Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 1 of 14 PageID: 3790
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`Not for Publication
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`FILED UNDER SEAL
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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`WAG ACQUISITION, LLC,
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`Civil Action No.: 14-2340 (ES) (MAH)
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`MULTI MEDIA, LLC. et a!..
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`Defendants.
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`WAG ACQUISITION, LLC.
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`Civil Action No.: 14-2345 (ES) (MAH)
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`DATA CONVERSIONS, INC., eta!.,
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`Defendants.
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`WAG ACQUISITION, LLC,
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`Civil Action No.: 14-2674 (ES) (MAH)
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`FLYING CROCODILE, INC., eta!.,
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`Defendants.
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`

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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 2 of 14 PageID: 3791
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`WAG ACQUISITION, LLC,
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`Civil Action No.: 14-2832 (ES) (MAH)
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`GATTYAN GROUP S.ã.r.l., et at,
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`Defendants.
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`VAG ACQUISITION, LLC,
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`Civil Action No.: 14-3456 (ES) (MAll)
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`FRIENDFINDER NETWORKS INC., et aL,
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`Defendants.
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`WAG ACQUISITION, LLC,
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`Civil Action No.: 14-4531 (ES) (MAH)
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`VUBEOLOGY, INC., er at,
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`Defendants.
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`WAG ACQUISITION, LLC,
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`Civil Action No.: 15-3581 (ES) (MAH)
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`\VEBPOWER, INC., ci’ aL,
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`Defendants.
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`OPINION ADOPTING
`REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
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`7
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 3 of 14 PageID: 3792
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`SALA5, DISTRICT JUDGE
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`Pending before the Court is a joint motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matterjudsdiction
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`pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`1 2(b)( I) or, in the alternative, to dismiss or transfer for improper venue
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`under the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. * 1400(b), filed by’ Defendants.’
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`(D.E. No. 162).2
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`Plaintiff WAG Acquisition, LLC (“Plaintiff’) opposes the motions.
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`(D.E. No. 165). Also before
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`the Court is Plaintiff’s cross-motion to dismiss Defendant Doeler Media, LLC as a Defendant
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`(D.E. No. 152), which Defendants Docler Media, LLC and Duodecad IT Services Luxembourg
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`S.a.r.l. oppose (D.E. No. l54).
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`On October 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer issued a Report and
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`Recommendation (D.E. No. 175 (“R&R”)) recommending that this Court: (i) deny the joint motion
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`to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction filed by all Defendants in the above-captioned
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`cases; (ii) deny Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss for improper venue: (iii) grant Defendants’
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`joint motion to transfer venue as to WAG r. Mit/ti Media, LLC (Civ. No. 14-2340): WAG v. Data
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`conversions, Inc. (Civ. No. 14-2345); WAG v. P/ring Crocodile, Inc. (Civ. No. 14-2674); WAG v.
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`FriendPinderNetu’orks, Inc. (Civ. No. 14-3456); IVAGv. Vubeologv, I,zc. (Civ. No. 14-453 1); and
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`WAG v. WebPower,
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`Inc.
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`(Civ. No. 15-3581);
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`(iv) grant Plaintiff’s cross-motion to dismiss
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`This litigation is proceeding against various Defendants across the above-captioned related actions.
`The following Defendants have signed on to the pending motion to dismiss: Multi Media. LLC:
`FriendFinder Networks Inc.; Streamrav Inc.: WMM, LLC: WMM holdings. LLC: WebPower: Accretive
`Technoloe Group.
`ICF Technology Group,
`Inc.;
`Inc.; Riser Apps, LLC: Duodecad IT Services
`Luxembourg Sari.; Docler Media LLC; and Vubeology. Inc.
`(See Civil Action No. 14-2340, D.E. No.
`163 at 49-51).
`
`1
`For ease of reference, all citations will be to docket entries in the lead case. WAG Acqiusitzo;i. LLC
`1’. Mu/ti Media, LLC. Civil Action No. 14-2340, unless othenvise noted.
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`All references to this motion and the documents pertaining thereto relate to 1MG Acquisition. LLC
`v. Gattvdn Group Lot I., Civil Action No. 14-2832.
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`3
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 4 of 14 PageID: 3793
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`Defendant Docler Media, LLC as a Defendant without prejudice; and (v) deny Defendants’ motion
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`to transfer venue as to Defendant Duodecad IT Services Luxembourg S.a.r.l. (Civ. No. 14-2832).
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`The parties were given notice that they had fourteen days from their receipt of the Report and
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`Recommendation to file and serve any objections pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.1 (c)(2).
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`(R&R
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`at 44). Defendants timely filed ajoint objection (D.E. No. 176 (“DeE Obj.”)), and Plaintiff timely
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`filed a response (D.E. No. 181 (“P1. Resp.”)).
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`Having carefully reviewed the Report and Recommendation de noio and the submissions
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`by the parties.
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`the Court hereby ADOPTS the well-reasoned and thorough Report and
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`Recommendation of Judge Hammer.
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`In addition to adopting the facts, the procedural history’, the
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`summary of the parties’ arguments. the discussion, and the conclusions of Judge Hammer,
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`the
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`Court addresses Defendants’ main objections to the Report and Recommendation and Plaintiffs
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`main responses.
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`I.
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`Legal Standard
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`When a magistrate judge addresses motions that are considered “dispositive,” such as to
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`grant or deny a motion to dismiss, a magistrate judge will submit a report and recommendation to
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`the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A): Fed. R. Civ. P. 72: L. Civ. R. 72.l(a)(2). The
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`district court may then “accept.
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`reject or modify.
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`in whole or
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`in part.
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`the findings or
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`recommendations made by the magistrate. The district judge may also receive further evidence or
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`recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. * 636(b)( I )(C); see also L.
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`Civ. R. 72.l(c)(2). Unlike an opinion and order issued by a magistrate judge, a report and
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`recommendation does not have the force of law unless and until the district court enters an order
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`accepting or rejecting it. United Steelu’orkers ojAm. v. N.J. Zinc Co., Izic., 828 F.2d 1001, 1005
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`(3d Cir. 1987).
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`4
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 5 of 14 PageID: 3794
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`The standard of review of a magistrate judge’s determination depends upon whether the
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`motion is dispositive or non-dispositive. For dispositive motions, the district court must make a
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`de novo determination of those portions of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to
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`which a litigant has filed an objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C): Fed. R. Civ. P.72(b); L. Civ. R.
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`72.l(c)(2); see also State Farm Inc/em.
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`v. Fornaro, 227 F. Supp. 2d 229, 231 (D.N.J.
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`2002); Zinberg i’. Washington Bancorp Inc., 138 F.R.D. 397,401 (D.N.J. 1990). The district court
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`“may consider the record developed before the Magistrate Judge” and make its “own determination
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`on the basis of that record.” L. Civ. R. 72.1 (c)(2).
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`II.
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`Discussion
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`Defendants object only to Judge Hammer’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
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`lack ofsubject-matterjurisdiction. (DeE Obj. at 7). Defendants primarily recycle arguments made
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`in support of their motion to dismiss—namely, that by virtue of a series of litigation funding
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`agreements which Plaintiff entered with Woodsford Litigation Funding (US) Limited (“WLF”),
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`Plaintiff surrendered substantial rights in the patents-in-suit to WLF such that Plaintiff lacks
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`constitutional and prudential standing to enforce those patents. (See generally DeL Obj.; D.E. No.
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`163 at 22—36).
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`Judge Hammer rejected these arguments, concluding generally that Plaintiff did
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`not transfer such significant rights to WLF, and that WLF’s rights were not so restrictive of
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`Plaintiff’s rights, as would deprive Plaintiff of standing.
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`(See generally R&R at 11—27). This
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`Court agrees with Judge Hammer.
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`As an initial matter, the Court echoes Judge Hammer’s contextualization of this dispute in
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`the relevant legal landscape:
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`This matter is distinguishable from much of the caselaw on which
`the parties rely. Most of those cases involved licensing agreements
`between the patent owner and a licensee, where some right
`to
`practice under the patents, or to assign or license the patents, was
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`5
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 6 of 14 PageID: 3795
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`transferred to the licensee. The agreements between (Plaintiffi
`and WLFI, by contrast,I are not licensing agreements, and WLF
`is not afforded any independent rights under the patents at all.
`Rather, the crux of the issue currently before the Court is what rights
`were transferred from [Plaintiff] to WLF as a result of the financing
`and operating agreements.
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`(hI. at
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`13 (emphasis added)). With that important qualification in mind, the Court addresses
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`Defendants’ objections in turn.
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`A.
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`WLF’s Litigation Rights
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`The Federal Circuit has emphasized that “[f]requently.. .
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`. the nature and scope of[a patent
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`plaintiffs] right to bring suit .
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`. is the most important consideration” in detennining whether the
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`plainti ffretains enough rights in the patent-in-suit for purposes of standing. ri/fred E. Main; FoniuL
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`for Scientific Research v. Cochicar Corp.. 604 F.3d 1354. 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Judge Hammer
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`found, and Defendants do not dispute. that under Plaintiffs agreements with WLF, Plaintiff retains
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`the sole legal right to initiate litigation over the patents-in-suit. (R&R at 12 & 14). Once Plaintiff
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`initiates a suit, it must allow WLF the option to fund the action.
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`(Sec Ed. at 14).
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`If WLF decides
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`not to hind the action, Plaintiff may proceed with the litigation on its own. (See iS.). Nevertheless,
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`Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks the sole ability to sue :S a practical mat/cr because Plaintiff
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`lacks the resources to pursue litigation on its own and is therefore “financially dependent on \VLF
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`to enforce the patents-in-suit.”
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`(DeE Obj. at 11—12). As Plaintiff points out. Defendants’
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`contention about Plaintiff’s financial circumstances is speculative and unsupported by evidence.
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`(See P1. Resp. at II). Defendants also fail to cite any authority for their position that a party’s
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`ability or inability to fund its suit has any bearing on the standing analysis. The Court therefore
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`rejects Defendants’ objection and adopts Judge Hammer’s reasoning on this point.
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`Second, Defendants contend that WLF’s right to involvemcnt
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`in settlement decisions
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`deprives Plaintiff of standing.
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`(Def Obj.
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`at
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`12—14).
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`Judge Hammer’s Report
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`and
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`6
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 7 of 14 PageID: 3796
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`Recommendation explains Plaintiff’s and WLF’s relative rights with respect
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`to settlement:
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`“[Plaintiff] can settle pending litigation with the consent ofWLF. However, if[Plaintiffj and WLF
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`cannot agree on the settlement terms, a third-party expert makes a final and binding decision.”
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`(R&R at 12). Defendants argue that WLF’s involvement in settlement decision-making requires
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`a finding that Plaintiff alone lacks standing and that WLF must be joined in these actions.
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`(Def.
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`Obj. at 13—14).
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`In Defendants’ view, the requirement of WLF’s consent would force Defendants
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`to negotiate a settlement with a non-party entity, which prejudices Defendants.
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`(Ic!.). Plaintiff
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`responds that “WLF has no power on its own to settle” and that the settlement approval process
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`“is a private matter of corporate governance,” analogous to the context of a corporate entity that
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`requires input from various stakeholders before finalizing a settlement.
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`(P1. Resp. at 13—14).
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`The Court agrees with Plaintiff that WLF’s limited role in settlement decision-making is
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`insufficient to deprive Plaintiff of standing. As Judge Hammer reasoned:
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`to settle litigation does not, by itself,
`That WLF must consent
`compel the conclusion that [Plaintiff] lacks substantial rights in the
`patents necessary to confer standing. First, as noted above, only
`[Plaintiff] can initiate suit. Moreover, WLF cannot, by itself force
`Instead,...if [Plaintiff] and WLF cannot agree on
`settlement.
`settlement tents, a third-party expert makes the final and binding
`settlement decision. This provision alone limits WLF’s rights in the
`patents.
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`(R&R at 1$).
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`Judge Hammer analogized the provision requiring third-party expert approval to
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`other cases involving consent requirements but providing that such consent may not be
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`unreasonably withheld, reasoning that
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`the expert-approval provision serves a similar limiting
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`purpose.
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`(Id.). When moderated in this way,
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`the Federal Circuit has found that consent
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`requirements “do[ ] not significantly restrict the scope or’ a party’s rights in a patent. Speedplay.
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`Inc.
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`i’. Bebop, Inc., fl 1 F.3d 1245, 125 1—52 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Intellectual Prop. Dei’eL,
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`Inc.
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`i’. 717 Cablevision f Cal, Inc., 24$ F.3d 1333, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 200!). Here, importantly,
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`7
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 8 of 14 PageID: 3797
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`WLF alone can neither settle the litigation nor force Plaintiff to settle.
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`(Sec R&R at 22). This
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`Court
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`therefore agrees with Judge Hammer’s finding that, while WLF’s role in settlement
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`decision—making does function as a restriction on Plaintiff’s substantial rights,
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`it
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`is “not so
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`restrictive as to compel the conclusion that [Plaintiff] transferred substantial rights in the patents
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`to WLF.” (Id.).
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`Third, Defendants assert that WLF’s ability to exercise its special voting rights with respect
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`to litigation also deprive Plaintiff’ of standing.
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`(Del’. Obj. at 14—16). As a member of Plaintiff,
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`WLF may use its special voting rights to continue or discontinue litigation if both WLF and
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`Plaintiffs counsel agree.
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`(See R&R at 6 & 12). Defendants argue that such rights “make
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`[Plaintiffs] ability to control
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`litigation illusory” and render WLF “the party that controls the
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`litigation once it is initiated.” (DeE Obj. at 15—16). However, as Judge Hammer found. WLF’s
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`voting rights arise only contingently and “do not confer exclusionary rights” on WLF.
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`(R&R at
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`19). For instance. WLF may discontinue the litigation if WLF ceases finding and Plaintiff cannot
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`find an alternative funding source. (D.E. No. 163-13 at 30—3 1).
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`In such a circumstance, as Plaintiff
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`argues, Plaintiff may continue to pursue the litigation at its own expcnse.
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`(P1. Resp. at 15). As
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`this Court has already determined. Plaintiffs ability or inability to self-fund the litigation does not
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`affect its standing to bring suit.
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`\VLF may also discontinue the litigation if Plaintiffs counsel
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`ceases its representation and WLF cannot secure replacement counsel.
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`(See D.E. No. 163-13 at
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`30—31). But without any counsel to prosecute the case, the discontinuance of the litigation would
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`be a product of circumstances—not the result of any meaningful exercise of WLF’s “right’ to
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`discontinue it. The Court therefore concurs with Judge Hammer’s characterization of WLF’s
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`voting rights as future “contingencies” that do not constitute a significant transfer of Plaintiff’s
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`rights, as well as Judge Hammer’s analogy of these “contingencies” to potential future interests,
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`8
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 9 of 14 PageID: 3798
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`which the Federal Circuit has held not to constitute “full exclusionary interests” for purposes of
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`standing at the time a lawsuit commences.
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`(Sec R&R at 19 (citing Morrow i’. Microsoft Coip.,
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`499 F.3d 1332, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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`Finally, Defendants contend that WLF’s first priority to damages is indicative of ownership
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`rights in the patents.
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`(DeE Obj. at 16—17).
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`Judge Hammer found that WLF’s first priority to
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`—
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`damages is consistent with WLF’s protection of its own investment in this litigation and does not
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`constitute an ownership right.
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`(R&R at 23). A right to a portion of the proceeds of litigation is
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`not necessarily a substantial right in the patent, particularly when the portion is not a substantial
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`share. See Propat Intern. Corp.
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`i’. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Here, the
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`share of damages to which WLF is entitled under the parties’ agreements has been redacted (see
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`D.E. No. 163-13 at 16), but WLF’s Chief Executive Officer testified at his deposition that WLF’s
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`share would be less than fifty percent (P1. Resp. at 16 (citing D.E. No. 163-12 at 24—25)). Based
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`on this record, the Court cannot conclude that WLF’s first priority to some share of the damages
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`constitutes a substantial right in the patents enough to deprive Plaintiff of standing. Accordingly,
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`the Court concurs with Judge Hammer’s finding and adopts the Report and Recommendation on
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`this issue.
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`B.
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`VLF’s Patent Rights
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`Plaintiff retains the right to assign, transfer, sell, or license the patents, but it requires
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`WLF’s consent, which may not be unreasonably withheld. (See R&R at 12). Defendants maintain
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`that this consent requirement constitutes a substantial limitation on Plaintiffs ownership rights.
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`(Def. Obj. at 18—19). Judge Hammer rejected this argument, reasoning that “where restrictions on
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`the rights to assign and license are .
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`.
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`. limited by a requirement that the transferor and transferee
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`consent to the assignment or license, and the required consent cannot be unreasonably withheld,
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`9
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 10 of 14 PageID: 3799
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`such a restriction is not significantly restrictive of the transferor’s rights in the patent.” (R&R at
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`15). Judge Hammer correctly relied on Spccdp/av. Inc. i’. Bcbop. Inc., in which the Federal Circuit
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`considered. in/cr a/ia, a provision in a license agreement limiting the licensee’s ability to assign
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`its
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`license without
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`the licensor’s consent, but prohibiting the licensor
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`from unreasonably
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`withholding consent. 211 F.3d at 1251. The Federal Circuit distinguished such a provision from
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`an “absolute right to veto any assignment’S and concluded that, given the reasonableness limitation,
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`“the consent requirement [did] not significantly restrict the scope of [the plaintiffs] rights in the
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`patent.” Id. at 1252. The same is true here. The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that
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`WLF’s rights are broader than the licensor’s rights in Spcedplav or that WLF may withhold consent
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`for an undefined “multitude of reasons” (see Def. Obj. at 19), because here, the reasonableness of
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`WLF’s withholding of consent must be measured “according to its consistency with [Plaintiffs]
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`Patent Assertion Strategy.” (R&R at 17 (citing D.E. No. 163-13 at 10)).
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`Second, Defendants argue that WLF’s right to convert the patents to its own name under
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`certain circumstances indicates that WLF has significant rights in the patents. (Def. Obj. at 20—
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`21). Plaintiff agreed to give WLF a security interest in the patents as collateral, and WLF may
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`convert the patents to its name if Plaintiff defaults.
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`(See R&R at 7 & 13 (citing D.E. No. 163-2!
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`at 8—9. 13—14)). As with WLF’s right to continue or discontinue the litigation. Judge Hammer
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`found WLF’s right
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`to convert
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`the patents to be a “contingenc[y]” that does “not confer
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`exclusionary rights” on WLF.
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`(Id. at 19).
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`Indeed. WLF may convert the patent only in an event
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`of default. (See D.E. No. 163-21 at 13—14; P1. Resp. at 19—20). WLF’s conversion right is distinct
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`from the right considered in Propat. 473 E.3d at 1191—92, where the patentee had the ability to
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`terminate the plaintiffs patent rights if the plaintiff failed to perform up to certain benchmarks,
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`because here. WLF may convert the patents only upon an event ofdefault. WLF’s right to convert,
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`10
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 11 of 14 PageID: 3800
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`as Judge Hammer reasoned, is thus better characterized as a security interest protecting WLF’s
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`investment than as an ownership right in the patent. (See R&R at 23). As a result, WLF’s right to
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`convert the patent in the event of default does not deprive Plaintiff of standing.
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`Third, Defendants raise the prudential concern that Plaintiff’s continued prosecution of this
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`litigation withoiLt joining WLF poses a threat of multiple lawsuits.
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`(DeE Obj. at 2 1—22). Judge
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`Hammer correctly noted that Plaintiffs and WLF’s relationship “does not give rise to this risk”
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`because Plaintiff “holds legal title to the patents, and the agreements confer no authority on WLF
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`to initiate litigation, much less unilaterally.” (R&R at 24).
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`Instead, Plaintiff has the sole right to
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`sue.
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`(See Id.). Nevertheless, Defendants raise the possibility that Plaintiff could default and WLF
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`could invoke its right to convert the patents to its own name, in which case there would be “no
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`guarantee that there [would] not be additional lawsuits.” (DeE Obj. at 21). But this right is a
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`hypothetical future occurrence contingent on Plaintiff’s default.
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`In the event Plaintiffdoes default
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`and WLF does convert
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`the patents, Plaintiffs “right
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`to sue for
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`infringement would be
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`extinguished,” (P1. Resp. at 20),
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`leaving no risk of multiple lawsuits against Defendants.
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`Accordingly, the Court concurs with Judge Hammer and adopts the conclusions of the Report and
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`Recommendation on this matter.
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`Fourth, Defendants argue that
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`the rights that Plaintiff transferred to WLF outweigh
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`Plaintiffs retained rights to practice under the patents.
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`(DeE Obj. at 22—23).
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`Judge Hammer
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`carefully weighed the parties’
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`rights and found that Plaintiff “retained all exclusionary and
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`substantial rights in the patents such that [Plaintiff] possesses constitutional standing to bring this
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`action.” (R&R at 23 (citing Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1340)). Most importantly, only Plaintiff can
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`initiate proceedings to enforce the patents. (Id.). Plaintiff also retains legal title to the patents, and
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`can “practice under the patents, expand and strengthen them, license them, and sue third parties
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`11
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 12 of 14 PageID: 3801
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`for infringement.” (Id. at 23—24). As discussed supra, WLF’s limited set of rights and contingent
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`ftiture interests—such as its priority to a share of damages and its right to provide consent (not
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`unreasonably withheld) to licensing determinations—do not outweigh the significant rights in the
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`patents that Plaintiff retained. The Court therefore rejects Defendants’ objection and agrees with
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`Judge Hammer’s balancing of the parties’ rights.
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`Finally, Defendants
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`raise a new argument
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`in their objections to the Report and
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`Recommendation that Plaintiff lacks the ability to assign its rights under its agreements with WLF,
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`which, in Defendants’ view, is a significant limitation on Plaintiffs ownership rights in the patents.
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`(Def. Obj. at 19—20). Because this argument was raised for the first time in Defendants’ objections
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`to the Report and Recommendation, and not in Defendants’ motion brief (see genera/h D.E. No.
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`163), the Court deems this argument to be waived. Sec Jimene: r. Banthart. 46 F. App’x 684. 685
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`(3d Cir. 2002).
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`Fundamentally, WLF contracted to fund this
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`litigation, and Plaintiff secured that
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`transaction by granting WLF a limited set of rights. The very purpose of the parties’ engagement
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`was to enable Plaintiff to sue to enforce the patents. As Judge Hammer correctly concluded,
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`“WLF’s interest is purely financial—in short. if the infringement litigation yields an award to
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`[Plaintiff]. WLF is remunerated.” (R&R at 26). The rights transferred to WLF “reflect an intention
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`to allow WLF to protect its investment” in the litigation. which “is fundamentally different than
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`an intention to confer on WLF substantial
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`rights in the patents themselves.”
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`(14. at 23).
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`Accordingly, and because Defendants raise no further objections to Judge Hammer’s standing
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`analysis, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has standing to bring these actions and that the Court
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`may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction.
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`12
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 13 of 14 PageID: 3802
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`III.
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`Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons, having reviewed Magistrate Judge Hammer’s Report and
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`Recommendation, Defendants’ objection thereto, and Plaintiff’s response,
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`this Court hereby
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`adopts Magistrate Judge Hammer’s Report and Recommendation in full. Accordingly, the Court:
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`(i) DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1);
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`(ii) DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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`1400(b), 1406;
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`(iii) GRANTS Defendants’ motion to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b),
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`1406; as follows:
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`(a) WAG i’. Multi Media, LLC, Civil Action No. 14-2340 is TRANSFERRED to
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`the United States District Court for the Central District of California;
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`(b) WAG i’. Data Conversions, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-2345 is TRANSFERRED
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`to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada;
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`(c) WAG v. Flying Crocodile, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-2674 is TRANSFERRED
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`to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington;
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`(d) WAG v. FricndfInder Networks
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`Inc., Civil Action No.
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`14-3456
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`is
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`TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California;
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`(e) WAG v. Vubeologv, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-453 I
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`is TRANSFERRED to the
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`United States District Court for the Western District of Texas; and
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`(0 WAG v. Webponer, Inc., Civil Action No. 15-3581 is TRANSFERRED to the
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`United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
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`13
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`Case 2:15-cv-03581-ES-MAH Document 136 Filed 08/13/19 Page 14 of 14 PageID: 3803
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`(iv) GRANTS Plaintiff’s cross-motion to dismiss Defendant Docler-U.S. under Fed. Ft
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`Civ. P. 41(a)(2) without prejudice and DENIES Defendants’ motion to transfer pursuant to 2$
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`U.S.C. § 1404(a) in IMGAcqiiisition LLC i Gunman Group Lap!., Civ. No. 14-2832.
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`An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
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`s/Esther Saias
`Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
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`14
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