high-performance smartphone market by locking consumers into its ecosystem. Rather
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`than compete exclusively on the merits to win business, Apple imposes a web of
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`restraints, making it unnecessarily difficult and expensive to switch from Apple iPhones
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`to any other brand of smartphone.
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`While Apple’s “lock-in” tactics vary, all involve suppressing innovative cross-
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`platform technologies that would facilitate device switching and enhance competition in
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`the high-performance smartphone market. The suppressed technologies include super
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`apps and cloud-streaming apps. These are forms of “middleware” that could, if available
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`to iPhone users, make it easier to switch from an iPhone to a competing device. Apple
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`has further locked in its users by eliminating any cross-platform functionality for a core
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`suite of iPhone apps and accessory products, including messaging apps, smartwatches,
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`and digital wallets.
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`Apple’s strategy has been massively successful (for Apple). Having effectively
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`locked-in its user base, Apple has neutralized competition from would-be rivals to secure
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`and maintain a durable monopoly in the high-performance smartphone market. With a
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`stranglehold over a market that generates hundreds of billions in revenues every year,
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`6
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`Apple’s smartphone business yields historic returns, with consumers suffering the
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`anticompetitive effects, including substantial overcharges, reduced output, and
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`diminished market alternatives. In a competitive market, absent Apple’s anticompetitive
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`conduct, smartphones would be both less expensive and more innovative.
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`Members of the Majority Group filed the first Private Plaintiff cases against Apple
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`alleging monopolization of smartphone markets. See Collins, et al. v. Apple Inc., No.
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`3:24-cv-01796 (N.D. Cal.) and Goldfus v. Apple Inc., No. 2:24-cv-04108 (D.N.J.). After
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`dozens of additional Private Plaintiff cases were filed, members of the Majority Group
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`requested that the JPML transfer and consolidate the Private Plaintiff actions in this
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`Court, where the DOJ’s smartphone monopolization case against Apple is currently
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`pending. The JPML granted the application, reasoning that centralization was
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`“particularly merited” in this case because it is “highly complex and will involve time-
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`consuming fact and expert discovery.” See In Re: Apple Inc. Smartphone Antitrust Litig.,
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`2024 WL 2884408, at *1 (J.P.M.L. June 7, 2024).
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`
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`Members of the Majority Group have been coordinating efficiently on case
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`management issues ever since, including with Apple, to submit proposed CMO-1, which
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`the Court entered July 25, 2024. Dkt. No. 7. Among other threshold procedural matters,
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`CMO-1 sets August 8, 2024 as the deadline for motions seeking appointment of Interim
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`Class Counsel.
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`7
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`In complex cases such as this one, it is well-established that the Court may appoint
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`counsel to coordinate the prosecution of the litigation. Rule 23 specifically provides that
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`a court “may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of a putative class before
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`determining whether to certify the action as a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3). The
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`Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(g)(2)(A) explain that the rule “authorizes [a]
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`court to designate interim counsel during the pre-certification period if necessary to
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`protect the interests of the putative class.” The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
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`(FOURTH) elaborates:
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`If . . . there are a number of overlapping, duplicative, or competing suits
`pending in other courts, and some or all of those suits may be consolidated,
`a number of lawyers may compete for class counsel appointment. In such
`cases, designation of interim counsel clarifies responsibility for protecting
`the interests of the class during precertification activities, such as making
`and responding to motions, conducting any necessary discovery, moving
`for class certification and negotiating settlement.
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`Id. § 21.11 (emphasis added).
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`“Although neither the federal rules nor the Advisory Committee Notes expressly
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`state, it is generally accepted that the considerations set out in Rule 23(g)(1)([A]), which
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`govern the appointment of class counsel once a class is certified, apply equally to the
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`designation of interim class counsel before certification.” In re Insulin Pricing Litig.,
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`2017 WL 4122437, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2017); Waudby v. Verizon Wireless Servs,
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`Inc., 248 F.R.D. 173, 175-76 (D.N.J. 2008).
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`8
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`These factors are: (i) [t]he work counsel has done in identifying or investigating
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`potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other
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`complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s
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`knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources counsel will commit to
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`representing the class. Insulin Pricing, 2017 WL 4122437, at * 1; Bernhard v. TD Bank,
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`N.A., 2009 WL 3233541, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A)).
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`The Court must decide if the candidate for class counsel is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1)
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`and (4), and if there is more than one candidate, appoint the one who is best able to
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`represent the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2).
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`In addition to those factors, “the Court may also consider any other matter
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`pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class
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`and may, if it deems it necessary, direct the proposed class counsel to provide
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`information on any subject pertinent to the appointment.” Garbaccio v. St. Joseph’s
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`Hosp. and Med. Ctr. and Subsidiaries, 2017 WL 1196458, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2017);
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`see also Third Circuit Task Force Report, Selection of Class Counsel, 208 F.R.D. 340,
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`419-20 (2002) (listing other relevant considerations to appointment of lead counsel).
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`Here, the Majority Group is the product of private ordering, which is a common means
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`of selecting class counsel, and which is encouraged in the organization of class counsel.
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`See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.272 (“The lawyers agree who
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`should be lead class counsel and the court approves the selection after a review to ensure
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`9
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`that the counsel selected is adequate to represent the class under Rule 23(g).”); §10.22
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`(“In some cases the attorneys coordinate their activities without the court’s assistance,
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`and such efforts should be encouraged.”). The Majority Group’s leadership application
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`reflects the considered consensus of all counsel for Plaintiffs in 28 related class actions.
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`The Majority Group respectfully submits that they are best able to represent the proposed
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`class under Rule 23.
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`Proposed Counsel Filed Detailed and Comprehensive Complaints
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`A)
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`Since the private class action lawsuits comprising this MDL were largely, if not
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`exclusively, based on the investigation and complaint filed by the DOJ, no contender for
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`leadership can legitimately claim to have independently identified or investigated
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`potential claims in this action.
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`That being said, however, the Majority Group includes counsel with extensive
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`antitrust litigation experience generally, and most importantly experience litigating
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`complex cases against Apple in particular. See generally infra at § III.B (collecting
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`cases). For example, Steve Berman and his firm (Hagens Berman) have secured more
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`than $800 million in settlements from antitrust and other litigation against Apple. Mr.
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`Berman has gained further Apple-specific expertise—including on the smartphone
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`market at issue in this litigation—through pending antitrust lawsuits challenging
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`restraints Apple imposes on the resale of iPhones, as well as restraints Apple imposes to
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`dominate markets ancillary to the smartphone, including digital wallets and cloud
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`10
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`storage. Kaplan Fox & Kilshemer LLP (“Kaplan Fox”) and Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy,
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`LLP (“CPM”) were appointed co-lead in a class action litigation against Apple which
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`alleged that Apple distributed software updates to iOS which slowed processor speeds
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`and concealed a battery or battery-integration defect in various iPhones (In re: Apple
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`Inc. Device Performance Litig., No. 18-md-02827-EJD (N.D. Cal.)). Lead counsel
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`secured $310 million for iPhone purchasers. See also In re MacBook Keyboard Litig.,
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`No. 18-2813 (N.D. Cal.) (following multistate certification, Girard Sharp secured a $50
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`million settlement for purchasers of MacBook laptops fitted with allegedly defective
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`ultrathin “butterfly” keyboards). Of equal importance, we have already demonstrated a
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`commitment to working together in a collegial, efficient, and professional manner to
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`further the interests of our clients. This voluntary coordination demonstrates that the
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`Majority Group is best equipped to lead this important MDL.
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`B)
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`Proposed Co-Lead Interim Counsel, Executive Committee Counsel
`and Steering Committee Counsel Are Highly Experienced In Class
`Action and Complex Litigation
`
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`The cases in which Proposed Counsel have served individually and collectively as
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`lead or co-lead counsel in similarly large and complex class actions are legion and
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`detailed in each proposed counsel’s resume. A sampling of those cases is described
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`below and supplemented by a firm resume attached to this submission.
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`
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`11
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`Proposed Co-Lead Interim Counsel:
`Steve W. Berman of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, LLP
`1.
`Steve Berman is the managing partner of Hagens Berman, one of the nation’s
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`preeminent plaintiffs’ rights class-action firms, with nearly three decades of experience
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`litigating complex antitrust class actions and MDLs, including through trial. Since its
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`founding, the firm’s total recoveries are valued at more than $320 billion for class
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`members and clients.
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`Mr. Berman has spearheaded antitrust litigation against the NCAA for college
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`athletes, pioneering the payment of athletes for their likenesses and recently for their
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`performance. This is but one example of Mr. Berman’s groundbreaking antitrust
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`litigation practice. Among other victories, Hagens Berman prevailed against the NCAA
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`in a 10-day bench trial challenging the NCAA’s cap on college athlete scholarships, with
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`Mr. Berman serving as lead trial counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the verdict
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`and injunction in a unanimous 9-0 decision, cementing monumental changes to college
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`sports. As a result of follow-on litigation, a proposed settlement has been reached that
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`will pay $2.79 billion in past damages (a 63% recovery for most of the class) and
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`forward-looking revenue sharing that is conservatively estimated to be worth over $22
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`billion over the next ten years. The case has revolutionized college sports.
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`Mr. Berman also served as lead counsel in a series of recent cases that have
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`brought about transformative change in the real estate industry, including Moehrl v.
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`National Association of Realtors. The cases have resulted in sweeping conduct changes
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`through settlements with the National Association of Realtors and large real estate
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`brokerages. It is estimated that these conduct changes will save Americans billions of
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`dollars a year through lowered real estate commissions.
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`Mr. Berman and his Hagens Berman colleagues are the undisputed leaders in Big
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`Tech antitrust litigation, having successfully challenged an array of anticompetitive
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`practices by Apple, Google, Amazon, and others. Victories include $616 million in
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`settlements in Apple E-books Antitrust Litig., earning class members twice their losses
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`suffered in a historic antitrust victory. Currently, Hagens Berman has an unprecedented
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`number of cases against Apple and other Big Tech firms, including: Floyd v.
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`Amazon.com and Apple Inc., No. 22-cv-1599 (W.D. Wash.) (challenging agreement to
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`restrict competition in sale of iPhones and iPads); Affinity Credit Union v. Apple Inc.,
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`No. 22-cv-4174 (N.D. Cal.) (challenging Apple’s monopolization of digital wallets
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`market); Gamboa v. Apple Inc., 24-cv-1270 (N.D. Cal.) (challenging Apple’s
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`monopolization of cloud-storage market); DeCoster v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 21-cv-
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`0693 (W.D. Wash.) and Frame-Wilson v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-cv-0424 (W.D.
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`Wash.) (challenging Amazon pricing restraint affecting billions in commerce); and In re
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`Amazon.com, Inc., eBook Antitrust Litig., No. 21-cv-0351 (S.D.N.Y.) (challenging
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`price-fixing of eBooks).
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`Through these cases, Mr. Berman has developed unparalleled expertise applying
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`antitrust laws to cutting-edge technology markets, including the smartphone market at
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`issue in this MDL. Mr. Berman and his Hagens Berman colleagues have spent years
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`analyzing the economic and antitrust issues that will arise in this case, including Apple’s
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`market power, its downstream effect on consumers and prices, and all of the defenses
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`Apple is likely to assert (or has already asserted in the DOJ’s parallel action).
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`Mr. Berman also reached a $100 million settlement with Apple and a $90 million
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`settlement with Google in cases on behalf of iOS and Android app developers. In both,
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`the firm’s settlements achieved monumental changes to respective app store policies.
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`Developers represented in both cases will pay a reduced 15% service fee (a 50%
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`decrease) for an extended period, while benefiting from a range of injunctive relief that
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`will enable them to better monetize their apps. Mr. Berman also secured a $95 million
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`settlement for consumers asserting that Apple systemically breaches its AppleCare
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`agreements.
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`Mr. Berman’s firm resume is attached as Ex. A, and additional information about
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`Mr. Berman and his firm is available at www.hbsslaw.com.
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`Dena Sharp of Girard Sharp LLP
`2.
`Founded in 1995, Girard Sharp LLP is a boutique law firm representing the
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`plaintiffs in class actions and other complex litigation. The firm has repeatedly been
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`appointed to leadership positions by federal and state courts in a variety of substantive
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`legal contexts.
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`Dena Sharp is a seasoned antitrust lawyer who takes class actions and other
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`complex cases from inception through trial. She has secured favorable results through
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`trial verdicts and settlements in courts across the country, including in complex antitrust
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`MDLs. These results and her reputation for collaborative leadership earned her
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`recognition by Best Lawyers in America as the 2023 “Lawyer of the Year” in San
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`Francisco for Plaintiffs’ Mass Tort / Class Action Litigation, and the prestigious
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`“California Lawyer Attorney of the Year” award from the Daily Journal in 2024.
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`As co-lead counsel, Ms. Sharp has led notoriously complex “pay-for-delay”
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`pharmaceutical antitrust cases, including In re Xyrem Antitrust Litig., No. 20-md-02966-
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`RS (N.D. Cal.), In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521 (N.D. Cal.), and In re
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`Restasis Antitrust Litig., No. 1:18-md-02819 (E.D.N.Y.). Ms. Sharp navigated Lidoderm
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`and Restasis to favorable resolutions ($104.75 million and $30 million, respectively),
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`and Xyrem is set for trial. Ms. Sharp is a member of the end-payer steering committee in
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`In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., No. 2:16-md-02724-CMR (E.D. Pa.),
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`where the plaintiffs allege price-fixing and market allocation throughout the generic
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`pharmaceuticals industry. Class certification in the Generics MDL is pending.
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`Also experienced in technology and monopolization MDLs, Ms. Sharp filed one
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`of the earliest class actions in the Google digital advertising antitrust litigation, In re
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`Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litig., No. 1:21-md-03010-PKC (S.D.N.Y.).
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`Plaintiffs there allege that Google has monopolized and abused its dominance in the
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`market for digital display advertising. Ms. Sharp was also responsible for developing on
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`behalf of the direct purchaser class in In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig., No. 3:17-md-
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`02801-JD (N.D. Cal.), the case against U.S. defendant KEMET, which ultimately agreed
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`to pay $62 million—over 12% of non-trebled damages. The case culminated in two
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`different trial proceedings with final settlements in the second trial pre-verdict, and total
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`settlements exceeding $604 million.
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`Ms. Sharp has also been reco