CASE 0:19-cr-00185-SRN-KMM Document 130 Filed 02/10/20 Page 1 of 6
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
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`United States of America,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`William Charles Graham (2),
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`Case No. 19-cr-185(2) (SRN/KMM)
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`
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`ORDER
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`Defendant.
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`
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`Justin A. Wesley and Amber M. Brennan, Assistant United States Attorneys, United
`States Attorney’s Office, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis MN 55415
`(for the Government);
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`William Charles Graham, Reg. No. 22097-041, Sherburne County Jail, 13880 Business
`Center Drive Northwest, Elk River MN 55330 (pro se Defendant); and Andrew H.
`Mohring, Assistant Federal Defender, Office of the Federal Defender, 300 South Fourth
`Street, Suite 107, Minneapolis MN 55415 (standby counsel for pro se Defendant).
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`This matter is before the Court, United States Magistrate Judge Katherine M.
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`Menendez, on the parties’ non-dispositive pretrial motions. Based upon the record, motions
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`and memoranda, and the arguments in the parties’ respective filings, IT IS HEREBY
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`ORDERED as follows:
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`1.
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`The Government’s Motion for Discovery Pursuant to Federal Rules of
`Criminal Procedure 16(b), 12.1, 12.2, 12.3 and 26.2, (ECF No. 32), is
`GRANTED as follows: The Government seeks discovery pursuant to
`pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 16, and 26.2, including
`documents and tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests, expert
`testimony, notice of alibi defense, notice of insanity or mental illness
`defense, notice of public authority defense, and witnesses statements.
`Defendant has not specifically objected to the motion and the Government
`seeks discovery available to it under the Federal Rules of Criminal
`Procedure. Thus, the Government’s motion is granted; Defendant shall
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`CASE 0:19-cr-00185-SRN-KMM Document 130 Filed 02/10/20 Page 2 of 6
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`2.
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`3.
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`comply with his obligations under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
`by providing the requested discovery and information concerning defenses.
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`The Government’s Motion for Protective Order, (ECF No. 112), is
`GRANTED as follows: The Government moves, pursuant to Rule 16(d)(1),
`for a protective order to govern the distribution of police body camera
`footage involved in this case. Mr. Graham filed an objection to the motion
`on the grounds that he did not submit it and it was submitted by “an unknown
`source.” (ECF No. 120).
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`Under Rule 16, the Court may, at any time, “deny, restrict, or defer
`discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief” for good cause.
`Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1); United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, at 652 (8th Cir.
`2004).” The burden of showing ‘good cause’ is on the party seeking the
`order” and courts consider, inter alia, the safety of witnesses and others and
`particular danger of perjury or witness intimidation. United States v.
`Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A protective order should
`permit “disclosure in a manner sufficient to facilitate preparation of a
`competent defense.” United States v. Johnson, 191 F.Supp.3d 363, 373
`(M.D. Pa. 2016).
`
`The Government notes that the police body camera footage contains
`various sensitive information, including names and identities of crime
`victims, witnesses, defendants, law enforcement officers, and other members
`of the public. Having reviewed the police body camera footage in relation to
`Mr. Graham’s co-defendant’s suppression motions, (see ECF No. 92), the
`Court agrees. Mr. Graham has offered no substantive objection to the
`Government’s request and the Court finds that the Government has
`demonstrated good cause permitting entry of a protective order to govern the
`distribution of the police body camera footage in this matter. As such, the
`Court will enter the proposed protective order via separate order.
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`Defendant’s Notice for Notice of Demand to Produce, (ECF Nos. 119, 122),
`is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: Mr. Graham
`makes various demands in his motion. The Court addresses each in turn.
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`First, Mr. Graham demands the “file that pertains directly to any and
`all information from the Grand Jury . . .” as “exculpatory evidence.” (ECF
`No. 119, at 1; ECF No. 122, at 1). Mr. Graham appears to assert that the
`docket sheet does not reflect that any Grand jury proceeding occurred
`because there are no minutes on the record. (ECF No. 119, at 2; ECF No. 122,
`at 2). Mr. Graham also requests “the contract signed by [him]self” that “gave
`up [his] Constitutional Rights without being forced put under mass duress,
`or where [he] voluntarily wa[i]ved [his] Grand Jury hearing.” (ECF No. 119,
`at 2; ECF No. 122, at 2).
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`2
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`As evidenced by the indictment, a grand jury charged Mr. Graham
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`with two crimes. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 2-1 (signature page)). There are no
`minutes of the grand jury proceeding on the public docket because grand jury
`proceedings are secret and disclosure is restricted. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e).
`Moreover, a defendant “has no absolute right to appear before the grand jury
`that is investigating him or to have his counsel present.” United States v.
`Smith, 552 F.2d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1977). Thus, to the extent Mr. Graham
`asserts various grand jury errors entitle him to relief, his motion is denied.
`
`Mr. Graham asserts that some grand jury information may be
`exculpatory. Release of grand jury materials is governed by Rule 6(e)(3). For
`a defendant to obtain grand jury materials, they must show “a ground may
`exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the
`grand jury.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii). A defendant must demonstrate a
`particularized need for the information; that is, a demonstrative of specific
`evidence of prosecutorial overreaching. United States v. Finn¸919 F. Supp.
`1305, 1326 (D. Minn. 1995) (citations omitted). Except as discussed below,
`Mr. Graham has made no such showing. As such, his motion is denied.
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`To the extent grand jury materials contain exculpatory information,
`the Government is obligated to provide said materials under Brady v.
`Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),
`and their progeny. The Government indicates it is aware of its obligations
`under these authorities and has represented to the Court that it has and will
`continue to comply with said obligations; the Government notes it believes
`none of the grand jury materials are encompassed by Brady. (ECF No. 129,
`at 3). Therefore, within 10 days of the date of this Order the Government
`must disclose all Brady information in its possession or of which it has
`become aware as of the date of this Order and must promptly supplement its
`disclosure upon receipt of any additional Brady information not previously
`disclosed.
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`To the extent Mr. Graham generally requests grand jury transcripts, it
`is denied. “The Jencks Act requires that the prosecutor disclose any statement
`of a witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject
`testified to by the witness on direct examination.” United States v. Douglas,
`964 F.2d 738, 741 (8th Cir. 1992). It follows that statements contained within
`grand jury transcripts could constitute Jencks Act materials. United States v.
`Eisenberg, 469 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir. 1972). “Although the United States
`need not produce Jencks statements prior to a witness’ testimony on direct
`examination, the United States may agree to early discovery of Jencks
`material.” Douglas, 964 F.2d at 741 n.2. Therefore, the Court does not order
`production of Jencks materials at this time, but it expects the Government to
`provide Jencks Act materials as agreed so as to prevent delays in trial.
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`CASE 0:19-cr-00185-SRN-KMM Document 130 Filed 02/10/20 Page 4 of 6
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`its
`legislative act and
`Second, Mr. Graham requests “the
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`implementing regulations that precipitated this case.” (ECF No. 119, at 2;
`ECF No. 122, at 2). As the indictment describes, Mr. Graham is charged with
`one count of interference with commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
`§§ 1951(b)(1), 1951(b)(3), as well as 18 U.S.C § 2 (aiding and abetting).
`(ECF No. 1, at 1–2). Mr. Graham is also charged with one count of using,
`carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
`violation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), as well as 18 U.S.C § 2
`(aiding and abetting). (ECF No. 1, at 2). Finally, the indictment asserts
`convictions may result in forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C §§ 981(a)(1)(C),
`924(d)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). (ECF No. 1, at 2–
`3).
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`Third, Mr. Graham makes various requests related to his Sovereign
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`Citizen beliefs.1 He demands copies of the oaths of office of the undersigned
`United States Magistrate Judge, the United States Attorney for the District of
`Minnesota, and the two Assistant United States Attorneys prosecuting this
`case. (ECF No. 119, at 2; ECF No. 122, at 2). He demands the “address of
`the office where [he] may go to get a license for practicing law.” (ECF
`No. 119, at 2; ECF No. 122, at 2). Mr. Graham demands the contact
`information of the aforementioned judge and prosecutors. (ECF No. 119, at
`2; ECF No. 122, at 2). He likewise demands their “bond number and bonding
`company.” (ECF No. 119, at 2; ECF No. 122, at 2). Finally, Mr. Graham
`demands “an acknowledgement that [the aforementioned judge and
`prosecutors] understand [they] have perjured [their] Oath of Office and are
`committing Treason against the Constitution of the United States of America
`and the American Peace Flag.” (ECF No. 119, at 2; ECF No. 122, at 2).
`
`
`1 As explained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the “Sovereign Citizens” movement is
`based on a theory where they view the “USG [U.S. Government] as bankrupt and without tangible assets;
`therefore, the USG is believed to use citizens to back U.S. currency. Sovereign citizens believe the USG
`operates solely on a credit system using American citizens as collateral.” El v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs.,
`Inc., 710 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Cooper v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl.
`306, 313–314 (2012) (explaining that “an individual who identifies with the Sovereign Citizen Movement
`considers himself to be his own sovereign, not a United States citizen, and therefore ‘believe[s] that [he
`is] not subject to government authority.’ Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (2011). Members
`of this movement think that [t]he federal government . . . has tricked the populace into becoming U.S.
`citizens by entering into ‘contracts’ embodied in such documents as birth certificates and social security
`cards. With these contracts, an individual unwittingly creates a fictitious entity (i.e., the U.S. citizen) that
`represents, but is separate from, the real person. Through these contracts, individuals also unknowingly
`pledge themselves and their property, through their newly created fictitious entities, as security for the
`national debt in exchange for the benefits of citizenship.”); Sochia v. Federal–Republic’s Cent. Gov’t,
`2006 WL 3372509, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2006) (collecting cases and describing plaintiff’s
`“sovereign citizen” theories as “frivolous” and “rejected by every federal court that has considered
`them”).
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`Sovereign Citizen arguments have been repeatedly and soundly
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`rejected by all courts that consider them, and therefore, require no analysis.
`See, e.g., United States v. Jonassen, 759 F.3d 653, 657 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014)
`(providing that Sovereign Citizen arguments can take many titles, but at their
`core “assert that the federal government is illegitimate and insist that they are
`not subject to its jurisdiction. The defense has no conceivable validity in
`American law.” (quoting United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570
`(7th Cir. 1990))); United States v, Sileven, 985 F.2d 962, 970 (8th Cir. 1993)
`(finding similar arguments that defendant was not a federal citizen “plainly
`frivolous” and noting that further discussion was unnecessary); United States
`v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1031, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (sovereign citizen arguments
`“are completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected
`without expending any more of this Court’s resources on their discussion.”).
`Nonetheless, Mr. Graham already clearly has the contact information of the
`prosecutors and Court as evidenced by his numerous certificates of service.
`(E.g., ECF Nos. 124, 127-1). The other requests in Mr. Graham’s motion
`merit no further comment or analysis and are denied.
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`Fourth, Mr. Graham has submitted what he purports to be a
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`“Copyright Notice” as to his name. (ECF No. 122-1; ECF No. 99-1; see also
`ECF Nos. 123, 128). A person generally may not copyright or trademark
`their own name. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a). Regardless, the existence of a
`copyright or trademark “would not prevent a court from exercising
`jurisdiction over a civil or criminal matter.” Payne v. Kilda¸2016 WL
`491847, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2016), report and recommendation adopted
`by 2016 WL 465486, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2016); see also Osorio v.
`Connecticut, 2018 WL 1440178, at *6–*7 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2018)
`(rejecting Sovereign Citizen copyright claims on his name as frivolous);
`Miles v. United States , 2014 WL 5020574, at *3–*4 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 6, 2014)
`(same). As such, to the extent Mr. Graham requests relief under a purported
`assertion of copyright, it is denied.
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`Because this Court could rule on all pending motions without the need
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`for an evidentiary hearing, the pretrial motions hearing scheduled for
`February 19, 2020 at 1:00 p.m., (ECF No. 118, at 3–4), is CANCELLED.
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`4. Mr. Graham challenges his detention through several filings. (ECF No. 127;
`ECF No. 119, at 2; ECF No. 122, at 2). Mr. Graham also demands a
`detention/bail hearing on his arguments. (ECF No. 127). Mr. Graham asserts
`there is no “properly drawn Fourth Amendment warrant . . . [that states] that
`probable cause exists . . . .” (ECF No. 119, at 2; ECF No. 122, at 2). Mr.
`Graham asserts that because he is being detained without a warrant and “true
`bill returned by a Grand Jury,” he is being held in violation of his First,
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`CASE 0:19-cr-00185-SRN-KMM Document 130 Filed 02/10/20 Page 6 of 6
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`Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
`Amendment rights and Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
`Rights. (ECF No. 119, at 3–4; ECF No. 122, at 3–4; ECF No. 127, at 1–2).
`Conversely, while availing himself of the rights under the Constitution, Mr.
`Graham asserts he is not a “‘person’ as defined government statutes,” nor is
`he a “U.S. citizen, U.S. person, U.S. taxpayer, or resident.” (ECF No. 127, at
`1). Because he is merely a “living Man or Woman” the Court lacks
`jurisdiction over him. (ECF No. 127, at 2).
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`Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), a detention hearing may be reopened if
`the judge finds “information exists that was not known to the movant at the
`time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there
`are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such
`person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”
`Here, Mr. Graham has not pointed to any new information. Rather, Mr.
`Graham continues to assert his meritless Sovereign Citizen arguments. Mr.
`Graham puts forward no new facts or legal argument that would change the
`Court’s previous detention decision. As such, Mr. Graham’s request to alter
`his detention or have a detention hearing on these already-rejected arguments
`is DENIED and the detention hearing set for February 19, 2020 at 1:00 p.m.,
`(ECF No. 125), is CANCELLED.
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`5.
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`The Court notes that when Mr. Graham was represented by counsel, his
`counsel had filed several motions and the Court found those motions to be
`withdrawn in full. (ECF No. 118, at 1 (citing ECF Nos. 108, 110)). Mr.
`Graham has further confirmed that he does not accept any motions filed by
`his previous counsel. (ECF No. 124, at 3). Accordingly, any motions filed by
`Mr. Graham’s previous counsel remain withdrawn and will not be addressed.
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`6. Mr. Graham asserts that his previous counsel entered a “fraudulent plea” on
`behalf of “Private American private property without his consent.” (ECF
`No. 124, at 3). Mr. Graham requests that the plea be removed from the
`record. (ECF No. 124, at 3). Based on Mr. Graham’s actions and filings to
`date, this Court understands this to be yet another Sovereign Citizen
`argument rather than a genuine request to withdraw the “not guilty” plea
`entered on his behalf. Without an expression that Mr. Graham desires to
`plead guilty, the request to withdraw his not guilty plea is denied.
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`Dated: February 10, 2020
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`s/ Katherine M. Menendez
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`Katherine M. Menendez
`United States Magistrate Judge
`District of Minnesota
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`6
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