Case 2:24-cv-05915-SDW-LDW Document 10 Filed 07/03/24 Page 1 of 4 PageID: 32
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`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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`Civil Action No. 24-5915 (SDW) (LDW)
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`WHEREAS OPINION
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`July 3, 2024
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`RAJESH DHARIA,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`WIGENTON, District Judge.
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`THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon pro se Plaintiff Rajesh Dharia’s
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`(“Plaintiff”) Complaint (D.E. 1 (“Complaint”)) filed on May 7, 2024, and this Court having sua
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`sponte reviewed the Complaint for sufficiency pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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`(“Rule”) 12(h)(3); and
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`WHEREAS it is difficult to make sense of the instant Complaint, but it seems to allege
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`that the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and several American political
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`figures—including former President George W. Bush, former Vice President Dick Cheney, and
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`former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates—were involved in a bombing in Mumbai, India on July
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`11, 2006. (D.E. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff seeks relief in the following forms: the issuance of arrest warrants
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`for John Doe, Jenny Doe, and an unnamed federal prosecutor; a default judgment against the
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`United States; $1 septillion in damages; and an order for “America[’s s]urrender totally and
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`unconditionally to [him].” (Id. at 2); and
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`1
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`WHEREAS Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue this action, and even if he did, the
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`action raises a nonjusticiable political question; and
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`WHEREAS Article III of the Constitution vests federal courts with the power of judicial
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`review extending only to “Cases” and “Controverses.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This “case-or-
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`controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and
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`appellate,” and is enforced though “‘several justiciability doctrines,’ which ‘include standing,
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`ripeness, mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the prohibition on advisory opinions.’”
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`Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Because
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`these doctrines implicate a court’s authority to decide a case, they may be raised sua sponte. See
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`Kim v. Hanlon, 99 F.4th 140, 153 (3d Cir. 2024); Wayne Land & Min. Grp., LLC v. Del. River
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`Basin Comm’n, 959 F.3d 569, 573–74 (3d Cir. 2020); and
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`WHEREAS standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an “injury in fact, causation, and
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`redressability.” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
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`504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). The Supreme Court has “consistently held that a plaintiff raising
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`only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every
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`citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
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`directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case
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`or controversy.” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74). Here, Plaintiff challenges military action
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`that was allegedly taken by the United States, or its political actors, in India in 2006. Even
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`accepting Plaintiff’s recitation of the facts as true, as this Court must, the Complaint still fails to
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`sufficiently explain his Article III standing. In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar
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`Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In evaluating whether a complaint
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`adequately pleads the elements of standing, courts apply the standard of reviewing a complaint
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`Case 2:24-cv-05915-SDW-LDW Document 10 Filed 07/03/24 Page 3 of 4 PageID: 34
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`pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim: ‘Court[s] must accept as
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`true all material allegations set forth in the complaint, and must construe those facts in favor of the
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`nonmoving party.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Ballentine v. United States, 486 U.S. 806, 810
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`(3d Cir. 2007)); and
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`WHEREAS “[t]he political question doctrine is a judicially created theory that limits the
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`power of the federal courts to adjudicate certain types of claims.” In re Nazi Era Cases Against
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`German Defendants Litig., 196 F. App’x 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2006). “[P]rimarily a function of the
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`separation of powers,” id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)), the political question
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`doctrine “dictates that courts will not adjudicate political questions reserved for the executive or
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`legislative branches,” Rodriquez v. 32nd Legislature of V.I., 859 F.3d 199, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2017)
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`(collecting cases). The Supreme Court has identified six factors, any one of which may indicate
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`the presence of a nonjusticiable political question:
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`(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
`to a coordinate political department; (2) or a lack of judicially
`discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) or the
`impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
`a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; (4) or the impossibility of
`a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing
`lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; (5)
`or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
`decision already made; (6) or the potentiality of embarrassment
`from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
`question.
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`Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 465 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baker,
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`369 U.S. at 217); and
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`WHEREAS even if the facts in the Complaint are true, the foreign policy decisions
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`described therein are political—not judicial—and thus cannot be reviewed by this Court. See, e.g.,
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`El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The political
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`question doctrine bars our review of claims that, regardless of how they are styled, call into
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`question the prudence of political branches in matters of foreign policy or national security
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`constitutionally committed to their discretion.”); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 560 (9th
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`Cir. 2005) (“We are not a war crimes tribunal. To act as such would require us to intrude unduly
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`on certain policy choices and value judgments that are constitutionally committed to the political
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`branches.” (cleaned up)). As the Supreme Court explained in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v.
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`Waterman Steamship Corporation,
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`[s]uch decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the
`political department of the government, Executive and Legislative.
`They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
`They are and should be undertaken only by those directly
`responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
`They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither
`aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to
`belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial
`intrusion or inquiry.
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`333 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1948). That rationale applies with equal force here; therefore
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`The Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An appropriate
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`/s/ Susan D. Wigenton
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` SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
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`order follows.
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`Orig: Clerk
`cc:
`Parties
`Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.
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